The Breaking Point

by Robert A Doughty

  If Belgium appealed for aid prior to an enemy invasion, French forces could possibly join the Belgians in defending their border with Germany. If not, the French had three other lines along which they could defend. The first of these, which was the farthest forward, ran from the French border at Givet along the Namur-Dyle, River-Antwerp line. The plan for placing troops along this line eventually became known as Plan D, or the Dyle Plan. The second alternative was to defend farther to the rear along the French frontier to Condé, through Tournai along the Escaut River to Ghent, and then either directly to the North Sea at Zeebrugge, or alternatively along the Scheldt (Escaut) River to Antwerp. The plan for placing troops farther to the rear along the Tournai-Escaut River-Antwerp line eventually became known as Plan E, or the Escaut Plan. The final alternative was to defend along the entire French border to Dunkirk. Of these three alternatives, a defense along the Namur-Dyle River-Antwerp line would be about seventy or eighty kilometers shorter than the other two.8

  During the first weeks of the war, General Maurice Gamelin (the commander of French forces) preferred to be cautious and prepared to implement the Escaut Plan. Following the rapid and deep thrusts of German forces into Poland in September 1939, France's military leaders were deeply concerned about whether her mobile forces could reach and occupy their designated defensive positions in Belgium before the arrival of highly mobile German mechanized forces. Less than a month after the beginning of the war in 1939, the French High Command issued a directive to the commander of Army Group 1 that specified his mission and that placed the first priority on “assuring the integrity of the national territory and defending without withdrawing the position of resistance organized along the frontier….” The directive also noted that Army Group 1 could be authorized to enter into Belgium and to occupy a defensive position along the Escaut River.9

  On 24 October a directive from Gamelin described the two main alternatives for occupying positions in Belgium, one along the Escaut and the other along the Dyle River. The directive explained that an advance beyond the Escaut could be considered only if French forces had time to reach prepared positions before coming under attack or if they arrived in time to prepare positions before a German attack.10 Thus, for the first weeks of the war, France favored moving no farther than the Escaut line.

  Only after it became apparent that the Belgians were strengthening their defenses along the Ardennes Canal and were improving the readiness of their forces did Gamelin become more optimistic about being able to send French forces farther into Belgium.11 During late October and early November, Gamelin concluded that the Allied forces could move forward successfully to the Dyle line. He favored the more ambitious strategy despite the suggestion of caution from General Alphonse Georges, the commander of the northern and northeastern frontiers, about the difficulties of reaching the Dyle line before the Germans attacked. Georges’ concerns were not new, since the High Command had discussed the point on several occasions in peacetime.

  While the British initially expressed reservations about any move into Belgium, Gamelin discussed his plan with their top-ranking officers and managed to gain their consent. After detailed analysis and discussions, formal adoption of Plan D occurred on 9 November during a meeting of the Allied generals at Vincennes. In its meeting on 17 November, the Supreme War Council concluded that it was “essential” to hold the Dyle line. On that same day, Gamelin sent out a directive that provided details about the occupation of the Dyle line from Antwerp, to Louvain, to Wavre, across the Gembloux Gap to Namur, to Givet.12

  Thus, by the middle of November, the Allies considered the Dyle line to be the most likely position to be occupied by their forces in Belgium. During the next four months, as the Dutch and Belgians improved their defenses, as the British Expeditionary Force slowly increased in size, and as the French forces became better equipped and trained and gained confidence in themselves, Gamelin's eyes began to look farther toward Holland.

  While adoption of Plan D was still being discussed by Allied officials, Gamelin began considering the possibility of moving into the Netherlands toward Breda. His concerns revolved around the strategic importance of the Netherlands. By sparing the Dutch from German conquest, the Allies could retain the ten Dutch divisions, secure North Sea communications, and deny the Germans an easy staging area for the launching of an offensive against Great Britain.13 By securing the mouth of the Scheldt (Escaut), the Allies could also move supplies by ship into Antwerp. The possibility of linking up with Dutch forces along the Scheldt (Escaut) River, or pushing across the river into Dutch territory, however, was an extreme variation of Plan D.

  On 8 November Gamelin sent out a directive that for the first time mentioned the possibility of a German invasion of the Netherlands. The directive emphasized the importance of preventing the bypassing of Antwerp on the west by pushing forces to the south bank of the mouth of the Scheldt (Escaut). To accomplish this, Gamelin strengthened the left wing of Army Group 1 with the Seventh Army, which apparently moved into position in December. Prior to its being placed on the far left flank of the Allied forces, the Seventh Army—which included some of France's most mobile and capable divisions—had served as part of the General Reserve behind the forces designated to move forward into Belgium. According to its new mission, in addition to occupying the south bank of the Scheldt (Escaut), the Seventh Army would—after receiving orders to do so—move into Holland and secure the mouth of the river by occupying the peninsula on the northern bank of its mouth.14 This was the first formal indication that the “Holland Hypothesis” was a possibility.

  Despite concerns in the High Command, Gamelin decided about two months before the German attack that the Dyle Plan and the “Holland Hypothesis” would include the advance of French troops toward Breda, which was soon known as the “Breda Variant.” He wanted French forces to linkup with Dutch forces along the Scheldt (Escaut) River or to make the linkup by pushing across the river into Dutch territory. On 12 March 1940 he issued a directive to Georges that coupled the Seventh Army's mission on the left flank with the Dyle maneuver and made the move into the Netherlands almost automatic. Georges, in turn, issued a directive to General Gaston Billotte, the Army Group 1 commander, which explained that if the order were given to move into Holland, the left flank of Army Group 1 would move into Holland as far as Tilburg, or as a minimum, as far as Breda.15

  Thus, on order, the French Seventh Army was supposed to occupy a bridgehead between the Belgians in the south and the Dutch in the north. To reach this position, the Seventh Army would have to move past the Belgians along the Albert Canal and then pivot east. While carrying out the risky Breda maneuver, the Seventh Army would have to travel about 175 kilometers; the Germans would have to travel about 90 kilometers to reach Breda.

  During the last two months before the German invasion, the only modification to this plan came on 16 April when another directive addressed the question of the Germans attacking the Netherlands and leaving Belgium alone. The major substantive change was a modification of the area to be occupied by the Seventh Army, but the directive noted, “In this case, the Belgians may be hostile or passive.” The key point, however, had been included in Georges’ directive on 20 March. It explained, “If circumstances are favorable, our positions will be pushed to the Albert Canal. It is only in the case where the enemy has largely preceded us in Belgium that the Escaut hypothesis will be followed.”16

  In making the decision about the Breda Variant and concomitantly weakening his reserves and his ability to concentrate forces elsewhere, Gamelin personally took the final step in the long evolutionary process in which the military hierarchy decided how to defend France's frontiers. Studies by the French military about sending forces toward Breda elicited strong objections from several high-ranking officers, but none were as prophetic as those voiced by General Georges. He emphasized the danger of committing most of France's mobile forces against a “diversion” when the main German attack could come through the French cente
r. He also asked that the Seventh Army be replaced by a corps with two divisions and that the field army be returned to the General Reserve.17

  As Gamelin's confidence in his forces had increased, he had allowed himself to be seduced by a grand strategic design of questionable value despite the objections of several of France's most senior and important generals. In return for the possible addition of ten Dutch divisions to the Allied cause and for the possible denial of the Scheldt (Escaut) estuary to the Germans, Gamelin sacrificed a significant portion of his strategic reserve and severely weakened the French ability to reply to an unexpected German move. That he would take such a risk must be attributed to his confidence in the ability of the French and Allied forces to halt the Germans. Additionally, Gamelin committed himself to the Breda Variant, even though staff talks were not conducted between France and the two neutral countries of Belgium and Holland, and even though Gamelin was uncertain of the response of the two countries. Neither country was willing to enter into detailed military cooperation with the Allies until Germany actually entered their territory.

  Because of his having designed the Breda Variant, Gamelin must personally bear responsibility for the riskiest aspects of the ultimately disastrous French strategy. Though he had made his way to the highest echelons of the French Army by being cautious and rarely taking chances, he chose a highly risky alternative when the destiny of his country and its allies depended on his judgment. The irony is that the French strategy was a conservative strategy, except for the Breda Variant. Had the Germans known that Gamelin was going to squander a significant portion of his reserves, they would have entered the campaign with greater confidence.

  By May 1940 the French and British were poised to carry out the Allied strategy. Army Group 1 had responsibility for the area between the English Channel and the western edge of the Maginot Line. The Seventh Army, B.E.F., First Army, and Ninth Army prepared to move forward and occupy the Dyle line, while the Second Army remained in position. After arriving at the Dyle line, the Seventh Army would occupy the area west of Antwerp and, if ordered, would move into Holland. After resisting a German attack, the Belgians were expected to fall back from the Albert Canal and occupy the river line between Antwerp and Louvain. To their right, the B.E.F. would have the most favorable situation, for the British were supposed to defend the river line between Louvain and Wavre, a distance of about twenty kilometers, with nine divisions. To their right, the First Army occupied what the French considered the most dangerous avenue of approach: the Gembloux Gap. This ancient invasion route included the area between the Dyle River and Namur. The avenue of approach through the Gembloux Gap ran along the northern bank of the Sambre River between Masstricht and Mons, had few natural obstacles, and aimed directly at Paris. The First Army had ten divisions to defend its front of about thirty-five kilometers between Wavre and Namur. To its right, the Ninth Army was supposed to move forward between the First Army and the Second Army and occupy positions south of Namur along the Meuse River.

  To the right of the Ninth Army, the Second Army was the easternmost field army in Army Group 1 and had responsibility for the area between Pont à Bar (six kilometers west of Sedan) and Longuyon. Its eastern sector included a portion of the Maginot Line. The western boundary of the Second Army served as the hinge for the advance of the other field armies in Army Group 1 into Belgium.

  French military leaders believed the Second and Ninth armies occupied the “least dangerous” sectors in Army Group 1. Both armies had ideal defensive terrain to occupy along the left bank of the Meuse River. To their front was difficult terrain that would require substantial effort and time—the French assumed—for an invading force to cross.

  Behind Army Group 1, French reserves were relatively small. After committing the seven divisions in the Seventh Army (one light mechanized division, two motorized divisions, and four infantry divisions) to the extreme left flank of Army Group 1, the French had seven divisions behind the Second and Ninth armies that could be used as reserves for that sector of the front. Others, such as the 14th Infantry Division, could also be moved west from behind the Maginot Line. Except for the 53rd Infantry Division, however, the divisions behind the Second and Ninth armies tended to be south or north of the hinge between the armies. The placement of the reserves demonstrates the lack of concern by the High Command for the “hinge” between the Second and Ninth armies. It also demonstrates the concern of the High Command with the possibility of a German attack coming around the flank of the Maginot Line and turning southeast through the so-called Stenay Gap. Most of the reserves behind the Second Army were located so they could respond to this possibility.

  Much to the surprise of the French High Command, the German XIXth Panzer Corps turned west on 14 May in the area behind the hinge after crossing the Meuse River at Sedan on the 13th. If the seven divisions of the Seventh Army had been available on the 13th and 14th and had been committed in front of the German forces, the entire course of the war may have been different.

  On the morning of the 13th, however, the Seventh Army pushed the main body of its forces into Holland, the 1st Light Mechanized Division having established a screening force at Tilburg on the 11th. The main body did not reach Breda, for the Germans quickly pushed back the French covering force and attacked the French as they attempted to move northeast toward Breda. By the end of the day, the Seventh Army managed to hold a line between Bergen op Zoom (thirty kilometers northwest of Antwerp) and Turnhout (thirty-five kilometers northeast of Antwerp) and thereby protected the estuary of the Scheldt (Escaut).18 However, the French never really established contact with the Dutch, for by the end of the 13th, the Dutch had been overwhelmed and had pulled back into Fortress Holland, the large peninsula that includes Rotterdam, Utrecht, and Amsterdam.

  Unfortunately for France, she had wasted a significant portion of her mobile reserves by sending them toward Holland. With minimum reserves behind her long line of defenses between the English Channel and the Rhine River, and with her most capable forces being located behind the Maginot Line or being pushed forward into Belgium and Holland, her strategy proved to be particularly vulnerable to a German attack through the Ardennes. While General Georges played the primary role in placing individual divisions behind the main line of French defenses, General Gamelin personally devised the Breda Variant and forced his subordinates to accept it. Consequently, the responsibility for the primary weakness of that strategy must be borne by him.

  GERMAN MILITARY STRATEGY

  In sharp contrast to the French, the German strategy in May 1940 sought a swift, decisive victory by the launching of a massive attack through the Ardennes. The initial plans for the war against the Allies, however, differed dramatically from the final plan that ultimately yielded victory in 1940.

  During the fight against Poland in September 1939, the Germans assumed a defensive position along the French and Belgian borders in the west to permit the concentration of forces in the east. After the swift victory, however, much of the military hierarchy preferred to remain on the defensive in the west. In particular, the senior leaders of the Army believed their forces were not ready for a difficult campaign against the Allies. The possibility of remaining on the defensive and seeking a diplomatic solution to the war appealed to the military hierarchy, which had a high estimate of the military capabilities of the Allies, particularly of the French. General Franz Halder, the Chief of the Army's General Staff, noted in his diaries: “Techniques of Polish campaign no recipe for the West. No good against a well-knit Army.”19

  Despite the reservations of German military leaders, the quick victory over Poland convinced Hitler that a similar campaign could yield victory in the west. On 10 October, Hitler met with his generals and read them a memorandum, a copy of which was given to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and to the commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The memorandum is remarkable, for it is a clear statement of Hitler's aims and his views on military strategy. In the document Hitler stated,
“The German war aim is the final military dispatch of the West, that is, destruction of the power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to oppose the…consolidation and further development of the German people in Europe.”20 According to Hitler, the main danger to Germany was a war of long duration, because neutral or even friendly states could eventually side with the Allies for economic or political reasons. A long war would also be difficult because of Germany's limited food and raw materials. The “essential factor” in the “victorious” conduct of a long war, Hitler said, was to safeguard industrial production in the Ruhr.

  Since the primary danger to the Ruhr was aerial attacks, Germany had to possess strong antiaircraft capabilities and excellent fighter aircraft. The control of the Low Countries was also important. Hitler explained, “If the Dutch-Belgian area were to fall into the hands of the English and French, then the enemy air forces would be able to strike at the industrial heart of Germany and would need to cover barely a sixth of the distance required by the German bombers to reach really important targets.” For Germany, her main military arms for waging a long war, Hitler believed, were her Air Force and her U-boats. Both could be “ruthlessly employed” against France and Great Britain.21

  Throughout his memorandum, Hitler emphasized preference for a short war and the importance of annihilating the Anglo-French forces. He also said that the passing of every month enabled the Allies to increase their power. He added, “At present the German soldier is again the best in the world. His respect for himself is as great as the respect he commands from others. Six months of delaying warfare and effective propaganda on the part of the enemy might cause these important qualities to weaken once more.”22 To avoid a decline in the readiness of the German military, Hitler wanted an attack to be launched in the immediate future.