Tanaka Giichi sought to avoid conflict, but he was under pressure to keep
his promise to protect Japa nese lives and property, so he sent General Fu-
kuda Hikosuke and 4,000 troops to Ji’nan. Chiang Kai- shek was camped
nearby, and on the eve ning of May 3 it looked as if the situation was under
control so that the Guomin dang troops would move on peacefully and Japa-
nese troops could exit the city. To this day, it is not clear why the efforts to
avoid conflict failed and ended in a deadly clash. An incident at the resi-
dence of a Japa nese citizen caused either the Japa nese or the Chinese to open
fire. The fighting escalated and got out of control. Fukuda’s troops, with
prior orders from General Staff Headquarters in Tokyo to protect the lives
of Japa nese residents, started an all- out assault against the Chinese troops,
with the result that 6,000 Chinese soldiers were killed or injured.
A maneuver that could have enhanced the trust between Chiang Kai-
shek and Tanaka had gone seriously wrong. Perhaps as the two sides went
into Ji’nan tensions were already so high and the level of trust so low that
a slight accident sparked the fierce fighting. Perhaps a soldier from the Japa-
nese side intentionally provoked an incident to slow down the Northern
Expedition. The Japa nese newspapers published reports of the incident
along with a photo graph of the body of a mutilated Japa nese civilian, placing
the blame squarely on the Chinese. The massacre provoked an emotional
reaction in both countries, and monuments commemorating the massacre
are still visited by Chinese tourists and schoolchildren. The documents re-
cording who at General Staff Headquarters gave the orders to General
Fukuda’s troops were burned, along with thousands of other files, after the
Japa nese surrender in 1945. What is known is that the general in charge of
operations at General Staff Headquarters was Araki Sadao, who would
soon become the charismatic leader of the army’s ultranationalist Imperial
Way faction.
While most of the daily newspaper reports in Japan were about Chi-
nese attacks on the Japa nese, Ishibashi Tanzan wrote articles about the dis-
proportionate number of Chinese deaths in the conflict, and pointed out
the absurdity of having sent 4,000 troops to protect 2,000 Japa nese resi-
. 226 .
Po liti cal Disorder and the Road to War, 1911–1937
dents; by his calculations, it would have been much cheaper to simply evac-
uate the Japa nese residents to get them out of harm’s way.
The Assassination of Zhang Zuolin
In the spring of 1928 it appeared to the Japa nese military officers in Beijing
that Chiang Kai- shek’s Northern Expedition, then poised to take over Bei-
jing, had the military power to defeat Zhang Zuolin, who had become the
top warlord in Beijing. Tanaka Giichi and the Japa nese diplomats believed
it would be better for Zhang Zuolin’s troops to return to Manchuria in an
orderly, face- saving retreat than to fight losing battles and make a disor-
derly retreat. The Japa nese military did not want Chiang Kai- shek’s troops
chasing Zhang north of the Great Wall, so the Japa nese successfully per-
suaded Zhang Zuolin that it was in his own interest to return to Manchuria,
and he boarded a train for Shenyang. Beginning with General Ugaki, the
top military leaders in Japan felt that Zhang Zuolin could best serve the
needs of Japan as a collaborator in managing Manchuria. Zhang had never
been a docile puppet of the Japa nese, but Ugaki felt that he was the best
choice for managing the vast expanse of Manchuria and keeping it out of
the hands of the Guomin dang.
Komoto Daisaku of the Kwantung Army had a diff er ent idea. He and
his troops wanted to create an accident in Manchuria that would lead to
chaos and serve as an excuse for the Japa nese to expand their control. The
train carry ing Zhang Zuolin left Beijing on June 3, 1928. Komoto and a
group of conspiring subordinates planted a bomb on a bridge over the rail-
road, and when it exploded it brought the bridge crashing down on Zhang’s
private train car as it was passing into Shenyang, killing Zhang. Although
they tried to make it appear that the explosion was caused by the Chinese,
within a few weeks it became obvious that Komoto and his group had com-
mitted the assassination. General Ugaki, for one, was furious and accused
Komoto of being a spoiled, traitorous child.
The truth about the explosion gradually made its way to the Japa nese
cabinet and the Imperial Palace. Army Minister Shirakawa, like General
Ugaki, was furious about traitorous insubordination, but he also strongly
felt that the truth should be concealed to protect the reputation of the army
and Japan’s position in dealing with China. Prime Minister Tanaka thought
. 227 .
china and japan
the perpetrators should be tried and punished. Prime Minister Tanaka and
War Minister Shirakawa held several separate meetings with Hirohito. Fi-
nally, Tanaka changed his mind and de cided to conceal the truth. In the
pro cess, however, he felt that he had lost the confidence of the twenty- seven-
year- old Hirohito and he therefore resigned. Tanaka died shortly there-
after, and there is some suspicion that he took his own life.
These two incidents— the slaughter at Ji’nan and the assassination of
Zhang Zuolin— became fatal turning points. Both acts exposed weaknesses
in the Japa nese Army’s chain of command. If the incidents had been avoided,
relations between China and Japan might have improved. Instead, they
cleared the path to war.
The Hamaguchi Cabinet, More Assassinations
After the resignation of Tanaka Giichi, the president of the rival Minseito
Party, veteran politician Hamaguchi Osachi, formed a cabinet in July 1929.
Shidehara returned as foreign minister and Ugaki returned as army min-
ister. Shidehara started once again to work with the British and the Guomin-
dang on a plan to give China tariff autonomy and to dismantle other ele-
ments of the unequal treaties. Ugaki tried to continue his proj ect to
modernize the army, which for him meant further downsizing the troops
and investing in modern artil ery, but the economic situation was even worse
than it had been before, and within several months the collapse of the
U.S. stock market plunged the entire world into an economic depression.
Shidehara, facing prob lems left over from the Tanaka cabinet, needed
an experienced China hand, and he named as minister to China one of
Japan’s best diplomats, his long- time protégé Saburi Sadao. Shortly after
taking up his post in China, Saburi returned to Japan to take a rest at the
Fujiya Hotel in Hakone, and on November 29 he was found dead in his
room, with a bullet wound to his head. The death was reported as a sui-
cide, but the mystery of Saburi’s death has never been solved. Like many in
Japan at the time, he carried a revolver, but the gun that shot him was not
his own.
This was a heavy blow to Shidehara and his China strategy. He imme-
diately appointed Shigemitsu Mamoru, anothe
r seasoned diplomat, to
take Saburi’s place. Shigemitsu moved to Shanghai and took up residence
. 228 .
Po liti cal Disorder and the Road to War, 1911–1937
in a house in the French section, next to that of his long- time friend T. V.
Soong, a Harvard gradu ate and the influential brother- in- law of Chiang
Kai- shek.
The finance minister was Inoue Junnosuke, a conservative economist
and the former president of the Central Bank of Japan. Hamaguchi’s Min-
seito Party had made a campaign promise to return the yen to the gold stan-
dard, and in preparation, Inoue had tried to deflate prices and lower wages.
Even government employees took salary cuts. Inoue returned the yen to the
gold standard in January 1930, which, because of the U.S. stock market crash,
was the worst pos si ble time. The value of the yen went up, forcing Japa nese
exporters to lower their prices. Many smaller companies went out of busi-
ness. Rural areas were particularly hard hit, partly because of a drop in the
demand for Japa nese silk. Desperate families began practicing infanticide
because they could not afford to feed another child, or selling their daughters
into prostitution. Two years later, in February 1932, a member of an ultra-
nationalist group, influenced by a deranged Nichiren Buddhist priest, mur-
dered Inoue. At the same time, another member of the group murdered the
president of Mitsui Corporation, Dan Takuma. In both cases, the crimi-
nals were arrested and sentenced to death, but their sentences were later
commuted. The influential Nichiren priest later served as an adviser to
Konoe Fumimaro when he became prime minister.
In April 1930 Japan took part in the London Naval Conference, an ex-
tension of the Washington Conference of 1921. The negotiating team was
headed by former prime minister Wakatsuki Reijiro (prime minister from
April to December 1931) and included a team of civilians. The main focus
of the conference was on heavy cruisers, and Japan was able to strike a
compromise that provided a ratio that the Imperial Navy could tolerate.
But the results of the negotiations on submarines were unfavorable to
Japan. In fact, perhaps owing to blunders by the Japa nese negotiating
team, the agreement forced Japan to give up building submarines all together,
which for a time caused Japan to lose its technical edge.
Of the many issues faced by the Hamaguchi administration, the out-
come of the London Naval Conference was the least popu lar with Japan’s
military. The navy protested that the negotiations infringed on the emper-
or’s right of supreme command. Some members of the Diet, including
longtime politicians such as Inukai Tsuyoshi, made the same claim.
. 229 .
china and japan
Hamaguchi was a capable politician with a long, distinguished career.
But with the collapse of the worldwide economy, he came into office at the
wrong time. Many Japa nese people, particularly those in the military, had
lost confidence in politicians because of scandals and incompetence. Sol-
diers had been trained to revere the emperor, but no one had been trained
to re spect the po liti cal pro cess or po liti cal leaders. The extreme reverence
for the emperor evolved into what came to be known as the Showa Resto-
ration, as Showa was the reign name for Emperor Hirohito.
The following year, in November 1930, Prime Minister Hamaguchi was
shot in the stomach at Tokyo Station by an ultranationalist terrorist, a
member of the right- wing Aikoku Society named Sagoya Tomeo, who had
spent time in China as a so- called China ronin (a samurai adventurer).
Hamaguchi survived the attack and strug gled to recover for nine months
until fi nally succumbing in August 1931; he was actually reelected from his
hospital bed in March 1931. Shidehara assumed many of Hamaguchi’s du-
ties until the cabinet resigned in April 1931. Like many of the assassins cap-
tured during this period, Sagoya was sentenced to death, but his sentence
was commuted to life, and he was released from prison in 1940. He would
continue to be a right- wing activist until his death in 1972, at the age of
sixty- four.
Assassinations, beginning with the murder in 1921 of Prime Minister
Hara, had become common in Japa nese politics. The system for addressing
them was also commonplace, with a public trial providing a platform from
which a sympathetic defense attorney extolled the “pure” ultranationalistic
ideals of the accused. The criminals were usually convicted, followed some-
time later by a commuted sentence and their release from prison. Even the
assassin of Prime Minister Hara was released; he went on to work as a bu-
reaucrat in Manchuria.
Insubordination in Manchuria
On September 18, 1931, a group of Japa nese soldiers, thinly disguised as Chi-
nese, planted explosive material near the tracks of the Mantetsu. The ex-
plosion caused minor damage, but the ensuing uproar gave the group of con-
spirators, led by Lieutenant Col o nel Ishiwara Kanji and Col o nel Itagaki
. 230 .
Po liti cal Disorder and the Road to War, 1911–1937
Seishiro, an excuse to commence an attack on Zhang Xueliang’s forces and
thus begin the Japa nese invasion of Manchuria.
In Tokyo the cabinet gathered at 10:00 a.m. on September 19 for the
first of many urgent meetings. Army Minister Minami Jiro stated that the
fighting by the Japa nese had begun in self- defense, but this was challenged
by Foreign Minister Shidehara. The Army’s General Staff office in Tokyo
issued an order to avoid expansion of the conflict. When Ishiwara and his
team received this order, they were temporarily dismayed. Over the next
few days, they staged further provocations that gave them cover to expand
their attacks. For example, a staged uprising in Jilin allowed the army to in-
vade and take over the province. On September 21, the minister of the
army requested permission at a cabinet meeting to deploy the Japa nese
Army divisions stationed in Korea, but his request was refused. Later, when
it was learned that the Korea divisions were already deployed, Prime Min-
ister Wakatsuki gave his permission post facto. Similar excuses were used
to occupy Harbin, which was in the far north and totally out of the range
of the Mantetsu or Japan’s span of control. Piece by piece, provocation by
provocation, the Kwantung Army expanded its reach across Manchuria.
Prime Minister Wakatsuki could not build a consensus in his cabinet
about the invasion, nor could he gain a consensus about how to keep from
losing control over the military. He began discussions with the opposition
party, the Seiyukai, to form a joint cabinet in an effort to overcome the
military with po liti cal force, but the invasion of Manchuria was so popu lar
with the public that nearly all the Diet members had already succumbed to
the momentum. Wakatsuki was forced to resign, and a new cabinet, under
veteran politician Inukai Tsuyoshi, was formed.
Inukai had been a member of the lower house since the first election in
1890. He was a popu lar politician a
nd good friend of China. He was one of
two Japa nese dignitaries invited to China for the entombment of Sun Yat-
sen at Purple Mountain in 1927. However, despite his pro- China stance,
Inukai was a strong advocate claiming Japan’s rights in Manchuria.
Inukai named Takahashi Korekiyo to replace Inoue Junnosuke as fi-
nance minister. Unlike Inoue, Takahashi Korekiyo used Keynes’s approach.
He allowed prices to increase, thereby giving relief to farmers, and he al-
lowed wages to rise, which increased domestic demand. He also devalued
. 231 .
china and japan
the yen, making Japa nese products more competitive overseas. Japan was
quickly on the way to recovering from the depression.
The second impor tant and surprising appointment was Araki Sadao as
army minister. Araki had been first in his class at both the military acad emy
and the war college, but he was a hard- core nationalist and he was viewed
as the leader of the army’s Imperial Way faction. Araki was popu lar among
young nationalistic officers, and one reason for his appointment was to pla-
cate the radical ele ments in the army.
The domestic reaction to the expansion of the Manchurian conflict
was strongly favorable. In December 1931, all po liti cal parties in the Diet
supported a bill to thank the military for protecting Japan’s rights in China.
Even though the Kwantung Army had been insubordinate, on January 8,
1932, Emperor Hirohito issued an imperial rescript that praised the Kwan-
tung Army for having fought courageously in “self- defense” against Chi-
nese “bandits” and for having “strengthened the authority of the emperor’s
army.”
The most vocal overseas critic of the events in Manchuria was Secre-
tary of State Stimson of the United States. After the invasion of Manchuria
on September 18, he restrained his staff from putting too much pressure
on Japan in the hope that his longtime colleague Shidehara could keep the
matter under control. He warned Shidehara not to let the army attack
Jinzhou, which was the headquarters of Zhang Xueliang’s army north of
the Great Wall. Japan’s ambassador to the United States, Debuchi Katsuji,
met with Stimson daily to provide updates, usually accompanied by assur-
ances that the matter would soon be under control. On October 4, when
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