The Breaking Point

by Robert A Doughty

  At 0200 hours on the 12th, the division's infantry reached the Semois River and shortly thereafter, seized a crossing site at Mortehan. The daily log notes simply, “Weak enemy, bridge destroyed.” After the bridge was repaired, vehicles could pass over by driving very slowly.60 Despite the extremely difficult terrain and the tortuous path to the Semois, the division seized a crossing site over the river at about the same time as the 1st Panzer Division, which had moved forward under much more advantageous circumstances.

  After crossing the heavily forested area east of Mortehan and the difficult terrain near the Semois, the 10th Panzer Division did not have a simple move to the banks of the Meuse. Only a few roads passed through the dense forest to their front, and no more than one or two went in the direction of Sedan. To reach the point on the Meuse where it was supposed to cross, the division had to move about five kilometers south of Mortehan to Maison Blanche, turn west for about twelve kilometers, and then move toward La Chapelle (five kilometers northeast of Sedan), Givonne (three kilometers northeast of Sedan), and Sedan.

  For obvious reasons, the attack south of the Semois proceeded slowly. The 86th Infantry Regiment reached La Chapelle at 1300 hours on the 12th; Givonne fell around 1900 hours.61 Though little or no enemy resistance remained on the northern bank of the Meuse, artillery fires on demolition sites, craters, and obstacles, as well as on La Chapelle, caused long delays in the division's efforts to push men and materiel forward.

  As the division began to prepare to cross the Meuse, it faced a formidable challenge. Much of its equipment and many of its units were scattered throughout the heavy forests and tiny roads through which it had passed. Though the actual crossing of the Meuse would be a complex, dangerous operation, it probably seemed simple in comparison to the task of assembling the division for the crossing.

  THE ADVANCE OF THE 2ND PANZER DIVISION THROUGH BELGIUM

  The 2nd Panzer Division moved on the right flank of the XIXth Panzer Corps and thus was the northernmost unit in Guderian's force. The initial part of the 1940 campaign was a challenge for the division, for it had to move through some of the most difficult terrain in the Ardennes. Though the road network through northern Luxembourg favored a north-south move, the division had to wind its way through the sharp curves and steep hills. After entering Belgium on 10 May, the division continued to move forward slowly, eventually reaching the Semois River later than the other divisions in the XIXth Panzer Corps.

  As with the 1st and 10th Panzer divisions, the 2nd Panzer Division encountered no opposition in Luxembourg. Its crossing near Vianden went smoothly, especially since it used a special commando unit at midnight on the 9–10th to seize the bridge and obstacles at the Our River. The division moved with an advanced guard to its front, followed by infantry that crossed the Luxembourg border at 0831 hours.62

  Passing through Luxembourg proved to be difficult, for the division's march route included several sharp S turns that could not be negotiated by large trucks without their pulling back and forth several times. The march groups also became separated when several broken down vehicles blocked the road. The division finally had to change its march route and shift farther to the north before turning back to the south. At 1030 the leading elements of the division reached the Belgian border near Surré. Scouting elements reported that the Belgians were not defending Tintange (immediately adjacent to the frontier and six kilometers north of Martelange) and that the defenses near Strainchamps (five kilometers to the west of Tintange) were “without movement.”63

  Some time after 1330 hours, a scout troop from the division's armored reconnaissance battalion passed through Tintange and attacked the Belgians at Strainchamps. Before the attack began, the division tried to move the 74th Artillery Regiment forward, despite the narrow roads and difficult terrain, so it could provide support. Around 1700 hours, the Germans seized Strainchamps but discovered the bridge to the west was destroyed. Infantry waded across the Sûre River and minutes later captured Hotte (two kilometers to the west of Strainchamps). The 38th Engineer Battalion immediately began building a tactical bridge over the small river, which was hardly more than a stream.64

  The division commander wanted to bring his tanks forward at this point, but they were still deep in Luxembourg. In addition to constraints posed by the difficult roads, the 1st Panzer Division had brashly pushed forward onto one of the roads on which the 2nd Division had priority and had thereby disrupted the movement of the division. It was clear that the Panzer brigade could not reach the Belgian border until the following morning.

  Though its tanks were far behind, the 2nd Panzer Division pushed its infantry aggressively forward. The soldiers of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 2nd Infantry Regiment quickly reached Winville (ten kilometers west of Tintange) and continued moving west. After the engineers completed the bridge at Strainchamps around 0100 hours on the 11th, the 74th Artillery Regiment and the vehicles of the 2nd Infantry Regiment hurried forward. The division began preparing for an attack against Libramont on the following morning.65

  To deliver the attack on the 11th, the division commander moved his forces forward in two columns. While one advanced via Widemont, Ste. Marie, and Libramont, the other advanced via Bernimont, Sberchamps, and Recogne. Problems with rear units marching through Luxembourg continued to plague the division as elements from the 6th Panzer Division also began to push onto some of the routes used by the 2nd Panzers. A few tanks, nevertheless, managed to cross the Luxembourg border, and at 0900 the 2nd Company, 4th Panzer Regiment was rushed forward to support the attack on Libramont. Reports from reconnaissance aircraft indicated that the French had concentrated their forces in the southern part of Libramont and were not defending the road between Libramont and Neufchâteau.

  After some hard house-to-house fighting against a French horse cavalry unit, the Germans gained control of Libramont at 1445 on the 11th. Because the division's tanks were still far to the rear, it was unable to send a large armored force around the city, as the 1st Panzer Division was able to do at Neufchâteau. After clearing Libramont, the division pushed west in two columns against continued French resistance. Comprised mostly of infantry, both columns moved slowly toward the Semois, one toward Membre and the other toward Mouzaive (ten kilometers northwest of Bouillon). After the Germans seized Ochamps (eight kilometers west of Libramont) at 2000 hours, the enemy ceased defending to the front of the 2nd Panzer Division, and the division moved forward more easily.66

  Not until 1900 hours on the 11th, however, did the tanks of the 2nd Panzer Brigade reach Ste. Marie (three kilometers east of Libramont). Traffic problems in Luxembourg had seriously delayed the tanks’ advance and thereby had slowed the advance of the division.

  After a three-hour rest from 0115 to 0400 on the 12th, the 2nd Infantry Brigade reached the Semois River at 0700 hours. It immediately reported that the south bank was not occupied by the enemy but that the bridges at Membre and Vresse (thirteen kilometers northwest of Bouillon) were destroyed. The brigade also discovered that the 1st Panzer Division had seized the crossing site at Mouzaive and was busy rushing troops across it. The 2nd Panzer Division had no choice but to erect its own bridging near Vresse.67 As it struggled to bring the bridging materials forward, some of its infantry crossed the Semois and moved toward Sugny. Since the French had already withdrawn west, the Germans encountered no opposition.

  After completing the bridge over the Semois at 1500 hours on the 12th, the 2nd Motorcycle Battalion crossed and moved toward Sugny, Bosseval, Vrigne-aux-Bois, and Donchery (four kilometers west of Sedan). Several hours later, destroyed roads and obstacles forced the right march column to give up trying to reach Membre, and the division commander ordered it to cross at Vresse with the left march column. Problems with march routes continued to be the main factor in the slow move of the division and ultimately caused the division to attack across the Meuse later than the other two Panzer divisions.

  THE ADVANCE OF THE 1ST PANZER DIVISION TO THE SEMOIS RIVER

>   Guderian's objective for the XIXth Panzer Corps on the first day of the campaign had been to break through the enemy's second line of defenses near Neufchâteau. The combination of unanticipated difficulties in moving ponderous columns through Luxembourg and the spirited defense of the Belgians at Bodange, however, had prevented him from attaining his first day's objective. None of his three divisions seized its first day's objectives. As the new day began, he recognized the importance of pushing forward as rapidly as possible, particularly with the 1st Panzer Division, so he would not fall far behind his time table and allow the French time to reinforce their defenses at Sedan. Despite being behind schedule, he did not change the objective for the second day. Guderian wanted to reach the Semois River.

  Early on the morning of 11 May, the screening forces of the 1st Panzer Division were about ten kilometers east of Neufchâteau. While the light units in the screening force from the 1st Panzer Division pushed west of Witry during the night of 10–11 May and early morning of 11 May, the main body of the division continued to encounter difficulties moving through the bottleneck of Martelange and Bodange, but these difficulties were not as great as those encountered by the 2nd Panzer Division. The most important bottleneck for the 1st Panzer Division continued to be Bodange. When road conditions stopped the 1/73rd Artillery at Bodange, the entire 1st Panzer Regiment was behind it, but fortunately for the Germans, the 2nd Panzer Regiment had already crossed.68

  Because of the delays at Bodange, the 1st Panzer Division attacked early on the 11th with only one of its Panzer regiments and with little or no artillery support. The presence of the tanks, however, proved to be extremely important to the division and enabled it to move much more rapidly beyond the Belgian defenses along the Luxembourg border than the 2nd Panzer Division to the north.

  When the division pushed west toward Neufchâteau, the 2nd Panzer Regiment became its leading element. At 0145 hours on the 11th, the regiment reached Witry, and after resupplying and resting for a short period, moved west at 0430 hours. At 0645 hours the regiment reached the woods east of Namoussart (five kilometers east of Neufchâteau).69 Rather than attack the built-up area without infantry, the 2nd Panzer Regiment moved to the south, bypassing the city of Neufchâteau. After passing through Namoussart, Marbay, and Grapfontaine, the regiment turned north and approached Petitvoir (four kilometers west of Neufchâteau). As the Panzer regiment attacked toward the road leading out of Neufchâteau, the French tried to stop them. The sudden appearance of the tank regiment created the danger of their forward defenders being cut off and encircled from the rear.

  The German division's daily log explained: “The opponent puts up a strong defense here. The most important thing for him is to hold open the roads leading to the west from Neufchâteau.” During what the Panzer brigade called “a hard fight,” the 2nd Panzer Regiment destroyed a French artillery battery and a motorized column.70

  To the rear of the 2nd Panzer Regiment, the 1st Panzer Regiment moved “slowly” and reached Namoussart about the time the leading tanks of the 2nd Regiment attacked Petitvoir. The 3/1st Infantry followed the 1st Panzer Regiment, while the 37th Armored Engineer Battalion acted as a flank guard against an attack emanating from Neufchâteau. After reaching Le Sart just south of Neufchâteau, the 3/1st Infantry turned north and attacked the city. The infantry discovered that the city was not strongly defended, and after moving quickly to its center, broke the enemy's defenses. By 1330 the town was under German control.71

  To continue the advance toward the west, the 1st Panzer Division moved the 1st Panzer Regiment around and ahead of the 2nd Panzer Regiment. While the 2nd Panzers continued pressing against Petitvoir, the 1st Panzer Regiment attacked on its left and captured Biourge (half way between Petitvoir and Bertrix). This deep thrust enabled the 2nd Panzer Regiment to take Petitvoir “after a short period of time.” The daily log of the division notes, “The breakthrough of the second resistance line has finally succeeded.” This breakthrough apparently occurred around 1400 hours.72

  The division's next objective was to reach the Semois River. The 1st Panzer Regiment received the order to seize a crossing in Bouillon, and the 2nd Panzer Regiment received the order to seize a crossing near Rochehaut (seven kilometers northwest of Bouillon). The division did not intend to allow the French time to regroup.

  After capturing Biourge, the 1st Panzer Regiment quickly seized Bertrix around 1515 hours. Aggressively continuing the attack, the regiment finally was halted around 1715 hours at Fays-les-Veneurs (six kilometers west of Bertrix) by a blown bridge. After easily finding a bypass, the Panzers continued attacking west, but were held up again about two kilometers west of the town when they encountered another blown bridge. This time, a detour could be found only after a long search.73

  As elements of the 1st Panzer Division raced forward, halting only for obstacles, the division headquarters hoped to seize an intact bridge across the Semois. The leading element of the division—the 1/1st Panzers—received the order to advance rapidly toward Bouillon, seize a bridge across the Semois, and hold it until infantry arrived. As the battalion drove forward, it exchanged fire with several French tanks and on a couple of occasions pushed forward even though the enemy held both sides of the road. After receiving a report from a reconnaissance aircraft about enemy tanks fleeing toward the west, the battalion began moving forward even more rapidly.

  Around 1730 hours the battalion reached the outskirts of Bouillon. The 2nd Company, which was the lead company, heard the detonation of an explosion destroying a bridge as it raced into the city. When it approached the Semois River, it observed that one bridge had not been destroyed and fired its machine guns into the area around the bridge in an attempt to keep the French from destroying it. At the same time, the 4th Company received orders to move through the streets and take the bridge. Just before its tanks reached the bridge, an explosion destroyed it. Almost simultaneously, the company commander's vehicle was hit by an antitank round, and the gunner killed. Since the tank was no longer useable, the crew abandoned it.

  Meanwhile the 2nd Company crossed the Semois using a nearby fording site it had located. After the company seized a position on the opposite bank of the river, the battalion commander pulled it back across the Semois. Although the German commander did not state his reasons in his after-action report, the absence of infantry to protect the tanks in the thick woods probably convinced him to withdraw.74

  In the middle of all this action, German aircraft suddenly began bombarding Bouillon and dropping bombs around the tanks. Exploding bombs wounded at least one soldier. Even though the 1st Battalion fired white flares, the attacks continued. Then heavy enemy artillery fire began falling on the city. Without infantry support and under enemy artillery fire, the battalion commander decided to pull his tanks out of Bouillon to a position near Noirefontaine (three kilometers north of Bouillon).75 The opportunity to push rapidly across the Semois at Bouillon on the evening of 11 May had failed.

  With due pride in its accomplishments during the day, however, the daily log of the 1st Panzer Division noted:

  Despite all the difficulties which have surfaced through battles, obstacles, detours, blockages, and intermingling of march columns, this day has been the day of the first successes for the 1st Panzer Division. A feeling of superiority over the western opponents arose in the division on this day—a day in which it encountered for the first time French forces along the second Belgian resistance line. The division has reached the goals planned for it on the second day—far in advance of its sister divisions—without regard for its flanks and in spite of the slow progress of the first day.76

  THE 1ST PANZER DIVISION CROSSES THE SEMOIS RIVER

  Fortunately for the Germans, the aggressive advance of the 1st Panzer Division disrupted the defensive efforts of the French along the Semois. Even though the Semois could be forded in numerous places, the thick woods and high hills strongly favored the defender. But the French had pulled back so quickly under such heavy German
pressure that their defenses simply did not come together as strongly as they should have.

  After backing out of Bouillon, the commanding general of the 1st Panzer Division reorganized his forces into two battle groups. Under Colonel Keltsch, who commanded the Panzer Brigade, were the 2/2nd Panzer, 2/1st Infantry, 1/73rd Artillery, and an antitank company. Under Colonel Krüger, who commanded the infantry brigade, were most of the other maneuver elements in the division. While Battle Group Keltsch had the objective of seizing a crossing site farther north, Battle Group Krüger had the objective of seizing a crossing site over the Semois at Bouillon.

  The main attack of the division was directed at Bouillon by Krüger's battle group. At 0220 hours on the 12th, the 1/1st Infantry received orders to attack and seize Bouillon and the hill across the Semois to its south. Support would come from two tank platoons attached to the battalion from the 1st Panzer Regiment and by the 2/73rd Artillery, which would provide direct support. If the French attacked, the battalion was supposed to hold the hills to the north of Bouillon. After the time for the attack was changed from 0300 to 0500 hours, the infantry moved into Bouillon and quickly reached the main street. They found no enemy. The 3rd Company, which was the lead company, attacked across the Semois and seized a bridgehead, and the 2nd Company and an engineer platoon followed. The 1st Company remained behind to secure Bouillon. After the two companies crossed the Semois, the 3rd Battalion of the regiment and a platoon of tanks moved into and expanded the bridgehead.77