Payton and Brees

by Jeff Duncan

  “Our goal was to find guys that were unselfish and put the team first,” Payton said. “There’s an accountability that comes with that. The turnaround had to start with the players we were bringing into the building. If we’re not signing or drafting the right player, then it becomes more challenging. Getting the right leadership and creating the right atmosphere in the locker room was critical.”

  Payton and Loomis didn’t stop there. They made another difficult move in Week 11 of the 2015 season, when they fired Ryan as defensive coordinator and promoted Dennis Allen to the role. The move to the Seahawks-style defense had been an unmitigated disaster and the Saints defense nosedived to the bottom of the league rankings. In 2015, they allowed an NFL-record 45 touchdown passes and an opposing passer rating of 116.1. They finished 31st in the league in total defense (413.4 yards per game allowed) for a second consecutive season and were dead last in scoring defense (29.8 points per game allowed).

  And while Payton believed hiring Ireland and promoting Allen were steps in the right direction, his relationship with Loomis had continued to devolve behind the scenes. The back-to-back losing seasons in 2014 and 2015 strained the entire organization and exacerbated the issues between the two leaders. By the end of the 2015 season, things were growing worse instead of getting better.

  “There’s nothing in that building that goes on that Sean doesn’t know about, and he would get mad about the dumbest things,” said Mike Ornstein, a longtime marketing executive and friend and business associate of Payton and Loomis. “Sean was treating people so poorly, and Mickey would have to deal with it. It had gotten so ugly between Sean and Mickey that either Sean was going to get fired or he was going to quit.”

  Payton had become so frustrated he began to seriously explore an exit strategy. He leaned on his mentor, Bill Parcells, who was a proponent of change. During his Hall of Fame career as a coach and general manager, Parcells famously moved from job to job, rarely staying with one club longer than four seasons. Payton had always believed he would coach in New Orleans for his entire career. But the situation had become so frustrating to him, he now was seriously considering a move for the first time.

  Payton, through intermediaries including Ornstein himself, held back-channel talks with the San Francisco 49ers and Indianapolis Colts after the 2015 season. The 49ers and Colts were attractive for different reasons. The Colts were rebuilding around quarterback Andrew Luck, whom Payton viewed as a Brees-like franchise talent. The 49ers were run by general manager Trent Baalke, a Parcells protégé, and owned a bevy of draft picks and salary cap space to facilitate their rebuilding plan. Each was a potential quick fix, certainly less challenging than the job he inherited in New Orleans. But neither the Colts nor 49ers situation ever grew serious enough to merit a formal interview. Instead, Payton and Loomis conducted a series of in-depth meetings after the season and mended fences, and Payton signed a five-year contract extension that paid him $9.5 million annually, compensation that made him the second-highest-paid coach in the NFL behind only Bill Belichick.

  During an emotional press conference on January 6, 2016, Payton pledged his commitment to the organization and city. NFL head coaches typically conduct postseason press briefings to wrap up the year, but this get-together was different. Payton spoke for 61 minutes. The session was conducted in the Saints media room rather than on the practice field and was attended by Loomis, Saints president Dennis Lauscha, and owners Tom and Gayle Benson in a show of support and solidarity.

  “I knew in my heart of hearts, [leaving the Saints] was not going to be something that came to fruition, and that was something I knew in my heart that I didn’t want to come to fruition,” Payton said that day. “And yet, there’s a part of what we do that we can’t control. There will be a time where they don’t want you back anymore, and that’s okay. One by one that train stops for all of us.”

  But the positive vibes didn’t last long.

  After another disappointing 7–9 season in 2016, reports surfaced that Payton was putting out similar feelers with the Los Angeles Rams, who had fired head coach Jeff Fisher that December. By this time, Loomis and Saints ownership had grown weary of Payton’s dalliances with other teams. After three consecutive losing seasons, there was a feeling by some inside that organization that a change might be best for both sides. The Saints were prepared to lose Payton and start a new chapter. The Rams asked to interview Payton the week after the Saints’ season-ending 38–32 loss to the Atlanta Falcons, but once Loomis informed them any “trade” for Payton would involve compensation in the form of high draft picks, the Rams backed off and turned their sights toward Washington Redskins offensive coordinator Sean McVay, whom they eventually hired a week later. With encouragement from Ornstein, who was playing the role of consigliere, Payton and Loomis once again met behind closed doors and reconciled their differences.

  Loomis knew smart, talented leaders like Payton were hard to find. But he also knew that these things happened sometimes in the NFL. Great coaches can lose their way. Environments can go stale on them if they stay too long in one place. It happened to Andy Reid in Philadelphia and to Mike McCarthy in Green Bay. Sometimes a change can be the best thing for both sides. Loomis didn’t want to lose his head coach. He was loyal to Payton. But his first loyalty was to the organization, and he believed the Saints needed and deserved a coach who was “all in.” Loomis knew the landscape of the NFL. He knew the Saints, with their respected, hands-off owner Gayle Benson, fawning small-market media corps, and favorable lease arrangement with the state of Louisiana, were a unique franchise with several built-in advantages Payton wouldn’t experience elsewhere.

  “Those three years had been rough, and I had some pretty frank and hard discussions with him about it,” Loomis said. “And I think he eventually arrived at the decision that this is where he wanted to coach for the rest of his career. And that was a change from previous years.”

  Added Payton: “Mickey and I talked that offseason about the direction we were going. It was not renewing our vows but reconsidering what we created [in 2006] and how fragile that can be. Mrs. Benson has been great to work for. Mickey and Dennis [Lauscha] have done a lot of tremendous things for the organization. This is where I plan on coaching the rest of my career. I’ll be here as long as they’ll have me. I read something a few weeks back…‘Leave early a hero, stay late and become a villain.’ And if I have to someday become that villain, I plan on staying until everyone says we’re burning your wagon out of town. And I’m comfortable with that. I am.”

  After three consecutive losing seasons, something had to change, though. Payton and Loomis agreed to overhaul the defensive and special teams coaching staff. Payton fired five assistants, including longtime loyal lieutenants Joe Vitt, Greg McMahon, and Bill Johnson.

  “One of the biggest mistakes executives make in professional sports is they make decisions based on the record instead of making decisions on whether you believe you have a great coach,” Loomis said. “If the record didn’t reflect that there’s other reasons for it. It’s not just the head coach. I knew we had a great head coach.”

  Loomis’ steady hand throughout the tumultuous 2014–16 seasons was critical in maintaining organizational stability. Another general manager almost certainly would have moved on from Payton, given his transgressions. Someone with a bigger ego would have jettisoned the head coach and found a more malleable replacement. Loomis, after all, was the one who plucked Payton from anonymous assistant coaching ranks in 2006 and willingly allowed him to become the face of the organizational makeover after Hurricane Katrina. But Loomis knew the Saints were better with Payton leading the way. At times, Payton was a handful to manage, but his talent more than compensated for the hassles he sometimes created.

  “Sean needs Mickey, and Mickey needs Sean,” Strief said. “They make each other better. There’s no question Sean works best when he has people around him to rein him in. And Mickey is the p
erfect guy for that.”

  Added Brunell, the former backup quarterback who played in five different organizations during his 17-year playing career: “Mickey is a key guy in this whole thing. He realized what they had was special. He knew how to navigate the situation and keep Sean around and that was very impressive.”

  Dome-ination:

  2018 Philadelphia Eagles

  When the Philadelphia Eagles visited the Superdome in Week 11 of the 2018 season, they were only 10 months removed from the franchise’s first Super Bowl title. Coach Doug Pederson was still the talk of the town and quarterback Carson Wentz was still being hailed as the city’s next conquering hero. A spate of injuries and the inherent challenge of defending their title had conspired to wreck the first half of their season. The Eagles arrived in New Orleans at 4–5, having lost all five games by a touchdown or less.

  “If you want to be one of the best teams in the league, you have to beat the best, and I know teams are saying that about us,” Pederson said during a conference call with New Orleans–area reporters the week of the game. “We just haven’t lived up to how we’re capable of playing in a couple of situations this year. The team understands it, listen you got to be ready each week.”

  After suffering a close 27–20 loss to the longtime-rival Dallas Cowboys the previous week, the Eagles undoubtedly were ready for the challenge of facing the Saints in the Superdome.

  But were they able?

  They entered the game with a makeshift secondary. Their two starting cornerbacks (Ronald Darby, Jalen Mills) and one of their starting safeties (Rodney McLeod) were sidelined with injuries. Corner Sidney Jones was in the lineup after missing three games with a hamstring injury but was not 100 percent.

  The Saints wasted no time in attacking Jones, who limped into the game with a balky hamstring. Sean Payton targeted him all week in the game plan, and the Saints went after him on their first snap from scrimmage. Drew Brees put Alvin Kamara in motion to the left and slid the offensive line in that direction. The Eagles defense bit on the motion, leaving the right side wide open for Mark Ingram, who rambled past a weak arm tackle by Jones for a 38-yard gain.

  It didn’t get any better from there for Philly. Jones was injured early and played just 22 snaps. Safety/nickel corner Avonte Maddox suffered an injured knee in the second quarter and didn’t return. That left defensive coordinator Jim Schwartz with a defensive backfield manned by seldom-used 2017 third-round draft pick Rasul Douglas and three players who weren’t even on the roster two weeks earlier: Chandon Sullivan, Cre’Von LeBlanc, and De’Vante Bausby.

  Brees and Payton mercilessly attacked the Eagles’ overmatched secondary with an array of motions, formations, and play-action fakes. The Saints kicked a field goal on their opening drive, then scored touchdowns on their next two possessions. A little more than a quarter into the game, they led 17–0 and had outgained the Eagles 232 to 15 in total yards.

  By the time it was over, the Saints had scored on 8 of 10 possessions and embarrassed the Eagles with a 48–7 demolition, the most lopsided defeat ever for a defending Super Bowl champion. It was also the worst loss in Eagles history and by far the worst in Doug Pederson’s coaching career.

  “I haven’t gotten my butt kicked like that in a long time,” Philadelphia defensive end Chris Long said.

  Brees completed 22 of 30 passes for 363 yards and four touchdowns. His passer efficiency rating of 153.2 was the fourth highest ever recorded against the Eagles. He wasn’t sacked and was moved off his mark just twice the entire game.

  In all, the Saints piled up 546 yards of offense, the third-highest total against the Eagles in the modern era. And it could have been worse had Payton not called off the dogs and subbed Teddy Bridgewater for Brees with 5:28 left in the game.

  Brees’ fourth touchdown exemplified Payton’s take-no-prisoners approach to the game. He hit Kamara in stride down the right sideline for 37 yards on a fourth-and-7 play that gave the Saints a 45–7 lead early in the fourth quarter. Eagles safety Malcolm Jenkins, a 2009 first-round Saints draft pick, defiantly flipped the bird at Payton after being beaten on the play.

  The Eagles tried to throw a curveball at the Saints by consistently double-teaming their top two playmakers—Michael Thomas and Kamara—and playing man-to-man on everyone else. It was a look the Saints had not seen from the Philadelphia defense during film study. But Brees and Payton simply called on other options. Tre’Quan Smith caught 10 passes for 157 yards and Ingram added 103 rushing yards.

  Afterward, Brees gave a classic answer when asked about the Saints’ offensive efficiency and production.

  “There’s still a process,” he said. “Each and every week, the game plan that the coaches work so hard to put together, the time that we need in practice to make sure that we are executing that plan to perfection. The time that I need with the receivers and the running backs and the tight ends. There’s just so much that goes into that. We don’t take that for granted. You don’t just snap your fingers and come out and play like that. A lot of time on task, and great effort, and great focus and attention to detail. We do come out with a lot of confidence because we know the amount of preparation that has gone into that.”

  23. The Saint Patrick’s Day That Almost Was

  The Payton-Loomis spat wasn’t the only potential threat to the Payton-Brees partnership.

  A few months after Sean Payton recommitted to New Orleans, a different dilemma nearly presented itself to the head coach, one that also might have led to a premature split in the marriage.

  The Saints didn’t enter the 2017 NFL Draft looking for a quarterback. Drew Brees was still playing at an elite level, and the club had not invested a high draft pick in a quarterback in decades. Since Brees joined the Saints in 2006, the club had largely avoided quarterbacks in the NFL Draft. With Brees around, they had the luxury of concentrating on other positions in the draft. While Payton would say the Saints were “always in the quarterback business,” the position was a low draft priority. Garrett Grayson, who was selected in the third round of the 2015 draft, and Sean Canfield, who was picked in the seventh round of the 2010 draft, were the only quarterbacks drafted by the Saints in the Payton-Brees era.

  Besides, the Saints had more pressing needs that year. New Orleans was still fortifying its defense from the grim 2014–15 days, and cornerback was viewed as the team’s top priority.

  But as the first round transpired on Thursday, April 27, the prospect of using the No. 11 overall pick on a quarterback gradually inched closer to reality for Payton and the Saints, because the highest-rated quarterback on their draft board, Patrick Mahomes, was falling their way.

  Slowly but surely, the picks improbably ticked off the board.

  Wide receiver Corey Davis to the Titans at No. 5.

  Safety Jamal Adams to the Jets at No. 6.

  Wide receiver Mike Williams to the Chargers at No. 7.

  Running back Christian McCaffrey to the Panthers at No. 8.

  Then, at precisely 9:12 pm, things got real.

  The Cincinnati Bengals surprisingly selected Washington receiver John Ross at No. 9, a curveball few draft analysts or NFL scouts expected. Suddenly, as Payton sat at the large conference table in the Saints war room deep inside team headquarters, the reality of the situation started to sink in. With the Buffalo Bills on the clock at No. 10, the Saints were one pick, maybe 10 or 15 minutes away, from making their selection. And the top two prospects on their draft board were still available: cornerback Marshon Lattimore and Mahomes, in that order.

  Mahomes wasn’t just any quarterback. The Saints graded him higher than any quarterback they’d evaluated in recent drafts. They had worked him out privately a month earlier in Lubbock, Texas, where Mahomes played collegiately at Texas Tech University. They spent the entire day with him, sending him through a battery of interviews, tests, and on-field workouts before ending the night over dinner.
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br />   “He was exceptional in the meeting that we had,” Payton said. “The one thing that stood out, this player could climb, escape, throw from all the positions. And we play in an imperfect game where there’s protection issues. And we just saw him make throws going left, going right, through the pocket, up in the pocket, I mean, really unique throws. And look, man, in a conference and on a team where they had to go into a game feeling like scoring 45 was gonna give ‘em a chance. He was very impressive and certainly a targeted player for us in that draft.”

  It was the first time the Saints had seriously considering taking a quarterback so high in the draft during Payton’s coaching tenure.

  With Buffalo on the clock at No. 10, and the Bills expected to select a defensive player under first-year coach Sean McDermott, Payton suddenly realized there was a very real possibility Lattimore could be picked and the Saints would have no choice but to select Mahomes, the best player available by far on their board.

  Further complicating the situation, Brees, by sheer serendipity, just happened to be in the building. He and a couple of his college buddies, Jason Loerzel and Ben Smith, had just completed a wild boar hunting trip in south Louisiana and were back at the Saints training facility, their chosen meeting spot. After dining in the team cafeteria, they received an invitation from Payton to visit the war room just as the first round was getting underway. They weren’t the only VIPs there that day. Payton had also invited PGA golfers Jordan Spieth and Ryan Palmer, who were in town for the Zurich Classic of New Orleans and had played with Brees and Payton at the event’s pro-am tournament the previous day.

  When the Bengals selected Ross at No. 9, Payton knew he needed to have a conversation with Brees and apprise him of where things stood. This, after all, was a potentially unprecedented situation. Taking Mahomes with the No. 11 overall pick would create shock waves across the NFL and throughout the Saints fan base. You don’t use such a valuable commodity without a plan. And the Saints, particularly Payton, were high on Mahomes’ potential.