Executive Secrets
Page 26
34. The official is George Carver, Jr., cited in Bittman, “Use,” 245.
35. Bittman, “Use,” 246. Bittman notes that, during the period of supposed détente in the 1970s, the Soviets were particularly successful in achieving dominating influence (i.e., a pro-Communist regime) in nine countries in Africa, Central America, and Southeast Asia (247). See also Turner, “Coercive,” 429n10. The evidence for this is “overwhelming,” 435. Perhaps the most authoritative source is the KGB’s own highly secret files, published in Andrew, Gordievsky, and Mitrokhin, Sword, passim.
36. Weber, Spymasters, 296.
37. Church Committee, “Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.” And Ranelagh, The Agency, where he states, at 383, that “there is no evidence . . . that the CIA ever succeeded in assassinating anyone. However, as William Colby remarked, it was not for want of trying.”
38. Damrosch, “Covert,” 800.
39. Church Committee, “Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.”
40. See inter alia: Prados, Blood Road; Logevall, Choosing War; Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War. The reference to the White House tapes is from John Prados, The White House Tapes: Eavesdropping on the President (New York: The New Press, 2003), which was published just as this manuscript was being completed. The National Security Archives at George Washington University prepared a summary of the book, and the quotation in the text is lifted from its first paragraph; the summary and supporting document abstracts are at (www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/index2.htm). On ABC-TV Evening News with Carole Simpson, Sunday, November 3, 2002, Kennedy administration official Theodore Sorenson emphatically stated that, while the White House knew of the coup, the United States government neither initiated nor participated in it.
41. Church Committee, “Covert Action in Chile 1963–1973.” The quotation is lifted from Olmsted, Challenging, 217n109.
42. McClory, “Covert,” 23.
THREE: COVERT ACTION POLICY AND PITFALLS
1. Opening epigraph from Colby, “CIA’s,” 73.
2. Berkowitz, “Backfire,” B1.
3. The author was present at a meeting in the DDO’s office when the DDO related the story to gathered officers.
4. Samuel Halpern, cited in Weber, Spymasters, at 124.
5. Roy Godson calls this the “essential principle” of covert action (Tricks, 121).
6. Godson, “Focus,” 32. See also Lowenthal, Intelligence, 109.
7. Godson, Tricks, 121 and 132; Berkowitz and Goodman, Truth, 136–37; Lowenthal, Intelligence, 109; Statement from George Tenet’s Senate confirmation hearings for the position of Director of Central Intelligence, May 1977; Berkowitz and Goodman, “Logic,” 43; Berkowitz, “Backfire,” B1. Twentieth Century, Need to Know, lists its own similar desiderata at 8–9.
8. Barry, “Managing,” 21; Mathias and Leahy, “Covert,” 14; Phillips, “CIA,” 3; Newsom, “Successful,” 24. These criteria were deemed “critical” by DCI George Tenet at his Senate confirmation hearing, May 1997. Other DCIs and intelligence professionals would undoubtedly agree.
9. Horton, “Reflections,” 87.
10. The insider was Robert M. Gates; see Shadows, at 294.
11. Tuner, in “Coercive,” at 446n110, writes from personal knowledge that a SSCI staffer took notes during a briefing of the SSCI in which the mining of the harbors was discussed with the senators present. Tuner believes that senators did not later misrepresent (i.e., lie about) not being briefed, but rather opines that they “simply did not focus on the issue when it was reported and consequently could not recall it when it came under attack in the press.” Andrew writes that in a two-and-a-half hour briefing by Casey of the SSCI, the mining was mentioned only in one sentence and in a manner that implied it was a Contra operation without CIA participation (Eyes Only, 478). Woodward, in VEIL, at 322–23, writes that Casey told the SSCI about the mining in two briefings, although the CIA connection wasn’t noted, and also notes (at 327) that Senator Patrick Leahy later told aides that he did indeed remember Casey informing the committee of the harbor minings.
12. Related to the author by the senior Agency officer who received the information directly from the officer who provided the briefing.
13. Woodward, VEIL, 226–27; Godson, Tricks, 56–57.
14. Nor was Central America and Nicaragua the only case in which Congress confused the issue with contradictory legislation. The Angola program also saw a series of contradictory legislation between 1976 and 1986.
15. Chomeau, “Role,” 408.
16. See Chomeau, “Role,” 408–10, for a cogent discussion of this and related issues.
FOUR: THE MILITARY AND PEACETIME
COVERT ACTION
1. Opening epigraph was a favorite observation of the late John Millis, former staff director, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, which was spoken several times in the presence of the author.
2. Lowenthal, Intelligence, 116.
3. Ibid., 116.
4. As mentioned in chapter 2, many observers consider the Iranian hostage rescue operation to be a covert action operation. Given the scale of the operation, the resources required, and the purely military nature of the mission, however, it is inappropriate to consider it an example of peacetime covert action. It was in fact a secret military operation (as many military operations are), which was supported by CIA intelligence collection and support assets.
5. 10 USC 167 (g): the establishment of a unified special operations command “does not constitute authority to conduct any activity which, if carried out as an intelligence activity by the Department of Defense,” would require a Presidential Finding under Hughes-Ryan.
6. Lowenthal, Intelligence, 116.
7. Related to the author by an officer who was personally involved in the program.
8. Author’s personal knowledge from his last assignment at the CIA in covert action policy.
9. For one example among the many who advocate such foolishness, see Isenberg, “Pitfalls,” 22 and 26. Isenberg’s monograph is replete with errors of fact and misjudgments based on those errors; one reason may be found in his bibliography: his sources are almost all authored by critics, whose allegations and negative perspectives he parrots.
10. Related to the author by a member of the HPSCI staff who was present when they talked with Blair after the press conference. Blair was a Rhodes Scholar and shared the characteristics of arrogance and absolute certitude of other Rhodes Scholars in the Clinton administration, even in areas of which they knew little or nothing.
11. This, of course, resulted in an enormous amount of distrust between the operations folks and Deutch. This antagonism was exacerbated when, in an exercise of supremely poor judgment, Deutch gave a speech in the CIA auditorium to Agency personnel, praising military officers while concurrently denigrating the Agency and officers in the Directorate of Operations. Deutch’s idea of raising morale at the Agency was to build a field house and swimming pool—similar to the facilities at the Pentagon. Agency personnel were outraged: they had no desire for such facilities, mostly because there simply wasn’t the time available during the day to use them, but also because they’d rather have had the money to conduct more operations and because they didn’t want to be like DoD employees. Deutch never did realize the vast difference in staffing levels between the Agency and the Pentagon.
12. Related in confidence to the author by an Agency officer who was present at the briefing.
13. My position directly supported the executive director (ExDir) in the review and approval process of covert action programs. Prior to the arrival of the sycophantic Slatkin, there were three people supporting the ExDir in this manner. As I was leaving my position, Slatkin had directed the creation of a minor bureaucracy, with an anticipated twelve officers, to do the same work for just a small handful of programs. These officers, for the most part, were to be taken from field operations and turned into staff officers, even though Agency downsizing was creating serio
us shortages of experienced officers overseas and in operational management positions at headquarters. Slatkin was totally unmoved by any pleas for reconsideration—being served by staff was much more important to her than accomplishing the core mission.
14. Several officers in the Directorate of Science and Technology who worked with this author’s component on newly emerging technologies related instances in which very sensitive technologies, developed by the CIA for a range of CIA missions and paid for by CIA funds, were in effect “hijacked” by Deutch and turned over to the military. Because of this, and Deutch’s clear desire to become SecDef, there was consternation about this conflict of interest in which he acted in ways inimical to the best interests of the CIA and for the benefit of DoD. Of course, there were and no doubt still are numerous “black” technologies developed by DoD which were or are not shared with the CIA. This is justified as “need to know” but can also be highly counterproductive.
15. Related to the author by a senior DO officer who was involved in the dénouement of the fiasco.
16. Thomas, “Shadow Struggle,” 31; Arkin, “Secret War,” 1 (page number references Web site version of this article).
17. Shanker and Schmitt, “Pentagon,” 1 (page number references Web site version); Editorial, “Propaganda,” A12.
FIVE: THE DISCIPLINE OF COVERT ACTION
1. The opening epigraph is from Gates, Shadows, 292.
2. Intelligence scholar Loch K. Johnson has analyzed a range of possible covert action operations and constructed a “ladder of escalation,” with thirty-eight steps ascending in relation to the intensity of the program. The lowest three levels, which he labels “Routine Operations,” are really intelligence collection. Covert action operations, labeled “Modest Intrusion,” begin at step four and climb to step nine, and include “truthful benign information in autocracies,” “truthful benign information in democracies,” and “low-level funding of friendly groups.” The next “threshold” is “High Risk Options,” ascending from rung ten through rung twenty-six and encompassing most of the remaining non-lethal or highly visible covert action options, such as “truthful but contentious information,” “disinformation,” “economic disruption,” and “limited supply of arms.” The last echelon are the “Extreme Options,” from rung twenty-seven to thirty-eight, covering “sophisticated arms supply,” “environmental alterations,” “major economic dislocations,” and “major secret wars.” See Johnson’s Agencies, 60–88, and “Bright Line,” 284–300.
3. Johnson, “Accountability,” 84. Johnson claims that propaganda is the equivalent of psychological warfare, but that’s not exactly correct.
4. The Office of International Information Programs (IIP) describes itself as “the principal international strategic communications service for the foreign affairs community.” IIP designs, develops, and implements a variety of information initiatives and strategic communications programs, including Internet and print publications, traveling and electronically transmitted speaker programs, and information resource services. These reach (and are created strictly for) key international audiences, such as the media, government officials, opinion leaders, and the general public in more than 140 countries around the world.
5. Gates, Shadows, 91; Johnson, “Accountability,” 84. See also Gates, 90–94, for additional insights.
6. Godson, Tricks, 151.
7. Johnson, in Bombs at 29, gives an example of an editorial encouraging a nation not to pursue a weapons proliferation program.
8. Godson, Tricks, 145.
9. Ritchie, “Covert,” 2 (page number coincides with Web version).
10. Gates, Shadows, 357–58; Ritchie, “Covert,” 1.
11. Holland, “Disinformation,” 5–17.
12. Godson, Tricks, 157.
13. Definition found in Polmar and Allen, Spy Book, 158.
14. Godson and Wirtz, “Deception,” 427; Codevilla, Statecraft, 31–32.
15. Godson and Wirtz, “Deception,” 426.
16. Godson and Wirtz, “Deception,” 426, cited from Godson, Tricks, 236.
17. Godson and Wirtz, “Deception,” 427. During World War II, Operation Mincemeat called for a corpse dressed as a Royal Marine major with false plans for the invasion of Sicily handcuffed to his wrist to be placed by submarine off the coast of Spain. As planned, the “major” washed ashore and pro-Nazi Spanish authorities passed the false documents to their German counterparts.
18. Godson, Tricks, 16. For a fuller discussion of the Trust operation, see inter alia: Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB; Lockhart, Reilly; and Epstein, Deception. What makes the Trust special, in addition to its overwhelming success, was that it was a deception program with a counterintelligence goal.
19. Johnson, “Accountability,” 85; O’Brien, “Interfering,” 432; Isenberg, “Pitfalls,” 4, 7.
20. Roger Hilsman was director of the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Kennedy years, and Lyndon Johnson’s assistant secretary of state for Asian affairs. The ambassador was U. Alexis Johnson, who held numerous high-level State Department positions in the 1960s and 1970s. Details of the Italian covert action program from its inception until its termination in the 1960s is related by former DCI Bill Colby in Colby and Forbath, Honorable Men, at 136–40.
21. The Italian program was carried through the 1960s, phased out only in FY 1968. See Minutes of the 303 Committee for June 25, 1965, and August 22, 1967, and relevant State Department correspondence of January 24, 1964, and September 12, 1966, on the same topic in FRUS/WE Volume XII, Western Europe 1964–1968. The particular documents may be found on the Federation of American Scientists Web site as www.fas.org/sgp/advisory/state/italy.html; and the entire FRUS volume is available on the State Department’s Web site. For additional information on support to Solidarity see inter alia: Gates, Shadows, passim; West, Third Secret; and Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness.
22. Weiss, “Farewell.”
23. For an interesting, if somewhat biased, account of CIA “grunts” training the anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua, see Garvey, Gringo. For accounts of the CIA’s war in Laos, see: Holm, American Agent; Parker, Mule; Warner, Shooting the Moon; Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains; Robbins, Air America and Ravens; and Lert, Wings of the CIA.
24. Love, “Cyberthreat,” 205.
25. Johnson gives the examples of inserting a virus to destroy data or providing “faulty” computer components to an opposing power as types of information warfare (IW) covert action in Bombs, 29. See also Berkowitz and Goodman, Truth, 142, where they define IW in part as “attacks on an adversary’s information systems” (at 142); see also Berkowitz and Goodman, “Logic,” 45–46.
26. Love, “Cyberthreat,” 198.
27. Love, “Cyberthreat,” 201–2.
28. The clandestine intrusion into computer systems merely to “read” or collect the data while leaving no sign of entry is simply one more method of intelligence collection, not covert action, and so is beyond the scope of this work. A wonderful primer for novices (among literally hundreds of books and other writings available) on how computers and the information contained therein may be remotely entered and either manipulated, damaged, or destroyed is found in Schwartau, Information Warfare.
29. Johnson, Bombs, 181, provides the example of “emptying out” the funds held in a bank by a terrorist group as one use for CIA computer hacking.
30. Were the Agency to clandestinely and remotely enter a computer system only to read or acquire data without the “owner” realizing it, this would fall under the rubric of either foreign intelligence collection or counterintelligence.
31. Among others, President Clinton’s national security advisor Anthony Lake raises precisely this specter in Six Nightmares, 38–65. Lake calls this use of hacking “cyber-terrorism.”
32. Pincus, “Boutique,” A-06.
SIX: APPROVAL AND REVIEW OF COVERT
ACTION PROGRAMS IN THE MODERN ERA
/> 1. Opening epigraph is from Walter F. Murphy, Ph.D, McCormack Professor of Jurisprudence Emeritous at Princeton University, and cited in Twentieth Century, Need to Know, at 18.
2. See Smist, Congress, at 5, for Clark and Pforzheimer; Johnson, Bombs, at 202, for Stennis; and Treverton, Covert Action, 232, for Saltonstall. See also Fein, “Constitution,” 55, and Twentieth Century, Need to Know, 62–63.
3. Twentieth Century, Need to Know, 62–63.
4. Cinquegrana, “Dancing,” at 183. The other obvious attempt to exert control over the executive branch at the time was the War Powers Act of 1973.
5. Rindskopf, “Intelligence,” 23.
6. Smist, Congress, 263.
7. Cinquegrana, “Dancing,” 183. The text of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment may be found in Pub. L. No. 187-195, para. 662 (1974) (codified as amended at 22 USC 2422 [1988]).
8. Twentieth Century, Need to Know, 62.
9. Barry, “Managing,” 26. The January 17, 1986, Finding for Iran is reprinted in Twentieth Century, Need to Know, 95–96, but is missing the Supporting Document. See also Richelson, Community, 430, for an exemplar of a Finding.
10. Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, as amended by the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, at Title V of the National Security Act, 50 USC 413.
11. Colby, “CIA’s,” 76.
12. Johnson, “Accountability,” 90. Johnson notes (at 91) that the importance of accountability, in lieu of deniability, was lost on John Poindexter during the Iran-Contra scandal.
13. See Cohen, “Oversight,” 157. Representative Lee Hamilton, chairman of former HPSCI, from a speech, “The Role of Intelligence in the Foreign Policy Process,” delivered on December 16, 1986, at the University of Virginia. Hamilton noted that the withholding of funds for covert action programs by Congress is very rare, in that “CIA activities enjoy strong bi-partisan support” in HPSCI. See Simmons, “Intelligence,” 15.
14. See Getler, “Hill,” A1; Hoffman and Goshko, “Administration,” A1; Gordon, “Bush, A12; Schorr, “Sad,” 19; Associated Press, “Grab,” A1; Wicker, “Not Covert,” A19; Gerstenzang, “Reagan,” 5.