The Twilight of the Bombs

by Richard Rhodes

  I took this paradigm-shifting book home, read it, and then reread it, hardly stopping to sleep, sought and eventually found a copy of my own (it had been published in a small U.S. edition in 1972, had gone mostly unnoticed, and was correspondingly rare). It has been my handbook and guide for understanding nuclear man-made death now for more than thirty years.

  I tracked Elliot down through his publisher—he lived in London—and wrote him a letter of unqualified praise. Somewhat surprised, he responded. We began a correspondence. When my research for The Making of the Atomic Bomb took me to Europe, I stopped off in London to meet him. We’ve stayed in touch through all these years of work. Inevitably, I find myself turning again to Twentieth Century Book of the Dead as this last volume of my nuclear history draws to a close.

  Elliot devised a method for numbering the man-made dead of the twentieth century—you can read his book, if you can find a copy, to see how he does so—but even more profoundly, he identified for the first time the right way to think about the problem of man-made death. It’s the right way because it points to a solution, one that our species has already devised and tested and made to work against an older agent of slaughter, epidemic disease. But let him explain:

  Our societies are dedicated31 to the preservation and care of life. Official concern ceases at death, the rest is private. Public death was first recognized as a matter of civilized concern in the nineteenth century, when some health workers decided that untimely death was a question between men and society, not between men and God. Infant mortality and epidemic disease became matters of social responsibility. Since then, and for that reason, millions of lives have been saved. They are not saved by accident or goodwill. Human life is daily deliberately protected from nature by accepted practices of hygiene and medical care, by the control of living conditions and the guidance of human relationships. Mortality statistics are constantly examined to see if the causes of death reveal any areas needing special attention. Because of the success of these practices, the area of public death has, in advanced societies, been taken over by man-made death—once an insignificant or “merged” part of the spectrum, now almost the whole.

  When politicians, in tones of grave wonder, characterize our age as one of vast effort in saving human life, and enormous vigor in destroying it, they seem to feel they are indicating some mysterious paradox of the human spirit. There is no paradox and no mystery. The difference is that one area of public death has been tackled and secured by the forces of reason; the other has not. The pioneers of public health did not change nature, or men, but adjusted the active relationship of men to certain aspects of nature so that the relationship became one of watchful and healthy respect. In doing so they had to contend with and struggle against the suspicious opposition of those who believed that to interfere with nature was sinful, and even that disease and plague were the result of something sinful in the nature of man himself.

  Elliot went on to compare what he called “public death,” meaning biologic death, and man-made death:

  [I do not wish] to claim32 mystical authority for the comparison I have made between two kinds of public death—that which results from disease and that which we call man-made. The irreducible virtue of the analogy is that the problem of man-made death, like that of disease, can be tackled only by reason. It contains the same elements as the problem of disease—the need to locate the sources of the pest, to devise preventive measures and to maintain systematic vigilance in their execution. But it is a much wider problem and for obvious reasons cannot be dealt with by scientific methods to the same extent as can disease.

  And, a little later, he concluded this first attempt at synthesis: “In fact, the manner33 in which people die reflects more than any other fact the value of a society.”

  Hermann Biggs, an American public-health pioneer, made a similar observation at the beginning of the twentieth century. “The reduction of the death34 rate,” Biggs wrote in 1911, “is the principal statistical expression and index of human and social progress.”

  To advance the cause of public health it was necessary to depoliticize disease, to remove it from the realm of value and install it in the realm of fact. Today we have advanced to the point where international cooperation toward the prevention, control, and even elimination of disease is possible among nations that hardly cooperate with each other in any other way. No one any longer considers disease a political issue, except to the extent that its control measures a nation’s quality of life, and only modern primitives consider it a judgment of God.

  In 1999, for the first time in human history, infectious diseases no longer ranked first among causes of death worldwide. Public health, a discipline that organizes science-based systems of surveillance and prevention, was primarily responsible for that millennial change in human mortality. Half of all the increases in life expectancy in recorded history occurred within the twentieth century. Most of the worldwide increase was accomplished in the first half of the century, and it was almost entirely the result not of medical intervention but of public-health measures directed to primary prevention. Not surgeons cutting or doctors dispensing pills but better nutrition, sewage treatment, water purification, the pasteurization of milk, and the immunization of children extended human life. Half of all Americans alive today are alive because of public-health improvements. Without such improvements, 69 million of us would have died before reproducing; a further 69 million would never have been born. The number alive because of public-health improvements in the United States alone—138 million—is larger than the total number of man-made deaths worldwide in the twentieth century directly or indirectly caused by war. Public health is medicine’s greatest success story and a powerful model for a parallel discipline, which I propose to call public safety.

  Where the largest-scale instruments of man-made death are concerned, the elements of that discipline of public safety have already begun to assemble themselves: materials control and accounting, cooperative threat reduction, security guarantees, agreements and treaties, surveillance and inspection, sanctions, forceful disarming if all else fails.

  Reducing and finally eliminating the world’s increasingly vestigial nuclear arsenals may be delayed by extremists of the right or the left, as progress was stalled during the George W. Bush administration by rigid Manichaean ideologues who imagined that there might be good nuclear powers and evil nuclear powers and sought to disarm only those they considered evil. Nuclear weapons operate beyond good and evil. They destroy without discrimination or mercy: whether one lives or dies in their operation is entirely a question of distance from ground zero. In Elliot’s eloquent words, they create nations of the dead, and collectively have the capacity to create a world of the dead. But as Niels Bohr, the great Danish physicist and philosopher, was the first to realize, the complement of that utter destructiveness must then be unity in common security, a fundamental transformation in relationships between nations, nondiscrimination in unity not on the dark side but by the light of day.

  Violence originates in vulnerability brutalized: It is vulnerability’s corruption, but also its revenge. “Perhaps everything terrible,”35 Rainer Maria Rilke once wrote, “is in its deepest being something helpless that wants help from us.” As we extend our commitment to common security, as we work to master man-made death, we will need to recognize that terrible helplessness and relieve it—in others, but also in ourselves.

  Half Moon Bay

  2005–2010

  NOTES

  For full references, see Bibliography.

  PROLOGUE

  1 “The principle of common security …”: Palme (1982), p. 176.

  2 “The task of ensuring security …”: Quoted in Sigal (2000), p. 19.

  3 the United States had forced Taiwan: Hersman and Peters (2006), pp. 546–48.

  4 “If one country keeps …”: Quoted in Chernyaev (2000), p. 77.

  5 allowed its ally to test … Lop Nur: Reed and Stillman (2009), p. 252.

  6
“Despite certain promising developments …”: Spector (1990), pp. 303–4.

  7 A regional nuclear war … entire world: Toon et al. (2007).

  8 “As long as any state has …”: Cited by Richard Butler, class presentation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA, 2008.

  ONE “PRESIDENT BUSH’S FRANKENSTEIN”

  1 “In June 1982 … President Reagan …”: Howard Teicher affidavit, Document 61, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, “Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980–1984,” edited by Joyce Battle, pp. 2–4.

  2 Saddam “was pleased …”: Department of State telegram, “Subject: Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein,” Document 31, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, p. 1.

  3 (“I do not remember even one discussion …”: Quoted in Bergman (2007), p. 43. Bergman documents the Israeli program at length at p. 40ff.

  4 Aziz refused even to accept: Howard Teicher affidavit, p. 4.

  5 In 1981, striking from the air: Yengst et al. (1996), p. 331.

  6 “the deciding factor in this decision …”: Kay (1995), p. 111.

  7 Iraq rebuilt and extended Tuwaitha: See Albright et al. (1999).

  8 “Al Tuwaitha was visited …”: Kay (1995), p. 119.

  9 Iraq began buying uranium abroad: Table 1, Iraq Survey Group Report, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wm, accessed 20 Nov. 2008.

  10 Just as, after … underestimate Iraq: See Kay (1995), pp. 116–17.

  11 “In this connection …”: Quoted in Rhodes (1987), p. 511.

  12 “The fact is that during …”: UNMOVIC working document, 6 Mar. 2003, p. 6 (online).

  13 “The maximum level of radiation …”: Gary Milhollin, “Comments on the ‘Al-q’aq’a Bomb,” p. 2, Iraq Watch (online).

  14 In 1988 it decided formally: Albright (2002), p. 1.

  15 Precursor materials for WMD: See the Center for Grassroots Oversight, www.historycommons.org.

  16 “In September 1988 …”: Scott (1996), p. 1652.

  17 “I came immediately …”: Ibid., p. 1655.

  18 an incriminating Socratic dialogue: “Middle East: The Big Sting,” Time, 9 Apr. 1990 (online).

  19 “A purchase order …”: Robert Reinhold, “Artful Hunt for Smuggler Suspects,” New York Times, 29 Mar. 1990.

  20 Daghir dithered for months: Ibid.

  21 “On arrival at Heathrow …”: Scott (1996), p. 1652.

  22 “At this stage …”: Ibid.

  23 Iraqi agent Ali Daghir: Ali Daghir has steadfastly maintained that he was entrapped and that the capacitors he was shipping to Iraq were commonplace, a fact disputed by the officials who investigated his case. Daghir did succeed in having his conviction overturned on appeal on the grounds that the trial judge made a technical mistake in his jury instructions. Daghir then tried to win compensation for his conviction-related business losses but never succeeded in doing so. He also continued to be restrained by the U.S. government from doing business in Iraq.

  24 “Iraq may be close …”: David Fairhall, “Trigger Parts Point to Impending Test,” The Guardian (London), 29 Mar. 1990.

  25 enrichment by gaseous diffusion: For details see Albright (2002), pp. 14–15.

  26 “The Soviets have strong cards …”: Quoted in Waas and Unger (1992) (online).

  27 “had advised the president-elect …”: Friedman (1993), p. 133. The rest of the quotation follows on the referenced page.

  28 “Normal relations between …”: Ibid., Appendix B, p. 322.

  29 Baker endorsed: See a partial facsimile of this memorandum at Ibid., Appendix B, p. 323.

  30 “one of the largest banks in Italy …”: Henry B. Gonzalez, Congressional Record, House of Representatives, 28 Apr. 1992, p. H2694.

  31 An intense Bush administration … cover-up: See Friedman (1993), p. 215, passim.

  32 Bush himself participated: Ibid., p. 215; Gonzalez, Congressional Record, House of Representatives, 25 July 1992, p. H9502.

  33 “Despite all this, the United States …”: Gonzalez, Congressional Record, House of Representatives, 21 Sept. 1992, p. H8820.

  34 “The memo states …”: Ibid., p. H8821.

  35 “the current Middle East crisis”: Friedman (1993), Appendix B, p. 339ff.

  36 “In short, these are the facts …”: Gonzalez, Congressional Record, 21 Sept. 1992, p. H8824.

  37 “President Bush’s Frankenstein”: Quoted in Friedman (1993), p. 224.

  38 “Let the Gulf regimes know …”: Quoted in Wilson (2005), p. 97.

  39 “Brothers, the weakness of a big body …”: Quoted in “Vietnam: Setting the Stage,” presentation by Peter W. Rodman to the Conference on the Real “Lessons” of the Vietnam War, Center for National Security Law, University of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, VA, Friday, 28 Apr. 2000 (online).

  40 “By Allah, we will make …”: Quoted in Alfonsi (2006), p. 11.

  41 “Iraq came out of the war …”: “Excerpts from Iraqi Document on Meeting with U.S. Envoy,” New York Times International, 23 Sept. 1990 (online), p. 2.

  42 “So what can it mean …”: Ibid., p. 4.

  43 Glaspie responded: This and following statements quoted from ibid., p. 5ff.

  44 Glaspie-Saddam transcript: Glaspie subsequently testified before Congress that the transcript from which I have quoted, which was made public by Iraq on 11 Sept. 1990, had been “maliciously” edited by the Iraqis “to the point of inaccuracy.” She claimed she told Saddam in no uncertain terms that the United States would act if Iraq invaded Kuwait. The California Democrat Tom Lantos responded, “Let me tell you, very few people were sure [at that time] that we would move militarily.… For you to say in retrospect that Saddam Hussein absolutely knew that we would move in a military way is simply absurd.”

  45 “The United States and Iraq both …”: Quoted in Wilson (2005), pp. 102–3.

  46 electronic funds transfers: These and subsequent details from Hart (n.d.).

  47 “Their reports were very pointed …”: Ibid., pp. 6–7.

  TWO CUTTING SADDAM’S SINEWS

  1 “This will not stand …”: Quoted in Baker (1995), p. 276.

  2 “I know you’re aware …”: Ibid., p. 277.

  3 Wilson met with Saddam: Wilson (2005), p. 118ff.

  4 “Convey to President Bush …”: Alfonsi (2006), p. 113.

  5 “Saddam was worried …”: Wilson (2005), p. 123.

  6 The king … was easily persuaded: Gordon and Trainor (1995), p. 52.

  7 “After the danger is over …”: History Commons (online), citing multiple sources.

  8 “Dick Cheney called me …”: Powell (1995), p. 467.

  9 “Within a couple of weeks …”: Ibid., p. 469.

  10 “but a variety of military …”: Arkin and Fieldhouse (n.d.), Week Nine.

  11 that would not be enough for one bomb: Thomas C. Reed, personal communication, 15 Dec. 2008.

  12 twenty kilograms: Lyman (1995), p. 2.

  13 missile capable of reaching Tel Aviv: Hamza (2000), p. 237.

  14 “These tests were credited …”: Yengst et al. (1996), p. 338.

  15 delivered by … longer-range missiles: Ibid., p. 335.

  16 the bomb would be notably unstable: Ibid., p. 334.

  17 “It was a stupid idea …”: Thomas C. Reed, personal communication, 15 Dec. 2008.

  18 “We had learned that they …”: Wilson (2005), p. 141.

  19 “A half-century ago …”: Quoted in Alfonsi (2006), p. 99.

  20 “sharp divisions within George …”: Ibid., p. 101.

  21 “was convinced that military …”: Ibid., p. 86.

  22 The solution, devised by … Pickering: See ibid., p. 102ff.

  23 “The Bush administration …”: Ibid., p. 107.

  24 “the consensus opinion …”: David Kay interview, 2007.

  25 Pakistani derivative of the Chinese design:
Reed and Stillman (2009), p. 252.

  26 “gaining profits …”: Iraqi intelligence document 1/165, reproduced in Albright and Hinderstein (2004).

  27 “November 28 [1990] …”: Bush and Scowcroft (1998), p. 418.

  28 “what began as a strategic …”: Ronald Reagan (4Mar.1987), “Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy,” Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation.

  29 “somewhat to the right …”: Quoted in Rhodes (2007), p. 119.

  30 “I think you have to preserve …”: “Cheney in His Own Words,” Frontline, “The Dark Side,” PBS (online).

  31 “SENATOR KENNEDY: …”: Ibid.

  32 “It’s such a vital problem …”: Quoted in Alfonsi (2006), pp. 151–52.

  33 “I also warned him …”: Baker (2006), p. 298.

  34 “holding on to the hostages …”: Wilson (2005), p. 164.

  35 “That meeting with the king …”: Ibid., p. 165.

  36 “They ran the analysis …”: David Kay interview, 2007.

  37 “showed that there was uranium-238 …”: Nichols (2001).

  38 “Some of us believed …”: Ibid.

  39 “The reactor that did it …”: David Kay interview, 2007.

  40 “Those who would measure …”: Andrew Rosenthal, “Mideast Tensions; Visiting U.S. Troops in the Desert, President Talks Tough About Iraq,” New York Times, 23 Nov. 1990.

  41 “which concluded …”: Arkin and Fieldhouse (n.d.), Week Seventeen.

  42 “In the [government of Israel’s] view …”: Alfonsi (2006), p. 141. I follow Alfonsi’s argument here.

  43 “capability to produce …”: Quoted in Arkin and Fieldhouse (n.d.), Week Seventeen.

  “Thus, two weeks before …”: Ibid., Week Eighteen.