up his position. Given the troubled state of Sino- Japanese relations, Japan
then chose to send a very se nior diplomat, Kitera Masato, a French specialist,
to be ambassador in Beijing. During his three and a half years as ambassador,
Kitera met Foreign Minister Wang Yi once, and in that meeting in 2013,
Wang Yi complained about Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.7 When he met
with other officials in China, Kitera was presented with careful y worded
criticisms of Japan’s be hav ior. Japa nese officials were prepared to have more
frequent and productive interactions, but China limited the contacts.
In March 2016, Abe named as ambassador to Beijing an experienced
China specialist, Yokoi Yutaka, who had served as head of the China sec-
tion in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, head of the po liti cal section in Japan’s
embassy in Beijing, consul general in Shanghai, and ambassador to Turkey.
His contacts with his Chinese counter parts in Beijing developed slowly but
steadily.
Although Japa nese visitors to China leveled off after the tensions in 2010,
the number of Chinese visitors to Japan has grown rapidly since 2013. By 2013,
the rise in the Chinese standard of living and the decline in the value of the
yen enabled more Chinese tourists to travel outside the country. According
to Japa nese government figures, the number of visas granted to Chinese
travelers to Japan has under gone a striking increase, as shown in the table.
number of chinese visitors to japan
2012 1,425,100
2013 2,210,821
2014 2,409,158
2015 4,993,689
2016 6,372,948
2017 7,350,000
2018 8,380,000
Because Japa nese products have a good reputation in China, Chinese
tourists buy electronic goods, appliances, hi- tech toilet seats, baby formula,
and other Japa nese products when they visit Japan. Japa nese hotels and
stores in key tourist cities in Japan have hired Chinese employees who have
. 398 .
The Deterioration of Sino- Japanese Relations, 1992–2018
studied in Japan to help them meet the needs of their Chinese customers.
Even large shopping malls in Japan cater to Chinese tourists and have in-
troduced Chinese- language signs. Some have more signs in Chinese than
in En glish.
Given the very negative publicity in China about the Japa nese, many
first- time tourists have been surprised at how much they have enjoyed Japan.
When Chinese tourists began going to Japan in large numbers, they gener-
ally traveled in tour groups, but gradually families started visiting Japan on
their own. Chinese tourists typically first traveled to the well- known tourist
sites in Tokyo, Kyoto, Nara, and Osaka. But on later trips some tourists
began visiting vari ous spots in Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku, and scenic
places elsewhere in the country. Just as boorish American tourists in Eu-
rope and parts of Asia in the 1950s were known as “ugly Americans” and
Japa nese tourists going to Southeast Asia in the 1970s were often known
as “ugly Japa nese,” so some of the first groups of nouveau riche tourists
from China who traveled abroad were dubbed the “ugly Chinese” for being
noisy, careless about property in hotel rooms, and rude to people around
them. However, like experienced American and Japa nese travelers, Chinese
tourists have begun reading guidebooks to learn about expected be hav ior
in other countries, and Japa nese complaints about them have declined.
The educated middle- class tourists who have traveled to Japan find
that the Japa nese people they see and meet personally are courteous, very
diff er ent from the cruel soldiers depicted in World War II movies. Chinese
visitors generally return from Japan convinced that Japan is an orderly and
clean country, with little environmental pollution. In questionnaires about
whether travelers would like to revisit the country they traveled to, a higher
percentage of Chinese tourists report wanting to revisit Japan than any
other foreign country. Chinese leaders welcomed the pragmatic attitudes of
the Abe administration and its care in avoiding provocative statements
against China. Chinese publicity attacking Japan began to decrease. In 2012
fewer than 10 percent of the Chinese surveyed reported having positive im-
pressions of Japan, but surveys from 2017 showed that as many as 40 percent
of the Chinese polled had developed positive feelings toward Japan.
Japa nese impressions of China have been changing much more slowly.
The memories of China putting pressure on Japan in 2010 and 2012, of
TV images of Japa nese businesses in China being trashed by crowds of
. 399 .
china and japan
protestors, of the buzzing of Japa nese ships in the Senkaku / Diaoyu area,
of the countless World War II movies showing heroic Chinese soldiers
fighting Japa nese enemies, and of anti- Japanese Chinese movies and pro-
paganda in general, have been too strong and too recent for the Japa nese to
feel relaxed about how a strong China will behave.
By 2017 the Chinese had begun to reduce the number of new World
War II movies produced for Chinese TV and the numbers of Chinese air-
planes flown and ships sailed close to the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands. It had
also begun to cooperate with Japan in exchanging high- level officials.
In May 2018, forty years after China and Japan began preparing for the
Treaty of Peace and Friendship that they signed in 1978, Premier Li Ke-
qiang visited Japan, where he met Emperor Akihito and had discussions with
Prime Minister Abe on how to improve relations. To symbolize China’s re-
ceptivity to Japa nese companies in China, Li Keqiang visited a Toyota fac-
tory in Hokkaido that made parts for Toyota’s factories in China. Japan and
China agreed on further mechanisms for increasing communication. China
made it clear that it welcomed Japan’s willingness to cooperate on proj ects
in its Belt and Road Initiative, a plan to strengthen international coopera-
tion and broaden links for infrastructure development, investment, and
trade with countries on the Euro- Asian continent. Li Keqiang’s visit also
reflected his recognition that Japan and China had common interests in re-
sponding to President Donald Trump’s trade pressures.
In October 2018, Prime Minister Abe made the first visit to China by a
Japa nese prime minister since 2011, when relations between the two coun-
tries were far more tense. Prime Minister Abe and President Xi discussed
mea sures for increasing communications between the two countries and pos-
sibilities for cooperation in proj ects in other countries. During Abe’s time
in Beijing, October 25 to 27, China and Japan announced a $30 billion cur-
rency swap to promote greater stability of their two currencies. Abe said
that the two nations could now move from competition to cooperation. By
the time of the visit, it was amply clear that China was the dominant eco-
nomic and military power. After Abe returned to Japan, diplomats from the
two sides continued planning to bring Xi Jinping to Japan in 2019, for
what woul
d be Xi’s first visit to Japan since becoming China’s top leader in
2012. It is not expected that the meeting will end the standoff over the
Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, where neither side is prepared to give up its
. 400 .
The Deterioration of Sino- Japanese Relations, 1992–2018
claims, but it could stabilize the situation and further reduce the risk of
conflict. As in earlier centuries, particularly in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, competition between Japan and China over Korea has intensified
again. Japa nese efforts to develop a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) missile system, involving cooperation with South Korea and
the United States against threats from North Korea, have pulled South
Korea toward Japan, but China’s publicity about Japan’s refusal to face history
has exacerbated some cleavages between Korea and Japan that remain strong.
Japan amid Heightened Sino- American Tensions, 2017
The Chinese economy appeared poised to begin surpassing the U.S.
economy in overall size in 2017, just as it was poised in 1993 to begin the
transition to dominance in Asia as the size of its economy was surpassing
that of Japan. And just as relations between China and Japan became very
tense during that earlier transition, so relations between China and the
United States became more tense over the prospect that China’s high-
technology, military power, and international influence were beginning to
challenge the dominance of the United States in those areas.
The Japa nese were in many ways better prepared for the transition to
China’s gaining the dominant position than Americans are now. The Japa-
nese had historical memories of how the Chinese had treated Japan when
Chinese officials presided over a confident civilization that dominated Asia.
The Japa nese had deeper cultural contacts with the Chinese over the cen-
turies, with an overlap in written language that enabled them to have broader
and deeper communications than Americans have with China. Far more
Japa nese people had lived in China and learned how to work with the Chi-
nese. The Japa nese had long been accustomed to tensions with the Chinese,
ever since the 1870s when they confronted each other in Korea. Further-
more, Japan had experienced far too many difficulties with China to share
the naïve optimism displayed by some Americans in their dealings with
China since President Nixon’s visit in 1972.
The Japa nese also have had a deeper understanding of China’s economic
nationalism as it has tried to catch up with more modern industrial nations.
To be sure, Japan’s and China’s paths in pursuing their own economic inter-
ests were diff er ent. After World War II, Japan, which already had a strong
. 401 .
china and japan
industrial base, tried to commercialize its military technology and prepare
its infant industries for international market competition while creating
nontariff barriers to make it difficult for foreign countries to establish in-
dustrial plants in Japan. In 1978, when China suddenly opened up, its in-
dustries were so far below international standards that it allowed foreign
companies seeking access to its huge market to establish industrial plants
in China if they shared their technology. China expected that as their in-
dustries caught up, Chinese companies would begin to take the place of the
foreign companies. The Japa nese were less surprised than the Americans and
others when Chinese companies became strong and endeavored to reduce
the foreign presence in China. Japa nese companies, with deeper roots in
local Chinese communities and a broader perspective, were better prepared
because they were less interested in short- term profits, more cautious about
sharing their most precious technology, and more heavi ly invested in long-
term relationships with the Chinese.
The Japa nese cannot expect high levels of military cooperation between
their two nations, but they can expand their discussions to further reduce
the risk of conflict and extend their cooperation for responding to natu ral
disasters and carry ing out peacekeeping proj ects. The Japa nese already have
a rich network of relationships with the Chinese in all fields, and that net-
work is likely to expand in the de cades ahead.
Yet faced with a strong China, the Japa nese have every reason to main-
tain their ties to the United States, which have grown stronger and deeper
in the seven de cades since World War II. The Japa nese have close relations
with the United States in every sphere— military, po liti cal, economic, and
cultural. There is a high level of comfort between the Americans and the
Japa nese, and an open exchange of ideas and opinions. Although some in
China have an interest in expanding relations with Japan, it is not in China’s
interest to detach Japan from the U.S.- Japan military alliance, for an in de-
pen dent Japan would develop a stronger military and possibly develop nu-
clear weapons to defend itself. The Chinese have not erased their image of
the Japa nese as a militaristic aggressive people, and they believe that the
U.S.- Japan Alliance can still help keep the cork in the bottle. Japa nese strat-
egists are aware that the Chinese economy will soon be several times larger
than their own, that China is putting far more resources into its military
than Japan could match, and that Japan’s military manpower cannot com-
. 402 .
The Deterioration of Sino- Japanese Relations, 1992–2018
pare with that of China, which has ten times the population. The Japa nese
are therefore firmly committed to cooperation with the U.S. military.
Though the Japa nese are prepared to increase their cooperation with China,
their relationship with the U.S. military and the U.S. government since
1945 has made the Japa nese feel far more secure working with Americans
than with an authoritarian Chinese government that has expressed so much
hostility toward Japan.
However, the reduced role of the United States in maintaining global
order, the increased role of China in global affairs, and the stabilization of
relations between China and Japan provide a new basis for increased coop-
eration between China and Japan in regional and global affairs. The Chi-
nese and Japa nese have already begun discussions about working together
in the Mekong Delta, and they have begun cooperating on construction
proj ects in the Belt and Road Initiative. Japan responded to U.S. pressures
not to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), but it has begun
cooperating with the AIIB for financing vari ous proj ects in Asia. China
and Japan have good channels for working with the AIIB because of Japan’s
relations with the president of AIIB, Jin Liqun. A cosmopolitan interna-
tionalist, Jin was formerly vice president of the Japanese- led Asian Develop-
ment Bank, and he has for many years enjoyed good relations with Japa nese
officials as well as officials from the United States and other countries. The
nexus of relations between the Chinese and the Japa nese, already strong,
can be expect
ed to expand in the de cades ahead. Yet the history between
their countries since the 1870s is so troubled on both sides that Japan’s rela-
tionship with China cannot undo the deep positive relations between the
Japa nese and the Americans that have developed since 1945.
. 403 .
chapter twelve
Facing the New Era
What is the nature of the new era that China and Japan face, now
that China occupies the dominant position in the relationship? How might
the two nations work together in the new era for the benefit of both na-
tions and the rest of the world?
Sino- Japanese Relations after 2014
Until the arrival of Western explorers, merchants, and missionaries, China
and Japan were linked in a loose regional order dominated by Chinese
civilization. But now the two countries are part of a global order, which,
though highly imperfect, operates according to a far more complex struc-
ture of rules and procedures that were originally established by Western
countries. Even as China surpasses the United States to become the world’s
largest economy, it remains part of this global structure created by West-
erners. As China gains influence and leverage around the world, it is be-
ginning to take on a larger role within existing organ izations. It is taking
the lead to form new regional and global institutions that, despite being
established by China, operate less in the way China has traditionally dealt
with the outside and more like the institutions established under the lead-
ership of the United States and other Western countries. Japan, which has
been subordinate to the United States since the days of the Allied Occupa-
tion, remains a major global economic power and will continue working
within the framework of the U.S.- Japan Security Alliance. But since the
administration of Donald Trump, which is loosening its links to regional
and global institutions, Japan is gaining more in de pen dence and beginning
slowly to take more initiative in its global po liti cal role and in its relations
with China.
. 404 .
Facing the New Era
People in China and Japan now have far more contacts with each other
than they had at any time in history. Due to the advances in industrial pro-
China and Japan Page 62
