Despite this intense effort, and despite routes and priorities for their use being designated and closely controlled, problems did appear during the attack. On several occasions during the move through the Ardennes, units moved out of their sector and disrupted the movement of units to their flanks. For example, the 2nd Panzer Division's forward movement was interrupted first by the 1st Panzer and then by the 6th Panzer Division. At other times, the desire of units to move forward as rapidly as possible caused them to ignore traffic control measures and created enormous traffic jams in Luxembourg. This lack of discipline threatened the success of the entire operation.
On the morning of the second day of the campaign, von Kleist sent out a message to his subordinate commanders that said the problems encountered during the move through Luxembourg were caused primarily by independent decisions being made by lower-level leaders and by a “lack of energy and interest” among some officers. He announced that he had punished two military policemen for allowing some vehicles to pass that did not belong to Group von Kleist and that if conditions worsened, offenders would be punished with the death penalty.6 While this threat did not end the problems with march discipline, the 1st, 2nd, and 10th Panzer divisions did manage to make their way through the difficult terrain of Luxembourg.
The second step in the deep attack of the XIXth Panzer Corps was the movement across Belgium. For this part of the operation, each of the three divisions placed an advance covering force to its front. To control the movement of the divisions, the Germans identified march routes and priorities for their use, but they also used terrain features or cities as daily objectives and expected units to reach these objectives. If a unit did not attain its objective, a new objective based on the new circumstances was provided for the following day. The use of daily orders that included daily objectives continued throughout the campaign.
Shortly before the operation began on 10 May, each division completed an operations order covering the move through Luxembourg and the advance into Belgium. The divisions focused their planning and preparation on the initial part of the operation. The 10th Panzer Division, for example, broke down the operation into three parts: the march through Luxembourg, the attack through Belgian defenses along the border, and the penetration of the enemy's second line of defenses west of the border. Except for mentioning that the XIXth Corps had the mission of crossing the Meuse near Sedan, the division did not provide information in its plan about the crossing of the river.7 Guderian expected the divisions to break through the enemy's second line of defenses on the first day of the operation, and the divisions’ plans did not go beyond the first day. The plans, nevertheless, were fairly lengthy; the plan for the 10th Panzer Division, for example, consisted of twelve pages, not including information about the engineers, communications, and logistics, which were dealt with separately.
The third and most important step, however, in the operation was the crossing of the Meuse River. An extremely significant question that affected the details of the move across Belgium was determining where the XIXth Panzer Corps would cross the Meuse. General von Kleist wanted the corps to cross the river west of Sedan and to make the main effort west of the Ardennes Canal and Bar River (six kilometers west of Sedan). Such a move would enable the Panzer corps to continue attacking west without having to make a difficult and dangerous pivot to the west and without having to fight its way across the Ardennes Canal and Bar River. Locating the crossing point west of Sedan also placed it closer to the designated crossing site of the XLIst Corps and thereby ensured the massing of five Panzer divisions along a relatively narrow segment of the Meuse.
Apparently concerned that the headstrong XIXth Corps commander would ignore his order to cross west of the Ardennes Canal, von Kleist repeated his order on several occasions. The operations order that was published on 21 March ordered Guderian to cross between Sedan and Nouvion (ten kilometers to the west of Sedan). On 18 April von Kleist sent a message to Guderian that explicitly outlined the advantages of crossing west of the Ardennes Canal. The message also included the anticipated boundary between the XIXth and XLIst corps.8 During the first days of the campaign, daily orders from von Kleist to Guderian also directed the corps to cross west of the Ardennes Canal.
Guderian, however, preferred to make his main attack east of the Ardennes Canal and prepared his divisions to cross the Meuse on both sides of Sedan. In essence, he ignored the directives from von Kleist. Though the German philosophy of command gave commanders the freedom to use their judgment in the execution of their orders and encouraged them to make decisions based on the situation facing them, Guderian's decision to attack east of the Ardennes Canal was a startling act of independence and led to an intense confrontation with von Kleist on 12 May. A proud, egotistical officer, Guderian believed he knew best how to employ his tanks and was unwilling to accept guidance from anyone—even his immediate commander—who did not have as much experience in armored operations as he.
As for plans for crossing of the Meuse River, Guderian recognized the difficulties of predicting the situation to be confronted by his corps after marching about 120 kilometers through the Ardennes. Like most German staff officers, he had been thoroughly schooled in Moltke's dictum about no operation plan extending “with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main body of the enemy.” Knowing that he could not predict the enemy's actions precisely, Guderian did not complete a formal plan for crossing the Meuse but did use war games to test different courses of action and to develop a better understanding among his officers of his intentions.
At the end of March the XIXth Panzer Corps conducted an exercise in which it wrote an order for three divisions to make an assault across the Meuse River at Sedan, to continue the attack to the south, and then to pivot west. Using divisions designated as the 22nd, 21st, and 210th Panzer divisions and using the Gross Deutschland Infantry Regiment to reinforce the center division, the corps rehearsed crossing the Meuse at three points: Donchery, between Gaulier and Torcy, and east of Sedan.9 In a lucky break for the Germans, this war game turned out to be very similar to the actual crossing. On 13 May the corps staff changed unit designations and several small aspects of the plan and issued it to subordinate commands. Nevertheless, its utility on 13 May came from much careful thought and analysis, not from an inflexible adherence to a previously composed plan. Hard work, detailed analyses, and rehearsals left little to chance.
After the XIXth Panzer Corps established a bridgehead across the Meuse, the next operational decision concerned whether Guderian's forces would consolidate the bridgehead and enable additional forces to cross or would exploit its success by heading west. Although Moltke's dictum about the dangers of making an operation plan for actions beyond the first battle with the enemy's main forces influenced German thinking, it is clear that Guderian wanted his armored forces to continue attacking and drive deeply into the French positions. During a briefing on 15 March at the headquarters of Army Group A, Hitler asked Guderian what his corps was going to do after establishing a bridgehead across the Meuse. Guderian responded to what he called “this vital question” by saying that he intended to continue his westward advance unless he received orders to halt.10 Although Hitler did not reply, Halder wrote in his diary that the briefing “produced no new viewpoints.” He added, “Decision reserved on further moves after the crossing of the Meuse.”11
In his memoirs, Guderian wrote that he never received any orders from his superiors about what to do after crossing the Meuse. This is not completely correct, for on several occasions von Kleist warned him not to be drawn toward the south. He frequently emphasized that the operational direction for Guderian's corps was toward the southwest or toward Rethel. Von Kleist made this point in the operations order, in the letter of 18 April on the “use of the XIXth Corps,” and on other occasions. One of the main reasons for his concern about Guderian's desire to cross east of the Ardennes Canal, head south, and then pivot west was his belief that this would disperse the for
ces of the Panzer group and decrease the chances of a rapid move deep into and through the French positions.
For reasons that are not completely clear, the three divisions under Guderian apparently expected to halt after establishing the bridgehead over the Meuse. In an entry in its daily journal for 9 May, the 1st Panzer Division included a statement of its mission. A staff officer wrote: “After the breakthrough [at the Meuse], a bridgehead is supposed to be built immediately to permit the crossing of further forces that are supposed to roll up the enemy's fortifications lines while turning towards the west.”12
Thus by 9 May the Germans had carefully analyzed all aspects of the upcoming operation, but they had completed detailed plans only for the first phase of the battle. Although neither Guderian nor von Kleist mindlessly became slaves to a written plan, both had carefully thought through the entire campaign and had chosen different points for the XIXth Corps to cross the Meuse. Both recognized the unpredictability of the first battles and the necessity to modify objectives, task organizations, and timing according to the circumstances. The most important unknown, nevertheless, was the outcome of the battle of wills between von Kleist and Guderian over the location and direction of attack across the Meuse.
CROSSING LUXEMBOURG
Though the Germans expected a relatively short campaign, they did not anticipate an easy campaign and devoted considerable time to ensuring that their units were ready. In March 1940 the 1st Panzer Division moved into an assembly area near Cochem (forty kilometers southwest of Koblenz and along the Moselle River) and began special training for the coming campaign. The main components of the division were an armor brigade and an infantry brigade. Two Panzer regiments were in the armor brigade, but only one infantry regiment was in the infantry brigade. While each Panzer regiment had two battalions of tanks, the infantry regiment had three battalions. For artillery support, the division had two 105mm battalions and one 150mm battalion. Among its other units were an armored engineer battalion and a motorcycle battalion.
After arriving at Cochem and beginning training, officers concentrated on war games and classes that would familiarize them with the mission of the division and that would enable them to work jointly with the Air Force, while soldiers received special training in fighting against bunkers and crossing water obstacles. During this rigorous training, Guderian had some concerns about the “light-hearted” approach of some of his junior officers and drove them hard to ensure they would be ready for the demands of the campaign.
Amidst this training and with no special warning, the German forces were alerted on 9 May and moved with short notice into battle. They had expected little or no notice. In the middle of January, Hitler had become concerned about the Allies’ possibly observing the German forces entering a heightened state of alert before an attack and had decided to reduce the amount of time required for their deployment. In November and December, he had reduced the deployment time to seven days and then to five days. After indications that the Allies had received warnings from someone in Berlin shortly before the previously selected attack dates, he decided in January to maintain his armed forces at a state of alert that permitted them to commence operations with less than twenty-four hours’ notice.13 If the Allies received warnings, they would have significantly less time to react.
After Hitler changed the date of attack twenty-nine times during the fall and winter, General Halder, the Chief of the Army's General Staff, learned on 30 April that the next target date was 5 May. On 4 May he was told the attack would be delayed until 6 May, perhaps 7 May. Because of poor weather, the attack was again delayed. Hitler wanted to attack immediately, but concerns about the weather hampering Luftwaffe flights continued to delay the attack. Finally, on 9 May, after receiving a forecast for good weather on the 10th, Hitler ordered the launching of the attack,14 but he established a code word system to enable him, if necessary, to halt the attack at the last possible minute.
Around midday on the 9th, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of Staff of the German Armed Forces, signed the order specifying “A-Day” as 10 May and “X-hour” as 0435 hours (0535 hours German time). The code words “Danzig” or “Augsburg” were supposed to reach the branches of the armed services by 2035 hours at the latest. While the code word “Danzig” would unleash the attack, “Augsburg” would halt it. Much depended on the weather forecast scheduled for around 2000 hours on the 9th.15
Hitler did not wait for the weather forecast to make his own move. In the middle of the afternoon on the 9th, he departed Berlin by automobile with a few close assistants. Their destination was a railroad station outside the city of Berlin. There they boarded Hitler's special train that departed for the north at 1600 hours. Most of those on the train thought they were heading toward Hamburg, but after darkness fell, the train turned toward the southwest. At a small station near Hanover, a staff officer established contact by telephone with Berlin, and Hitler learned that the weather forecast for the following day was for beautiful weather. At 2130 hours the code word “Danzig” arrived at the XIXth Panzer Corps.16
A member of the 1st Panzer Division's staff has described the sequence of events leading up to the division's attack into Belgium. In a May 1941 article in Die Wehrmacht, Major von Kielmansegg wrote:
Lunch had hardly been served when a telephone call summoned the general. He began to listen, and after a pause said, “I repeat.”
The Chief of Staff of the division and I looked at one another. We were the only ones other than the general to understand the meaning of his words. I checked the time: 1215 hours, Thursday, 9 May 1940, a date that I would always remember.
At 1220 hours, the telephones commenced to ring, and the liaison officers left to transmit the orders [to subordinate units]. This was sufficient for…the division to be prepared to move toward the frontier. I quickly finished my dinner so I could move with the command group at the head of the division….
The timetable functioned regularly and punctually. The fuel trucks, liaison vehicles, and radio cars waited in front of the hotel, next to the Moselle, ready to depart toward the west. The departure [of the advanced elements of the General Staff] took place at 1630 hours.
At 1700 hours, the division departed…. The long columns of Panzer Group Kleist moved forward on three large routes, with the infantry primarily using trucks. The night enveloped us; not a single light could be seen. The march was slow and difficult. It was also very difficult to establish an itinerary permitting the forward movement of the column and the simultaneous joining of it by small detachments coming from all directions. The turns in the steep roads of the Eifel mountains and of the Kyll region, and the successive descents required special attention from the drivers. Even though several small difficulties inevitably appeared, they were taken care of, [and] the main column was not affected. The movement continued.
In the “Eichelhutte,” a small inn on a fork in the road, the advanced echelons of the General Staff halted for the first time to await orders. We had been instructed not to proceed without proper orders….
After the leading elements of the division had long since passed the Eichelhutte…, a vehicle covered with dust approached; it stopped. The Ia [operations officer] had arrived. [Having been on a pass,] he had traveled to our location in record time, arriving before nightfall even though we did not expect him until the following morning…. He was warmly welcomed.
It was the morning of 10 May. The hands of the watch approached 0435 hours. Exactly at the prescribed minute, the engineers began to place a ramp across the obstacles [on the bridge] at the Luxembourg frontier. The obstacles were made of thick concrete, were as high as a man, and were trimmed with pieces of [steel] rails. It would have taken much too long to destroy them.
A hastily constituted detachment of cyclists crossed a ford on the river at the frontier, the Our. Its mission was to seize the next obstacle [at Moestroff], a large steel gate controlled electrically, before it could be closed. The group succeeded. Part of the concr
ete barrier was destroyed, and the route was entirely clear. Before [the ramp over] the bridge was completed, the motorcycle battalion also crossed the Our at the ford.
Without encountering other obstacles, the reconnaissance elements of the division raced across the Luxembourg territory, greater than 50 kilometers at this spot, and passed through before the inhabitants were even awake. At 0745 hours, the Belgian frontier was reached at Martelange.17
Kielmansegg's account of the crossing is essentially correct except for his assertion about the engineers starting to place the ramp across the bridge at the Our River “exactly at the prescribed minute.” In fact, engineers began their work twenty minutes late and did not finish the ramp until 0615 hours. Shortly after the Germans arrived at the Our River, a screening force forded the river and quickly moved west. These forces consisted of a motorcycle company, three reconnaissance platoons, and engineer support. Their mission was to check the route and clear it of any small obstacles. At 0620 hours the advanced guard began crossing the completed ramp over the bridge on the Our and entered into Belgium. The advanced guard consisted of a variety of elements, including the remainder of the motorcycle battalion, two companies of infantry from the 1st Infantry Regiment, an engineer company, an antiaircraft battery, two companies of antitank weapons, and artillery from the 73rd Artillery Regiment. With its greater combat power, the advanced guard could overcome any unexpected resistance in Luxembourg and clear the route of obstacles too large for the screening force to remove.18
As the center division in the XIXth Corps’ advance, the 1st Panzer Division made the main attack for the corps and acted as its spearhead.19 After receiving the code word indicating the beginning of the campaign, the division was supposed to cross the border into Luxembourg at Wallendorf, penetrate the Belgian defenses at Martelange and Bodange, and move west as rapidly as possible. On the first day of the attack, the division was supposed to reach the high ground west of Neufchâteau, a straight-line distance of about sixty kilometers from the German border. The Germans expected the Belgians to establish their first line of resistance near Martelange and their second line of resistance near Neufchâteau. As mentioned previously, Guderian's mission was to penetrate this second line of resistance on the first day of the campaign.
The Breaking Point Page 6
