Even if the Germans did pass through the Ardennes and cross the Meuse, such an operation required such extensive resources and preparation that the French were confident they could reinforce the threatened area before a major penetration occurred. For planning purposes, they assumed the Germans would require nine days to cross the Ardennes and amass sufficient units and materiel to cross the Meuse River. If necessary, the French believed they had plenty of time to reinforce the threatened sector.
As with other issues, some officers within the French High Command had doubts about the Ardennes delaying a German advance for an extended period. In the spring of 1938, the French conducted a map exercise in which German armored and motorized forces moved from east of Luxembourg across the Ardennes toward Sedan. In this exercise, German divisions reached the Meuse in sixty hours, a time that corresponded closely to the actual movement time in May 1940.13 Despite the results of this map exercise, the French remained confident in the Ardennes being an obstacle to the rapid movement of large numbers of troops.
Ironically, the Germans also believed the terrain of the Ardennes would hamper the movement of troops. General Franz Halder, Chief of the German Army's General Staff, participated in a map exercise on 7 February 1940, which analyzed the possibility of a battle along the Meuse River. He concluded, “A concerted attack across the Meuse would be impossible before the ninth or tenth day of the offensive.” In this same map exercise, General Guderian proposed crossing the Meuse River with the XIXth Panzer and XIVth Corps on the fourth day of the offensive, but the Army Group A commander for the map exercise, General Günther Blumentritt, rejected this proposal, suggesting instead that the crossing begin on the eighth day of the offensive. Another map exercise on 14 February 1940 achieved the same results. In his diary, General Halder described Guderian's dissatisfaction with the relatively slow movement of mechanized forces across the Ardennes and Meuse River in the map exercise. He noted that Guderian “plainly show[s] lack of confidence in success…. Has lost confidence.” Guderian complained, Halder wrote, “The whole tank operation is planned wrong.” Despite the strong reservations of Guderian, Halder concluded, “A plus 8 is the earliest possible date for the front-wide attack. Technically it will not be possible before A plus 9.”14
Thus, as late as February, both the Germans and the French used the same planning figures about the length of time required to cross the Ardennes. Both assumed an attacking force could not cross Luxembourg and eastern Belgium and attack across the Meuse until nine days after the beginning of an offensive. In both armies, only a few officers believed a more rapid advance could be made across Luxembourg and eastern Belgium. Subsequent developments would lead the Germans to accept and the French again to reject the possibility of making a more rapid advance. By deciding to risk a more rapid advance across the Ardennes, however, the Germans dramatically changed the strategic situation.
Despite some reservations in the intelligence community and despite the results of the 1938 map exercise, the French maintained their confidence in the Ardennes as an obstacle and in the likelihood of the Germans moving through Maastricht and the Gembloux Gap. And in May 1940 the army executed almost flawlessly the plan for occupying the Dyle line.
An extremely important part of that plan was the sending of cavalry forward into Belgium.
MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH CAVALRY
During the period before the German attack in May 1940, the key question pertaining to the French cavalry in the Second and Ninth armies was how far it would move into Belgium. The answer to this question depended on whether the French would move only to the Escaut River or whether they would move farther to the Dyle River. If they moved only as far as the Escaut River, the Ninth Army would remain in place and would not require time for movement to and occupation of a new position. If they moved as far as the Dyle River, however, the Ninth Army would swing into Belgium and occupy new positions along the Meuse River. Consequently, additional time had to be provided for its units to move forward and occupy their new positions before being attacked by the enemy. Probably the best way of delaying German forces to the front of the Ninth Army and providing the additional time was to employ a cavalry covering force in Belgium.15
As the French and British forces increased their combat readiness and as the Dutch and Belgians improved their defensive positions and posture (particularly along the Albert Canal), the French became more convinced that their forces would most likely be employed along the Dyle, rather than the Escaut line. At the same time, they began preparations and planning for sending the cavalry of the Ninth and Second armies deeper into Belgium.
Until March 1940, the French did not intend to send their cavalry far beyond their own lines. Instead, they planned on sending the cavalry about twenty kilometers forward of their principal line of resistance. In the sector of the Second Army, the cavalry operations would have taken place primarily from the Semois River south to the Meuse River. On 15 March, the Second Army issued a written order that included two possible alternatives for the employment of its cavalry. In the first alternative, the cavalry would move to the Semois River and only send light elements forward. In the second, the cavalry would move beyond the Semois River and send light elements almost to the Luxembourg border. By the end of March, the Second Army expected its cavalry to move beyond the Semois River. Though two choices continued to exist, the alternative of only defending along the Semois no longer appeared to be the most likely method of employment.16
The mission for the cavalry in the Second Army appeared in the 15 March 1940 order:
In case of the violation by the enemy of the Belgian and Luxembourg frontiers, the cavalry of the Second Army, in liaison to the left with that of Ninth Army, with the advanced elements and the cavalry of the Third Army to the right, will accomplish the following missions:
—determine the axis and the zone of application of the principal enemy effort;
—enter into liaison with the Belgian forces;
—provide time to the command to put in place all the means necessary to halt the enemy attack.17
The assistant chief of staff of the Second Army later explained that since the bulk of the Second Army's units were already in position on the principal line of resistance, additional time was not required for them to occupy their positions. Instead, a delaying action to their front provided time for the French to execute their demolition plans and enabled them to extend the demolition zone forward of their main position of resistance.18 The real reason for the Second Army's cavalry moving deep into Belgium, however, was to ensure the Ninth Army to its left had time to move forward into its new position along the Meuse River.
Cavalry action forward of the principal line of resistance was conducted under the general control of the field armies. The cavalry did not come under the control of a corps headquarters until it was three to five kilometers from the principal line of resistance. The Ninth Army had the 1st and 4th Light Cavalry divisions, as well as the 3rd Brigade of Spahis, under its control, while the Second Army had the 2nd and 5th Light Cavalry divisions and the 1st Cavalry Brigade. Added to these cavalry forces were the reconnaissance squadrons of each of the divisions and corps in the two field armies.
With a total strength of about 10,000 men and 2,200 horses, the light cavalry division included one cavalry brigade with two horse-mounted regiments, one light motorized brigade with one regiment of armored vehicles and one regiment of motorized infantry, one regiment of artillery with two battalions (one 75mm, the other 105mm), one divisional antitank troop armed with twelve 25mm cannon, and one divisional antitank battery armed with eight 47mm cannon. In May 1940 the antitank troop in the 5th Light Cavalry Division had been reinforced and included twenty-eight 25mm cannon. The regiment of armored vehicles in a light cavalry division theoretically included fifteen A.M.D. Panhard vehicles, twenty-two A.M.R. Renault (Model 1935) light machine-gun vehicles, and fourteen H-35 tanks; the actual number and type of armored vehicles varied slightly
from division to division. The regiment of motorized infantry in the light motorized brigade consisted of two battalions, each with a mixed troop of reconnaissance vehicles, a truck-mounted infantry troop, and a heavy weapons troop.19
To strengthen the cavalry forward of the Xth Corps sector, an infantry battalion from the 55th Division and another from the 3rd North African Division had the mission of occupying key passage points along the Semois River. From the 55th Division, the 1/295th Infantry had the mission of moving forward. To the right of the 1/295th, in the sector for the XVIIIth Corps, the 3/12th Zouaves—which was from the 3rd North African Division—occupied a position along the Semois River. As a reserve for the cavalry, the Second Army identified the 4th Tank Battalion, which had forty-five F.C.M. tanks.20
With the 3rd Brigade of Spahis from the Ninth Army on its left flank, the 5th Light Cavalry Division had the mission of covering three avenues of approach: Houffalize to St. Hubert, Bastogne to Libramont, and Bodange to Neufchâteau. Its main concern was the avenue of approach leading from Bastogne to Libramont. Farther to the south, the 2nd Light Cavalry had the mission of covering the avenues of approach from Arlon to Florenville and from Arlon to Virton. In the center, the 1st Cavalry Brigade covered the heavily forested area between the two divisions.
While the French cavalry had a mission that corresponds to what is known in U.S. Army doctrine as an “advance covering force,” it was not expected to offer a high degree of resistance forward of the Semois River. In the 2,300 square kilometers between Mouzaive, Bastogne, Arlon, and Florenville, the area was too large and the number of troops available too small to enable the troops to conduct an energetic defense. Additionally, this large area had few natural obstacles and was too rolling and open for the cavalry to halt the Germans for any length of time. Consequently, the Second Army expected the cavalry to do little forward of the Semois River other than delay the Germans and locate their main body of troops. The cavalry was expected to offer its highest level of resistance along the Semois River just forward of the main line of resistance. Though the river itself was not much of an obstacle, since it could be forded in numerous places, the addition of several infantry battalions in the rough terrain and the availability of a tank battalion could enable the cavalry to conduct a much stronger defense on the high ground overlooking the river.
Before the cavalry units moved into the Ardennes, the French had great confidence in them, but they did not expect them to face Germany's main attack. While the proud, well-trained cavalrymen did not shrink before the possibility of facing larger forces than themselves, most did not expect to be overwhelmingly outnumbered by a significantly larger armored force. Their expectations are perhaps best represented in the attitude of General Huntziger, the Second Army commander. At 1400 hours on the 10th, he wrote General Gaston H. Billotte, Army Group 1 commander, and suggested that if the operations commencing that morning resulted in the cavalry holding along the Bastogne-Longwy line and in the Belgians holding along the Albert Canal-Liège line to the north, the cavalry should attempt to defend the terrain it occupied in Belgium. Such a defense would probably succeed, according to Huntziger, since the German forces opposing the cavalry could only be “the covering force or the flank guard of a strong action being executed in another region.”21
These optimistic hopes were quickly dashed when the cavalry encountered Germany's main attack moving rapidly and with great force through the Ardennes.
FRENCH CAVALRY IN BELGIUM
At 0540 hours on 10 May, the 5th Light Cavalry received the code word “Tilsitt,” which instructed it to assume alert status number three. With number four being the highest stage of alert, the cavalry began recalling its soldiers and preparing to move into Belgium. At 0720 hours another telephone call passed the code word “Wagram,” which informed the cavalry division to assume the highest state of alert and move into Belgium. At 0750 hours the division received orders to move into Belgium immediately, and at 0830 hours it received orders to move forward of the Semois River. The first elements from the division crossed into Belgium at 0810 hours, en route to positions close to the Luxembourg border.22
To control the operations of its cavalry in Belgium, the French Second Army had established a series of phase lines. Number 01 ran generally along the Semois River. Number 02 extended from the northwest to the southeast through Bertrix, Straimont, and a point east of Jamoigne; number 03 extended through Libramont, east of Neufchâteau, and Etalle; and number 05 extended through Morhet and Bodange.
Under the command of General Chanoine, the 5th Light Cavalry moved toward these phase lines with its units divided into three groups: distant security, advance guards, and main body. At 1455 hours the distant security elements of the division reached phase line 03. The advance guard reached the same line at 1600 hours and the main body at 1800 hours.23 A few distant security elements moved forward to phase line 05.
Elements of the division were also supposed to reach Bastogne, but when a mechanized detachment encountered German infantry from the 3rd Battalion, Gross Deutschland Regiment, near Nives, the French gave up any chances of reaching the key city. Unknown to them, the German infantry blocking their advance was a very small force that could have been easily bypassed.24
To the south of the 5th Division, the 2nd Light Cavalry Division became involved in the first heavy engagements between the Second Army's cavalry and the Germans. This fight occurred in the Arlon-Florenville avenue of approach, which consists primarily of a large, open valley between the two towns. The 2nd Division had responsibility for this valley and established its main position several kilometers west of Etalle (along phase line 03) early in the afternoon of the 10th.
For security and early warning, the division moved several company-sized units forward of its main position. These units consisted primarily of a troop of light machine-gun vehicles and a troop of motorized infantry at Etalle. Forward of them, a motorcycle troop acted as a screening force. Around 1230 hours the motorcyclists reached Arlon (about fifteen kilometers east of Etalle), but they were easily overrun by a large enemy force from the 10th Panzer Division. The same enemy force next attacked the two troops at Etalle and easily pushed them back. For the next several hours, the Germans attacked the main position of the 2nd Cavalry Division, but the pressure of their attacks decreased late that afternoon. The French managed to hold their positions, but when darkness came their division commander ordered them to fall back on Jamoigne (about ten kilometers to the rear and behind phase line 02).25
After the 2nd Cavalry pulled back to Jamoigne, Huntziger issued an order at 2200 hours for the 5th Light Cavalry and 1st Cavalry Brigade to adjust their positions. The 5th Cavalry folded back its right flank to a point just outside Straimont. The 1st Cavalry Brigade occupied a defensive position along a small stream between Straimont, Suxy, and Jamoigne and placed a horse cavalry troop in the small but key town of Suxy. The 5th Cavalry thus had most of its forces along phase line 03, while the 1st Cavalry Brigade and 2nd Cavalry had most of their forces farther to the rear along phase line 02.26
From their new positions near Jamoigne, the 2nd Cavalry awaited another attack, but the 10th Panzer Division unexpectedly turned to the north. Its new route took it toward Suxy and its eventual crossing point over the Semois at Mortehan. The French remained unaware of this move even though it had great significance for them. With the shift of the 10th Panzer Division to the north, the 5th Light Cavalry Division soon had all three divisions of the XIXth Panzer Corps in its sector. Subsequent events dramatically revealed that the cavalry division was incapable of handling such a large enemy force.
As the 10th Panzer Division shifted north, it encountered elements of the 1st Cavalry Brigade. On the morning of the 11th, French cavalry elements in Suxy fought a sharp battle against the infantry of the Gross Deutschland Regiment. Not until the arrival of assault guns from the 16th Assault Gun Company did the Germans manage to gain control of the key road junction in Suxy.27
To the north
, the 5th Light Cavalry Division had had only light contact with the enemy on the 10th, but the 11th was to be one of its most difficult days in the campaign. The division concentrated its attention on two main avenues of approach, which generally ran from the northeast to the southwest. On its left, the division concentrated on the axis Houffalize, Libramont, Bouillon; and on its right on the axis Bastogne, Neufchâteau, Herbeumont. The French considered the left (or northern) approach more dangerous and placed more of their forces there than on the right (south). The 1/78th Artillery provided fire support for the left (northern) axis, while the 2/78th Artillery provided support for the right axis.28
Clearly, the French distributed their forces based on the assumption that an enemy coming through the Ardennes would more likely be moving along an axis parallel to the one running through Maastricht and the Gembloux Gap, rather than one running east-west through Luxembourg. In other words, the position occupied by the cavalry division made it particularly vulnerable to a thrust coming from the center of Luxembourg, particularly since the division's weakest flank was on its right.
At 0300 hours a motorized cavalry squadron, which had spent the night at Bercheux (seven kilometers northeast of Neufchâteau), moved northeast toward Bastogne, but after moving about a kilometer encountered Germans and was forced to withdraw. Several hours later, another cavalry unit moved east toward Witry but came into heavy contact with the enemy. Beginning at dawn, the division's security elements began coming under heavy pressure and soon had to withdraw. As the cavalry pulled back toward Neufchâteau, they occasionally occupied a strong point and attempted to halt the Germans. But the Germans attacked with their tanks in the lead, and there was little the cavalrymen could do to slow or stop them. By 1000 hours French security elements had withdrawn to a line just forward of phase line 03 between Libramont, Neufchâteau, and Straimont, which was occupied by the main forces of the cavalry.29
The Breaking Point Page 11
