When the first wave of Garski's force flew across the Belgian frontier, the lieutenant colonel was confident that his force could accomplish their mission, for they were highly talented and well trained. The Gross Deutschland Regiment was truly an elite force, composed of volunteers from each province of the Third Reich. During the Christmas holidays, Hitler had personally visited the regiment and had assured them of his faith in their abilities. Additionally, the 3rd Battalion had undergone several months of hard training in preparation for its challenging mission.
As the German aircraft flew across the Belgian frontier, however, they received enemy fire and became dispersed. Five minutes later Garski's pilot recognized Witry and landed around 0500 hours about one kilometer to its northwest. After Garski and his adjutant climbed out of their aircraft, they were joined by eight other men from four aircraft. This was his entire force at Witry! The other fifty-one planes that were supposed to land at Witry had gotten lost.38
Captain Krüger's force also had bad luck. After receiving enemy fire, Krüger's pilot lost sight of the route he was following and drifted far south. Instead of landing at Nives, he landed nine kilometers to the southwest of Witry at Léglise (about fifteen kilometers south of his designated landing point). Krüger did not know where he was until he stopped two Belgians on bicycles, and they told him. Meanwhile, after establishing a hasty perimeter, Krüger's men began stopping and seizing all vehicles passing through the area. In addition to a number of civilians, they picked up about forty Belgian soldiers who were on leave and trying to return to their units on the frontier. After a French cavalry unit discovered them and began trying to encircle them, Krüger and his men took their prisoners and fled to the north, toward Witry.39
Most of the men who were supposed to be with Captain Krüger had landed successfully near Nives but, when they could not locate their company commander, believed they were lost. After asking a villager where they were and being told they were at Nives, they learned it was Krüger who was lost, not them. Despite the absence of their company commander, the two officers present, Lieutenants Obermeier and von Blankenburg, quickly prepared to accomplish their mission. Obermeier grabbed a Belgian motorbike and set out on a reconnaissance. About two kilometers away, he was shot at by a French cavalry unit that had just arrived in the area. The lieutenant hurried back to the other Germans and prepared for a French attack. Thinking quickly, the small German force stretched some barbed wire across the road and created a false minefield by burying some pieces of slate in the ground. The trick apparently worked, for the French did not attack.40
Meanwhile, Garski's small force had grown in size as his scattered soldiers began assembling at Witry. Then the second part of his force arrived in their Fieseler-Storch aircraft without difficulty. Garski began organizing a strong defensive position in Traimont, just to the west of Witry. By occupying the road junction in that small village, he blocked French access to Martelange and to Strainchamps and the north.41 Around noon, Krüger and his men arrived from Léglise. With their arrival, Garski had more than enough men to accomplish his mission.
Despite an unlucky beginning, the 3rd Battalion was in place. With Obermeier's force at Nives and Garski's at Witry, French forces were prevented from moving toward Neufchâteau and Bastogne. However, Operation Niwi had resulted in the Belgians offering a stronger defense at Martelange and Bodange than otherwise may have occurred. When Garski's men cut telephone lines throughout the area, they severed links between the 1st Regiment of the Chasseurs Ardennais and its 2nd Battalion. The subsequent heroic fight of the 4th and 5th companies at Martelange, Bodange, and Strainchamps kept the XIXth Panzer Corps from reaching Neufchâteau on 10 May. Thus the unintended result of the special operation was a strengthening of the resistance in front of the Germans, not a weakening.
After the 1st Motorcycle Battalion moved around the southern flank of the Belgian defenders at Bodange, it moved directly west toward Fauvillers. With Garski's force pushing east from Witry and the two companies from the motorcycle battalion pushing west, the two German forces met at Fauvillers around 1630 hours on the 10th. Between 1800 and 1830 hours, the remainder of the motorcycle battalion, including the motorcycles, reached Fauvillers, and shortly thereafter the battalion moved west to secure Witry.42
DELAYS AT BODANGE
After the 3/1st Infantry cleared Bodange and after the 1st Motorcycle Battalion reached Witry, the 1st Panzer Division's route of march to its front was clear of enemy forces for at least the next ten kilometers. Moving the heavy elements of the division beyond Bodange, however, proved to be extremely difficult.
As the Germans worked diligently to clear the minefield restricting their movement across the Sure River and to repair the roads through Martelange, Radelange, and Bodange, General Kirchner issued orders for the division to prepare to continue the attack. During the day-long battle on the Belgian border, the division's march columns had continued moving forward through Luxembourg and slowly had closed into Martelange. But the division was not massed at the frontier ready to spring forward when the route through Bodange was opened. Even though the light elements on the point of the division's advance moved quickly through Luxembourg, the march columns to their rear (tanks, artillery, and heavy trucks, especially) experienced numerous delays. By 2015 hours, when the crossing site at Bodange was opened, some elements were still far to the rear. And before the entire division could advance along the narrow road between Bodange and Martelange, numerous road and bridge repairs had to be completed in the tightly restricted terrain. These difficulties prevented the division from immediately unleashing its forces toward the west.
The daily log of the 1st Panzer Division concluded:
The division must therefore give up its intention to break through the second resistance line.
The units of the advanced guard organize themselves in a line from Volaiville to Witry and rest for the night while covered by security forces.
Thus the first day for the 1st Panzer Division did not end on a completely satisfactory note. The circumstances which caused that lay less in the energetic defense of the Belgians—the resistance of the Belgians was weaker than had been assumed—but above all in the great difficulties which occurred when all usable crossing points and pathways were completely destroyed. Detours were usually not to be found….”43
The assertion about the resistance of the Belgians being “weaker” than had been “assumed” is probably not true, but even if it were, the companies of the Chasseurs Ardennais accomplished their mission in a distinguished fashion. The greatest restriction of German mobility occurred at Bodange where the Belgian obstacles were covered by fire. The willingness of the small Belgian force to fight and the destruction of the road network on the Luxembourg frontier clearly affected the ability of the 1st Panzer Division to move forward rapidly.
THE ADVANCE OF THE 10TH PANZER DIVISION
To the left of the 1st Panzer Division and on the left flank of the XIXth Panzer Corps was the 10th Panzer Division. Evidently because of the threat of a French attack into the southern flank of the corps, Guderian attached the Gross Deutschland Regiment (minus two of its four battalions) to the division. This made it the largest of Guderian's three Panzer divisions.
With elements crossing at Bollendorf and Echternach, the division's role in the 1940 campaign began somewhat inauspiciously when the engineer company charged with assisting the crossing of the advanced guard over the Our River at Bollendorf got lost and arrived at the crossing site late. Without the engineers’ assault boats, the leading elements of the division did not cross the river until the ramp over the concrete obstacles on the bridge was in place. At 0535 hours, almost an hour late, the first Germans finally crossed the river.44 Despite this awkward beginning, the 10th Panzer Division subsequently performed superbly and initially moved far ahead of the other two divisions.
With screening forces consisting of motorcycle, engineer, and reconnaissance elements and advanced guards consisting of
air-defense, engineer, and reconnaissance elements, the division moved through Luxembourg along two march routes. The two battalions of the Gross Deutschland Regiment and a tank company were in the right column, and the 69th Infantry Regiment and the two tank regiments were on the left. Other units were, of course, mixed in the two columns.45
Around 0915 hours the screening forces on the right entered Belgium near Attert and found no opposition. In their quick move through Luxembourg, they had encountered no obstacles. The left column moved somewhat slower. The 10th Panzer Division was supposed to advance in two columns through the wide valley between Arlon and Florenville (thirty-five kilometers west of Arlon) and did not expect strong resistance from the Belgians. However, they did expect to meet French forces moving north into Belgium or moving east from Florenville.46 The division's prediction came true, for at 1230 hours, they made contact with French forces east of Etalle.
In Etalle the 2nd Battalion of the Gross Deutschland Regiment became involved in heavy house-to-house fighting in which the battalion commander was killed. Shortly before the French fled Etalle, a few tanks from the 10th Panzer Division finally arrived to reinforce the German infantry. Outside Etalle, the Gross Deutschland Regiment attacked with the 1st Battalion on the right, the 2nd Battalion on the left, and the 43rd Engineer Battalion in the center. Since the artillery had not yet arrived, the infantry and engineers fought without its support, but did receive support from the heavy assault guns of the 16th Company of the Gross Deutschland Regiment.47 In subsequent battles, the use of the engineers as infantry remained a common practice.
For the rest of the afternoon, the Germans fought against a “toughly defending enemy,” and by 1900 hours managed to reach the railway line that runs north-south about three kilometers west of Etalle. In this first day's fighting, the 69th Infantry Regiment and the Gross Deutschland Regiment began attacking along the southern and center parts, respectively, of the valley. As the battle progressed on the first day, the Gross Deutschland Regiment began attacking in a northwesterly direction toward Villers-sur-Semois (five kilometers northwest of Etalle). During the sharp fighting, the commander of the 69th Infantry Regiment was killed about three kilometers west of Etalle.48
Thus, in the initial hours of combat, the Germans lost the commanders of an infantry regiment and a battalion. These and subsequent losses of key personnel clearly demonstrated the willingness of German commanders to lead by example and to be at the forefront of the fighting. As will subsequently be shown, the French suffered far fewer losses of senior officers. Despite the willingness of the division's senior officers to lead from the front, the strong French defenses prevented the division from seizing its first day's objective, which was the Rossignol-Bellefontaine line (seven kilometers west of Etalle).
The 10th Panzer Division continued to try to break through the French defenses, and at 2100 hours received an order telephonically from corps to continue the attack on 11 May toward Florenville. At 0200 hours, however, it received a written order, which had been completed by corps headquarters at 2150, to shift toward the northwest and seize a crossing over the Semois River near Mortehan (ten kilometers east of Bouillon).
In his account of the battle, Guderian explained that Group von Kleist had become concerned about French cavalry advancing from the south and had ordered the 10th Panzer Division to turn toward the direction from which they were supposedly coming. According to Guderian, he recognized the diversion of one-third of his force would threaten the success of the Meuse crossing and therefore the entire operation. To avoid having to send the division south, Guderian changed its route of march and ordered it to move through Suxy (eight kilometers south of Neufchâteau) toward Mortehan (sixteen kilometers west-southwest of Neufchâteau).49
As he considered his alternatives and then issued orders changing the division's route of march, he ignored a message from von Kleist that arrived shortly before midnight on the 10–11th and that ordered the 10th Panzer Division to halt and secure the Panzer group's left flank.50 Guderian strongly believed that flank protection was the responsibility of follow-on divisions and that turning the 10th Division to the northwest defused the threat to the corps’ flank. He also believed that the success of the entire operation depended upon all three of his divisions being available for the attack across the Meuse. After conversations between the XIXth Corps and the Panzer group around 0330 hours, in which Guderian emphasized the advantages of protecting the corps’ flank by advancing rapidly, von Kleist finally rescinded the order.51 Thus Guderian bullheadedly ignored von Kleist's order and then had the audacity to debate its merits. If von Kleist had later insisted on turning the division to the south, or if the French had in fact attacked north, the difficulties of turning the division around would have been insurmountable.
Unfortunately, the shift of the 10th Division to the north forced it to pass through some of the worst terrain in the entire area. The daily log of the 10th Panzer Division explained:
The division had focused entirely on the continuation of the attack against Florenville and believed itself to be able to realize rapid success. It foresaw a delay in attaining the larger objective of Sedan through the difficult shift and the transfer of the march columns through the barely passable Anlier Forest and the forcing of the Semois River.
In contrast to that, corps appears to have reports of strong forces advancing from the south which call into question the rapid advance of the division through Florenville. Moreover, the shifting of the division was supposed to help the advance of the 1st Panzer Division which was still hanging back….52
Despite the short time involved, the division managed to inform all its units and shift its direction of march toward the northwest. While leaving two battalions of the 69th Infantry Regiment and an artillery battalion at Etalle to cover the shift, the 10th Division moved along three routes toward the northwest, including one group that moved north almost to Neufchâteau and passed through Grapfontaine (three kilometers to its southwest). The division's objective was Mortehan, which lay fifteen kilometers to its front on the Semois River.53
In the movement toward the northwest, the Gross Deutschland Regiment encountered “obstinately fighting enemy” in the heavily forested area around Suxy but managed to push the “very tough fighting horse-mounted reconnaissance battalion” back. Farther to the north, the 86th Infantry Regiment encountered weak resistance near Straimont. An unexpected problem appeared when elements from the 1st Panzer Division moved south of Neufchâteau onto the march route of the 86th Regiment. This caused delays. Nevertheless, leading elements of the division's infantry were about five kilometers east of Mortehan when darkness fell on the 11th.54
As the division moved northwest, the Germans learned that the reports about French cavalry elements moving from Florenville east toward Etalle were false, and von Kleist became concerned about the wisdom of diverting the 10th Division to the northwest. If the 10th Division advanced toward the west through Florenville, according to von Kleist, it could roll up the French positions along the Semois by attacking them from the south. During a visit to the corps’ command post on the afternoon of the 11th, von Kleist discussed the possibility of sending the division toward Florenville, rather than toward the northwest, but Guderian's Chief of Staff emphasized that turning the division toward Florenville could result in “intolerable” delays. Von Kleist departed without having ordered the corps to divert the division again.55
About two hours later, XIXth Corps received an order from the Panzer group to move forces toward Florenville. The operations officer of the group suggested sending the Armor Brigade from the 10th Panzer Division. He also explained that the High Command in Berlin wanted stronger forces sent toward Florenville. Recognizing the inevitable, the XIXth Corps radioed the division at 1745 hours and ordered it to send a battalion task force through Florenville toward the Semois River. This time objections came from the commanding general of the 10th Division.56
During a meeting with Guderian tha
t night at Neufchâteau, General Schaal argued that his division should not send a battalion toward Florenville. Pointing out that a battalion could not be moved in a timely manner and that sufficient protection would come from the advanced elements of the VIIth Corps, he emphasized the importance of continuing toward Mortehan. To protect the flank of the XIXth Corps, according to the original plan, advance elements of the VIIth Corps were supposed to move into position south of Etalle.57 When the VIIth Corps continued moving west, its units were supposed to be replaced by units from the XIIIth Corps, which followed the VIIth Corps.
Just as von Kleist had backed down before Guderian's objections on the previous day, Guderian soon backed down before Schaal's. The mission of the division remained that of crossing the Semois near Mortehan and thrusting forward in the direction of Sedan. But to respond to the High Command's concern about the group's flank, Guderian called the 29th Infantry Division (Motorized), which was part of the XIVth Motorized Corps and was following the 10th Panzer Division, and asked if it could send forces toward Florenville. After other delays, von Kleist finally recognized the difficulty of turning the 10th Panzer Division and ordered the 29th Division to move toward Florenville.58 Guderian's actions had left him little choice.
Throughout the 11th, the bulk of the Panzers from the 10th Division followed far behind the infantry, though a few accompanied them. Shortly before midnight on 11–12 May, the corps commander withdrew the Gross Deutschland Regiment from the control of the 10th Division and placed it under the control of corps headquarters. Shortly after midnight, the two Panzer regiments closed into an assembly area about five kilometers south of Neufchâteau.59 The infantry was about sixteen kilometers ahead of the main body of the tanks. The time gap between the infantry and the tanks, however, was much greater, for the tanks had to traverse some extremely winding roads through very difficult terrain.
The Breaking Point Page 8
