Executive Secrets
Page 16
Upon assuming office in January 1953, Eisenhower restructured the White House organization to suit his personal style (as is the habit of every incoming chief executive). This included the termination of the NSC-10/5 Panel and related committees. In the summer of 1953 Eisenhower’s National Security Council took the first step in establishing a formal mission statement for the role covert action would play in his administration by drafting the NSC- 162 series, policy documents that built upon similar authorizations from the Truman administration. The final version, NSC-162/2, Basic National Security Policy, was signed by the president on October 30, 1953, and was intended to serve as the primary national security reference document for Eisenhower’s first term. While addressing a range of national security issues beyond just the Soviet threat, it was clear that the Soviet Union and world Communism were the document’s major focus.
NSC-162/2 identified the role of covert programs (using both U.S. and Soviet operations for reference) in terms that would later be recognized colloquially as the “third option”: deniable operations executed in the shadows between overt diplomacy and military force. The paper asserted that the most significant Soviet threat came not from general war but from Soviet subversive measures, such as political and economic warfare, propaganda and “front activities,” Communist-controlled trade unions, sabotage, exploitation of revolutionary and insurgent movements, and psychological warfare.
Between the Departments of State and Defense arose a serious difference of opinion with respect to the scope of operations under 162/2, which Eisenhower eventually had to defuse. Specifically, the issue at dispute was whether to employ long-term, essentially nonconfrontational actions against the Soviets or to be more aggressive in selected instances. The State Department, unhappy that the language of 162/2 didn’t specifically prohibit aggressive actions, accepted a compromise that none would be undertaken except with the consideration of the NSC.
NSC-162/2 also served to sanctify one additional positive aspect of covert action operations: their low expense. Because the cost of covert action programs in tax dollars was minuscule compared to those incurred in large military operations, the programs had come to be viewed as a cost-effective tool to counter Soviet expansion. In short, with NSC-162/2, covert action also served as an instrument of budget control.5
In his later years, Eisenhower listed TPAJAX, the overthrow of the Iranian government in 1953, and PBSUCCESS, the removal of Guatemalan leader Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, as defeats for Communists and among his proudest achievements in his two terms of office. (Until the late 1990s the CIA used a two-letter digraph and a codeword to identify operations or agents. For example, “XYCanine” might denote a country assigned the digraph “XY” and the agent named “Canine,” who would either be a national of XY or who was of a different nationality reporting on XY.) Although Eisenhower was the final approving authority for these two major covert action programs, they were apparently considered on something of an informal basis, with no objective approval or reviewing authority in place to screen them before the president gave the final go-ahead. Eisenhower’s sense of military regimentation eventually led to his unease with the absence of a set procedure for reviewing and approving covert action programs, however. Particularly chagrined by a mishap during PBSUCCESS—in which a British merchant ship was accidentally sunk because the participants exceeded presidentially established limitations—Eisenhower sought “more rigorous” control over individual covert action operations, and not just the overall program. His mechanism for this was the creation of a committee similar to the 10/2 and 10/5 Panels, which, founded on a new directive, NSC-5412, instituted a formal control and coordination process. A collateral result of this decision was an effective “narrowing of the CIA’s latitude” in developing and executing covert action programs.6
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL-5412
On March 15, 1954, Eisenhower signed the National Security Council Directive on Covert Operations, NSC-5412, to replace NSC- 10/5. This document was important for “reaffirming the Agency’s responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad,” as well as instituting the Eisenhower administration’s intent to impose process and discipline on the approval and review of covert action programs. NSC-5412 pointedly expanded the policy on the use of covert action programs from the earlier Truman guidance; while National Security Council-10/2 discussed covert action in but one paragraph, the successor 5412 devoted more than a full page to these operations.7
NSC-5412 was explicitly anticommunist, charging the CIA to undertake covert operations to counter similar Soviet operations (later known as “active measures”); “discredit” Soviet ideology; support anticommunist guerilla or paramilitary operations; “develop underground resistance” organizations; counter threats to Communist attempts to “achieve dominant power in a free world country”; and undermine or “reduce International Communist control of any area of the world.” And as was by then the norm, the Agency was to act in a manner that enabled the U.S. government to “plausibly deny” any responsibility for sponsorship. In “reaffirming” the CIA’s role in covert action, NSC-5412 further required the DCI to coordinate with the Departments of State and Defense to ensure that programs were not in conflict with U.S. diplomatic or military policy, and created an interagency working group named the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) to focus not on the approval of covert action programs, but rather on their implementation.8
On the one-year anniversary of NSC-5412, Eisenhower signed NSC-5412/1, which established a White House-based mid-level Planning Coordination Group (PCG) to bring additional coherency to covert action programs worldwide. The PCG was to be advised in advance of all major covert action programs and was to serve as the “normal channel” for policy approval as well as coordinator of requisite support for the execution of these programs. But despite the seemingly clear language of 5412/1, the CIA managed to avoid the intent of the directive by arguing that the need-to-know principle allowed the Agency to brief the PCG only on parts of covert action programs, with the Agency being the arbiter of who needed to know what. This was unacceptable to Eisenhower, who eliminated CIA recalcitrance by signing a revision, NSC-5412/2, on December 28, 1955.9
This presidential directive created a committee—soon referred to as the “5412 Committee” or the “Special Group”—that was ostensibly to approve covert action programs. This group was composed of senior officials, appointed by the president and by the secretaries of state and defense, with the DCI as an ex officio member. The 5412 Committee was to vet and oversee all proposed covert action programs through the application of established procedures and criteria to ensure that the programs were in the national interest and compatible with presidential policies. There was no fixed agenda for the meetings: the choice of operations brought before the committee and when to bring them were at the discretion of the Agency. Eisenhower deliberately excluded himself from membership on the committee, which was chaired by the national security assistant, Robert Cutler (and, later, Gordon Gray), so that he would be insulated from “direct involvement.”
Eisenhower was very concerned that such operations conducted in peacetime should not be attributable to the United States; more specifically, he believed that the president should be able to claim a lack of knowledge should the existence and ultimate sponsorship of these potentially politically embarrassing programs be alleged or proved. While leaving the intelligence organs to assume the blame, and, consequently, to pay a heavy price in credibility, the president would (theoretically, at least) be immune from adverse political consequences. However, Cutler and DCI Allen Dulles ensured that Eisenhower was in “constant” or “close” contact with the committee and informed of its deliberations, because—despite the committee’s charter to “approve” covert action programs—the president was manifestly the final deciding authority.10 In fact, Eisenhower exercised such close scrutiny over these sensitive programs that he even followed secondary operations that supported the primary covert action pro
grams. To facilitate this he appointed Marine Corps Lieutenant General Graves B. Erskine as assistant secretary of defense for special operations and gave Erskine direct access to him in the Oval Office whenever necessary.11
As for the targets of the covert action programs reviewed by the Special Group and approved by Eisenhower, NSC-5412/2 focused on two dangers: the operations were to counter threats from “the USSR and Communist China and the governments, parties and groups dominated by them.” For the most part, operational proposals that originated within the CIA were usually approved by the president, demonstrating the confidence he had in the Agency. In late December 1958, Eisenhower added additional structure to the 5412 Committee by directing that it meet on a regular weekly schedule rather than on an “as-needed” basis. Further, when Eisenhower learned that the group was in essence ignoring some programs once they had received initial approval, he mandated semiannual reviews of all extant covert action programs and expanded the group’s purview by requiring it to develop a system to evaluate operations while in progress and in the post-operational phase. The 5412 Committee worked sufficiently well that it or its progeny continued to exist, under one name or another, through the Clinton administration. Nonetheless, as late as January 1959, covert action operations continued to be executed by the CIA only on Eisenhower’s personal authority, in the belief that the operations would be more likely to remain in the shadows.12
COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS
UNDER EISENHOWER
The story of the TPAJAX program, the overthrow of the government of Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh in August 1953, has been told so many times that it need not be repeated anew here.13 The president paid close attention to the Iranian situation after his election in November 1952, giving personal and final approval to the coup just a few weeks beforehand. Historian Zachary Karabell has accurately described Eisenhower’s preferred method of managing foreign policy: “Ike maintained an airy detachment in public, in private he was focused, and involved . . . it was Ike who called the shots.”14 The success of TPAJAX stemmed from just the right amount of pressure on the right people, at the right time and place. But the CIA and, indeed, the Eisenhower White House soon began to see the Agency’s role as far more determinative and decisive than it was. Kermit Roosevelt, the operation’s Agency manager, realized this and told senior officials, including Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, that the Agency succeeded only because the Iranian army and people supported the shah. In concluding his briefing to these officials, Roosevelt warned that if “we, the CIA, are ever going to try something like this again, we must be absolutely sure that people and the army want what we want. If not, you’d better give the job to the Marines.” Foster Dulles paid no heed to Roosevelt’s cautionary remarks, however. Soon after, Roosevelt was offered command of the Guatemalan program. When he saw the scope of CIA and American involvement, which was contrary to everything he had learned from the Iranian program, he resigned from the CIA.15
Like Iran, Guatemala and the regime of Jacobo Arbenz were of interest to the Eisenhower administration even before Eisenhower was sworn in. Just a few days after NSC-162/2 was signed, the NSC first reviewed the deteriorating situation in that Central American country, concluding that “it was a sufficient threat to national security to warrant covert action against it.” The council produced a draft that stated a “policy of non-action would be suicidal, since the Communist movement, under the tutelage of Moscow, would not falter nor abandon its goals.”16 As planning for the covert program, named PBSUCCESS, moved forward, the administration began implementing the overt diplomatic, economic, and military measures that would set the stage for the covert operations. By then Arbenz had legalized the Guatemalan Communist Party, giving it seats in his administration, and had expropriated a huge banana plantation owned and operated by United Fruit.17 These acts were highly disturbing for Eisenhower, who kept a close eye on PBSUCCESS, a multifaceted operation with paramilitary and psychological elements. On June 22, 1954, Eisenhower discussed details of air support for PBSUCCESS with the secretary of state and the DCI. Emboldened by the outcome of the Iranian operation, the administration moved ahead to repeat it in Central America, although the exact date and circumstances of Eisenhower’s approval remain obscured by a lack of documentation.18
The great irony is that while PBSUCCESS was a covert action success—overturning a potentially pro-Communist government in America’s backyard mostly through the psyops program and with only a “modest” push from the paramilitary side—it was ultimately a foreign policy tragedy. The removal of Arbenz allowed an oppressive and exceptionally cruel military dictatorship to hold sway for forty years, with hundreds of thousands of Guatemalans killed by their own government in that time. Also destructive to American foreign policy was that the CIA, as it had in Iran, took away from the Guatemalan operation a fundamentally misguided notion—this time that “Soviet subversion could always be effectively countered by American subversion.”19
Although it was long believed by many that the nationalization of the United Fruit plantation was a principal justification behind Arbenz’s removal (in other words, that American force had been called upon primarily to protect private corporate interests), this assertion has since been disproved. As the dean of cold war historians, Yale University’s John Lewis Gaddis found, “the [sanctity of the] corporation had greater influence over the Truman administration than over Eisenhower’s.” Gaddis makes it clear that Arbenz “did rely heavily on support from the Guatemalan Communist Party and was very much under its influence.”20 But while Arbenz desperately sought recognition and help from Moscow, his desires were unrequited—objectively leaving doubt about whether Arbenz’s regime could ever pose a genuine threat to hemispheric interests. But Eisenhower and Dulles had seen Soviet aggression and mischief upset the established order since before the end of World War II, and they were not about to accept even a remote possibility of a Soviet foothold in the Americas. What in retrospect appeared to be “a massive overreaction to a minor irritant” seemed to the administration in the tenor of the times a reasonable course of action to forestall potential Soviet advances. When Eisenhower held a congratulatory party at the White House for the CIA officials who conducted PBSUCCESS, he thanked them for “averting a Soviet beachhead in our hemisphere.”21
The displacement of Arbenz and the resulting rule of Guatemala by the ruthless military dictatorship for forty years were not the only negative consequences of PBSUCCESS. In combination with the successful overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran, the Guatemalan program permitted the Eisenhower administration to place too much confidence in the CIA as an institution and particularly in the employment of covert action as a policy tool. The Iranian program succeeded almost in spite of itself, with the CIA giving just a little nudge at the margins to capitalize on events already unfolding, while the Arbenz coup hardly classifies as a masterpiece of international intrigue. Nonetheless, covert action came to be seen within the Eisenhower administration and the national security community as a “silver bullet” that could slay Communist-dominated puppet governments easily and almost with impunity. These two successes left in their wake an attitude of hubris within the Agency and the administration that would lead to one of the Agency’s greatest disasters: the Bay of Pigs. The Arbenz coup also exacerbated anti-American sentiments in Latin America, serving to influence a number of future Latin American leaders, in particular Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.22
While the Iran and Guatemala programs have become well known (or notorious) to the public over the years, Eisenhower also instituted one of the least-known, quite possibly because it was one of the most successful, covert action operations. Indeed, it was so successful, as well as genuinely crucial to U.S. and Asian security interests, that it continued through the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations. That is to say, both Democratic and Republican presidents equally found this program to be essential to U.S. foreign policy. In this still shadowy program, the CIA supported cove
rtly the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party and individual members with financial aid. The program had both covert action and intelligence collection aims, specifically, the gathering of information on the Japanese political scene and the bolstering of Japanese democracy against Communist expansionism while “undermining the Japanese left.” The program was both a covert action and foreign policy success, in that the LDP “thwarted their Socialist opponents, forged close ties with Washington, and fought off public opposition to the United States’ maintaining military bases throughout Japan.” On the negative side, though, are charges that the program allowed the LDP to become a corrupt organization that controlled Japanese party politics—at the expense of a genuine democratic process—for forty-plus years.23 The exposure of this covert action program made headlines but no real controversy when it was revealed by the New York Times in 1994, complete with commentary by former Under-secretary of State Alexis Johnson and former Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman. Likewise, no one seemed to notice the publication two years later by Vladimir Bukovsky that the Soviets had channeled funds to the Japanese Socialists during the same period.24