sidered one of the best of its class, with considerable capacity for freight,
and it had already made several successful voyages under the British flag
between Nagasaki and Shanghai. The Japa nese renamed the ship the Sen-
zaimaru (“the ship to last a thousand years”). Soon after it was purchased
and outfitted, it was sent on its mission to China. No Japa nese ship’s cap-
tain had experience guiding steamships, so Japan hired the previous owner
and pi lot of the Armistice, Henry Richardson, and his crew to operate the
ship on its maiden voyage to China under the Japa nese flag.
The members of this first Senzaimaru trip were very carefully selected
for their ability not only to learn about potential markets for Japa nese goods
but also to report on the po liti cal situation, begin negotiations toward es-
tablishing formal relations with China, observe how foreigners were treated,
and explore opportunities for future trade. Some fifty- one Japa nese partici-
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Responding to Western Chal enges and Reopening Relations, 1839–1882
pants were part of the mission, including high- level shogun officials to
carry out the negotiations, thirteen merchants, Chinese and Dutch inter-
preters, and some highly educated young staff members from vari ous feudal
domains. The 516- mile voyage from Nagasaki to Shanghai took seven days.
Since there were no official representatives of the Chinese government
living in Japan, the Japa nese had no direct way of contacting the Chinese
about their plans to visit Shanghai. When they arrived in Shanghai, they
relied on the Dutch, whom they knew through the trade in Nagasaki, to
make introductions to the Chinese officials.
During the del e ga tion’s two months in Shanghai, the highest Chinese
official in Shanghai, cir cuit attendant Wu Xu, met with the members sev-
eral times. Wu Xu, perplexed as to how to receive the del e ga tion, sent a
report to his superiors in Beijing, and when the reply came without clear
directions, Wu Xu de cided to act with caution. The Dutch had assured
him that the Japa nese were reliable traders, and Wu Xu de cided to be gra-
cious and to help in selling their goods.
From goods that Chinese ships had previously carried from Nagasaki
to Hong Kong and Shanghai, the Japa nese merchants already had some idea
of what Chinese markets might bear. For this trip, they had brought a va-
riety of goods to test Chinese demand, including some sea products, lac-
querware, and paper fans. Even with the help of the Dutch, sales in Shanghai
went slowly, and many of the goods did not sell at all.
Wu Xu expressed appreciation to the Japa nese officials for their will-
ingness to go through customs procedures, for cooperating with local offi-
cials, and for not creating difficulties. But he was not prepared to accept
responsibility for the foreigners’ activities. He advised them to leave
promptly and not to send another mission to China without first receiving
prior official approval. Although high- level Japa nese officials had already
de cided to promote trade and diplomacy with the Chinese, the Chinese
had yet to accept it.
Conversations with Wu Xu were conducted through an interpreter, but
the Japa nese did not have enough interpreters for all of their meetings with
the Chinese. Some used “brush conversations,” writing down comments in
Chinese characters and sharing them with their Chinese counter parts, to
ask questions about local conditions and to learn Chinese views on trade,
politics, and their relations with Western countries. Some of the Japa nese,
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china and japan
through their interpreters, were also able to converse with Western traders
in Shanghai, especially those from the Netherlands and Great Britain. They
kept diaries of their conversations and observations for distribution upon
return.
The Senzaimaru returned from China without making profitable sales,
without negotiating a treaty, and without a welcome to return. In a sense,
however, the Japa nese felt the trip had “paid their tuition” for learning about
the port of Shanghai, trade on the China coast, and the procedures for dealing
with China. Thus those on the ship judged the trip to have been a success.
When the Senzaimaru was in Shanghai, the city had not yet recovered
from the damage caused by the Taiping Rebellion. The Japa nese were ap-
palled by the chaotic situation they observed— the poverty, the filth, and
the lack of concern for hygiene. The Japa nese travelers were deeply disap-
pointed with the Chinese civilization they saw; it was a striking contrast to
what they had expected and to what their counter parts had reported a
millennium earlier after visiting Yangzhou and Chang’an. Japa nese news-
papers did not begin to flourish until several years after the visit, but after
the ship’s return, the observations of the Senzaimaru travelers were never-
theless passed on in reports, in books, and by word of mouth, and they
began to have an impact on Japa nese leaders’ views of China.
Though they were disappointed that China had so many prob lems, the
Japa nese on the trip identified with Chinese attitudes toward foreigners.
They were furious about the arrogant way in which Westerners treated the
Chinese— like slaves—in their own country. Takasugi Shinsaku, the Japa-
nese official on the trip whose reports had the greatest influence in Japan,
expressed kinship with the Chinese and disgust at the Westerners, whom
he referred to as “barbarians.”
Japa nese officials at home worried that the British and French who had
attacked China during the Opium Wars of 1856–1860 might also attack
Japan. Indeed, in 1863 the British attacked the Satsuma domain and in 1864
Western ships bombarded the Choshu domain. Japa nese strategists were be-
ginning to think about cooperating with China against the Western powers.
Although Chinese officials had advised officials on the Senzaimaru not
to send other ships without first receiving permission, two years later when
the Japa nese ship Kenjunmaru docked in Shanghai without special permis-
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Responding to Western Chal enges and Reopening Relations, 1839–1882
sion, the Chinese did not turn it away. The following year, when a ship
from the Choshu domain arrived in Shanghai, those Japa nese merchants
were allowed to engage in trade.
Treaty Negotiations, 1870–1873
In the early 1860s, even before Emperor Meiji came to power, the Japa nese
had been seeking to establish diplomatic relations with China. Japa nese of-
ficials regarded China as a huge country that could provide markets for
their merchants, but the main goal of Japa nese officials at the time was to
cooperate with China in the face of the Western challenges.
Following some discussions between officials of the two countries, a
Japa nese official, Date Munenari, was dispatched to Tianjin in October 1870
to meet with Li Hongzhang, who had just been given responsibility for the
Chinese side of the negotiations, to discuss the possibility of a treaty to es-
tablish formal diplomatic relations. Li Hongzhang believed in the value of
establishing relations with Japan and also in the importance of concluding
an agreement fairly quickly, for he could see that, after the Meiji Restora-
tion, Japan was strengthening its military more rapidly than China was, and
he expected that as Japan grew stronger, it would demand more concessions.
Li Hongzhang admired Japan for preventing Westerners from invading
their country and for limiting the activities of Western missionaries in their
country. The meeting was cordial, as both sides perceived a common interest
in working together to resist Western pressures.
On September 13, 1871, a year after negotiations began, Li Hongzhang
and Date Munenari met in Tianjin and signed the Friendship and Trade
Treaty, the first formal diplomatic document between China and Japan in
history. Li Hongzhang was able to negotiate an agreement that the two
countries would not launch aggression against each other, and that if either
nation were involved in a conflict with an outside power, the other would
come to its assistance. Although the treaty documents were signed, some
months later, before the treaty was ratified by the two countries, the Japa-
nese tried to eliminate the clause in which each side agreed to provide
assistance to the other and to add a most- favored- nation clause that would
give Japan the same rights that the Western powers were accorded by China.
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china and japan
Li Hongzhang, annoyed by the change in Japa nese demands, held firm, and
ratification of the documents was delayed. Fi nally, in May 1873, the Japa-
nese yielded, accepting the mutual- assistance clause and abandoning a most-
favored- nation clause that would give Japan rights in China equal to those
accorded to the Western powers. The leaders of both countries expressed
the view that China and Japan, with a “common culture and common race”
( tongwen, tongzu in Chinese; dobun, doshu in Japa nese) shared an interest
in working together to respond to threats from the Western countries.
Negotiations over Taiwan and Ryukyu, 1873
When the treaty was signed between China and Japan in 1873, the Iwakura
Mission had not yet returned to Japan, but Emperor Meiji assigned Japan’s
foreign minister, Soejima Taneomi, to visit China to gain its understanding
of Japan’s position on the issue of the Ryukyus and Taiwan, where Japan
was promoting a view that China was not prepared to accept. Not only was
Soejima considered the finest calligrapher in the Japa nese government, but
he was also deeply knowledgeable about the Chinese classics and skilled in
writing Chinese poems. Though his Chinese hosts tried to make it clear
that Japan was the supplicant in its relationship with the great Chinese em-
pire, Soejima used his deep knowledge of the Chinese classics to earn a
special position for Japan. When he arrived at the port of Tianjin in China,
he was received by Li Hongzhang. The Chinese did not approve of Japan’s
rush to replace traditional customs with those from the West; when Li, who
was dressed in traditional clothes, met Soejima, he began by criticizing
Soejima for wearing Western clothing.
From Tianjin, Soejima went on to Beijing where he was kept waiting
for several days before he was received by high- level Chinese officials. The
Chinese were clearly unhappy about Japan’s new request for a most- favored-
nation clause. Even though the two powers were equal, China was making
it clear that in requesting the treaty, Japan was the supplicant. Soejima, upset
at the condescension with which he was treated, quoted Confucian texts
saying that visiting envoys should be regarded as friends and treated with
sincerity and mutual re spect. He quoted the Duke of Zhou: “If you treat
[foreigners] as barbarians, they will be just that, but if you treat them as
true gentlemen, they will indeed become true gentlemen.”
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Responding to Western Chal enges and Reopening Relations, 1839–1882
Soejima was the first Japa nese person in modern times to have an audi-
ence with the Chinese emperor. When Prince Gong fi nally received him,
Soejima was told that since he was familiar with Chinese customs, of course
he would not object to following the custom of kowtowing (kneeling and
knocking one’s head on the floor several times) when meeting the emperor.
Western diplomats had already been complaining about being asked to
kowtow, and Soejima helped make their case by declaring that foreign em-
issaries should not be asked to kowtow. The Chinese yielded, agreeing that
foreigners would not be asked to kowtow; instead, they were only to bow
five times. The Chinese showed re spect for Soejima’s knowledge of Chinese
learning by receiving him ahead of the other foreign diplomats and allowing
him to bow only three times. When Soejima stopped in Tianjin on the way
home, Li Hongzhang, more cordial than during their earlier meeting, toasted
to the eternal friendship between China and Japan. Soejima was pleased
with the goodwill expressed by Li Hongzhang, and he returned to Japan
proud that he had been recognized for his superior knowledge of the Chi-
nese classics and treated with more dignity than other foreign representa-
tives. He also returned confident that China would not stop Japan from ex-
panding its trading activities in the Ryukyus and in China proper.
The Chinese Legation Opens in Tokyo, 1877
Soon after the Friendship and Trade Treaty was ratified in 1873, the Japa-
nese began preparing to send their legation staff to China. Within months,
Japan established a formal diplomatic office in Beijing, with Mori Arinori,
who had already served as ambassador to Washington, as ambassador to
China. Li Hongzhang advocated that Beijing establish a legation in
Japan, arguing that if China had had a legation in Japan it could have pre-
vented Japan’s attack on Taiwan in 1874. However, China’s legation staff of
seventeen government officials did not arrive in Tokyo until December 1877.
Although Li Hongzhang had by then grown suspicious of Japa nese inten-
tions, when Li Hongzhang and Mori Arinori met in November of 1876,
they shared their concerns over Rus sian advances. Li Hongzhang suggested
to Mori Arinori that the two countries should also cooperate on matters in
Korea. Li Hongzhang still wanted peaceful relations with Japan, and in
1877, when Japan was attempting to put down the Satsuma Rebellion, Li
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china and japan
Hongzhang even supplied the Japa nese government with 100,000 car-
tridges to use in its fight against the rebels.
According to directives they received, China’s legation staff members
were to report routine matters to the Zongli Yamen and to send memo-
rials directly to the throne for impor tant and urgent matters. The Tokyo
legation was headed by He Ruzhang (Ho Ju- chang), then age thirty- nine,
a Hakka from Guangdong who had been a scholar in the government-
sponsored Hanlin Acad emy. He was a friend of Li Hongzhang, who had
selected him. Also on the staff sent to Tokyo
was a twenty- nine- year- old,
Huang Zunxian (Huang Tsun- hsien), who would later write the most com-
prehensive and influential Chinese volume about Japan in the nineteenth
century. Like He Ruzhang, his family members were Hakka from Guang-
dong. Huang’s father had passed the second- level official examination ( juren)
and was a midlevel government official. Although Huang Zunxian had
failed the imperial examinations several times, he was considered very bright
and had the confidence to keep trying. He had spent time with his father,
observing the life of an official, and his father eventually bought him a po-
sition. Both He Ruzhang and Huang Zunxian were selected for the lega-
tion because they had taken special interest in foreign affairs, even though
they had no training in Japa nese affairs. Li Hongzhang required ministers
in each country to keep a daily journal detailing all impor tant affairs in that
country to provide an understanding of foreign developments.
In Japan, Huang Zunxian, whose career has been thoroughly studied
by Noriko Kamachi, sought to understand the essence of Japan as it really
was. He not only studied Japa nese history but also its po liti cal system,
economy, and foreign policy. The nature of the relationship between the
Chinese staff in their Tokyo legation and the Japa nese had less to do with
economic and military issues and more to do with their common culture
as men of learning. Huang did not speak Japa nese, but he became friends
with cultured Japa nese individuals through extensive “brush conversations.”
Throughout the Meiji period, all well- educated Japa nese, including those
who would later fight against China, were trained in classical Chinese.
Huang could write classical Japa nese, so it was easy for him to grasp the
meaning of Japa nese documents and essays, particularly since nearly all of
them were written in classical Chinese. He also kept lists of Japa nese words
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Responding to Western Chal enges and Reopening Relations, 1839–1882
to help facilitate communications. Huang believed that the Japa nese and
Chinese people shared a common culture, and he advocated that the two
countries should work together. He respected the high quality of essays and
poems written in Chinese by Japan’s best intellectuals, with whom he en-
joyed associating. He was delighted to find that copies of some ancient Chi-
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