duction and transportation that spread to China in the early de cades after
reform and opening began in 1978, the scale of goods and people exchanged
between the two countries is more than a hundred times what it was in 1972,
when they first reestablished formal diplomatic relations. More goods are
exchanged, and more people travel between the two countries, in a single
day now than in an entire de cade during the centuries of the Qing dynasty
(1644–1912) and the Tokugawa period (1603–1868). Between World War II
and 1972, trade between the two countries never reached $1 billion a year,
but by 2017 the countries were trading $300 billion in goods per year.1 In
1965, the peak year for Japa nese visitors to China before normalization,
aside from some Japa nese visitors to the Guangzhou trade fair, fewer than
5,000 Japa nese travelers visited China during the entire year.2 In 2018, more
than 8 million visas were issued to Chinese travelers going to Japan and
more than 4 million visas were issued to Japa nese individuals going to
China. By 2018 an average of more than 20,000 Chinese visitors were ar-
riving in Japan each day, and the number of tourists was continuing to grow.
More than 30,000 Japa nese companies now operate in China, far more
than companies from any other country. Pragmatic Chinese officials in
charge of local economic relations have been willing to work with the Japa-
nese, despite public expressions of anti- Japanese sentiment. Japa nese com-
panies are also playing a role in supplying products to Chinese consumers
through e- commerce.
However, between the po liti cal leaders of Japan and China, the level of
trust and empathy and the number of frank discussions is low compared
with those between the leaders of other major nations, and the nature of
their exchanges tends to be more formal. No high- level po liti cal leader on
either side has close friendships with or deep knowledge about the people
in the other country. Top leaders of the two nations occasionally have their
own brief side meetings at gatherings of regional or international organ-
izations, but long discussions between them have not taken place more than
once every five years. By Chinese standards for welcoming foreign guests,
Japa nese officials are often not given honored treatment, and sometimes
they are not received at all.
. 405 .
china and japan
Until the Sino- Japanese War of 1895, most Chinese people living out-
side of the major east coast cities were hardly aware of Japan’s existence. Even
during the Sino- Japanese War of 1937–1945, unlike those living near large
cities or Japa nese military camps, the 80 percent of the Chinese population
living in rural areas without access to radio had little awareness of what
Japa nese soldiers were doing in China. Now, every day, virtually every one
in both Japan and China has access to electronic media presenting news or
stories about the other country. In China, state media officials supervise
the content of information presented to the public, and between 1992 and
2014, images of Japa nese aggressors were widely available to Chinese
viewers. Japan did not have an or ga nized propaganda department as it did
during World War II, but coverage of China in the Japa nese media in-
cluded televised pictures of Chinese protestors throwing stones at Japa-
nese shops in China, and Chinese ships and planes harassing Japa nese
ships near the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands. The result of such media coverage
in both countries was a widespread, mutual public antagonism that peaked
between 2010 and 2014. Yet as Chinese incomes began to rise, Chinese
people acquired a high regard for Japa nese industrial products.
The extensive personal contacts and economic relations between
China and Japan thus rest on a fragile foundation that is threatened by
widespread popu lar hostility and the changeability of po liti cal leaders who
lack trust in their counter parts in the other country. Since much of the
passion in Sino- Japanese relations is deeply rooted in perceptions of his-
tory, it will be difficult for the two countries to place their relations on a
more solid, stable base, unless they deal with the volatile emotions stem-
ming from history.
Concerns of Chinese Leaders and Their Use of History
The concerns that Chinese leaders have about Japan are reflected in the is-
sues they raise about history. The three most common issues raised by
Chinese leaders are: visits by Japa nese po liti cal leaders to the Yasukuni
Shrine, Japan’s failure to acknowledge the horrors of the Nanjing Massacre,
and the failure of Japa nese textbooks to describe accurately the Sino-
Japanese War. What are the concerns under lying China’s focus on these
issues?
. 406 .
Facing the New Era
The Yasukuni Shrine
Although many Japa nese leaders have expressed goodwill toward China
during the past 125 years, ultimately China suffered greatly from attacks by
Japa nese troops, not only from 1937 to 1945 but also during the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894–1895, the Ji’nan Incident of 1928, the Manchurian
Incident of 1931, and the Shanghai Incident of 1932. Chinese leaders recall
the efforts by Toyotomi Hideyoshi to march through Korea to capture Bei-
jing. They see in Japanese the samurai warrior spirit and the willingness
to die for their country. They are concerned that Japan might again become
an aggressive militarist power, and they do not believe that Japan’s declara-
tions of its peaceful intent are a reliable predictor of its be hav ior. There-
fore, they are alert to any signs that militarists might once again rise to
power in Japan. They are sensitive to discussions of increasing military
expenditures, to proposals to eliminate Article 9 in the Japa nese Constitu-
tion forbidding the use of war as a means of settling international disputes,
and to the activities and statements by right- wing activists.
For the Chinese, the enshrinement in the Yasukuni Shrine of the souls
of Japa nese military figures who were tried as class- A war criminals after
World War II signals that the Japa nese still re spect those who took part in
attacking China. Japan’s failure to separate the war criminals from the place
where others who died serving Japan are enshrined is seen by the Chinese
as reinforcing the readiness of young Japa nese to sacrifice themselves for
their country. Knowledgeable Chinese are also aware that the Yushukan
Museum at the Yasukuni Shrine glorifies Japa nese military achievements.
Having suffered from Japa nese military aggression, China’s leaders are
acutely concerned when they see any sign that Japan might be becoming
more militaristic. For them, the return of the souls of Japa nese war crimi-
nals to the Yasukuni Shrine, and visits made by Japa nese po liti cal leaders
to the Yasukuni Shrine since then, arouse fears that a militaristic spirit is
being revived. From the perspective of the Chinese, the actions of Japa nese
leaders— visiting the place where Japa nese war criminals are enshrined—
speak louder about Japan’s t
rue intentions than their “empty” words about
peace.
. 407 .
china and japan
The Nanjing Massacre
To the Chinese, the Nanjing Massacre represents the vicious nature of Japa-
nese warriors. Many in China are familiar with tales about the cruelties of
the Japa nese. The reports of the be hav ior of Japa nese soldiers in Nanjing
resonate with what the Chinese have long heard about sword- swinging sam-
urai and bloodthirsty Japa nese pirates.
When the Chinese hear statements by Japa nese scholars arguing that
not as many people were killed during the Nanjing Massacre as the Chi-
nese claim, they interpret them as playing down the seriousness of the crimes
that Japa nese soldiers committed in China. If the Japa nese try to soften the
horror of the atrocities committed by their troops, it creates doubts about
whether they have really turned their backs on the be hav ior of earlier
generations.
The Textbook Issue
The Chinese are concerned that the next generation in Japan, rather than
being trained to denounce the militarist past, will be susceptible to be-
coming aggressors just like earlier generations. If the Japa nese are really
turning their backs on their militarist past, the Chinese ask, why are they
not learning the lessons of history and renouncing their past be hav ior in
what they teach their youth? Textbooks have become a vis i ble, concrete
symbol for the Chinese to evaluate how Japa nese students are being trained.
Knowledgeable Chinese are aware that the textbooks used in high school
social-science courses in Japan provide very little background on the two
Sino- Japanese Wars. In their view, the youth in Japan today are not suffi-
ciently aware of the horrors that were committed by Japa nese soldiers and
hence they do not thoroughly reject war making. If Japa nese youth were
to be drafted into military ser vice by their leaders and called to war, they
ask, might they not commit the same cruel acts as their grand fathers and
great- grandfathers?
. 408 .
Facing the New Era
Chinese Leaders’ Limited Contacts with Japan
Since World War II, China’s leaders, unlike Chinese students who have
studied in Japan, have had few contacts with the Japa nese, and therefore
they have not had opportunities to witness the depth of the Japa nese com-
mitment to peace. Their perspectives, like those of the Chinese public in
general, are more deeply colored by memories of the Japa nese atrocities of
World War II.
Chinese Leaders’ Use of History
Leaders in China have drawn on their people’s historical memories to in-
crease China’s leverage over Japan. The Chinese assumption has been that
when Japa nese leaders show signs of reviving militarism, strong complaints
and warnings will eventually deter Japan from pursuing a military course.
When they see signs that Japan may be becoming more militaristic, they
warn the Japa nese of the anger of the Chinese people. China’s leaders ral-
lied public opinion to protest Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s visit to
the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 1985, for example, on the fortieth anniver-
sary of Japan’s surrender to the United States. They set off an anti- Japanese
campaign when Japan announced plans in 2010 to try in a domestic court the
Chinese fishing- boat captain who had rammed into two Japa nese vessels
near the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands. They or ga nized another anti- Japanese
publicity campaign in 2012 when Japan announced plans to “nationalize” the
islands.
The leaders of China have often called attention to Japan’s aggressive his-
tory when pursuing specific goals. For example, when it appeared in the
1980s that Japan was hesitating to renew its programs to extend aid to China,
Chinese complaints about Japan’s handling of history became more pro-
nounced, subsiding only after Japan de cided to renew its aid. Many Chi-
nese individuals and Chinese businesses have also criticized Japan for its
past aggressions when they have failed to receive payments from Japa nese
individuals or companies for other offenses.
When the United Nations was considering making Japan a permanent
member of the UN Security Council, the Chinese government opposed it,
arguing that the position would be unacceptable because of Japan’s aggressive
. 409 .
china and japan
be hav ior in the past. Chinese leaders mobilized their citizens to sign peti-
tions and to take part in public demonstrations against Japan.
Following the Chinese student demonstrations at Tian anmen Square
in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 after its own domestic
protests, Chinese leaders introduced the Patriotic Education Campaign to
encourage patriotism among the next generation. To help build national loy-
alty, many articles appeared in the Chinese media that were critical of
Japan for its treatment of China. The government also began using new
formats— movies, video games, and other digital media—to display the
brutal be hav ior of the Japa nese and thus build greater support among Chi-
nese youth for their leaders, who sought to protect their country from the
enemy. In 2012, for example, the Chinese government approved the produc-
tion of 69 anti- Japanese tele vi sion series and 100 anti- Japanese films. Ever
since 1915, when China opposed Japan’s Twenty- One Demands, Chinese
leaders have found anti- Japanese publicity to be a useful tool for building
loyalty to the Chinese government and its leadership.
The Japa nese History Prob lem
The essence of the Japa nese history prob lem is that although the Japa nese
overwhelmingly wish to pursue the path of peace, their re spect for their own
ancestors and their determination not to bow down to China have prevented
them from satisfying Chinese demands. The Japa nese have rejected mili-
tary pursuits, but they want to re spect their fellow countrymen, and espe-
cially their relatives, who sacrificed themselves for their nation. They believe
that if their ancestors did bad things, it was not because they were inherently
bad people but because they faced difficult circumstances in which they had
little choice.
Except for members of some right- wing groups in Japan, the Japa nese
strongly believe that it was wrong for Japan to invade China, and they deeply
regret that their nation caused so much suffering. But they also feel that
they have paid an enormous price—in the results of the massive aerial
bombing of their cities, the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan, and the
seven years of Allied Occupation. The dominant view among the Japa nese
public is that, after the war, the best way to deal with the suffering Japan had
caused in China was to offer assistance for China’s modernization program.
. 410 .
Facing the New Era
They are pleased that their country’s pursuit of peace and its generosity
toward other countries have earned Japan a positive worldwide reputation,
except in China and Korea. In their view, Japan has made great contribu-
tions to China, contributions that have been inadequately acknowledged.
The Japa nese recognize that the Chinese are becoming stronger, both
militarily and eco nom ically. In dealings with the Chinese, the Japa nese
want to be treated as respected equals, not forced to submit to Chinese
demands. They also believe that the Chinese use anti- Japanese rhe toric as
a way of both maintaining domestic unity and extracting favors from Japan,
and they respond negatively when angry Chinese leaders tell them what
they must do.
The Japa nese believe that the Chinese have used the issue of history to
achieve goals not in Japan’s interest. They have used it to issue demands for
more help and more payments from Japan. They have used it to gain coop-
eration from other countries that also suffered from Japa nese aggression and
to pull them closer to China and away from Japan. The Chinese have done
this with Korea, in par tic u lar, but also with Southeast Asia and the United
States. The Japa nese have noticed that the Chinese have called attention to
the cooperation between the Americans and the Chinese during World War
II in confronting their common enemy, Japan. The Japa nese were deeply dis-
appointed that China used the history issue to keep Japan from receiving a
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, in spite of the fact
that Japan was the number- two contributor to UN funding and that since
1945 Japan has been pursuing the path of peace.
It has been difficult for Japan to find an effective way to react to accusa-
tions of past aggressions. It has responded by saying that many of the com-
plaints about Japa nese be hav ior are exaggerated. The Japa nese also feel it is
grossly unfair that they are still the focus of such criticism when Ameri-
cans are no longer constantly criticized for their actions against American
Indians, or Belgians for their acts in the Belgian Congo, or the British and
other colonial powers for be hav ior in the colonies that they exploited. Why,
Japan’s younger generations ask, must they continuously apologize to the
Chinese for events that occurred more than seven de cades ago, long before
they were born? In the Pew polling for 2016, 53 percent of Japa nese respon-
dents said that Japan had apologized enough, while only 10 percent of the
Chinese polled agreed.
China and Japan Page 63
