In hard fighting, I Company and a section of tanks counterattacked, broke out of the enemy encirclement, and fought their way through Somin-dong to a friendly roadblock half a mile west, held by the 2nd Battalion. K Company in counterattacks was still trying to hold parts of Hills 404 and 360 to the south.
Farther west toward Kujang-dong, a Chinese force penetrated between B Company and a ROK battalion of the 3rd Regiment on its left flank and reached high ground from which they could deliver fire on the 38th Regimental CP and the Collecting Station adjacent to it. An air strike on this enemy force greatly aided B Company in regaining its position. During the day of the twentyseventh, there were 74 air sorties in the 2nd Division sector. One of the most spectaclar took place in the 38th Infantry's sector. This strike was directed against a mine shaft on Hill 943, where observers had reported a steady stream of enemy entering the mine. Air observers estimated this enemy force at 600, perhaps two battalions. The strike hit the mine entrance first with napalm and then with 500-pound bombs. The observers thought the strike closed the mine-shaft entrance and that possibly large numbers of Chinese may have perished inside.
Chinese even attacked the 38th Regimental CP on 27 November from its rear. Also included in this attack were the 38th Field Artillery Battalion, together with the attached A Battery of the 503rd Field Artillery Battalion. The headquarters personnel and the artillerymen beat off the attack, inflicting about 100 casualties on the Chinese." ROK troops were south of the CP.
At dusk the 38th Regimental CP moved about one and a half miles west. Chinese followed, and at 2 A.M. they again attacked the CP. Peploe then moved his CP farther west to the vicinity of Lieutenant Colonel Skeldon's 2nd Battalion's CP.31 This was the situation in the predawn hours of 28 November in the 38th Infantry. The regiment was now headed as rapidly as possible for Kujangdong, but it had to fight almost every foot of the way.
Full-scale retreat of the 2nd Infantry Division got under way during the night of 27-28 November. All day of the twenty-seventh, aerial observers had reported large numbers of enemy moving south from the direction of Huichon. Large numbers of Chinese perished from numerous air strikes, since many of these strikes caught groups and formations of Chinese in the open. While it will never be known how many Chinese lost their lives on 27 November in the 2nd Division sector from ground combat and from air strikes, the number must have been substantial by any standard. But the Chinese were willing to accept heavy losses to press their advantage.'
On 27 November Eighth Army was in the fourth day of its well-advertised "attack" to the North Korean border, but it was no longer an attack. It was now a retreat on all sectors of the front. The Chinese counterattack was rolling south and southwest against Eighth Army. With every passing hour it seemed to be assuming increased magnitude. To many, the picture was murky at best.
Meanwhile, on this day, 27 November, the X Corps on the other side of the peninsula in the Chosin Reservoir area was just beginning its offensive designed to drive west and cut off the Chinese who might be facing Eighth Army. While the X Corps offensive was doomed to failure and the corps's destruction itself was narrowly averted, it did not know on that day how critical the situation was in the Eighth Army front. And neither, apparently, did the Far East Command in Tokyo.
The night of 27-28 November was one of Chinese attacks almost everywhere against 2nd Infantry Division units. The 9th Infantry, still on the west end of the division line, and badly crippled, lost still more men. At this time, Lt. Col. Edgar V. H. Bell's 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion (4.2-inch mortars) was attached to the regiment and served as fight artillery for it. During the night, the mortar battalion lost almost all of its C Company. Of its vehicles, the company had only four jeeps left, and remaining personnel consisted of one officer and 24 enlisted men. Many of the missing, however, came in later to Clearing Stations or infiltrated back to friendly lines. After C Company of the mortar battalion was eliminated, Lieutenant Colonel Bell kept his A and B mortar companies in the fight. When the division withdrawal began, they were still with the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, and among the last troops to cross from the west to the east side of the Chongchon River. The mortar battalion loaded the 274 officers and men left in the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, on its vehicles and moved south to Won-ni, where the men set up a roadblock. It lasted only a short time. Bell said that at about 3:30 A.M. on 28 November, Major Barberis reported only 30 of his infantrymen left. The entire group then withdrew to Kunu-n.'
Map 9. The 2nd Infantry Division front line at 2 A.m., 28 November 1950.
The 8076th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) at Kunu-ri, and its commanding officer, Lt. Col. Krvder E. Van Duskirk, on 27 November 1950. National Archives 111-SC 354715
At the same time, the Ist and 2nd battalions of the 9th Infantry were trying desperately to withdraw south. Chinese overran the CP of the 3rd Battalion during the night and its members joined the 2nd Battalion CP. It will be recalled that the 2nd Battalion, under heavy enemy attack, crossed to the east side of the Chongchon and entered the 23rd Infantry's perimeter before dawn of 28 November.'
During 28 November, the 2nd Infantry Division attached the 9th Infantry, minus the 2nd Battalion, to the 23rd Infantry. These troops blocked for the 23rd Infantry during its withdrawal at Won-ni. From the beginning of the Chinese attack against Eighth Army, from the evening of 25 November to 29 No vember, the three infantry battalions of the 9th Infantry had more than 50 percent casualties. The 2nd and 3rd battalions each had less than 400 men remaining as they moved southward toward Kunu-ri.'
On its extreme right flank, the IX Corps at 11 A.M. on 28 November attached the Turkish Brigade to the 2nd Infantry Division. The division in turn attached the Turks to Peploe's 38th Infantry Regiment, which held that flank. The 38th Regiment also had the ROK 3rd Regiment under its control. Thus, from 28 November on, Peploe's 38th Regiment had the difficult and critical task of defending the Eighth Army's right flank on the forward battle line as the entire army went into a rapid retreat. At the same time, Eighth Army moved the 1st Cavalry Division, with the ROK 6th Division attached to it, behind the collapsed ROK II Corps sector, in an effort to halt or slow the Chinese envelopment there from the southeast. The 2nd Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division had no contact with each other. In between them, Chinese forces moved at will. The Eighth Army right flank was by this time in a most precarious position.'
On 28 November the 2nd Infantry Division issued an operations order establishing unit priority of movement with objectives the division staff hoped would result in an orderly withdrawal toward Kunu-ri. The 23rd Infantry, with the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, and the 72nd Tank Battalion attached, was to cover the division withdrawal. The 9th Infantry was to move south first and attempt to secure Won-ni (Pugwon) and hold a defensive position there. The 38th Regiment, in the hills west of Kujang-dong and heavily engaged with the enemy, was to break contact and fight its way west to Kujang-dong and then continue south on the river road to Kunu-ri, where it was to take up defensive positions northeast of the town. The 23rd Infantry was to withdraw from Chinaman's Hat to Kujang-dong and there establish a defense position that would hold open the road junction with the river road of the Somin-dongTokchon road, by which the 38th Regiment was withdrawing. If the 38th Regiment was to escape with any of its equipment, transport, and artillery, this road junction had to be held until the regiment had passed it. The 38th Regiment was in great danger during the night of 27-28 November of being cut off and decimated before it could reach Kujang-dong. Once the 38th Regiment passed through Kujang-dong and started south on the river road, the rest of the division would follow it, while rear-guard elements tried to hold back pursuing Chinese.'
During the night of 27-28 November, the artillery at Kujang-dong massed its fires on all avenues of approach to the 23rd Infantry at Chinaman's Hat. The artillery commanders knew that Chinese were attacking that regiment in great numbers and that it needed all the help they could give it. All artillery units
were ordered to strengthen their defenses, as it was considered possible that enemy forces might break through to them during the night. About midnight the division artillery at Kujang-dong received a radio message that one of their officers was to be present at division headquarters at 7 A.M. on 28 November to receive instructions. The division artillery S-3, Col. Walker R. Goodrich, was designated to attend the meeting.
At the conference the next morning, Goodrich learned that a Chinese roadblock was in place between the 38th Infantry and Kujang-dong, that the 38th Regiment was fighting its way toward Kujang-dong on the east-west road from that place to Tokchon, and that the regiment was expected to reach Kujangdong in several hours. The artillery units were to hold their positions at Kujangdong until the 38th Infantry reached that point, and then they would follow it and the 38th Artillery Battalion south in a withdrawal to positions south of Kunu-ri, on the road to Sunchon. When Goodrich returned to Kujang-dong, he relayed the 2nd Division's orders to all units, and a plan of withdrawal was prepared. The heavy artillery (17th Bn.) would go first, followed by the medium artillery (155th Bn.) and finally the light artillery (105 mm). All artillery battalions at Kujang-dong were ordered to send out reconnoitering parties to select firing positions south of Kunu-n'.'
About 10 A.M. on 28 November, an artillery air observer reported a column of approximately 200 to 250 soldiers dogtrotting along a ridge southeast of the Kujang-dong artillery positions. He maneuvered his plane above the column several times in an effort to determine whether they were ROK or Chinese, but without success. The artillery command informed the 2nd Division of the incident.'
All night of 27-28 November the 38th Infantry had fight after fight with the Chinese on the road west to Kujang-dong, with the Chinese trying to block its passage. The first task of the regiment was to break contact with the enemy and get on the road leading to Kujang-dong. It used vehicles and tanks for transportation when it could move; the ROK 3rd Regiment, having no vehicles, had to move on foot. The 2nd and 3rd battalions were to go out first, while the 1st Battalion held the road open for them.
Just after midnight, A and L companies, together with C Company of the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion, began a four-hour fight for control of a hill overlooking the road. They lost the hill at one time, but in a counterattack, led by a tank platoon, they recaptured it. In the meantime, Chinese occupied the 38th Regiment's former CP and high ground on both sides of the road with about 300 men. In this action, they had cut off Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher's 1st Battalion, which was east of the former regimental CP. Colonel Peploe called Kelleher to come to him to receive his withdrawal orders. Kelleher had a dangerous and difficult assignment to carry out his instruction, which was to break contact with enemy forces cast of the new big enemy roadblock and to fight his way at night westward through that roadblock to join the rest of the regiment.
In the effort, Kelleher had the help of a tank platoon and a company of the 3rd ROKs in attacking the roadblock. At dawn the ROKs, the tanks, and C Company of the Engineers engaged the Chinese at the roadblock in a savage fight. After 45 minutes they drove the Chinese off into the hills. In this fight, the Chinese knocked out two tanks with 2.36 rockets. L Company had joined the battle and, during the course of the fight, was reduced to one officer and 41 enlisted men. One platoon of C Company was cut off for a period. Tanks went back cast on the road and delivered overhead fire while the ROK troops attacked up an almost vertical slope to reach the Chinese entrenchments. C Company escaped during this daring rescue effort. Then Henry Brown with some tanks ran back farther to rescue wounded. The tank drivers and assistant drivers ran the tanks with their hatches partly open so that they could see. One driver saw a face and a hand appear at the partly opened hatch. He snapped it shut, and four fingers fell off inside the tank. But in other instances, Chinese who climbed on the tanks pulled off American wounded who had been placed there. The Chinese infantry were very aggressive in attacking these tanks. Often they climbed on them to throw grenades inside the hatch. They also made every effort to blind the crews by heavy concentrations of small-arms fire and to knock out periscopes, radio antennas, and the deck machine gun.9
Leading elements of the 38th Infantry reached Kujang-dong and turned south from the 2nd Division Artillery CP about noon of 28 November. The regiment had cleared the Kujang-dong junction with the river road by 3 P.M. When the leading elements of the regiment first began arriving at Kujang-dong, the regiment received an order to take a defensive position east and south of the town, and the regimental staff made reconnaissance to do this. But before this first order could be carried out, another had the 38th Infantry continue its withdrawal on south toward Kunu-ri.10
When the 38th Regiment cleared Kujang-dong at midafternoon on 28 November, its companies were down to an average of two officers and 40 men. The regiment was ten miles south of Kujang-dong when it received division orders to take up a defensive position north and east of Kunu-ri. Facing north, the 23rd Infantry would be on its left (west), and the Turks would be on its right (east). During the day, the Fifth Air Force gave strong air support to the 2nd Infantry Division, but it could not dislodge the CCF. One air observer reported a column from the northeast that looked like ROK troops marching around Peploe's right flank. It was believed, however, that nearly all the ROKs had left this area. The strike planes flew low over the column, and pilots could see South Korean uniforms. The column paid no attention to the planes. A bit later this column vanished from view. It is likely that it was CCF dressed as South Koreans and moving straight into the 2nd Division rear areas."
At 7 A.M. on 28 November, General Keiser ordered Colonel Freeman to move his 23rd Infantry to the vicinity of Won-ni. This regiment, still at Chinaman's Hat, was then the northernmost unit of the 2nd Division, although its 3rd Battalion was south of it, blocking the lateral road from Kujang-dong toward the 38th Infantry. Freeman's 1st Battalion and the regimental Headquarters Company were to go into a blocking formation just north of Kujang-dong, tying in there with the left flank of the 3rd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion was to remain in a blocking position 1,000 yards south of Chinaman's Hat until all of the 9th Infantry had passed through it.
When the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry, reached Kujang-dong, there was enemy fire on the area. The 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, meanwhile had been in a blocking position near Won-ni. After all elements of the 2nd Division had passed south through Kujang-dong, the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry, was to act as rear guard for the movement to Won-m. To carry out this mission the 1st Battalion held a position just south of the Kujang-dong road junction. Once the 1st Battalion was in position there, the 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, passed through it, then the 9th Infantry units, then the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, which had been fighting a delaying action south of Chinaman's Hat. By 5 P.m. on 28 November all elements of the 2nd Division had passed south of the 1st Battalion roadblock at Kujang-dong. The 1st Battalion started to fol low, with its A Company, accompanied by tanks, the rear guard. Lt. Col. Claire E. Hutchins, the battalion commander, stayed with A Company in personal command."
When the 38th Infantry passed through Kujang-dong at midafternoon, the artillery there followed south on the river road. The division Artillery Headquarters followed the 503rd Artillery Battalion. The movement was slow but orderly, with short halts from time to time. At dark the headquarters had reached the northern edge of Kunu-ri. There the artillery column met converging columns of the 25th Infantry Division, which was withdrawing from the northeast across the Chongchon River. In passing through Kunu-ri and for a few miles beyond, both divisions had to use the same road. Colonel Goodrich of the 2nd Division Artillery Headquarters and Colonel Dick, the 25th Division Artillery executive officer, joined at the Kunu-ri road junction to direct traffic of the merging columns. The last elements of the 25th Division cleared after 9 P.M., before those of the 2nd Division. After the 25th Division had cleared the road junction, Colonel Goodrich went on to the new 2nd Division Artillery CP. All artillery unit
s completed their withdrawal that night without loss and were in firing positions south of Kunu-ri by midnight, 28 November."
The 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry' the last of the 2nd Division infantry battalions to move into the withdrawal march order, started its withdrawal from Kujang-dong at dusk, a little after 5 P.M. on 28 November. Infantrymen from its B and C companies loaded on the 15th Field Artillery Battalion vehicles. A Company, in the rear, rode on tanks, with their organic weapons in trucks. South of Kujang-dong the battalion came to a halt because of a jammed vehicular column ahead. The tanks and A Company infantry deployed in rice paddies on the west side of the road, and soon engaged in an exchange of machine-gun fire with Chinese pursuers. This stoppage lasted about half an hour. After the road ahead began to clear, A Company reloaded on tanks and proceeded another one and a half miles, when it again came up against a stalled column.
Here a sharp firelight with the Chinese developed. The CCF now had mortars in action as well as machine guns, and there was heavy small-arms fire from the railroad embankment west of the road. The moon was up and cast a bright light. Men in A Company could see Chinese troops moving around the column and could hear them talk. The last tank in line was protected by the shadows of a wooded knob near the road. The men with the tank saw a column of about 50 Chinese, four abreast, walking south on the road toward them. The Chinese did not see the tank. First Lt. William Majors and 1st Lt. Barrie E. Storrs, the tank platoon leader, happened to be with this last tank at the end of the A Company column. At a distance of 25 yards from the approaching Chinese, Storrs fired the 76-mm tank gun and Majors fired the tank .50-caliber machine gun. Sfc. Jack W. Warren on the ground by the tank fired his BAR. When this heavy burst of point-blank fire hit them, the Chinese screamed, and those still on their feet scattered. Warren walked up the road to see if all were dead. He disappeared from view and never came back."
Disaster in Korea Page 31
