preparing him for those issues he would face when he reached maturity and
became Japan’s ultimate authority.
Japan’s Military Modernization
Within two de cades of the Meiji Restoration, Japan built a national
army, with unified direction and organ ization. Unlike China, which sent tal-
ented young men abroad but did not always make good use of them, Japan
put those people it had sent abroad to study fields such as public health,
science, and technology in key positions where they could incorporate the
new information in national institutions.
In 1870 a bright young student from the Satsuma domain, Oyama Iwao,
was sent to France. After training in the language, he began studying the
French military. He had arrived in France in time to observe the French
Army in the Franco- Prussian War ( July 1870– May 1871), and when he re-
turned to Japan he played a role in shaping the development of the Japa-
nese Army, rose in the ranks to become minister of war, and was able to
incorporate what he had learned abroad as he guided the nation’s military.
Oyama not only advanced military training in Japan but also accepted the
need for rules that placed limits on vio lence. He required that his military
officers take a course on the laws of war, he supported Japan’s decision to
join the 1864 Geneva Convention on the proper treatment of the wounded,
and he was later a founder of Japan’s Red Cross.
Some months after Oyama’s trip abroad, Katsura Taro, from the Choshu
domain, was dispatched to France for advanced military training. When he
arrived in England in 1871 on his way to France, he learned that France had
just lost the Franco- Prussian War. Instead of going on to France to study,
he went to the victor’s military schools in Germany, where he remained a
student and a military attaché until 1878. Shortly after he returned to Japan,
he submitted a blueprint for modernizing the Japa nese Army. Yamagata
Aritomo, supreme military adviser to Emperor Meiji, was favorably im-
pressed with Katsura’s plans and used them as the basis for his broad-
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Responding to Western Chal enges and Reopening Relations, 1839–1882
ranged plans to modernize the army. Katsura later served as war minister
for three terms, and as prime minister during the period of the Russo-
Japanese War.
Oyama, Katsura, and other military officers who led Japan’s military
modernization were from the samurai class and its culture of honor and
discipline, and the bureaucrats who led Meiji civilian modernization were
also overwhelmingly from the samurai class. Although the samurai in Japan
had not fought for more than 200 years and had become bureaucrats in their
respective domains, their spiritual training, discipline, and re spect for the
warrior who was prepared for sacrifice remained influential throughout the
Tokugawa era and penetrated the officer corps in Meiji Japan’s new army.
The high levels of literacy in Japan enabled enlisted men as well as officers
to read documents, and they were given strict disciplinary training by of-
ficers who promoted and maintained the samurai spirit.
Chinese and Japa nese Management of Foreign Relations
In the centuries before the arrival of Westerners in the nineteenth century,
neither China nor Japan had enough contacts with the outside to require a
specialized bureaucracy knowledgeable about foreign affairs. Management
of foreign affairs in East Asia largely consisted of overseeing the ritual as-
pects of the relations among countries and managing the activities of crews
that arrived in ports where trade took place.
Prince Gong and Empress Dowager Cixi realized that new issues not
easily handled within the traditional bureaucracy, such as dealing with for-
eigners, required new institutions. They therefore chose to build quasi-
governmental institutions outside the regular bureaucracy that would hire
their own officials, some of whom had passed the Chinese official exami-
nations and some of whom had not. This provided some flexibility for China
in adapting to the changing world, but it also resulted in a governmental
structure at the top that was led by Manchu Confucian literati, most of
whom lacked specialized training and were not eager to learn from those
they considered barbarians.
In 1861, the Zongli Yamen (Zongli Geguo Shiwu Yamen, or Office of
Affairs of All Nations) was created as a quasi- governmental institution to
handle the demands of increased contacts with foreign nations. Officials
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were assigned to interact with foreigners and also to build up the arms nec-
essary to resist pressures from foreign nations. It was designed to be a tem-
porary institution, until the crisis in dealing with foreigners ended. Zongli
Yamen officials were selected not according to their training in foreign af-
fairs but through the traditional examinations used to select government
officials. Although Li Hongzhang and others in the Zongli Yamen acquired
some practical knowledge in dealing with foreigners, the decisions of the
Zongli Yamen were subject to final approval by higher- level Manchu
officials.
The Imperial Maritime Customs Service was established in 1854, before
the Tongzhi Restoration. In 1863, after the restoration, it was placed under
the direction of a British citizen named Robert Hart, who successfully
guided the institution for several de cades. Hart, who had studied the Chi-
nese classics, had arrived in China in 1854 to work in the British consulate.
He proved to be remarkably successful in building an institution that worked
with the Chinese government as well as with the British and French, man-
aging the growth of contacts that stemmed from the increased trade
between China and other countries. The Imperial Maritime Customs Ser-
vice was staffed by both foreigners and Chinese citizens, and over the years
it established offices in all of China’s ports. It not only collected customs,
which grew to represent nearly half of the government’s bud get, but also
managed the harbors, trained diplomats, and undertook studies of foreign
affairs. In the absence of formal government institutions for international
relations, it also served as a go- between for China and the outside world.
In 1862 a school for interpreters opened in Beijing, and soon thereafter
foreign- language schools were opened in Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Fu-
zhou. Chinese leaders, who were much more confident than the Japa nese
about the ability of Confucian generalists to deal with outsiders (both Japa-
nese and Westerners), did not give impor tant positions to Chinese officials
who had studied Western legal systems. Perhaps the Chinese individual
most familiar with Western institutions and thinking at the time was Yan
Fu. Yan Fu and Ito Hirobumi had been classmates in England from 1877 to
1879, and some scholars report that Yan Fu, who never achieved his goal of
becoming a Chinese official, was a better student than Ito, who eventually
became the leading statesman in Meiji Japan. It was not until China lost
the war with Japan in 1895 that Yan Fu’s writings about the West were even
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Responding to Western Chal enges and Reopening Relations, 1839–1882
published in China. After 1895 neither Yan Fu nor anyone else with com-
parable knowledge was given a high position to negotiate with other coun-
tries. High- level Manchu officials in China did not spend a great deal of
time on foreign affairs, and the key person who managed foreign affairs was
Li Hongzhang.
Even in the 1870s the Chinese took little interest in Japan. The Zongli
Yamen was responsible for training interpreters, but it did not train inter-
preters in Japanese, nor did it hire any Japan specialists or publish mate-
rials on Japan. There were a few Chinese individuals who had visited Japan,
such as Luo Sen, who had served as an interpreter for Commodore Perry,
and there were some Chinese traders who, during short stays in Nagasaki
or Yokohama, had contacts with Japa nese merchants. These individuals
recorded superficial observations of what they had seen on the streets
during their brief sojourns, but they had little understanding of Japa nese
politics, the Japa nese economy, or Japa nese society. When additional Japa-
nese ports were opened under foreign pressure, Chinese merchants began
branching out from Nagasaki to trade in Yokohama, Hakodate, and
Kobe, but the Chinese government still showed little interest in gathering
information about Japan.
The lack of Chinese interest in training foreign- affairs specialists in gen-
eral, and Japan specialists in par tic u lar, was in striking contrast to Japa nese
efforts to learn about foreign affairs. In Japan, not only high- level po liti cal
officials and foreign- policy specialists but even Emperor Meiji took an in-
terest in learning about foreign affairs.
Japan hired many Western specialists in all aspects of governmental bu-
reaucracy to help train the Japa nese, including foreign- affairs specialists.
At their peak, in 1875, there were more than five hundred foreign advisers
in Japan, and their salaries accounted for approximately one- third of Japan’s
national bud get. When Chinese officials went to Japan in 1877 to set up their
legation, they were astonished to find that the Japa nese bureaucracy for for-
eign affairs, unlike that in China, had already completely adopted Eu ro-
pean procedures and protocols.
In Japan, when young Emperor Meiji ascended the throne he was still
being tutored, and decisions were made by se nior officials under his name.
Throughout his life, he continued his education through lectures on
Japa nese history, the Chinese Confucian classics, Chinese history, and
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the policies of Eu ro pean monarchs, as well as current issues. Count Iwakura,
observing the emperor’s intellectual growth, believed that when Emperor
Meiji reached maturity he had acquired sufficient knowledge and sound
judgment to make all decisions on his own. But Emperor Meiji chose to
let others make daily decisions until 1880 when he turned twenty- six
and announced that, after reviewing the evidence, Japan would no longer
borrow money from abroad. He then established himself as the final arbiter
when there were disagreements among high- level officials.
Emperor Meiji regularly received distinguished foreign guests as well as
the foreign ambassadors serving in Japan. Although he focused on the big
issues facing the country, throughout his reign, he attended high- level of-
ficial meetings and he was diligent in carry ing out his daily responsibilities.
Although the emperor retained authority to make the final decisions about
key appointments, including for prime minister and foreign minister, he
came to rely on officials, such as Ito Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo, to
manage both foreign and domestic policy. He favored diplomacy over the
use of military force and was cautious about antagonizing the major Western
powers. Nevertheless, he approved of decisions that expanded resources to
build up the Japa nese military.
Impor tant documents issued in Emperor Meiji’s name, such as the Con-
stitution and the Educational Rescript that underpinned the nation’s edu-
cational system, were drawn up by his staff but were approved by the em-
peror before they were issued. Once they were issued in his name, such
documents took on a sacred “above the clouds” aura that reduced the danger
that they would be subject to controversy. The Japa nese took pride in the
fact that their emperor was a direct descendant of the founding emperors of
Japan, a continuity that they believed placed him above the rulers in many
other countries. They considered Emperor Meiji to be superior in position to
the Korean emperor and equal in position to the Chinese emperor. The Japa-
nese were pleased when, in 1887, Emperor Guangxu of China sent a letter to
Emperor Meiji referring to himself as the Great Emperor of the Great Qing
Country and referring to Emperor Meiji as the Great Emperor of Great
Japan, formal y recognizing for the first time that the two leaders were equals.
As soon as the Meiji government was formed, it established a Foreign
Office, which in 1869 was renamed the Foreign Ministry and began re-
cruiting and training specialists on foreign relations. Major decisions
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Responding to Western Chal enges and Reopening Relations, 1839–1882
about foreign affairs, though approved by Emperor Meiji, were made by
five se nior officials, three of whom (Ito Hirobumi, Okubo Toshimichi, and
Kido Takeyoshi) had been deputy leaders of the Iwakura Mission. A
fourth official, Mori Arinori, Japan’s first ambassador to the United States
and first ambassador to China, had studied in London from 1865 to 1868,
and the fifth, Yamagata Aritomo, had participated in a study tour of Eu ro-
pean military systems from August 1869 to September 1870. These five
leaders bonded with other Meiji officials, such as Iwakura Tomomi, and
they had long discussions with former officials of the shogunate who had
dealt with Commodore Perry and other foreigners, to prepare themselves
for dealing with foreign officials. All five had been samurai, but they were
not from high- ranking samurai families, and they had been selected based
only on their individual ability. Ito Hirobumi had served in the Foreign
Office before he traveled on the Iwakura Mission and had considerable
experience in foreign affairs before he became prime minister in 1885. He
had returned from study in England aware that Japan was far weaker than
the Western countries and that it needed the cooperation of the Western
countries to learn from them. With his ability to work in En glish, he was
given major responsibility for negotiating with other countries. Ito was Li
Hongzhang’s partner in negotiating the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858 and in
negotiating the Treaty of Shimonoseki at the end of the Sino- Japanese
War in 1895.
Another influential official was Mutsu Munemitsu, the best- known pro-
fessional diplomat during the Meiji period, who had studied in Eu rope
/> in 1884. He played a key role in the strategic decisions in Japan’s confron-
tation with China in 1894–1895, and he spent many years trying to end
the unequal treaties with the Western powers. By 1899, when Mutsu
achieved his goal of ending the unequal treaties, he had already earned a
high reputation.
The Senzaimaru Visit, 1862
The first time Chinese and Japa nese officials met in more than two centu-
ries was when the Senzaimaru arrived in the port of Shanghai in 1862.
During the Qing and Tokugawa periods, some goods had been traded and
some books had been exchanged, but the Japa nese were not allowed to go
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china and japan
abroad and no Chinese official had visited Japan. The Chinese and Japa-
nese officials who met when the Senzaimaru arrived in Shanghai were
strangers and had no rules to follow. The visit of the Senzaimaru, introduced
to the Western world by the research of Joshua Fogel, opened the door be-
tween officials of the two countries, but only a crack.
However, in the following de cade the Chinese and Japa nese govern-
ments followed Western patterns and developed normal diplomatic rela-
tions with each other. Some Japa nese defense specialists, worried that Rus sia
and Western Eu ro pean powers might establish bases in Korea and the
nearby islands, began considering how Japan might use its new military
force to reach out beyond its borders to control territories in the vicinity
that its enemies might use to gain access to new resources and control mar-
kets. Individual Chinese leaders had similar ideas, but China did not de-
velop such an institutional structure as quickly as Japan.
In 1859 the magistrate of Hakodate, one of Japan’s two newly opened
ports, had written to the shogun advising him on steamboats, which in the
future would quite likely dominate travel to China. Since it would take some
years before Japan could build a steamboat, he suggested that Japan should
buy one in order to make profits from trade, train its own crews, learn
what Japa nese products might be sold in China, and become familiar with
Chinese trade regulations. The shogun accepted this advice, shopped
around, and then paid cash to purchase the Armistice, a 385- ton British ship
that traveled by both steam and sail. The Armistice, built in 1855, was con-
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