Disaster in Korea

by Roy E Appleman

  In response to the question, "Did the 2nd Infantry Division ever receive clearance from I Corps through IX Corps for using the Kunu-ri-Anju road?" Lieutenant Colonel Holden said "The answer is emphatically No." We know, as stated earlier in this chapter, that, about I A.M. on 30 November, General Keiser called his principal staff officers together in conference and told them he had just finished a telephone conference with General Coulter of IX Corps and that the latter had ordered him to take the 2nd Division out south on the Kunu-riSunchon road within the zone of IX Corps. General Coulter never countermanded it. In these circumstances, General Keiser believed he was not free to accept General Milburn's offer to use the Anju road.'°'

  In summary on this point, one may say that General Keiser never received from his superior commanders, either from General Coulter or from General Walker, authority to use his judgment as to whether he should withdraw his division on the Anju road, nor did he receive an order to do so. Rather, he had a definite order from General Coulter to take the division down the Sunchon road within the IX Corps zone of operations.

  General Keiser faced a most difficult task to get his division out on the Sunchon road, given the nature and strength of the CCF fireblock there, without incurring very heavy losses in men and equipment. If the IX Corps commander or the Eighth Army commander had kept fully abreast of developments on 30 November, and had strongly reinforced the Middlesex Battalion and mounted an attack from the south end of the Pass against the CCF fireblock, coincident with a 2nd Division attack from the north, the 2nd Division might have escaped with only a fraction of the loss in men and equipment it sustained. The IX Corps and the Eighth Army had the troops at hand in the vicinity of Sunchon to accomplish this. Available were the British 27th Commonwealth Brigade and about four battalions of the 1st Cavalry Division. Also, the 19th and 21st regiments of the 24th Division were west of the Taedong River near Sunchon on the morning of 30 November and could have been used. None were. Had the Pass been held by friendly troops, one of the most difficult obstacles to the passage of vehicles would have been eliminated.

  The Corps and the Eighth Army command must be charged with underestimating the critical nature of the situation on the 2nd Division front, of wrongly interpreting its intelligence of the enemy drive against the 2nd Division, and of not using its reserves to help the 2nd Infantry Division. One cannot fairly accuse General Keiser of being responsible for the disaster that overwhelmed the division on 30 November 1950. It was a higher-command failure as well.

  2nd Infantry Division Casualties at Kunu-ri

  In the chaotic conditions prevailing on 30 November and the loss of all 2nd Infantry Division records for the day, it is impossible to be exact in stating division personnel casualties in the enemy fireblock. Some generalizations are possible. It is known that the casualties were very great-crippling, in fact, for some units-and that the division was declared combat ineffective, having only about half its authorized strength at the beginning of December. For some units, it was possible later to be rather precise in giving casualties for 30 November1 December.

  The 82nd AAA AW Battalion, organic to the 2nd Division, lost 12 officers and 263 men, mostly from its Headquarters Battery, in the action south of Kunuri in the enemy fireblock. This battery was caught on the road when CCF fire New up two ammunition trucks and halted all movement behind them. In the ensuing action the enemy came off nearby ridges and swarmed over the road in one of the few instances this occurred during the period they enforced the fireblock.

  Some figures come from units (the 5th Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Cavalry Division) stationed at Sunchon while the 2nd Division was trying to reach that place. General Walker had made the 1st Cavalry Division responsible for covering the withdrawal of the 2nd Division south of Sunchon. A 5th Cavalry Regiment report stated that, on 30 November more than 700 wounded men from the 2nd Division and the Turkish Expeditionary Force passed through its aid stations and evacuation facilities. The 1st Cavalry Division War Diary states that more than 500 casualties passed through its medical and evacuation facilities on 30 November. They did not have enough ambulances to transport these wounded farther to the rear and had to use 2`h-ton trucks. In this way, the 1st Cavalry Division moved more than 500 wounded through its Clearing Station in less than 24 hours. It also arranged with Eighth Army to send a train with four coaches from Pyongyang to Sunchon with medical supplies and to assist in evacuation of wounded.'os

  The 2nd Infantry Division G-1 report for November 1950 states that, during the month, the division had 4,935 battle casualties, most of them near Kunu-ri and in the CCF fireblock. This figure includes 1-2 December, as it is impossible to separate those two days from 29-30 November in connection with casualties incurred below Kunu-ri. The division lost 237 officers in this period. The G-1 (Personnel Section) estimated that the division lost one-third of its strength in the period 27 November-2 December. The 2nd Engineer Battalion lost all its field-grade officers and many company-grade officers. The 2nd Division Medical Company lost all but one of its officers. Lt. Col. James Tanner, the 2nd Division G-1 Personnel Officer, gave the figures in tables 4 and 5 for the 2nd Division at the end of November.'"

  Table 4. Casualties for US 2nd Division, as of 30 November 1950

  The tabulations show that, of the three infantry regiments in the 2nd Division, the 9th Regiment suffered the greatest number of battle casualties in the battles along the Chongchon in late November. The Division Artillery suffered more casualties than any of the infantry regiments. This was caused in large part because of the extremely high casualties in the 6th serial of the withdrawal from Kunu-ri. After the 23rd RCT abandoned its rear-guard role, the remaining two battalions of artillery were badly hurt.

  In comparing the two tables, one learns that the 2nd Engineer Battalion suffered far more casualties in relation to its actual strength at the end of November than any other unit of the 2nd Division. The 23rd Infantry Regiment had less than half the casualties of the 38th Infantry, and only a little more than a third those of the 9th Infantry. The 2nd Division was a little more than half strength at the close of the Chongchon River and Kunu-ri battles at the end of November.

  One regiment of the division, the 9th Infantry, made a tabulation of its casualties in November, most of them occurring 27-30 November. This count reveals its losses by battalions: 1st Battalion, 428; 2nd Battalion, 331; and 3rd Battalion, 397. These figures do not include the casualties of its special units or of attached ROKs. It lost 6 battalion staff officers, 11 company commanders, and 5 medical officers. 107 The three rifle battalions of the 9th Infantry had only 35 officers and 751 enlisted men, for a total of 786 men.

  Some indication of the number of wounded and severe frostbite cases that had accumulated at Pyongyang, behind the lines, by 30 November is indicated in the fact that, on that day, 740 patients were flown out of Pyongyang for treatment in hospitals farther to the rear or in Japan, that 300 still awaited evacuation, 130 more were at the 8063rd Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, and 300 were at the 25th Medical Clearing Company for Not all of these were from the 2nd Division.

  The US 25th Infantry Division was adjacent to the 2nd Infantry Division on the west and had heavy fighting and resultant heavy casualties during the Chinese 2nd Phase Offensive. It reported 1,313 battle casualties for November, second highest for the American divisions, but this was only one-fourth those of the 2nd Division.'" This is a measure of the 2nd Division battle casualties as compared with other American divisions in this ill-fated "drive to the border."

  Generally in a military disaster, the losses at first seem larger than a later count reveals. As the days pass following any defeat and loss of a battlefield, stragglers and sometimes groups of men who have had to take to the hills on foot begin to come in and increase the number of survivors. So it was about 30 November at Kunu-ri. During the first week of December, a total of 724 men returned to their units and were removed from the missing-in-action status. After the first week of December, however, th
ere were few further arrivals of stragglers. Just about all who were ever to regain friendly lines from the Kunu-ri action had done so, and it was possible then to make a reasonably accurate count of the losses.1'

  As elements of the 2nd Infantry Division arrived at Sunchon in the late afternoon and night of 30 November they were instructed to go to an assembly area seven miles south of the town. Some personnel did not stop when they got there but continued on to Pyongyang. The bulk of the division, however, stopped at the designated assembly area, where the division had established its CP. There the division received Eighth Army orders for it to go into army reserve and move to the vicinity of Chunghwa. There it would try to regroup if the current front line could be held and stabilized."'

  Table S. Strength of US 2nd Division Units, 30 November 1950

  Perhaps the most reliable assessment of the damage suffered by the 2nd Infantry Division at Kunu-ri is set forth in Lt. Col. A. E. Lancaster's report to Colonel Dabney, Eighth Army G-3, on 5 December 1950. Lancaster was a staff officer in the G-3 Section. He was sent to the 2nd Infantry Division on 5 December when it was in the Munsan-ni area, for the purpose of obtaining its latest count on personnel and equipment losses at Kunu-ri. It was thought at that date the count would be reasonably accurate. Lancaster's report on the 2nd Division status showed the following major facts:

  The 2nd Engineer Battalion came out with six vehicles and about 300 men. All field-grade officers were lost.

  The Division Artillery lost all 155-mm howitzers and all but eight 105-mm howitzers. The 38th Field Artillery Battalion had only 65 enlisted men left.

  The 9th Regiment had 1,400 officers and men, a capability of one battalion, plus.

  The 23rd Regiment had 2,200 officers and men, a capability of a regiment, minus.

  The 38th Regiment had 1,600 officers and men, with a recount in the regiment increasing the number to 1,801 men and 51 ROKs, a capability of 1 battalion, plus.

  The 72nd Tank Battalion was in fairly good shape, with 33 tanks.

  The 2nd Battalion, 38th Infantry, had lost all company commanders.

  The 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry, had lost its entire battalion staff and the battalion commander was seriously wounded and evacuated.

  The Turkish Brigade had a strength of 4,118 officers and men. It reported a loss of 68 men killed, 238 wounded, and 630 missing in action."'

  2nd Infantry Division Equipment Losses at Kunu-ri

  The loss of the 2nd Division in artillery pieces at Kunu-ri was easily the heaviest of any action in the Korean War. Three artillery battalions-the 503rd, the 38th, and the 15th-lost all their pieces. The 15th Artillery Battalion, attached to the 23rd Infantry Regiment, left its artillery in position but destroyed vital parts of the firing mechanism when the 23rd Regiment hastily broke contact with the enemy and withdrew its personnel about 4:30 or 5:00 P.M. west on the Anju road from the hills southwest of Kunu-ri. In the enemy fireblock on the Kunu-ri-Sunchon road, the 38th Field Artillery Battalion abandoned its howitzers. The 503rd Artillery Battalion, likewise, abandoned or lost all its howitzers on the withdrawal road when the bypass ford at the blown bridge near Karhyon became impassable near midnight, 30 November. The 37th Field Artillery Battalion got out with eight howitzers. Of the five artillery battalions with the 2nd Infantry Division, only the 17th with its 8-inch howitzers, and the first of the artillery battalions in the march order through the enemy fireblock, got out with nearly all its guns. Table 6 gives the artillery strengths and losses of guns at Kunu-n, 30 November, as best as can be determined.

  The 82nd AAA AW Battalion's M19s and M16s were interspersed, as de scribed earlier, in the march order of the division column. They were without any doubt the most effective defense weapon in the division column in going through the enemy fireblock. It seems appropriate to list the commanding officers of the several batteries:

  82nd AAA AW Bn.-Lt. Col. Walter Killilae, CO

  A Battery-Capt. Edgar L. Casey, CO; Sgt. Lewis E. Chancy

  B Battery-1st Lt. C. T. Hathaway, CO; Sgt. Bobby F. Dill

  C Battery-Capt. Robert Adams, CO

  D Battery-Capt. Simon Stevens, CO

  One eyewitness of the scene told of finding the entire crew of an M16 dead beside their vehicle on the road and more than "500 dead CCF on approaches" to it. While this is certainly an exaggerated count or estimate of enemy dead, the impression that the M16 killed a lot of the CCF before its crew were overrun and killed may be considered valid. One M19 with its two Bofors automatic 40-mm guns with the 38th Infantry was credited with knocking out three enemy machine guns in the fireblock."'

  Other heavy weapons and equipment losses at Kunu-ri included 40 to 50 percent of all signal equipment, 45 percent of crew-served weapons (the Engineer Battalion lost 90 percent of its crew-served weapons), and 30 percent of all vehicles. The Turkish Brigade lost 50 percent of its artillery, 90 percent of its signal equipment, and 90 percent of its vehicles."` The 2nd Infantry Division and Eighth Army finally settled on the number of men lost in the division at Kunu-ri -killed, wounded, and missing-as 4,037. The 2nd Division at the end of the Kunu-ri action was given an overall capability of one regimental combat team.15

  Maj. Gen. Laurence B. Keiser-Scapegoat?

  Maj. Gen. Laurence B. Keiser was 55 years old when he rode and walked through the CCF fireblock on 30 November, fighting his way more like an infantry pri vate than the commanding general of a division. After the 2nd Infantry Division command staff left its CP six miles south of Kunu-ri and started through the CCF fireblock toward Sunchon in the afternoon of 30 November it lost communication with just about all its subordinate units, and there was no command control of the division column. It was largely a case of every unit, and often every individual, for itself or himself. In this chaotic afternoon, General Keiser showed personal courage equal to that of anyone in the division, over which he no longer had any control. Was he to blame for the sorry situation of and the thousands of casualties in this exhausted combat division that had covered Eighth Army in its exposed extremity for the past five days and nights? This question is interesting, if unanswerable.1'

  Table 6. US 2nd Division Artillery Losses at Kunu-ri

  Source: The number of weapons in the artillery battalion is based on Goodrich, letter to author, 16 Mar. 1982, giving strength as of 24 Nov. 1950. The losses are based on Lancaster, Report, and the known loss of one 8-inch howitzer that turned over in a ravine nearing the blown bridge, killing ROK troops riding on it. The count does not include artillery lost by the Turkish Brigade.

  On 30 November General Keiser was not in the best of condition. He suffered that day and later from a bad cold. On 28 November, according to Capt. William E. Manning, General Keiser seemed to be in excellent health. Two days later, when the division was preparing to fight its way through the enemy fireblock, Manning said Keiser had a had cold and was bundled up in a heavy parka. Others who saw him at different times in the fireblock said he appeared to have a heavy cold and was using a bandanna handkerchief frequently. He loaded his jeep to the limit of its capacity with wounded as he went through the fireblock. His jeep acquired seven small-arms and machine-gun bullet holes, but remained operational, in getting through the fireblock. Many persons saw General Keiser using his old Springfield 1903 bolt-action rifle in returning enemy fire at the frequent stops he made in the fireblock.

  At the pass, General Keiser was on foot most of the time, trying to find soldiers he could organize into some kind of effective resistance. He walked down the south side and then turned back toward the top. By now he was very tired. One story has it that he failed to lift his booted foot high enough to clear the body of what appeared to be a dead soldier in the road and accidentally stubbed his toe against it. The supposed corpse jerked upright and cursed the man who had stumbled against him. General Keiser, astonished, said, "My friend, I'm sorry," and continued on up the road to the point where he had left his jeep.

  Colonel Epley saw General Keiser at Sunchon when he arrived t
here and reported to the 2nd Division CP on the evening of 30 November. Epley wrote of that meeting, "One of the first questions I asked General Keiser when I reported to him at Sunchon after reaching the Division assembly area was-Did you authorize the 23rd RCT to withdraw via the Anju route? His answer was an emphatic `No!"""

  The next day, 1 December, Capt. Perry Davis, the division information officer, saw General Keiser. At that time Davis said Keiser had a bad cold. In the following days, Captain Manning said Keiser had a bad cough, was quite hoarse, and was often blowing his nose. Colonel Carle, the division surgeon, recommended that General Keiser go to a hospital. According to the Chief of Staffs Journal in the 2nd Division Command Report for December 1950, an entry at 6:30 P.M. on 5 December said that General Keiser was taken to a field hospital because of a "serious illness." Brig. Gen. Loyal M. Haynes assumed acting command of the division. He held this post until 1:45 P.M. on 7 December, when Maj. Gen. Robert B. McClure arrived to take command of the division.'

  The Eighth Army Command Report on 5 December, in its G-3 Section, cared its first official record that General Keiser was being evacuated from Korea to Japan for treatment of a cold influenza and "pneumonia" and was being replaced by Maj. Gen. Robert B. McClure as commanding general of the 2nd Infantry Division.19 General Keiser did not consider himself that ill and always thought the charge to evacuate him for medical reasons to Japan for treatment of pneumonia was nothing more than an excuse to relieve him of command of the 2nd Division because of what happened to it south of Kunu-ri.

  When the 2nd Division had withdrawn south as far as the Han River in early December, it set up its CP at Yongdong-po on the south bank, opposite Seoul. There, on 6 December General Keiser received what was said to be an army order to go to Japan for medical and hospital treatment. He left the next day for Japan. The official word passed out was that he had pneumonia. He never returned to the division. There is no official record that he was relieved of command of the 2nd Division, and there appears to be no adverse reprimand or other comment from the Eighth Army commander about him in the records.