As the XIXth Corps raced across Luxembourg, special operations were launched to ensure its successful passage of the difficult terrain in the Grand Duchy. In one of these operations, about 125 commandos under the command of Lieutenant Werner Hedderich seized five crossroads on Guderian's southern flank (Bomicht, Soleuvre, Foetz, Bettembourg, Frisange), which controlled the major routes going from France into Luxembourg. The objective of the operation was to provide some protection to the flank of the XIXth Panzer Corps as it moved through Luxembourg until additional forces arrived to establish stronger defenses. The Germans recognized that a minor raid or attack from France into Luxembourg could close one of the march routes and cause colossal traffic jams.
The volunteers from the 34th Infantry Division were flown into position using twenty-five tiny Fieseler-Storch aircraft that could carry only three men (including the pilot and their equipment). Since the planes needed only a small area for a landing, the passengers could be dropped off very close to their designated fighting positions. Except for Frisange, Hedderich's men successfully seized the key road junctions, and after being rapidly reinforced by infantry riding motorcycles, prevented enemy forces from attacking into the German flank.20 The first engagement between the French and Germans occurred on 10 May when elements of the 3rd French Light Cavalry Division moved north into Luxembourg and encountered the commandos.
In another special operation, tiny Fieseler-Storch aircraft carried an infantry battalion to the front of Guderian's corps along the frontier between Belgium and Luxembourg. In his diary, General Halder noted, “350 to 400 men are standing by in two groups at Crailsheim. Will go to Bitburg on A day. Their mission is to open the way for XIX Corps west of Bastogne. Fieseler-Storch planes.”21 This specially trained unit was the 3rd Battalion of the Gross Deutschland Regiment. Its soldiers were to be landed in an area just west of Bodange where they could cut off any Belgian defenders and prevent their being reinforced. With its code name being derived from a contraction of the two towns to be seized by the soldiers (Nives, Witry), the effort became known as Operation Niwi.
Additionally, commandos were sent into Luxembourg to seize several key passage points along the XIXth Corps’ march route. In some cases, these men crossed the frontier before the German divisions began their attack. Among the key points seized was a bridge in Diekirch, along the 1st Panzer Division's route. Though the Germans knew that Luxembourg had no intentions of destroying the bridge, they wanted to take no chances. Shortly after midnight, Germans dressed in civilian clothes seized the two policemen guarding the vital bridge and thereby ensured the safe passage of German columns.22
Everything about the attack across Luxembourg thus emphasized surprise and speed. Around 0745 hours, the screening forces of the 1st Panzer Division encountered the Belgians at Martelange.
THE FIGHT AT MARTELANGE AND BODANGE
The Belgian forces in the Ardennes were light forces under the command of General Maurice Keyaerts. Known as “Group K,” after their commander, the Belgian forces included two light infantry divisions, one of which included three Chasseurs Ardennais regiments. Group K's mission in eastern Belgium was to conduct a “delaying action which would hinder the advance of an invader toward the Meuse…”23 Instead of offering a tough defense along the Luxembourg border, the Belgian Army planned on offering its strongest resistance along the Meuse River between Namur and Maastricht and along the Albert Canal between Maastricht and Antwerp. Although the French secretly requested the Belgians to reinforce their forces in the Ardennes and thereby to prolong their delaying action against an invader, the Belgians insisted they did not have the forces to strengthen Group K sufficiently for it to offer a high degree of resistance along its eighty-five-kilometer front.
Because the main Belgian defensive lines were to the rear of Group K, the defenders along the Luxembourg frontier were not expected to establish a strong defense even if the terrain favored such an action. They intended to delay an enemy through the use of “obstacles and long range fires.”24 Though they planned on destroying many bridges and roads, they did not intend to cover all the obstacles by fire.
To accomplish his mission, General Keyaerts dispersed his forces across a wide front and did not attempt to establish a continuous line of defenses. In eastern Belgium, the Chasseurs Ardennais established two main “lines” of resistance, which were lines only in the sense of placement of strong points. One ran north–south from Bastogne, to Martelange, to Arlon, and the other ran north–south from Libin, to Libramont, to Neufchâteau, to Etalle. After creating obstacles along these two lines and hindering the advance of the Germans, Keyaerts planned on withdrawing his forces toward the northwest to Huy, near Liège. The Germans knew about the two lines of defenses and in their planning prepared to penetrate both of them on the first day of their offensive.
Though not exactly the same, the two Belgian lines also generally followed two lines that were identified by France for occupation by her cavalry forces. Unfortunately, because Belgium maintained her status as a neutral nation until she was invaded, very little coordination was actually accomplished between the security forces of the two nations. Later both sides criticized the other. On the one hand, France complained that the Belgian obstacles delayed the advance of her cavalry and that the Chasseurs Ardennais withdrew through the French cavalry without making any attempt to fight in a combined fashion. On the other hand, the Belgians complained that the French did not move forward fast enough to reinforce the vastly outnumbered Chasseurs Ardennais.
The primary onus for the failure of the two forces to work together must be given to Belgium since she feared compromising her neutrality and thus accepted only limited cooperation with France. Nevertheless, neither side expected much help from the other. And both sides received almost none.
Directly in the path of the 1st Panzer Division, the 2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment of the Chasseurs Ardennais occupied the area around Martelange and Bodange with its 4th and 5th companies. In a valiant and unexpected battle, this doughty little force almost entirely derailed on 10 May the carefully choreographed advance of the XIXth Panzer Corps. Their valiant struggle is particularly interesting, for the Belgians did not intend for them to fight. They nevertheless put up one of the hardest fights the 1st Panzer Division encountered during the entire campaign.
The Chasseurs Ardennais were an extremely light infantry force that used bicycles as their main means of transportation and that had only four machine guns and twelve submachine guns in a company. The heaviest weapon available to them was the T-13 armored (and tracked) vehicle, which was armed with a 47mm gun and weighed only five tons. The T-13 was not organic to an individual company but could be sent forward as a reinforcement.25
Around 0100 hours on 10 May the Chasseurs Ardennais, who were already near their wartime positions, were alerted. The 4th Company occupied its main position at Martelange, and to its rear, the 5th Company occupied defensive positions at Bodange. Both companies had chosen their positions carefully and occupied extremely strong terrain, but the position of the 5th Company at Bodange was particularly strong. To reach Neufchâteau, the German 1st Panzer Division had to follow the route from Martelange, to Bodange, to Fauvillers, but the narrow route followed the Sûre River and was filled with numerous curves and defiles. To bar the enemy's progress, the Belgians placed eight demolitions in the roads in 4th Company's area (Martelange) and six in the 5th Company's (Bodange); they also installed one minefield at Martelange, one at Strainchamps (three kilometers north of Bodange), and three at Bodange.26
After the Germans crossed into Luxembourg on 10 May, Group K authorized the blowing of those demolitions that would not impede rearward movement. Unfortunately, one of the explosions cut the 4th Company's communication line with its battalion headquarters and with 5th Company, and it had to rely on a motorcyclist to carry messages. After the first German motorcyclist appeared around 0745 hours, the company came under strong attack from the Germans around 0930–0945, and at 103
0 hours, it received an order from the 2nd Battalion to withdraw west to Fauvillers (two kilometers west of Bodange). At 1115 hours the 4th Company passed through the 5th Company at Bodange.27
The 5th Company, which was under the command of Major Bricart, had also blown some of its demolitions early in the morning. Around 0800 hours Bricart learned that German soldiers had landed by aircraft at the rear of his company, and he soon received orders from his regimental headquarters to send his T-13 armored vehicle, which carried the only antitank weapon in his company, to the rear to be used against the Germans. After the 4th Company passed through his position, Bricart gave the order to explode the demolitions to his company's front. He had to rely on these obstacles to halt enemy armored vehicles.
Throughout the fight at Bodange, Bricart expected to receive orders telling him to withdraw. Sometime around 1230 a written order arrived for the 5th Company to defend in place as long as possible. This was the last message received by Bricart. Unfortunately, the explosion of one of the company's demolition charges soon severed his contact with the commander of the 2nd Battalion, and he never received an order to withdraw. Additionally, the 2nd Battalion lost contact with its regimental headquarters after Germans in its rear cut the communication line. Having nothing else but a weak radio (E.R.P. 36) to assure contact with higher headquarters, the battalion commander, Major Agon, had extremely tenuous contact with his superiors and never received orders for his battalion to withdraw. The regimental headquarters of the 1st Chasseurs Ardennais sent orders at 1320 hours for the 2nd Battalion to withdraw, but Agon did not receive the message. A long encrypted radio message arrived at 1640 hours, but Agon could not decipher it.28 Ironically, were it not for the cutting of communications with higher headquarters, the 2nd Battalion probably would have withdrawn early in the afternoon and opened the way for the 1st Panzer Division.
Though it faced a formidable force, the 5th Company occupied an extremely strong position at Bodange. As one travels along the winding road that connects Bodange to Martelange, one rounds a curve and can see a small hill to the left front (known as Stein) and a larger hill to its right rear. Bodange, which included at least nine thick masonry buildings in 1940, sits halfway up the larger hill. Bricart placed his 2nd Platoon (minus a squad) on Stein hill and his 3rd Platoon in Bodange. During the battle, the 3rd Platoon moved up the hill into the houses along the highest street in the village. He placed a squad from the 2nd Platoon on the high ground above Wisembach (one kilometer southeast of Bodange). As the Germans moved along the road from Martelange, they first encountered this squad. Later in the battle, the squad moved by bicycle into Bodange and reinforced the 3rd Platoon, which had already shifted into the houses further up the hill. Bricart's 1st Platoon occupied a defensive position overlooking the destroyed bridge over the small stream at Strainchamps (three kilometers to the north). He located his command post to the west of Bodange on the route to Fauvillers.
Since the small Sûre River, which was in actuality a large stream, ran alongside the road toward Bodange, Bricart's 2nd and 3rd platoons easily blocked the road with a barricade and a crater from a demolition charge. From their positions on the two hills, the 2nd and 3rd platoons could cover the obstacles to their front, which would strip the Germans of any protection they could get from armored vehicles. After some adjustment of their positions, the two platoons could also cover one another. If the Germans were to move through Bodange, they would have to push the Belgians off Stein hill and then root out the defenders in Bodange.29
As for the 1st Panzer Division, Major Kielmansegg explained, “[T]he attack was halted before Bodange, where the bridge over the Sûre was…destroyed. The enemy had installed here his first line of resistance. Established in well-camouflaged and carefully fortified positions of fire, the defense was strong. Everywhere there were dense and deep rolls of barbed wire; the roads and trails were all blocked. It was not possible to go around them; that would accomplish nothing. It was necessary that we go directly over them.”30
The first Germans to encounter the Belgians at Martelange were from the 3rd Company of the 1st Motorcycle Battalion. Arriving at the Belgian border around 0745 hours, the point of the company halted when it reached the destroyed bridge across the Sûre River and then attacked the Belgian positions’ bunkers to the northwest of Martelange. Other elements from the advanced guard, including another motorcycle company and an armored reconnaissance troop, soon arrived, and when the commander of the advanced guard, Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Balck, who commanded the 1st Infantry Regiment, appeared on the scene, he sent them into the village. Balck remained in charge of the initial fighting until Colonel Walter Krüger, who commanded the 1st Infantry Brigade but who had been on pass when the operation began, arrived and took command of the leading elements of his brigade.31 With cover being provided by a heavy machine gun section and three reconnaissance vehicles, the German soldiers fought their way through the streets and quickly crossed the stream, whose waters reached to their waists.
After crossing the Sûre, the Germans moved north and northwest for about three kilometers along the road toward Bodange. Except for some of them stumbling into a minefield near Wisembach, the move went smoothly. With supporting fires coming from the 4th Company (a heavy machine gun unit), the 3rd Company and then the 1st Company of the 1st Motorcycle Battalion seized the high ground to the northeast of Bodange around 1100 hours. Around 1400 hours the 3/1st Infantry received orders to assume responsibility for taking Bodange. At the same time, the motorcycle battalion received orders to attack toward Fauvillers (three kilometers west of Bodange) and to make contact with the 3rd Battalion of the Gross Deutschland Regiment, which had flown into the area and landed near Witry (six kilometers west of Bodange) in Operation Niwi. To get to Fauvillers, the motorcycle companies pulled back and moved to their left, around the southern flank of the Belgian defenders.32
Around 1400 hours pressure from the Germans (probably from the 1st and 3rd Motorcycle companies) forced the 2nd Platoon of the 5th Belgian Company to abandon Stein hill, the southern flank of its position. Because of enemy fire coming from the hill to the northeast, the survivors of that platoon moved to the rear and did not reinforce the 3rd Platoon in Bodange. The 3rd Platoon's plunging fire from Bodange to the top of Stein hill, however, prevented the Germans from occupying their newly won position. Thus, by mid-afternoon, the small Belgian force still prevented the Germans from moving through Bodange, even though the 1st Motorcycle Battalion had circled around its southern flank on foot and was now heading west. Since they had not received permission to withdraw and still hoped the French would reinforce them, the 3rd Platoon continued fighting.
To avoid further losses and to blast out the Belgians from their holes, the Germans tried to concentrate the fires of three artillery battalions on their positions, but only one battery managed to push its way through the tangle of German forces now concentrating near Martelange. The Germans also managed to push forward four 88mm antitank guns so they could engage the Belgians. At 1600 hours Major Bricart's last message reported his position was under artillery fire. At about the same time, the German 3/1st Infantry made its final assault on the village. Though the thick walls of the buildings provided some protection from the massive German fire, the Belgians began taking more casualties and soon expended almost all their ammunition.33
Around 1800 hours the Germans finally succeeded in reaching the street next to the buildings, and the Belgians recognized the end was at hand. The twenty-six remaining soldiers of the 3rd Platoon surrendered. The small group of determined men at Bodange had single-handedly delayed the advance of the 1st Panzer Division. Major Bricart died fleeing toward Fauvillers while trying to avoid capture.34
The Germans, nevertheless, still could not pass through Bodange. As they tried to ford the river near the destroyed bridge over the Sûre River, they discovered a Belgian minefield at the crossing site. After carefully clearing the mines, they opened a safe route around 2015 hours.35 The 1s
t Panzer Division had spent from around 0745 to 2015 hours trying to push through the two light infantry companies, who had delayed the main body of the division from about 1200 to 2015 hours.
To the north at Strainchamps, the 1st Platoon of Major Bricart's 5th Company slowed the advance of the 2nd Panzer Division, which also had not encountered any opposing forces in Luxembourg. After the platoon received orders around 0900 hours to hold as long as possible, the first Germans—according to the Belgians—appeared around 0900 hours but did not unleash a violent attack until around 1400 hours. After the Belgians withdrew around 1700 hours, the 2nd Panzer Division energetically worked on building a bridge across the Sûre River. This bridge, however, was not finished until 0100 hours the next morning.36
OPERATION NIWI
Operation Niwi had the purpose of airlifting infantry from the 3rd Battalion of the Gross Deutschland Regiment to positions behind the Belgian defenses along the Luxembourg border. By seizing Witry (six kilometers west of Bodange) and Nives (six kilometers north of Witry), the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions could break through the first line of Belgian defenses more easily. Belgian and French movement between Neufchâteau and Bastogne could also be halted.
The commander of the 3rd Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Eugen Garski, divided his forces into two groups for the operation. One under the command of Captain Krüger was supposed to land at Nives; the other under the command of Garski was supposed to land at Witry. Garski's task force was larger than Krüger's (who was the commander of the 11th Company) and was transported by fifty-six Fieseler-Storch aircraft while Krüger's was carried by forty-two. To move the entire force of four hundred men, the aircraft had to make two round trips. Garski planned on the second group arriving about two hours after the first. After the Germans arrived at their designated points, three Junker-52 were to be used for resupply.37
The Breaking Point Page 7
