Disaster in Korea

by Roy E Appleman

  The next day a switch engine arrived at Sadon Station at 8 P.M. with six flatcars of replacement tanks for the 6th and 70th tank battalions. The Air Force crew left just about that time, and the ramp became available. In leaving, the Air Force abandoned much of its equipment at the rail yard. Banks told the North Korean locomotive operator to switch the cars and bring the flatcars to the ramp. The newly arrived replacement tanks were then unloaded. It was then found that two of them would not start. The 57th Ordnance Recovery Company had all the tanks unloaded before midnight, but only two disabled tanks were loaded during the rest of the night. The next morning, loading resumed and went faster. At 8 A.M. that morning, 2 December, Banks received orders that the 57th Ordnance Recovery Company had to leave Pyongyang by noon the next day, 3 December.

  According to Lieutenant Banks, 17 disabled tanks had been loaded on the flatcars by 9:30 A.M. on 3 December-14 disabled M-46 Patton tanks, the two M-46 Patton replacement tanks that would not start, and one M-26 Pershing tank. Banks notified Flicker, the RTO at Sadon Station, that the tank loading was completed and the cars could be pulled out of the station. Lieutenant Flicker could not give assurance they would be moved-there was no locomotive there. Banks then telephoned Lt. Col. Herbert W. Wurtzler, I Corps ordnance officer. Wurtzler was not in his office to take the call, but it was relayed to him. He in turn notified Eighth Army that the tanks were loaded and ready for evacuation. A locomotive was needed. Eighth Army said it would be sent. A little later, the RTO at Sariwon notified Lieutenant Colonel Wurtzler that three locomotives had started for the Sadon Station. None ever arrived there. The last train that left Sadon Station carried the 14th Engineer Battalion, but no tanks.

  On 4 December the Air Force reported a daylight attack of F-51s and F-80s that destroyed eight and damaged six friendly tanks in the vicinity of Pyongyang. Two days later, on 6 December, the US I Corps Ordnance Section received a report from the Air Force that it had destroyed 16 tanks at Pyongyang15 M-46 Patton tanks and one M-26 Pershing tank. These were the tanks that Lieutenant Banks and personnel of the 57th Ordnance Recovery Company had tried so hard to evacuate from Pyongyang. Thus, we see the devoted work, frustration, and final failure of a less than smoothly running Army machine in the course of a major defeat and its aftermath.32

  The personnel of the 57th Ordnance Recovery Company were under firm orders to evacuate Pyongyang by noon, 3 December. On the way south, about 15 miles below Sariwon, military police would not allow the company to stop to retrieve one of its wrecker vehicles that had slid off the road. They insisted that to do so would interrupt traffic moving south. The Ordnance Company had another defeat in that it had to pour gasoline on the vehicle and burn it. In their withdrawal, company personnel saw many other vehicles burned along the side of the road.

  In Pyongyang, where explosions and fires were becoming ever more common on 3 and 4 December as the evacuation continued, one stood out above all others. It started as an accident. A British truck loaded with ammunition accidentally caught fire at 11 P.M. on 3 December at the British ASP 16 near the Pyongyang K-23 airfield. The burning truck and exploding ammunition in it started a chain reaction of explosions in the Ammunition Supply Point that continued until 100 tons of British ammunition and 900 tons of American ammunition had been destroyed. Among the losses were 10,000 rounds of 105-mm howitzer shells and 1,000 rounds of 155-mm howitzer shells. The burning and exploding ammunition at ASP 16 continued through the early hours of 4 December. All traffic on the roads near it was stopped for a period of three hours. This big fire and the thunderous roar of exploding shells, heard throughout the city, caused chaos during the night. It also caused a delay in the departure of some military units in the withdrawal."

  In the developing crisis in Korea during the first days of December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that their agent for Korean Affairs, Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins, should visit Japan and Korea for the purpose of making a personal appraisal of the situation, talk with Generals MacArthur, Walker, and Almond, and then report back to them. Collins's arrival in Tokyo nearly coincided with the big explosions at ASP 16 in Pyongyang. Collins conferred hastily with MacArthur on the morning of 4 December, immediately after his arrival, and then left for Seoul, Korea. General Walker flew from Pyongyang to Seoul that day to meet Collins, who later in the day continued on to Sariwon, where he met General Milburn, commander of I Corps.

  The next day, 5 December, Collins flew to Hamhung in northeast Korea, where he conferred with General Almond. That night he returned to Tokyo. The next day he conferred with General MacArthur, Admiral Joy, and General Stratcmeyer, together with Generals Hickey, Wright, and Willoughby of MacArthur's staff. On 8 December General Collins was back in Washington, where he reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

  Collins had submitted an interim report to the Joint Chiefs on 4 December after his first meeting with MacArthur and before he left for Korea. In it he said that the X Corps had been ordered to assemble in the Hamhung area, that Eighth Army would hold the Pyongyang area as long as possible, but that the Far East Command felt it would "ultimately have to fall back to Seoul-Inchon area. No estimate now on this timing."" It is difficult to understand this last analysis of the Eighth Army situation because General Walker had already the day before informed General MacArthur that he could not hold Pyongyang, and on 3 December he had ordered its evacuation.

  In his conference with General Collins at Seoul on 4 December, General Walker told Collins that he could continue the Eighth Army withdrawal without further serious losses unless he were ordered to defend the Seoul-Inchon area. In that event he felt the Chinese could encircle him. He felt that an evacuation of the army from Inchon would be costly and that, if an evacuation of the army from Korea became necessary, it should be made from Pusan and not from Inchon. Walker felt he could safely get the army into a defensive position at Pusan and hold there for an indefinite time if the X Corps joined him there. At Hamhung, Collins found that General Almond believed he could hold the Hamhung-Hungnam area for an indefinite period and could withdraw from it successfully when ordered. General Collins agreed with these assessments.

  When General Collins returned to Tokyo on the evening of 5 December he knew the views of Generals Walker and Almond. He spent the next day going over the several options General MacArthur presented for action during the period ahead. General MacArthur told General Collins that, if the CCF continued their attack and he received no reinforcements from the United States or from the Nationalist Chinese, if he were not allowed to mount air attacks against China, and if there were no blockade against China, his forces would have to be withdrawn from Korea. Use of the atomic bomb in North Korea was discussed. General MacArthur agreed with General Walker that, if the UN troops were withdrawn from Korea, it should be done through the port of Pusan. General Collins agreed. The other options considered need not be discussed here, as the conditions that did prevail as policy decisions in Washington were those just mentioned. General MacArthur made it clear to General Collins that he felt impossible restrictions were being placed on him in conducting the war."

  The Last Troops out of Pyongyang

  While the British 29th Brigade was the tactical infantry organization for the protection of Pyongyang from possible CCF attack during its evacuation, the I Corps Engineers carried out the destruction of the Taedong River bridges, the rail and warehouse facilities, and selected targets within the city. It is impossible to know precisely what unit was the last to leave Pyongyang. It is reasonably clear, however, that, when all tactical units had passed through their perimeter and crossed the Taedong River during the night of 4-5 December, the British 29th Brigade informed the Engineer demolition units to start their final work-the destruction of the bridges crossing the Taedong River. These were blown by 7:20 A.M. on 5 December. I Corps Engineers reported to the I Corps commander at 8 A.M. that morning that all planned demolitions had been completed.

  Within the British 29th Brigade, the Royal Ulster Battal
ion is credited with being the last infantry unit to cross from the north to the south side of the river, at 6:30 A. M. on 5 December. Some Engineer units of I Corps crossed later after their last demolitions north of the river. Maj. Gen. William F. Marquat, of the Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA AW), says that D Battery, 865th AAA AW Battalion, engaged in airfield defense at Pyongyang, was the last American unit to leave the city. It is probable, however, that some unidentified Engineer demolition squad of the I Corps Engineers were the last troops to leave Pyongyang. In any event, all UN troops were out of Pyongyang by 9 A.M. on 5 December, except possibly for a few inevitable stragglers."

  On 5 December, as Eighth Army completed the evacuation of Pyongyang, it requested that General MacArthur change the boundary between the X Corps and itself to give the army control of all the area eastward not occupied by X Corps and then for the boundary to follow the 39th Parallel eastward to the coast. It also requested that the Navy be required to watch the east coast south of Hamhung and to land ROK Navy patrols there to question civilians about potential and actual enemy activities. Eighth Army also asked for air surveillance of this area. These requests reflected Eighth Army's concern about CCF and North Korean troop movements in the central and eastern parts of the Korean peninsula and their potential of outflanking the army on the east and cutting it off from Pusan."

  Chinnampo Evacuated

  The decision to evacuate Pyongyang carried with it necessarily the decision also to abandon its port, Chinnampo, situated 30 air miles southwest on an estuary of the Tacdong River where it empties into the Yellow Sea. This event was particularly ironic in that, at tremendous effort, the US Navy, in its greatest minesweeping effort ever made, had just cleared the 84-mile-long channel leading to the port. Supplies for Eighth Army in support of its operations north of Pyongyang had just started arriving from Chinnampo. All that the Navy had accomplished at Chinnampo was speedily undone. It literally went up in smoke."

  It chanced that, on 1 December US Navy Transport Squadron 1, with APA (attack) transports Bayfeld, Briar, and Okanogan, and AKAs (cargo ships) Algol and Montague, with Capt. S. G. Kelly in the BayfeId, commanding, were en route from Japan to Inchon. While steaming north in the Yellow Sea on the afternoon of 3 December Captain Kelly intercepted an urgent message from Eighth Army to the commander, Navy Far East, to divert these ships to Chinnampo to help evacuate that port. Captain Kelly did not receive any immediate orders from the Navy Far East to change his destination, and for five hours he continued on course. Then, on his own initiative at 10 P.M., he changed course and headed for Chinnampo. The next morning at 3:30 on 4 December, Kelly intercepted a naval message that six destroyers were available to protect his transports and that the Ceylon was leaving Sasebo, Japan, to join them. Unknown to Kelly, Admiral Andrewes, in the aircraft carrier Theseus, and four destroyers were also preparing to sail for Chinnampo.

  Meanwhile at Chinnampo, Lt. Comdr. Henry J. Erekson, with the destroyer escort Foss, was providing the town with electric power. Off the mouth of the Taedong River, a mine-sweeping group was still at work. There was a small South Korean naval base with three motor launches at Chinnampo. About 3 A.M. on 4 December, the South Korean naval-base commander reported to Erekson that Eighth Army had ordered him to leave at once, and that he had 100 sailboats available to remove some refugees. Of the 50,000 refugees on hand, he estimated he could take only 20,000 out by sea; the remaining 30,000 would have to go by land.

  The American transports under Captain Kelly through the night continued on their way toward Chinnampo. At 9:30 A.M. on 4 December his group of five ships, with the exception of the Bexar, had reached the outer end of the 84-mile swept channel and started in. Believing that surrounded army units were awaiting rescue, Kelly gave orders to man all guns, lower all boats, commence loading at once, and keep steam up to the throttles. About this time he received a succession of radio messages that the destroyers were on their way to give protection and that the next day the Theseus would be there to give air cover. Captain Kelly was now in charge of the Chinnampo evacuation.

  Kelly and his transport crews quickly learned that the only army troops at Chinnampo were 1,700 port logistics personnel and about 7,000 South Koreans, some of them wounded soldiers; others were government workers, military and political prisoners, and police. The &,xar, coming up the channel in the dark, had now arrived. With the loading rapidly nearing completion, the main problem ahead was to get safely back down the tortuous channel. It was considered best to leave Chinnampo as soon as possible because it was a poor place in which to be caught. Hills came down to the harbor's edge. From the reverse slope enemy mortars could hit the ship anchorage. Word came that Chinese were in Pyongyang, and that some of their forces were closing on Chinnampo-an erroneous report. At 9 P.m. on the night of 4 December the six destroyers had reached the mouth of the Taedong and started in to protect the transports at Chinnampo. Two of them never made it, one going aground and the other fouling a screw propeller in a buoy cable. The latter turned back. By 2:40 A.M. on 5 December the other four destroyers (Cuyuga, Athabaskan, Bataan, and Forrest Ro)al) anchored off Chinnampo and trained their guns on the waterfront.

  Loading continued on the morning of the fifth, mostly refugees packing into sailboats, which then slipped downriver. In the afternoon, aircraft from the Theseus arrived over Chinnampo. Half an hour after noon, the American transports began leaving the Chinnampo anchorage individually, and by 2:30 P.M. the beach was nearly empty. But then, suddenly, 3,000 more Korean refugees arrived. The unexpected arrival of another ship, which had not received notice of diversion to another destination, solved that problem, and the refugees were taken from the dock to this ship. At 5:30 P.M. on 5 December, the Bexar, the last of the transports to leave, headed downstream together with the destroyer escort Foss. LSTs, having the port logistics personnel aboard, anchored in the harbor for the night. The destroyers then bombarded the oil storage tanks, harbor cranes, railway equipment, and everything else considered of military value to the enemy. After daylight on 6 December, the destroyers and the LSTs made an uneventful trip down the channel. The night before, the Bexar had grounded north of Sokto but got herself free without damage. A blinding snowstorm raged over the mouth of the Taedong and the Yellow Sea on the sixth. The passage through the open sea was not without danger, as floating mines were frequently encountered. About 2,000 tons of military supplies at Chinnampo were destroyed in the evacuation of the port.'°

  After the evacuation of Pyongyang, the rumor spread (and was repeated by some officers of the army) that a large amount of highly secret enemy materials, collected by a special American task force in the first hours after the capture of Pyongyang in October, had been lost in the hectic evacuation of the city on 4-5 December. Lt. Col. Ralph L. Foster, G-2 of the US 2nd Infantry Division, had led this task force, known as Task Force Indianhead, named from the shoulder patch of the 2nd Division. It had been attached to the 1st Cavalry Division for the entry into Pyongyang. Its mission was to enter the city with the leading 1st Cavalry troops and to secure and protect certain government buildings and foreign compounds until they could be searched for intelligence materials. Highly classified Soviet and North Korean materials were obtained in this way. The rumor that this material had been lost was untrue. The material, collected by Foster's group and Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) agents, was turned over to a Far East Command General Headquarters Team from Tokyo, headed by Maj. Eugene Kryloff, and flown back to Japan to ATIS. The rumor regarding the loss of this material apparently derived from the fact that a copy of a summary report on it was lost with all 2nd Division G-2 records in the withdrawal from Pyongyang.'0

  The Last Hours of Eighth Army Headquarters in Pyongyang

  If one counts 5 December as the last day any Eighth Army and UN troops were in Pyongyang, American troops had held this oldest of Korean cities for 47 days. First Lt. James H. Bell's F Company, 5th Cavalry Regiment, had reached outskirts of the city about noon on 19 October. The ROK 15th R
egiment of the ROK 1st Division was the first unit to cross the Taedong River and reach the main part of Pyongyang later in the day. On 24 October, five days later, when Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker arrived in Pyongyang to take personal command of the Eighth Army Advance CP, which Col. William A. Collier, deputy chief of staff, had established in the North Korean capitol building two days earlier, he took over Kim II Sung's room as his office. No one ever disturbed Joseph Stalin's picture in its place on the wall of the room, and it was still there when Eighth Army abandoned the city."

  it seems appropriate to describe the last days of the Eighth Army occupancy of its Advance Headquarters in Pyongyang, especially since we have, in Cpl. Randle M. Hurst's manuscript, an eyewitness account. He appears to be the last American soldier to have left the building in the evacuation of Pyongyang. Hurst, a member of the 502nd Reconnaissance Platoon, General Walker's personal bodyguard, gives an intimate view of what the CP was like in the midst of the hectic withdrawal from North Korea.

  Hurst was a native of Oklahoma City. He volunteered for the army at the age of 19, in 1948, and arrived at Yokohama, Japan, in October 1949. He was assigned to the 519th Military Police Battalion. In it he was a member of "the General's Platoon," C Company, and was present for duty on 19 October 1949. The platoon numbered about 25 soldiers, who guarded Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker's residence and his Eighth Army Headquarters office in downtown Yokohama. In the spring of 1950, the General's Guard Platoon of C Company, Military Police, was changed to the 502nd Reconnaissance Platoon. It then had about 45 men.