Executive Secrets

by William J. Daugherty

  Once inaugurated, Carter established in Executive Order 12036 two separate committees to help with foreign policy and national security issues, including intelligence matters. The lower level group, the Policy Review Committee (PRC), created and monitored policy, programs, and resources for the intelligence collection mission; the Special Coordination Committee (SCC), the highest-level White House committee, was given the responsibility to approve new and review current covert action programs, with the president exercising the final say. Membership in the SCC consisted of the usual suspects: secretaries of state and defense, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the national security advisor, and the DCI. However, in a reflection of the increased congressional oversight and passage of federal statutes that in effect regulated covert action, Carter gave the attorney general and the director of the Office of Management and Budget full membership in the committee for the supervision of covert action operations.4

  In response to congressional concerns over what the legislators probably saw as overly generous language in the Ford administration’s Worldwide Findings, Carter merged the several Findings into just one “Omnibus Finding” covering all issues, albeit with the scope and limits of permissible operations more narrowly described. University of Georgia professor Loch Johnson’s research found that Carter’s Omnibus Finding “combined the first worldwide findings approved by the President into a single, somewhat more detailed finding. In his initially limited use of covert action, President Carter relied chiefly on this generic finding, which he augmented later with a few overarching propaganda themes and selected specific findings focused on individual countries.”5

  Still, the oversight committees remained worried about the nature of the language. As explained by Carter’s DCI, Admiral Stansfield Turner, “Under a broad Finding, an operation can be expanded considerably; with a narrow one, the CIA has to go back to the president to obtain a revised Finding if there is any change in scope. The Congress is wary of broad Findings: they can easily be abused.”6 While the admiral is basically correct, changes to Findings (Memoranda of Notification, or MON) are less likely to be generated by the CIA than by the White House, which may seek to modify program objectives. MON are written documents that are reported to Congress exactly as original Findings are, keeping the integrity of the oversight process sound. As Carter began approving more Findings in 1978 and later, the president acknowledged congressional concerns by drafting discrete Findings for individual countries or specific issues. By the end of his tenure, there were three generic types of Findings—the Omnibus Finding, Worldwide Findings on transnational issues (modified from time to time by MON), and an increasing number of “single country/single issue” Findings whenever possible. Thus, it is accurate to say that “the Finding process under the Carter Administration . . . was quite exhaustive in its consideration of covert action recommendations.”7

  COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS UNDER CARTER

  Just three months into his administration, Jimmy Carter, who as a presidential candidate had thought the CIA and covert action to be corrupt and undemocratic, initiated covert action programs targeted at the internal political situation in the Soviet Union. He followed these programs with a propaganda and political action campaign in Western Europe to counter a massive Soviet active measures program in the same region. The Soviets’ goal was to prevent the NATO deployment of the neutron bomb on the continent.

  Although the Nixon administration had found it convenient to accept the supposedly absolute right of the Soviet Union, as a sovereign political state, to conduct its internal affairs as it saw fit without outside interference, Carter took a new path. The president’s concern for human rights impelled him to insist that the Soviet Union abide by all international agreements it was a party to, including those with provisions for respecting and adhering to international standards of humans rights. Carter saw this as a matter of the Soviets meeting their obligations and not as interference with the internal affairs of the USSR, an interpretation that the Soviets did not share. At the urging of National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter “approved an unprecedented White House effort to attack the internal legitimacy of the Soviet government.”8

  The president gave initial approval for “covert propaganda” to be infiltrated into the USSR proper, as opposed to merely the Eastern European satellite countries, as early as March 1977, but CIA and State Department bureaucratic accession didn’t come through until later in the spring. Within the CIA, one reason for the delay was that the proposals first went to the Soviet/East European Division (SE) in the Operations Directorate, which was populated by “non-believers”—operations officers who had spent their careers handling agents reporting on the Soviet Union. These officers had little or no faith in the possibility that mere propaganda or even more ambitious political action programs, no matter how imaginative or how lengthy in duration, could ever make one iota of difference in changing the behavior of the Soviet regime. But, of course, changing the behavior of the Soviet government was only one objective of these programs, and a lesser one at that. That White House officials, including Brzezinski, didn’t understand that SE was not the DO component to run these covert action programs delayed CIA action. It was only when White House officials sought out the Covert Action Staff—populated not by agent recruiters and intelligence collectors but by covert action specialists who, as “true believers,” possessed an unlimited faith in the ability of the written word and subtle influences eventually to make a difference, even if only at the margins—that the right folks were finally in the loop.

  CIA operations included support for the printing and underground distribution of political writings, known as samizdat by dissidents living in “internal exile” inside the Soviet Union. Samizdat was vitally important to the dissident movement, but it was illegal in the Soviet Union for anyone to make a copy of anything without permission of the state authorities—access to photocopiers, printing presses, and even typewriters was strictly limited and controlled. CIA assistance enabled the dissidents to circumvent the authorities. The CIA also provided Soviet and Eastern European émigrés living in self-imposed exile in Western Europe the means to publish books and academic journals for distribution within émigré circles; but a good portion of these products would also eventually find their way behind the Iron Curtain and into the hands of those living under the Communist boot.9

  White House officials, especially Brzezinski, and the covert action specialists at the CIA believed that it was vital to continue the Nationalities programs, keeping alive the culture, history, religions, and traditions of the oppressed non-Russian minorities in the republics east of the Urals as well as the huge Ukraine Republic. And there were proposals to provide support, covertly through cut-outs (i.e., a third party functioning as a go-between for two principals so that there would be no evidence that the two principals were connected in any manner), funding, and other means, to Western European human rights and pro-democracy groups to counter Soviet propaganda. However, these proposals met with surprisingly intense opposition from the Departments of State and Defense, as well as elements within the CIA, because of the sensitivity that always accompanies the idea of conducting covert action operations intended to influence audiences in allied nations. It wasn’t until more than a year later that many, but not all, of the proposals received final approval by nature of inclusion in the Omnibus Finding.

  Just a month before leaving office, Brzezinski briefed a senior emissary from Pope John Paul II about these Nationalities programs to inform the Vatican that the United States had the covert mechanisms, resources, and dedicated personnel to come to the aid of the Solidarity labor movement in an increasingly troubled Poland. Topping the list of threats in Eastern Europe at that time was the potential for the Soviet Union to invade Poland militarily, as they did in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Aware of the reluctance of European governments to confront the Soviets for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was lucrative trade agreements
, Brzezinski eventually asked the pope directly if he would be willing to “use his bishops [in European countries with] large Catholic populations to support an ultimatum threatening the Soviets with economic, political, and cultural isolation if they intervened in Poland.” The pope was. But with the end of the Carter administration looming, the Polish program, as well as the enhancement and expansion of all of the Nationalities programs, would have to wait until the Reagan administration and the unrelenting pressure by DCI William J. Casey for a more active CIA role in the covert action arena.10

  Although many observers think that the Afghan covert action program was initiated by Carter in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion of that country on December 26, 1979, in fact it began months prior. As early as January 1979 the Carter administration began reflecting on the possibilities and opportunities presented by opposing the Marxist government in Kabul. The governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia each had strong interest in opposing the pro-Soviet regime, and their support was a factor in the eventual covert action program that Carter approved. Initial proposals were for “a small scale propaganda campaign publicizing Soviet activities in Afghanistan; indirect financial assistance to the insurgents; direct financial assistance to Afghan émigré groups to support their anti-Soviet, anti-regime activities; non-lethal material assistance; weapons support; and a range of training and support options.” President Carter signed the original Afghan Finding on July 3, 1979, authorizing the provision of aid to the Mujahedin, an element opposing the pro-Soviet regime, which had taken control of the country in a coup the year before.11

  Brzezinski realized that this covert aid might push the Soviet government to take a more active role in Afghanistan, or even invade it (which, of course, they ultimately did). However, he did not see this as a negative; when the Soviet army did invade the country, Brzezinski wrote a memo to the president saying that “We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam,” recognizing the difficulties an “unsustainable” war would entail for Moscow.12

  While Carter’s Afghan program was initially funded at a minimal level, with the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces on December 26, the funding increased dramatically. By the time Carter left office, he had authorized the provision of large numbers and varieties of weaponry and other support for the Mujahedin, while funding rose to nearly $100 million.13 This program was ultimately “approved by three U.S. presidents [Carter, Reagan, and Bush] and reviewed throughout the 1980–1992 period” by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees; it saw more than $2 billion in military supplies going to the anti-Soviet resistance, with as much as $250 million a year allocated for each of the last two years. And it contributed no small amount to the final downfall of the Soviet Union.14

  In another region of the world, aggression on the part of the Marxist government of the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Yemen against its northern neighbor, the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), in February 1979 led the Carter administration to suspect that either the Soviets or Soviet proxies in the form of Cubans or Ethiopians were at least participants, if not instigators. The proximity of the Yemens to Saudi Arabia was also of concern to the administration. After a series of discussions at the SCC, the administration decided it was necessary to shore up the YAR government and to enhance its ability to secure its borders. To this end, the president signed another Finding on July 3, 1979, authorizing covert assistance to the YAR.15 National Security Advisor Brzezinski was said to have “pushed for a covert mission in part because he felt that the United States had been too passive in responding to Cuban activities [in] 1977 and 1978 in Zaire and Somalia.” This program continued into the Reagan years.16

  But after the Yemen program was terminated, there were numerous questions about the initial wisdom and logic of the program’s goals. According to a senior CIA official quoted in a Washington Post article, “There were unrealistic grand strategic goals that the White House thought could be accomplished through covert action. And they were trying to fix a lot of things: many, too many, that had nothing to do with South Yemen.” Still, there were also some in the administration who thought that it was necessary to show Saudi Arabia that the Carter team could be “tough,” including Vice President Walter Mondale. Feelings in this regard were not as strong in the CIA (with the possible exception of the Near East Division in the DO and its Arabian Peninsula Branch); DCI Stan Turner was later quoted as calling the scheme “harebrained.”17

  In the summer of 1979, within two weeks of the Sandinistas’ rise to power in Nicaragua, President Carter signed two Findings authorizing covert operations in the Central American region. Carter sought to:

  encourage democratic elements in Nicaragua rather than to risk a new totalitarian regime allied with Moscow in Latin America. One sub-component of this Finding was propaganda operations to inform and sensitize the world to the nature of the Marxist-oriented Sandinista regime and the covert supply of weaponry and other materials that they were receiving from Cuba’s leader, Fidel Castro. This was not a lethal Finding, but rather one intended [to] “strengthen democratic elements.”18

  A concurrent Finding was signed for El Salvador, where the pro-West, right-wing government was under attack by leftist insurgents supported directly by the neighboring Sandinistas and indirectly by Cuba (Cuban arms and munitions flowed through Nicaragua to the Salvadoran rebels). Interestingly, at this juncture the State Department was highly supportive of these programs and, in October 1979, urged the president to expand and intensify them. The problems of Nicaragua and El Salvador were yoked with Cuban-instigated actions in Grenada and a hostile Marxist government in Jamaica, leading the Carter administration to sign a “broader Finding to counter the Soviets and Cubans throughout Latin America.”19 However, despite these programs Cuban and Soviet support to the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran rebels continued to the end of Carter’s tenure, leaving a major policy problem to be inherited by the Reagan team.

  A Soviet-supported regime in Ethiopia, having attained power by coup, was another cause for concern to the Carter foreign policy team. This was especially so after the Soviet Union and the new Ethiopian regime inked a military assistance pact in May 1977, paving the way for the arrival of some thousands of Cuban troops meant to aid the regime in its disputes with a rebellion in the Ogaden province and a separatist movement in Eritrea. Brzezinski believed that (a) Soviet activities were a test of the new American president and (b) U.S policy should be to link Soviet behavior in Africa with the overall U.S.–USSR relationship. In the end, however, the Carter administration made no response, taking no action against the Soviet and Cuban activities around the Horn; any covert action program for Ethiopia would have to wait. Brzezinski would come to believe that the administration’s ultimate lack of response to those events emboldened the Soviets to invade Afghanistan in 1979.20

  A coup in Grenada by a “pro-Cuban Marxist” named Maurice Bishop alarmed President Carter to the point that he requested options for a “covert effort to focus international attention” on the Bishop regime. After discussions with the CIA, the president signed a Finding on July 19, 1979, that “authorized a covert effort to promote the democratic process in Grenada and also to support resistance to the Marxist government there.” However, the Senate oversight committee differed with the president as to the significance of the Bishop regime to U.S. interests, while also pointing out the dichotomy between the intent of the Finding and the administration’s policy of “non-interference” in the affairs of other countries. Upon receiving a letter from the SSCI stating that the members would not support the covert program targeted against Grenada, Carter dropped the program, leaving the problem to “fester until President Reagan’s use of military force” there in late October 1983.21

  The Carter experience with covert action is instructive for those who call for it to be banned, either by executive order or though congressional statute. Jimmy Carter was as philosophically and morally opposed to the concept of covert action as any preside
nt in the nation’s history. And yet, when confronted with issues in which diplomacy and sanctions wouldn’t work, and in which the use of military force was inappropriate or would have been excessive, this president repeatedly relied on covert action to achieve his foreign policy goals.

  TWELVE

  Ronald W. Reagan

  The [Nicaraguan] operation was totally different from what had been previously presented by the CIA briefers [to Congress] in Washington. It was obvious that covert policy was frequently out ahead of or overriding stated or implied U.S. foreign policy. A regional war was getting off the ground, and much of the planning was unspoken and subtle.1

  Bob Woodward, Washington Post

  For Ronald W. Reagan and his DCI, William J. Casey, covert action was not an adjunct endeavor but a fundamental component of an activist foreign policy and a means of thwarting Marxist regimes outside of the Warsaw Pact. Reagan expanded all of Carter’s Findings and added numerous Findings of his own. The years 1981–1989 saw the CIA managing presidentially directed and congressionally approved covert action programs around the globe. Among the numerous covert action programs conducted during the Reagan administration, those that have been officially acknowledged by the U.S. government as of fall 2003 include operations for Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Central America, Eastern Europe and the USSR, Poland, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Lebanon, as well as operations for counterterrorism.2 Reagan also authorized operations to counter or subvert the illegal transfer of banned technologies to the Soviet Union, a program that enjoyed great congressional support and approval. And Reagan approved covert support for the Polish labor movement Solidarity, which had gone underground once outlawed by the martial law regime. This proved to be one of the most successful covert action programs ever conducted and was certainly one that virtually all Americans, had they known of it at the time, would have resoundingly supported.3