China and Japan

by Ezra F. Vogel

  tural Revolution, 1966–1971, relations would once again deteriorate.

  The Zhou- Hatoyama Effort to Improve Relations, 1953–1956

  In 1953 when China was inaugurating its First Five- Year Plan for the

  economy, its leaders sought to detach Japan from the control of “U.S. im-

  perialism” and gain access to Japa nese technology. To influence the po liti cal

  pro cess in Japan, China established links with Japa nese citizens’ groups, es-

  pecially left- wing organ izations and youth groups, and encouraged “Japa-

  nese friends” to criticize in the Japa nese media U.S. domination and the

  U.S.- Japan Security Treaty.

  Most Japa nese, including conservative leaders like Prime Minister Yo-

  shida Shigeru, were convinced that, as during the prewar period, Japan still

  needed imported food from China and that Japan had to sell manufactured

  goods to China to earn money to pay for its imports. As early as 1949 Japa-

  nese businesses seeking to trade with China had begun forming business

  associations to promote trade, and China was ready to work with them.

  The United States restrained Yoshida from carry ing on extensive trade

  with China. In 1952, in return for agreeing to end the Allied Occupation

  and allow Japan to govern itself, John Foster Dulles required Yoshida to

  . 312 .

  The Col apse of the Japa nese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1972

  agree that once Japan could make its own decisions, it would establish rela-

  tions with Taiwan. Yoshida was also required to write what has become

  known as the “Yoshida Letter,” declaring that Japan had no intention of

  signing a bilateral agreement with Communist China. On April 28, 1952,

  the day the peace treaty ending the Occupation went into effect, Japan and

  the United States signed a security pact that continues to this day. Yoshida

  agreed to continue the embargo on goods to China that had been put in

  place during the Korean War. However, in the Yoshida Letter he was able

  to get the United States to accept a statement that read: “The Japa nese gov-

  ernment desires ultimately to have a full mea sure of po liti cal peace and com-

  mercial intercourse with China.”9 In his treaty with Taiwan, Yoshida received

  permission from the Occupation authorities to avoid saying Chiang Kai-

  shek had power over the mainland. He said the treaty applied to “all the ter-

  ritory under the control of Taiwan.” In his memoirs, published in 1957, Yo-

  shida wrote that the United States did not understand China as well as

  Great Britain did, for Great Britain had normalized relations with China in

  1950. He added that U.S. policies in China had been a failure.10 Yoshida died

  in 1967, four years before Henry Kissinger’s visit to China opened up a new

  era that would allow Yoshida’s successors to do what he had been blocked

  from doing by the United States— expand economic relations with China.

  In 1953, after the Korean armistice was signed, China had achieved suf-

  ficient stability to inaugurate its First Five- year Plan. Mobilization for the

  Korean War had ended, inflation sparked by war time shortages was under

  control, the massive relocation of people after the Chinese Civil War was

  ending, local order had been restored through the campaign against coun-

  terrevolutionaries and the land- reform campaign, and newly chosen leaders

  were in place in the provinces. Chinese leaders began taking steps to im-

  prove relations with other countries, to provide a peaceful external climate

  for the advancement of trade and technology that would support economic

  growth. They knew that Japa nese companies had both the capacity and the

  desire to carry on trade with China. Although Mao Zedong was the ulti-

  mate leader and made the final decisions, implementation of the policy to

  improve relations with other countries was generally in the hands of Pre-

  mier Zhou Enlai. Having lived in Japan for a year and a half during his youth

  and having met many of Japan’s leaders over the years, Zhou was comfort-

  able dealing with the Japa nese.

  . 313 .

  china and japan

  There were still an estimated 20,000 Japa nese citizens remaining in

  China in 1953. However, there were almost no travelers between the two

  countries. From 1949 to 1953, only slightly more than 200 visas were issued

  to Japa nese individuals to visit China, and there were no Chinese visitors

  to Japan.11 Diplomats from China and Japan could meet in a third country,

  but they did not negotiate any significant agreements. The dominant con-

  servative policies in Japan had been so subordinated to U.S. policy during

  the Occupation that Zhou Enlai had few opportunities to improve relations

  with Japan.

  In September 1953, Premier Zhou told Oyama Ikuo, a visiting Japa nese

  Diet member, that China was willing to restore normal relations with Japan

  and expand trade. Oyama, an upper house member who had been elected

  in 1950, supported international peace movements. He had taken part in

  leftist activities in the 1920s and early 1930s as a faculty member at Waseda

  University. By 1933 his opposition to Japa nese imperialism had gotten him

  in trou ble with the Japa nese government, and he went to the United States,

  where he had studied earlier. He remained in the United States throughout

  World War II, working as a librarian and researcher at Northwestern Uni-

  versity. He returned to Japan in 1947. When Zhou Enlai broke the news to

  Oyama that China was willing to restore relations, there were still many

  issues to settle. One month later, in a follow-up visit by Japa nese Diet mem-

  bers to Beijing in October 1953, Guo Moruo told the visitors that China

  was ready to sign a nonaggression pact, but no agreements were reached at

  that time.

  At the Geneva Conference on Indochina (April 26– July 20, 1954), Zhou

  Enlai laid out five princi ples of coexistence that spelled out China’s desire

  to have good relations with other countries. While at the conference, Zhou

  had side meetings with the Japa nese, as part of an effort to loosen ties be-

  tween Japan and the United States, expand trade relations with Japan,

  weaken ties between Taiwan and the United States, and reduce the chance

  that Japan would once again become a military power. Japa nese officials were

  concerned about U.S. reactions, because the United States still hoped to

  limit Japan’s contacts with China. The Japa nese government responded cau-

  tiously but began to explore ways to expand Sino- Japanese relations.

  In 1952, as the Occupation was coming to an end, vari ous Japa nese po-

  liti cal groups began jockeying to win po liti cal power. By late 1955, after many

  . 314 .

  The Col apse of the Japa nese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1972

  negotiations as diff er ent groups tried to aggregate their interests, relatively

  stable alliances among vari ous po liti cal groups had been forged. Early that

  year several small progressive po liti cal groups united to form the Socialist

  Party of Japan, and then, to prevent the Socialists from taking power, con-

  servative groups united to form the Liberal Demo cratic Party. The leading

  business federatio
n, Keidanren, acquired a strong leader, Ishizaka Taizo,

  who could represent the business community in support of the Liberal

  Demo cratic Party. Businesses in vari ous sectors strengthened their sectoral

  associations, enabling the business community to work with the bureau-

  cracy and the politicians. Also in 1955, the government’s Economic Plan-

  ning Agency (Keizai kikakucho) was formed to guide Japan’s long- term

  planning. These developments provided a stable po liti cal and economic

  structure for Japan, known as the 1955 system, that enabled politicians, bu-

  reaucrats, and business leaders to work together to achieve rapid economic

  growth. The system also provided a relatively well-coordinated base for con-

  ducting relations with China and other countries.

  The mainland economy was still very small in 1955, but most Japa nese,

  while unable to imagine how much China would grow in the next several

  de cades, nonetheless expected that trade with the mainland would increase.

  In December 1954, Hatoyama Ichiro, a second- generation po liti cal leader

  who had spent most of World War II on his country estate because of dis-

  agreements with the military leaders, replaced Yoshida as prime minister.

  His minister of trade and industry, Ishibashi Tanzan, had just written ar-

  ticles in The Oriental Economist criticizing the United States for blocking

  closer economic relations between Japan and China. Hatoyama and Ishi-

  bashi took a bold approach toward improving relations with China just at

  the time when Zhou Enlai was ready to reach out to Japan.

  Zhou Enlai followed up the Geneva Conference with the Bandung Con-

  ference in Indonesia (April 18–24, 1955) to promote peaceful coexistence.

  Despite the objections of the United States, Prime Minister Hatoyama sent

  a Japa nese del e ga tion, led by Takasaki Tatsunosuke, to the Bandung Con-

  ference. Both Zhou Enlai and Takasaki hoped to use the meeting to find a

  way to break through the impasse in Sino- Japanese relations. An interme-

  diary had arranged for the two to exchange greetings several minutes be-

  fore the meeting opened, whereupon they arranged to hold a secret meeting.

  Zhou assigned Liao Chengzhi to pick up Takasaki and take him to the

  . 315 .

  china and japan

  secret meeting with Zhou Enlai and Vice Premier Chen Yi (not the same

  person as General Chen Yi, who served as chief executive and garrison com-

  mander of Taiwan). Liao and Takasaki had met in 1949 when Takasaki

  had been approached by Liao in an effort to arrange for Japan to supply

  spare parts and other industrial machinery so China could continue oper-

  ating the Japanese- built factories in Manchuria. Although Zhou Enlai and

  Takasaki were not able to achieve a breakthrough in 1955, their meeting

  helped keep open the channels that seven years later resulted in the Liao-

  Takasaki trade agreement.12

  Although Prime Minister Hatoyama wanted to improve relations with

  China, he put a greater priority on improving relations with the Soviet

  Union. He was also cautious about alienating Taiwan, which as a member

  of the UN Security Council could block Japan from entering the UN. Japan

  fi nally succeeded in doing in December 1956. In his effort to expand trade

  with China, Hatoyama faced considerable opposition in the Diet as well

  as from the United States. In the end, he and Zhou Enlai were able to make

  modest pro gress in improving relations between their countries. Ishibashi

  Tanzan, who succeeded Hatoyama as prime minister in December 1956,

  continued to work toward better relations with China, but two months after

  taking office Ishibashi developed a severe case of pneumonia and resigned

  from office.

  The fortunate timing of Zhou’s initiative and Japa nese receptivity under

  Hatoyama and Ishibashi brought some pro gress, though on a much smaller

  scale than after normalization in 1972. In 1955 seventy- eight Diet members

  visited China, more than in any year since the end of World War II. Also

  in 1955, China had its first trade fair in Tokyo and Osaka and Japan had its

  first trade fair in Shanghai and Beijing. Trade increased from a very small

  base. The total value of trade between China and Japan in 1954 was $60

  million, in 1955 it was $110 million, and in 1956 it was $151 million, which

  was the largest annual amount until 1964. In 1955 China and Japan also

  signed agreements on fisheries and cultural exchanges. In 1955 and 1956

  some 2,000 Japa nese visited China, and a number of Chinese del e ga tions

  visited Japan.

  In the first de cades after 1945 there were many Chinese and Japa nese

  individuals who, from their own experience, had a deep understanding of

  the other country and could be called upon, when policy permitted, to

  . 316 .

  The Col apse of the Japa nese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1972

  manage relations. Many of the tens of thousands of Chinese who had

  studied in Japan held impor tant positions in China’s military, government,

  businesses, and universities. Many Japa nese who had previously lived in

  Manchuria, Shanghai, and other Chinese cities were familiar with Chinese

  culture and had Chinese acquaintances with whom they could work. But

  because there was so little contact between the two countries from 1945 until

  1978, when the Treaty of Peace and Friendship fi nally enabled them to work

  together closely, there was virtually no one at the working level in either

  country who had a deep personal understanding of the other country.

  China’s Po liti cal Tightening and Prime Minister Kishi, 1957–1960

  China’s more open policies from 1953 to 1957 coincided with the more

  China- friendly policies of Hatoyama Ichiro and Ishibashi Tanzan. Simi-

  larly, China’s tightening from 1957 to 1960 coincided with the rule of a con-

  servative, pro- Taiwan leader in Japan, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, thus

  halting the pro gress the two countries had made up to 1957. China’s po liti cal

  tightening began in the summer of 1957 with the first phase of the “anti-

  rightist campaign,” an attack on some 550,000 people who had criticized

  the government in the spring of 1957, after Mao said, “Let a hundred flowers

  bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend,” to encourage intellec-

  tuals to speak out.

  In 1957 Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser’s seizure of the Suez

  Canal, the Rus sians’ successful launch of the first satellite, and China’s eco-

  nomic growth during the First Five- Year Plan gave Mao confidence that the

  “East wind was prevailing over the West wind.” In 1958 he launched the

  Great Leap Forward, and in the summer of 1958 China began shelling

  Quemoy and Matsu, two islands off the coast of Fujian that were governed

  by Taiwan, in preparation for a pos si ble invasion of Taiwan.

  In Japan, Prime Minister Ishibashi was succeeded in February 1957 by

  Kishi Nobusuke, who during the Sino- Japanese War had served as min-

  ister of commerce and later as minister of munitions in Tojo Hideki’s cab-

  inet. As minister of munitions, Kishi had been arrested after World War

  II on suspicion of being a class- A war criminal and impr
isoned in Sugamo

  Prison from 1945 to 1948, but he was not indicted. The Chinese Commu-

  nists were outraged that someone suspected of being a class- A war criminal

  . 317 .

  china and japan

  would be selected as prime minister. In June 1957 Kishi became the first

  postwar prime minister to visit Taiwan, further infuriating the mainland.

  At the Chinese trade mission in Tokyo in early 1958, the Chinese gov-

  ernment displayed the Chinese flag. The Japa nese government did not pub-

  licly express approval but it raised no objection, thus implicitly accepting

  it. Shortly thereafter, at an exhibition of mainland Chinese products at a

  Nagasaki department store, the Chinese again flew the flag. On May 2, 1958,

  a Japa nese youth tore down the flag, and the Chinese responded by cutting

  off all economic and social relations with Japan, declaring that politics could

  not be separated from economics. Although the Japa nese economy had

  begun to grow, China, with its much broader economic base had also made

  great pro gress during the 1953–1957 First Five- Year Plan. As he launched

  the Great Leap Forward, Mao was brimming with confidence, and he ex-

  pected China would vault far ahead of Japan. Some in Japan believed that

  Mao was so confident that Japan needed China, as Japa nese leaders had in-

  deed said in the 1930s, that he thought Japa nese voters might vote against

  Kishi in the May 22 election because of Kishi’s failure to maintain economic

  relations with China. In fact, on May 22 Kishi was reelected by a wide

  margin. Sino- Japanese trade in 1957 was valued at $141 million; after Mao

  cut off economic relations with Japan, trade in 1959 and 1960 amounted to

  only $23 million in each year.

  Improved Trade Relations and the Liao- Takasaki Office, 1960s

  By the summer of 1959 Chinese officials recognized that while the Japa nese

  economy was continuing its healthy growth, the first year of the Great Leap

  had been an economic disaster for China. In September 1959 Zhou Enlai

  invited “friends of China” Ishibashi Tanzan and Utsunomiya Tokuma to

  China to consider the possibility of increasing economic aid and trade. But

  by the time of their meeting, Mao had just criticized Peng Dehuai at the

  Lushan Plenum and was returning to the excesses of the Great Leap For-