By the evening of 26 November, B Company, 9th Infantry, which the previous morning had attacked Hill 219 north of Sinhung-dong, was reduced to 34 men, some of them with light wounds, from the 129 men who had moved to it the previous day. E Company, 9th Infantry, had become involved in heavy fighting southeast of Hill 219 during the night of 25-26 November as the enemy pushed south around Hill 219 and its environs. It had lost 52 men killed and wounded during the night. When dawn of 26 November came, the 1st Battalion and parts of the 2nd Battalion east of the Chongchon River were virtually surrounded by Chinese and had to find some way to evacuate their wounded before they withdrew.
The 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry, at Chinaman's Hat was in the same predicament. An enemy roadblock had been set up south of it on the road to Kujangdong. This was the only route over which wounded could be evacuated.
The E Company commander, 1st Lt. Joseph Manto, selected Pfc. James L. Brown to take charge of getting casualties from the two battalions through the enemy roadblock south ofChinaman's Hat. The effective part of the roadblock was a group of 15 to 20 Chinese in a culvert under the railroad east of the road. Brown had the walking wounded lay down a covering fire on the culvert. At the same time he took two men with him and pushed a small handcar down the tracks, which gave them some protection. As Brown advanced toward the culvert, he eliminated small enemy fire groups along the way. In this way he approached close to the culvert, where he engaged the main enemy body with rifle fire and grenades. He successfully destroyed the roadblock, and the vehicles with the wounded then got through. His action also opened the way for many other troops to withdraw down the road, relatively free from hostile action.12
Brown earned the Distinguished Service Cross in the E Company fight that night, as did another man. Second Lt. Robert Gallardo remained with his platoon after being wounded, and after the company commander was wounded in a counterattack, Gallardo assumed command. He recovered an abandoned truck, supervised loading the wounded into it, and successfully evacuated them from the scene of action.23
Colonel Sloane ordered those still combat effective in E Company to wade the Chongchon River and join the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, on the west side. At full daylight on 26 November, only three companies of the 9th Infantry -G, F, and H-were combat effective. Before dark that day, the regiment could account for only about half its men. In addition to battle casualties, the regiment had many men suffering from frozen feet and otherwise disabled by exposure.
During the night of 26-27 November, Chinese overran G Company, 9th Infantry, west of the Chongchon. In a devastating Chinese attack on the company that night, Pfc. Andrew J. Gasquet, Jr., a machine gunner with the 3rd Platoon, played a dominant role in enabling his platoon, and subsequently G Company, to escape destruction. Enemy mortar fire was heavy and enabled Chinese to penetrate the 3rd Platoon. First one squad withdrew-all except Gasquet, who voluntarily stayed with his machine gun. In a few minutes the entire 3rd Platoon followed the one squad that had fallen back and joined the 2nd Platoon on its left. Gasquct still stayed in his position, and by his automatic fire aided the 3rd Platoon in its successful withdrawal. Gasquet stayed with his gun until Chinese overran it. Within a few minutes all of G Company had left its position. Gasquet's fate is not known.2'
parts of F and G companies slipped back toward the tanks and the quad-50s. H Company suffered the least of the 2nd Battalion. The battalion's fight had been short and vicious. The attack had come just after Colonel Sloane had ordered Maj. Cesibes V. Barberis, the battalion commander, to load as many men as possible on tanks and other vehicles and cross to the east side of the Chongchon River into the perimeter of the 23rd Infantry. Sloane realized that his 2nd Battalion was being surrounded and probably could not hold during the night. The Chinese struck it from close-in on three sides just as the 2nd Battalion started to abandon its positions. Artillery of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion at Kujangdong fired heavily in support of the battalion on Hill 180 but had little effect on the close-in fight. From Hill 180, Barberis withdrew his battalion to Hill 153, south of the dry creek bed. There the Chinese soon attacked again.
Major Barberis later reported that the whole thing started about 11 P.M. on 26 November, when he sent out patrols to contact friendly units he thought were on his left (cast) flank. The battalion had just moved to Hill 153, on the south bank of Dry Creek, close to the Chongchon River, preparatory to crossing to the east side of the river. The friendly troops Barberis thought were close were not there. Chinese were there instead. His patrols ran into large numbers of them, who were moving toward Hill 153. These Chinese enveloped the hill from three sides and attacked it. Barberis thought that only about three out of every ten Chinese in this force had rifles or submachine guns. The rest carried pouches of grenades tied to their waists.
On Hill 153, Barberis was opposite the positions of the 23rd Infantry at Chinaman's Hat on the other (east) side of the Chongchon River. From there Major Barberis was in the act of carrying out Colonel Sloane's order to cross the river into the perimeter of the 23rd Infantry. He put most of his men on tanks and quad-50s and started for the ford across the river.
A Chinese bazooka team ambushed the lead tank, and their rockets set it afire. The flames illuminated the column behind it, making it vulnerable to Chinese machine gunners. Many men on the vehicles were killed, and many wounded were left behind as the vehicles sprinted ahead and entered and crossed the river. Barberis's men tried unsuccessfully to save their 81-mm mortars, and others tried to carry out the machine guns, but most of those who made this effort were killed. By heroic effort the 2nd Battalion got about 150 wounded across the river. Those who could walk had to wade the icy Chongchon. After these wounded had gained the east bank of the river, Lt. Martin Kavanaugh and Lieutenant Haywood ventured back across the river and returned with their tank, loaded down with more wounded.
E Company, which had just joined the 2nd Battalion on the west side of the river, suffered very heavy losses. One of its platoon leaders, however, Lieutenant Manto, fought his way back to the east side with 40 wounded and then returned to the west side again to recover some abandoned equipment. When some of the Chinese tried to pursue him across the river, they were repulsed by the combined efforts of the 9th and 23rd infantrymen on the east side and the fire of eight tanks.2S
While these heavy blows were falling on the 9th Infantry on 26 November and the night of 26-27, the 23rd Infantry on the east side of the river at Chinaman's Hat had a somewhat easier time until after dark. After daylight on the twenty-sixth, some of its infantry, supported by tanks, attacked north into the position the 61st Field Artillery had occupied the night before. They captured the position and 21 Chinese soldiers who were still there, including Culture Officer We Yu Shu. The 61st Field Artillery now recovered most of its lost guns and displaced them south.26 Altogether, there were 102 Chinese prisoners taken during the night and in the clean-up the next morning at the 23rd Infantry lines adjacent to Chinaman's Hat, all of them from the CCF 359th Regiment, 120th Division.
The morning of 26 November at Chinaman's Hat was cold, with a freezing wind from the northwest, and the temperature only a few degrees above zero. Reinforcements arrived for the 23rd Infantry just after noon. At 1 P.M., Lt. Col. James W. Edwards brought his 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, from Kujangdong into the 23rd perimeter. Edwards had little time to contemplate the situation. Colonel Freeman at once ordered him to attack Chinaman's Hat.
Lieutenant Colonel Edwards assigned Capt. John E. Emerson, Jr.'s G Company to attack the hill from the west and E Company to attack it from the southwest. G Company had to climb a 45-degree slope in its attack. By 8 P.M., it had reached a point 50 yards short of the crest. But E Company had not been able to move even from its line of departure.
At 8:30 P.m. the Chinese struck back with great force in full moonlight in a two-pronged attack. One part went right through E Company to the 23rd Regimental CP. The other came from the north around the west side of Chinaman's Hat to t
he 1st Battalion CP.
Earlier, in his attack toward the crest of Chinaman's Hat, Captain Emerson had led G Company in charge after charge-seven of them, according to one account. Now when the enemy gained G Company's rear, the battalion commander ordered Emerson to withdraw from Chinaman's Hat. To do so he had to lead a bayonet charge through a Chinese company that had cut him off. But he succeeded in getting his company back down to the flat ground and adjacent to B Company. Emerson then mounted a tank and fired its deck machine gun until he ran out of ammunition.27 In two counterattacks during the night, the 23rd Infantry failed to regain its lost positions.
In these swirling battles around Chinaman's Hat, Sgt. John A. Pittman, C Company, 23rd Infantry, led a counterattack to regain lost ground, even though suffering from mortar fragment wounds. During this attack an enemy grenade landed amid his squad. He threw his body on the grenade. When a medical aid man reached him, Pittman's first words were to ask how many of his men had been injured. Pittman survived the war.2'
The Chinese attack on the 23rd Infantry at Chinaman's Hat on the night of 26-27 November, following the failure of Edwards's 2nd Battalion to drive the Chinese from the hill, included an enemy force sweeping around the base of the hill and overrunning Colonel Freeman's CP. One Chinese tommy gunner S9 ran through the CP tent, spraying bullets at random and wounding several men.
After daylight on 27 November, the CCF who had captured the 23rd Regimental CP withdrew from it, and the regiment reoccupied it at 9 A.M. Most of its abandoned equipment was recovered at that time. The 23rd Regiment reorganized during the day and sent out patrols. These reported that Chinese were digging in east of the regiment. Stragglers from the 9th Infantry west of the river continued to come in to the 23rd Infantry perimeter, and others escaped downstream and crossed over to the artillery positions at Kujang-dong. Those suffering most from wounds and frostbite were taken to Kujang-dong to warming tents.
A harbinger of what was to come is found in the order received by the 17th Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch howitzers) at 10 P.m. on 26 November to move back from Kujang-dong 30 miles on the river road to Kunu-ri. This was the first official order that presaged the retreat of the entire 2nd Infantry Division. Already it was possible to read the cards. Although the 9th Infantry Regiment had greater losses than the other two regiments in the division, all had incurred heavy losses. The 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, for instance, on 25 November had approximately 28 officers and 750 men. Three days later it was down to 9 officers and 250 men. Although most of the 9th Infantry on the morning of 27 November were on the east side of the Chongchon with the 23rd Infantry at Chinaman's Hat, its strength was so low that the protection of the area of Kujang-dong northward depended largely on the 23rd Infantry. If the 23rd Infantry should come to disaster in the next day, the fate of the 38th Infantry might be in jeopardy. It could escape only if the Kujang-dong-Tokchon road junction with the Chongchon River road was held. That depended on the 23rd Infantry primarily.
Meanwhile, the 38th Infantry cast of Kujang-dong was having its share of problems. On 26 November, after a night of battle almost everywhere on its line, the 38th Regiment was in a state of flux. One of the more serious factors was the movement of the ROK 3rd Regiment, westward into its lines cast of Tongchang, which was the coordinating point between K Company on the 38th Regiment's right flank and the ROK 3rd Regiment on the ROK II Corps's left flank. This development left the eastern flank of the 38th Regiment, the 2nd Division, the IX Corps, and the whole Eighth Army completely exposed to Chinese encirclement and attack from the Tokchon area. It has already been noted that General Walker had directed the IX Corps to send the Turkish Brigade to Tokchon to halt the retreat of the ROK 11 Corps and to deal with the CCF threat from that quarter. But Chinese forces had met and defeated the Turks on the road to Tokchon.
Colonel Peploc reported to General Keiser the movement of the ROK 3rd Regiment into his sector. Keiser reported it to IX Corps, which confirmed him and Peploc in Peploe's having assumed control of the ROK regiment and any other ROKs that might enter the 2nd Division zone of operations. The ROK regimental commander accepted Pcploc's control and cooperated fully with him. During 26 November Colonel Peploe sent two of the three ROK battalions to the left flank of his 1st Battalion to buttress his defense there.3°
Evidence of intense enemy buildup of supplies and ammunition for use against an expected Eighth Army drive north toward the border, or for a general attack south of their own in this area, came to light in the 38th Regimental sector on 26 November. A patrol found a Chinese ammunition dump in an abandoned lead mine. It was only 300 yards south of the Ku-fang-dongSomin-dong-Tokchon road. Two mine tunnels were used-in one tunnel, ammunition had been stored; in the other, billets had been built for troops. The stored ammunition included 500 cases of 60-mm mortar shells, 200 cases of 6.5 rifle ammunition, and 200 cases of 7.9 rifle ammunition-in all, about 18 tons of ammunition. Local civilians informed the patrol that about 100 Chinese soldiers came to the area on or about 9 November with a Korean interpreter and remained there for about ten days. During this period trucks and animal-drawn vehicles moved the ammunition into the mine tunnel. The Chinese worked only during the night. During daytime they remained hidden."
Previously during 26 November Peploe had sent C Company to restore G Company's line on the cast, but Chinese had encircled it. F and L companies were under fire. The 3rd Battalion was withdrawn under enemy fire to form a refused flank on the east of the 2nd Division line. In the middle, near Somindong, the 2nd Battalion lost two tanks before the battalion CP was abandoned. The battalion aid station also withdrew. In the fighting there, tank crew members said they encountered American-made rocket-launcher fire for the first time in Korea. The 2nd Battalion CP and parts of L Company withdrew one mile south of Somin-dong to Hill 404. I and K companies of the 3rd Battalion, two to three miles northeast of Somin-dong, meanwhile enjoyed relative calm.
By 6 P.m. on 26 November the 38th Regiment had established a new defensive line. The 3rd Battalion withdrew I and K companies from the original defcnsc line a mile or more west of the Somin-dong-Tokchon road and turned them to form a line facing south in a refused eastern flank. The 2nd Battalion centered on Hill 404, a mile south of Somin-dong, and the 1st Battalion was southeast of Chinaman's Hat. Generally, the 38th Regimental line now protectcd both the 2nd Division and Eighth Army from sudden envelopment on their eastern, or right, flank. The regimental line resembled roughly a horseshoe, the toe pointed north. On its western flank, the regiment had assigned C Company, 2nd Engineers, to the 1st Battalion to replace A Company as riflemen, since A Company was now combat ineffective. A Company went into regimental reserve in rear of the regimental CP.
-At the close of daylight on 26 November, the 2nd Division fine consisted of remnants of the 9th Infantry along the Chongchon River on the west; two battalions, the 1st and 2nd, of the 23rd Infantry were east of the river at Chinaman's Hat; and the 38th Infantry on its horseshoe-shaped line ran generally cast-west a few miles northeast of Kujang-dong. As stated earlier, some elements of the ROK 3rd Regiment were buttressing the 1st Battalion. The 38th Regiment was vulnerable in its position, as it had no north-south road in its sector. The only exit road was the lateral road running east-west from Tokchon to Kujang-dong, and Chinese had closed the Tokchon end. They had blocked the Kujang-long end in the regiment's sector at different points for part of the time. In effect, the exit at Kujang-dong to the Chongchon River road from the regimental position was the only possible escape route open to the 38th Infantry. Friendly forces had to hold Kujang-long to make the 38th Infantry withdrawal possible.
Th 2nd Division's position grew worse as available transportation diminished:. The division ordnance report for 26 November said that 20 vehicles a day were being lost, and the number increasing rapidly, because of a lack of spare parts. The division had abandoned 39 general-purpose vehicles and 47 track-laying vehicles for these reasons after stripping them of needed parts. But a favorable note
concerned winter clothing. Three thousand parkas and 2,695 pile jackets arrived at Won-ni on 26 November, and they were issued to troops the next day."
When Colonel Peploe had reached General Keiser on radio to tell him that the ROKs had collapsed on his right, that was Keiser's first information that his division's right flank was open and exposed. He instructed Peploe to use his own judgment as to how long he could hold his position. Keiser is reported to have said later that Peploe's prompt action in refusing his right flank saved the division at that time. He told Peploe to retire without further instructions whenever he felt it necessary to save the regiment. By this time the 38th Infantry had taken Chinese prisoners from three Chinese divisions, the CCF 113th and 114th from the CCF 38th Army, which hit him from the north, and from the 119th Division of the CCF 40th Army, which came from the west."
On the night of 26-27 November, the Chinese renewed their assault against F Company on Hill 383. Again they captured some high ground there. Cpl. Robert K. Imrie and his platoon undertook to recapture the lost ground. They came under heavy machine-gun cross fire, which stopped them. Then Imric alone charged the machine gun on the platoon's right flank under covering fire and, by automatic fire, succeeded in knocking out that position. But hardly had he accomplished this, than enemy machine-gun fire from the other flank hit and mortally wounded him. Imrie's platoon now attacked that machine-gun position and destroyed it."
For a time during the morning of 27 November, the 38th Regimental CP had no contact with F, K, and I companies through their battalion CPs. Peploe, hard pressed everywhere, now used elements of the ROK 3rd Regiment to support his line at its most threatened points, always issuing his orders through the ROK regimental commander. Chinese were attacking Hill 404, south of Somin-dong, and drove I Company from it. At the same time, other Chinese attacked Somin-dong, just north of Hill 404, and drove K Company from it. This and other related action cut the MSR between the 38th Infantry and its 3rd Battalion to the east.
Disaster in Korea Page 30
