China and Japan
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Ishibashi was particularly popu lar among students, pacifists, and the left
wing of the Liberal Demo cratic Party.
Ishibashi’s father had been a priest in the Buddhist Nichiren sect, and
at the age of ten Ishibashi served as an apprentice in a Yamanashi- prefecture
temple, where he studied Buddhism and attended a school run by disciples
of William Clark, a well- known American educator who inspired a gen-
eration of Japa nese youths with the phrase, “Boys, be ambitious.” In 1907
Ishibashi graduated from Waseda University, the leading center of in de pen-
dent liberal thinking in Japan, with a degree in philosophy.
In 1911 Ishibashi joined Toyo Keizai, a com pany that published several
periodicals focusing on economics and business, including Toyo Keizai
Shimpo (Oriental economist). He was first assigned to work for Toyo Jiron,
a publication specializing in po liti cal and social commentary, where he ap-
plied his philosophy training to adopt a set of basic princi ples that would
become the framework for his future essays. One such princi ple was the con-
cept of “absolute individualism,” by which he meant that economic, po-
liti cal, and social systems exist for the well- being of the individual, not the
other way around. In keeping with absolute individualism, he was an avid
advocate of gender equality and birth control.
Ishibashi constantly criticized Japa nese prejudices against the Chinese
and Koreans as well as pronouncements supporting Japa nese exception-
alism. He had deep re spect for the Meiji emperor, but he was a constant
critic of what he called the “mystical spell of the imperial system.”
Though committed to certain ideals and princi ples, Ishibashi was a well-
informed realist whose readers were business leaders, bankers, bureau-
crats, and politicians. His arguments against Japan’s expansionist colonial
policy were based on his calculation that colonies would be a net drain on
the economy and that the colonized, deprived of their basic rights to self-
determination, would inevitably resent the colonizers and create prob lems
for Japan that would be difficult to manage.
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Ishibashi vehemently opposed Japan’s invasion of China. He thought
Japan’s military had underestimated the ability of the Chinese to resist and
that the China venture would end with Japan in a meaningless quagmire.
Influenced by the Japa nese media, he felt that Japa nese people in general
and Japa nese soldiers in par tic u lar had no re spect for the Chinese, and
therefore the Chinese would later remain anti- Japanese.
In 1920, when Ishibashi was sent a warning by the army because of his
criticism of the intervention in Siberia, he bravely published the army’s
warning verbatim and continued to criticize the military’s actions. After the
war, Ishibashi was purged by the Allied Occupation in 1947, and as he had
done previously, he published the purge notice verbatim in Toyo Keizai.
By the 1940s Ishibashi was not only the editor but also the president of
the Toyo Keizai publishing com pany, with a staff of 250 employees. The
government censored vari ous articles in Toyo Keizai and reduced its quotas
for ink and paper in order to limit its reach. Eventually Ishibashi was faced
with deciding whether to close the paper and divide the remaining cash
among his employees or submit to government censorship. Ishibashi found
a middle way. Along with many Japa nese, he felt that Japan was nearing de-
feat in the war in China and the Pacific and that it was impor tant to plan
for a post- defeat future. He and his staff devised an editorial policy that
would circumvent government censorship by carefully following govern-
ment directives while continuing to make clear the meaning of the articles
as they continued to publish. For example, in referring to policies in Korea
and Taiwan, they stopped using the term “colony” and instead referred to
those areas as “Japan’s economic region.”
When Germany surrendered to the Allies in Eu rope, the headline in
Toyo Keizai read: “We can no longer expect miracles in the current war,” and
when the emperor fi nally surrendered on August 15, 1945, the lead sentence
in Ishibashi’s editorial was: “We are now at the door of Japan’s rebirth; in
fact, the potential is without limit.” Ishibashi surely was tempted to cheer
the defeat, but that would have been an insult to his readers, many of whom
had lost loved ones during the war. In fact, Ishibashi himself had lost a son.
So rather than dwelling on Japan’s defeat, he began to plan for Japan’s future.
As finance minister in the Yoshida cabinet, he battled against the policy
of the Allied Occupation General Headquarters, which required that Japan
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Biographies of Key Figures
pay a significant portion of the expenses for the Occupation officials, in-
cluding housing, staff, and luxuries such as hotel stays, golf courses, and
chauffeured vehicles. This burden amounted to one- third of Japan’s entire
government bud get, making it difficult to fund the rebuilding of Japan’s
devastated infrastructure.
During his two months as prime minister Ishibashi sought to promote
better relations with China. He intended to visit China as a first step toward
normalization, but he fell sick before he could make the trip. After he left
office and recovered from his illness, he did visit China twice, in 1959 and
1961, and he met with Zhou Enlai. In 1972, before Tanaka Kakuei made his
historic trip to China, Tanaka called on Ishibashi, who was then near death,
and vowed to fulfill Ishibashi’s dream of normalizing Sino- Japanese rela-
tions. Ishibashi had lived to see Japan reject its colonial empire, and just be-
fore he died, he could take comfort in seeing Japan take the first steps
toward normalizing relations with China.
For further reading, see Sharon H. Nolte, Liberalism in Modern Japan:
Ishibashi Tanzan and his Teachers, 1905–1960 (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1987); Matsuo Takayoshi 松尾尊兊, ed., Ishibashi Tanzan hy-
oronshu石橋湛山評論集 (The critical works of Ishibashi Tanzan) (Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten, 1984); Shumpei Okamoto, “Ishibashi Tanzan and the
Twenty- One Demands,” in The Chinese and the Japa nese: Essays in Po liti cal
and Cultural Interactions, ed. Akira Iriye, 148–198 (Prince ton, N.J.: Prince ton
University Press, 1980).
Ishiwara Kanji, 1889–1949
A Nichiren zealot, Ishiwara Kanji was a brilliant military analyst and strat-
egist who in 1931 defied higher military authorities and led the plot that
resulted in the Manchurian Incident. Yet in 1936 he played a key role in put-
ting down those who took part in the February 26 failed coup d’état by
Japa nese government leaders, and in 1937 he opposed the war against
China.
Ishiwara was born on January 18, 1889, the son of a policeman whose
forefathers had been low- level samurai on the Shonai Plain in Yamagata pre-
fecture, a poor farming area in the northwestern part of Japan’s main is-
&nbs
p; land. The Shonai Plain had been under direct rule of the Tokugawa, and
the area sided with the Tokugawa shogun in resisting the Meiji Restora-
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Biographies of Key Figures
tion. Ishiwara and Okawa Shumei, also from that area, became superpa-
triots, proving to Meiji leaders that they had no lingering loyalty to the
Tokugawa family. Ishiwara was intensely patriotic, strong- willed, in de pen-
dent, and out spoken.
At the age of thirteen Ishiwara entered a military preparatory school,
and at eigh teen he enrolled in the Central Military Acad emy. In 1910, as a
second lieutenant, he was sent to Korea just after its annexation. In 1915,
after passing highly competitive exams, he entered the Army Staff College,
from which he graduated second in his class in 1918. He applied for ser vice
in China, and in 1920 he was assigned to spend a year in the Central China
Garrison in Wuhan. While in China, he often took trips to the countryside
to get a sense of the country. He expressed disgust with the rude way some
Japa nese visitors treated the Chinese; after riding a rickshaw, for example,
they would pay the rickshaw puller by throwing the coins on the ground.
Ishiwara had hoped that China and Japan, Asian brethren, could unite
against the West. As he traveled in China, he was bitterly disappointed to
find widespread disorder and poverty. He concluded that China could not
build a modern state on its own and it would need assistance from Japan
to achieve the leadership’s goals.
Ishiwara was also disgusted by the be hav ior he saw in Japan, especially
the selfish capitalism. He first took an interest in Shinto, but concluded that
it did not provide sufficient dynamism. He then turned to Nichiren Bud-
dhism, founded in the thirteenth century by Nichiren, a militant patriot,
and in 1919 Ishihara, then age thirty, became a dedicated Nichiren follower
who believed that Japan had a mission to propagate to the rest of the world:
after a final war of unpre ce dented turmoil, the world would usher in a lasting
golden age of peace and harmony. Each day, Ishiwara read Nichiren texts
and observed Nichiren daily rituals.
In 1922 Ishiwara was dispatched to Germany for three years to study
the German language and then military history. He learned about the
weapons first used in World War I— tanks, machine guns, and airplanes—
that drew on new technology and were far more advanced than those
Japan had used in its wars against China and Rus sia. Ishiwara concluded
that whereas earlier wars had been fought by military specialists, after the
arousal of national passions and demo cratic ideologies, World War I be-
came a total war, involving not only professional soldiers but all able- bodied
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Biographies of Key Figures
males and the civilian population. He understood that in the future, new
technologies, especially planes, would be critical, and entire cities could be
wiped out at once. Total wars of long duration would be de cided not only
by military factors but also by economic and social factors. Because Japan
lacked the resources and economic depth to win such a total war, Ishiwara
believed Japan should engage in short wars that it could win by striking a
quick, decisive, overwhelming blow ( kessenteki senso) immediately after hos-
tilities began. His analy sis was remarkably prescient.
In 1925 Ishiwara left Germany and traveled on the Trans- Siberian
Railway to Harbin. After returning home, Ishiwara lectured for three years
on military history at the Army Staff College. His broad strategic analy sis
and the depth of his convictions, reflecting his Nichiren commitments, made
him the most influential strategist among a generation of Japan’s leading
young military officers.
On October 20, 1928, Ishiwara arrived in Manchuria on an assignment
as an operations officer for the Kwantung Army. His power ful influence on
the Japa nese Army in Manchuria stemmed not from his position but from
his reputation as Japan’s leading strategist.
By 1930 Ishiwara had concluded that Japan and the United States,
because of their conflicting interests, spheres of power, and ideologies, were
destined for a showdown. Should that come about, he believed the United
States would try to blockade Japan, and therefore Japan should build up a
substantial navy. The war with the United States would likely be a protracted
one, and Manchuria was necessary to provide a broad economic base for
such a military effort. Ishiwara believed that by building up a strong indus-
trial base in Manchuria, Japan could win a total war with the United
States, a mistaken judgment that would have grave consequences.
With the support of the Mantetsu research staff, Ishiwara compiled in-
formation on the military and economic situations in Manchuria. He be-
lieved that Manchuria was not originally Chinese but had belonged to local
tribes, and so Japan had as much right to Manchuria as China. Unlike
the Chinese military cliques that had oppressed the people of Man-
churia, he and his Japa nese colleagues were working for the good of the
Manchurians.
On September 18, 1931, under the leadership of Ishiwara and his col-
league Col o nel Itagaki Seishiro, Japa nese troops planted a bomb that ex-
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Biographies of Key Figures
ploded on the railway tracks near Shenyang. They initially claimed that the
bomb had been planted by the Chinese, but within weeks it became clear
that it had been planted by the Japa nese. During the next two weeks, Japa-
nese troops overwhelmed Chinese forces in the nearby areas of Manchuria.
Japan’s Central Army Headquarters in Tokyo directed Ishiwara and Itagaki
to return the railway to China. But by this time Ishiwara and Itagaki had
stirred up civilian chaos, and they explained that military action was neces-
sary to protect the Japa nese in Manchuria. Japa nese troops used the railway
explosion as an excuse to move with lightning speed to take over nearby
cities. By January 1932 Japa nese troops occupied Shanhaiguan, the pass be-
tween Manchuria and North China, and by the next spring Japa nese troops
occupied Harbin. There is no rec ord that Tokyo was notified in advance of
these actions by the Japa nese military in Manchuria.
Ishiwara and others in the Kwantung Army planned to create a Manchu
state, led by their puppet, Pu Yi, the Manchu child emperor who had been
deposed during the 1911 Revolution. At the formal installation of Pu Yi six
months after the Japa nese Army took over, it was announced that the in-
de pen dent Kingdom of Manchuria (Manshukoku, in Japa nese) was being
established to promote racial harmony. In fact, the kingdom was controlled
by the Kwantung Army and Japan retained control of defense, foreign re-
lations, transportation, and communications. Not only did non- Japanese
have no power in the administration but even Japa nese residents in Man-
churia had little power. Furthermore, the Japa nese government in Tokyo
had little leverage over the government, which was dominated by the Kwan-
tung Ar
my.
Japa nese civilians in Manchuria, concerned about their safety owing to
personal attacks being carried out by the Chinese, felt safer because of Ishi-
wara’s bold actions, and Japa nese merchants applauded the strong actions
by Japa nese troops to resist Chinese boycotts of Japa nese goods. Ishiwara,
viewed as brilliant and dedicated, enjoyed the support of younger officers
in Manchuria.
By early 1932, Ishiwara had come to envision Manchuria as a place for
harmonious cooperation among all races in China, including Manchus, Chi-
nese, Mongolians, Koreans, and Japa nese. During the previous year he had
grown more optimistic that the Chinese people might play a leading role
in the Manchurian government and the government of Japan would have
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Biographies of Key Figures
no control over activities in Manchuria. The Kwantung Army would help
maintain peace, but it too would have no role in the government. The Japa-
nese in Manchuria would not receive any special privileges and the
wages of Japa nese officials would be reduced so that they were the same as
those of Manchu and Chinese officials who held comparable jobs. Man-
churia would be led by the Concordia Association (Kyoowakai in Japa-
nese; Xiehehui in Chinese) that would promote harmony among all ethnic
groups.
Westerners and the Chinese did not support Ishiwara’s efforts to create
a harmonious Manchurian government that in fact would be controlled by
the Japa nese, who were criticized by the West and hated by the Chinese.
Higher military and po liti cal leaders in Tokyo were unhappy that Ishiwara
would not listen to them. The hard real ity was that the Japa nese Army in
Manchuria controlled the government and Ishiwara’s vision of Manchuria’s
future role heightened tensions with the United States that ultimately re-
sulted in World War II.
When Ishiwara returned to Japan in August 1932, he was pleased with
his success in making Manchuria a part of Japan. He became part of the
Army General Staff and was stationed in Japan’s northeast. As a member
of the General Staff, he took part in the discussions in the League of Na-
tions on the Manchurian question. He also played a key role in persuading
Ayukawa Yoshisuke to develop the Manchurian economy. Convinced of