the Japa nese started bombing Jinzhou, Stimson knew that Shidehara was
unable to control the situation, so he arranged to have President Hoover
write letters to both Japan and the Republic of China, stating that the United
States would not recognize any changes in Manchuria.
In contrast to Stimson, Undersecretary of State for Asian Affairs Wil-
liam R. Castle stated that although he was cautious about Japan’s move, the
Japa nese approach was not unlike that of Amer i ca in the Western Hemi-
sphere— for example, in its control over Nicaragua. He was convinced that
in the long run Amer i ca’s interests in the Far East would be best served by
a strong Japan as a guarantor of order.
. 232 .
Po liti cal Disorder and the Road to War, 1911–1937
Except for Stimson, most world leaders were not critical of Japan’s move
into Manchuria, and many were actually in favor of it. The British govern-
ment, headed by Labourite Ramsay MacDonald, saw more danger from a
chaotic China than from a rightist Japan. The British press also tended to
favor Japan. The Daily Telegraph stated in an editorial that “the right of a
government to protect its interests against barbarism and anarchy is a well-
recognized one.”
What is remarkable about Japan’s invasion is the total absence of re sis-
tance from Zhang Xueliang’s troops. Of his total army of 200,000 soldiers,
fewer than 50,000 were north of the Great Wall in Manchuria; the rest were
south of the wall, mainly in Hebei province, securing territory for Chiang
Kai- shek. Chiang Kai- shek’s forces, in turn, were preoccupied in Jiangxi
province in a prolonged battle with Communist troops. In 1931 Chiang had
failed three times in his efforts to rout the Communist forces from Jiangxi,
incurring nearly 100,000 casualties. If Zhang Xueliang were to deploy his
troops north of the Great Wall to fight the Japa nese, Chiang would have
had to take some of his troops away from the fight with the Communists
and send them to the north. An effective fight against the Japa nese would
require 300,000 to 400,000 soldiers, which would mean totally abandoning
the fight against the Communists in Jiangxi. The alternative was to wage a
token battle against the Japa nese with 50,000 to 100,000 troops, which
would have been a suicide mission. Using Chiang’s math, it was better not
to resist at all.
This logic, in vari ous forms, continued through 1936. Because his troops
were limited, Chiang Kai- shek figured he had to choose between fighting
the Communists or fighting the Japa nese. He chose the Communists, saying
that they were a “disease of the heart,” whereas the Japa nese were a “disease
of the skin.”
China and Japan Become Enemies
One of the few times that Chinese troops resisted Japa nese aggression was
during the Shanghai Incident of 1932. This rare case of re sis tance prob ably
occurred because Chiang Kai- shek was temporarily out of power and a rival
faction from Guangzhou, under the leadership of Sun Fo, the son of Sun
. 233 .
china and japan
Yat- sen, had come to Nanjing to form a co ali tion cabinet. For protection
against pos si ble reprisals from Chiang Kai- shek, Sun Fo ordered 30,000
soldiers from the Nineteenth Route Army to move to Shanghai from their
home base in Guangdong. Sun Fo also named his own ally, Wu Tiecheng,
to replace Zhang Qun as mayor of Shanghai. Wu had studied law at Meiji
University in Tokyo and was fluent in both Japa nese and En glish.
After the invasion of Manchuria, anti- Japanese sentiment in Shanghai
reached a new height. Major boycotts of Japa nese products were or ga nized.
The impact was particularly severe on Japa nese textile manufacturers and
Japa nese owners of small retail shops, many of which went out of business.
On January 18, according to a Japa nese news release at the time, a group of
five Japa nese Nichiren Buddhist priests and laymen were chanting sutras
and beating on ceremonial drums near a Chinese towel factory when they
were attacked by a group of sixty Chinese young men. The Buddhists were
seriously injured, and later one of them died. On January 19, thirty mem-
bers of the Japa nese Youth Corps, a quasi- military reserve group, mounted
a retaliatory attack and set fire to two Chinese towel factories and, in the
pro cess, killed a Chinese police officer.
Japan Consul General Murai Kuramatsu demanded that Mayor Wu ar-
rest the Chinese group responsible for the attack on the priests and clamp
down on all anti- Japanese activities. He gave Mayor Wu a deadline of mid-
night on January 28 to meet his demands. Mayor Wu Tiecheng, eager to
keep the incident from escalating, agreed to the demands, including a
commitment to close the offices of the Shanghai Anti- Japanese National
Salvation Association and to post guards to make sure that no one entered
the building.
The Imperial Navy, under the command of Rear Admiral Shiozawa
Koichi, was responsible for protecting the safety of Japa nese citizens in
Shanghai with a permanent force of several thousand marines billeted in
barracks in Hongkou, the Japa nese section of the city. Shiozawa sent for
reinforcements from Japan, and within ten days an armada of twenty- three
ships arrived in the port of Shanghai and another thirteen ships were
moored in waiting at the mouth of the Yangtze. This was an incredibly large
force to send in response to the death of a single Buddhist priest. One ex-
planation for the overreaction by the Japa nese Navy is that it desired to com-
pete with the popularity of the army after Manchuria. Araki Sadao, the
. 234 .
Po liti cal Disorder and the Road to War, 1911–1937
nationalistic army minister in the Inukai cabinet, boasted that the Japa nese
military could occupy Shanghai within four hours and occupy all of China
within three months.
It was not until twenty- five years later, at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials
in the 1950s, that Major General Tanaka Ryukichi, a defendant who turned
“state’s witness” at the trials, revealed that he had staged the attack on the
Buddhist priests that set off the Shanghai Incident to deflect attention from
Manchuria. Tanaka’s coconspirator, the famous Manchurian princess Ka-
washima Yoshiko (Eastern Jewel), had bribed the Chinese youths to at-
tack the priests. Tanaka, then a major, was serving as the army attaché in
Shanghai at the time. Earlier in January he had gone to Manchuria to work
out the plan for the Shanghai Incident with Itagaki Seishiro, Ishiwara
Kanji’s co- conspirator in the September 18 Manchurian Incident. As attaché,
Tanaka had command of the local reserve units and also of the youth corps,
which numbered in the thousands, and he armed both forces with rifles and
swords. Many of those local Japa nese soldiers and youths became eager vigi-
lantes, seeking revenge on the Chinese for their anti- Japanese activities.
The Japa nese may have missed the fact that Chiang Kai- shek had been
displaced at the time, and that in his absence Shanghai was protected by
the
Nineteenth Route Army, a seasoned, motivated force that had been
fighting Communist guerillas in Jiangxi. The Nineteenth Route Army was
under the command of two violently anti- Japanese generals, Jiang Guangnai
and the charismatic Cai Tingkai. On January 29, the two generals sent out
a notice to the Chinese community that they would not allow Japa nese citi-
zens to place “one foot on Chinese soil or trample one blade of Chinese
grass.” Jiang Baili, a brilliant military leader and analyst, was highly respected
by the two generals and served as their adviser (see Biographies of Key Fig-
ures). In 1931, before the invasion of Manchuria, Jiang had visited Tokyo
and met with Araki Sadao, among others, and he had a sense of the jingo-
istic mood in Japan.
Hongkou was adjacent to a densely populated Chinese section of
Shanghai called Zhabei, which was outside the boundary of the treaty port
and under the jurisdiction of Mayor Wu. Normally, Japa nese police or mil-
itary could not enter the Chinese part of the city, but on January 28 Ad-
miral Shiozawa de cided to send several thousand Japa nese soldiers into
Zhabei to check on the well- being of the Japa nese residents. The incursion
. 235 .
china and japan
into Zhabei began with armored vehicles driving down the narrow streets
shooting out the streetlamps. The Nineteenth Route Army held its fire until
the Japa nese soldiers were deep in the narrow streets of Zhabei, and then
it opened fire from all sides. The result was confusion and panic among the
Japa nese troops, who had not been trained for urban battles. Shiozawa re-
ported the response from the Nineteenth Route Army as an “unwarranted
attack” on Japa nese reconnaissance troops; he did not explain why a recon-
naissance group had entered a Chinese section of the city in armored
vehicles and had begun shooting out the streetlights.
Immediately, the Japa nese called for reinforcements from Japan. The
navy sent 17 additional ships, including a seaplane carrier and the Kaga,
Japan’s first aircraft carrier. Over the course of the next three weeks, the
Japa nese sent a total of 100 planes, 90 tanks, 160 heavy cannons, 5,000 pack-
horses, and 2 army divisions, and a total of 40,000 soldiers. The logistics
were complex, but because of the prolonged boycott of Japa nese products,
the military had access to idle merchant ships. During his 1931 trip, Jiang
Baili had noticed that the Japa nese had not made pro gress toward mecha-
nizing their army. In contrast to what he had observed in Eu rope, the Japa-
nese were still using horses and humans to transport outmoded field artil-
lery. The Japa nese troops’ lack of mobility was one reason Jiang thought a
strategy of re sis tance would serve China in the case of a full- scale invasion.
On the Chinese side, the battle helped forge a rare moment of unity.
Chiang Kai- shek returned to active duty in mid- February and committed
the Guomin dang’s Fifth Route Army to join the Nineteenth Route Army.
T. V. Soong returned as finance minister to raise money for the campaign.
Huge numbers of people in Shanghai volunteered, including members of
the Communist Party. In keeping with Jiang Baili’s strategy of retreating to
the “three yangs” (Luoyang, Xianyang, and Hengyang), the Guomin dang
moved its capital to Luoyang, far out of the reach of both Japan’s navy and
its army.
Because they were failing at infantry combat in the narrow streets of
Zhabei, the Japa nese took to dropping bombs from planes and to lobbing
shells into the city from cannons on the navy ships. This was the first aerial
bombing of a civilian population in Asia. The Japa nese claimed they aimed
only at military targets, but in the densely populated neighborhoods of
Zhabei, they destroyed thousands of houses, the North Shanghai Railway
. 236 .
Po liti cal Disorder and the Road to War, 1911–1937
Station, and the headquarters of the Commercial Press Com pany, owned
by the Soong family, as well as the adjacent library of rare books. Japa nese
bombs also hit a camp on the outskirts of Shanghai that housed refugees
from the 1931 flood of the Yangtze, even though a large Red Cross symbol
was displayed on the roof of the camp dormitory. This seems not to have
been an accident, because the bombing of the dormitory continued for four
days.
The losses on the Japa nese side were kept secret, but a New York Times
reporter, Hallett Abend, made it a practice to attend Japa nese funeral ser-
vices and count the urns of ashes and to tour hospitals and count the beds.
Abend estimated that in the first month of fighting, the Japa nese suffered
about 4,000 casualties and 700 deaths. There were many more losses on
the Chinese side, including civilians.
The Japa nese newspapers reported the battles as a glorious victory for
Japan. The large dailies published extras filled with photos every week, and
for the first time the Chinese adversaries were called “ enemy soldiers.” Here-
tofore, Chinese soldiers were referred to simply as Chinese, or southern or
northern warlord troops; now, Chinese soldiers became the “ enemy.”
After a disastrous first month, the emperor asked General Shirakawa
Yoshinori, the former army minister under Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi,
to take command in Shanghai. Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo was sent to
Shanghai to take charge of the naval forces. What had begun with the al-
leged murder of one Japa nese Buddhist priest thus became a major battle
commanded by Japan’s most se nior officers.
Ishibashi Tanzan and Finance Minister Takahashi both strongly criti-
cized the expense of the Shanghai battle. Takahashi, who had raised money
for the Russo- Japanese War in 1905 by selling bonds to an American finan-
cier, Jacob Schiff, head of the investment bank Kuhn and Loeb, pointed
out that Japan could not afford this battle and said he could not think of a
compelling explanation for the battle that would convince investors to loan
money to Japan or to buy its bonds.
The Japa nese eventually occupied Shanghai, but at enormous cost. The
battle gave the Chinese a badly needed sense of confidence. General Cai be-
came a national hero, and his photo appeared all over the country, even on
packages of cigarettes and containers of salt. Statues of Cai can still be found
in China today. The battle showed the Chinese that the Japa nese were
. 237 .
china and japan
willing to commit a disproportionate amount of firepower to what could
have been a minor scuffle.
With mediation by ambassadors from Britain, the United States, and
Italy, the two sides agreed on a ceasefire in late April 1932. The battle had
continued for three months, including during the week of February 6, when
the Chinese New Year was celebrated. The Japa nese ceremony to commem-
orate the ceasefire was scheduled for April 29, 1932, which was also Emperor
Hirohito’s birthday. The Japa nese built a temporary stage on an athletic field
in Hongkou. As the ceremony began, General Shirakawa, Ambassador Shi-
gemitsu, Admira
l Nomura, Consul General Murai, and Chairman Kawa-
bata Teiji of the Japan Residents’ Association climbed onto the stage. Just at
the moment when the band started playing the Japa nese national anthem,
Kimigayo, a Korean man ran to the stage and threw a bomb. The explosion
killed General Shirakawa and Chairman Kawabata. Shigemitsu was injured
and had to have his right leg amputated below the knee.
Because of the explosion, the signing of the official armistice agreement
was postponed to May 5. On behalf of Japan, the agreement was signed by
Shigemitsu Mamoru from his hospital bed, where surgeons were preparing
his leg for amputation. Shigemitsu, barely able to speak, told Samuel
Chang, the official who was carry ing the armistice document, “Tell your
people I dearly wish that we shall be at peace.” Samuel Chang was moved
by Shigemitsu’s statement and attempted to shake his hand, but since his
right hand was completely ban daged, Shigemitsu extended his left hand and
patted Chang with his ban daged right hand. Samuel Chang then took the
agreement to the bedside of Vice Foreign Minister Guo Taiqi, who had been
designated to sign on behalf of the Guomin dang government. Guo Taiqi
was also hospitalized, after having been beaten by a mob of angry students
who were protesting the ceasefire. To prevent further attacks by angry stu-
dents, Guo’s hospital room was guarded by five police officers. In Tokyo,
General Araki issued a statement saying he hoped that with this agreement
the Chinese would abandon their “provocative policies.” Prime Minister In-
ukai’s statement was more conciliatory: “The armistice benefits both par-
ties, though restoration of complete harmony is impossible unless the sus-
picions that have poisoned the relations of China and Japan have been
cleared away.” He added: “History has shown that the Chinese can unite
. 238 .
Po liti cal Disorder and the Road to War, 1911–1937
when they are determined.” This was May 5, 1932. Prime Minister Inukai
was assassinated by a group of young navy officers ten days later.
The bomb thrown by the Korean on April 29 had been made in labora-
tories at Fudan University. Thereafter, compact bombs became a common
weapon for terrorists in places like Shanghai. As a result, in the Japa nese
section of Shanghai, before the start of gatherings such as meetings or
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