Anticipating that the enemy would come from the northeast, the French were prepared to offer a strong defense along phase line 03. They nevertheless were not well prepared for an attack by a large armored force on their right, and thus the Germans made easy work of them, particularly those around Neufchâteau. Since the Germans attacked toward Libramont with an infantry-heavy force from the 2nd Panzer Division and toward Neufchâteau with a regiment of tanks, the French found themselves thrown completely off balance by the rapid, deep thrust into their right flank.
The terrain around Neufchâteau is predominantly open and rolling, but it also has numerous small forests and wooded valleys that limit the vision of a defender. Skillfully using the terrain to their advantage, tanks from the 1st Panzer Division advanced in a wide left hook south of Neufchâteau toward the small village of Petitvoir (about five kilometers west of Neufchâteau). They soon were pressing hard against Petitvoir, which sat astride the route between Neufchâteau and Bertrix. Though the Germans may not have foreseen the results, this move turned the defenses at Neufchâteau, placed a tank regiment in the center of the 5th Light Cavalry Division's zone, and threatened to cut off the French defenders in Neufchâteau. Recognizing they were in danger of being outflanked and encircled, the French cavalry began pulling out of the town about the time German infantry moved against it from the south.30
Though the French fought valiantly to halt the German tanks at Petitvoir, time and firepower were on the side of the Germans. Among those elements destroyed at Petitvoir was the 4th Battery, 2/78th Artillery. Emerging unexpectedly behind the right flank of the cavalry division, the German tanks quickly overran the 105mm battery, which was providing support to the units pulling back. The surprising and devastating German attack against the road to Bertrix transformed the withdrawal of the cavalry from Neufchâteau into chaos and caused some elements to withdraw beyond Bertrix. The French cavalry on the Bastogne-Neufchâteau-Herbeumont axis had apparently anticipated withdrawing from Neufchâteau toward Herbeumont (twelve kilometers east of Bouillon), but as the German tanks continued west beyond Petitvoir, they decisively cut off the road leading from Neufchâteau to Herbeumont, leaving the French cavalry no choice but to head farther west.
To the north of Neufchâteau, the left flank of the cavalry division came under heavy pressure at Libramont about the same that some of the units on the right flank pulled back behind Bertrix. Since the 2nd Panzer Division's tanks had not yet cleared Luxembourg, its infantry moved more slowly against Libramont than did the tanks of the 1st Panzer Division against Neufchâteau. When the defenders at Neufchâteau fled west toward Bertrix, the right flank of the 5th Light Cavalry Division collapsed onto the rear of the left flank, and the Germans suddenly threatened to cut off the left flank, just as it had done to the right. In its after-action report, the French division explained its subsequent withdrawal beyond Bertrix and phase line 02 when it said, “Our elements were disorganized…. The situation…on [phase line] 02 became critical so quickly that the commander…was obliged to withdraw to the Semois….”31
Though its after-action report did not use the word “rout,” the division obviously was not completely under control as it rushed back to the west. The situation was not made any better by the cavalry on the right axis having been cut off from its route of egress. According to the Second Army, the cavalry began withdrawing toward the Semois around 1500 hours.32 Instead of being pushed back from their position, the French had been the victims of a brilliant envelopment.
Farther to the north, the 3rd Spahis Brigade, which was the far-right unit of the Ninth Army's cavalry, pulled back to the phase line 02 and then the Semois at about the same time as the 5th Light Cavalry on its right. Though the brigade commander, Colonel Marc, later complained about the 5th Cavalry's withdrawing without informing the Spahis, the main body of the brigade closed in along the Semois between 1900 and 2030 hours. He explained, “The Semois was thus held initially with insufficient forces, stretched out along the large bends of the river, [which was] fordable almost everywhere.”33 In reality, however, the Spahis brigade failed to occupy all its designated position along the Semois, including the important fording site at Mouzaive. This failure, as will subsequently be explained, contributed significantly to the French eventually losing control of the Semois River.
To the south of the 5th Cavalry, the 1st Cavalry Brigade came under attack on the route west of Suxy at 0750 hours. After pushing the French defenders back about three kilometers, the 10th Panzer Division opened the route to Mortehan through St. Médard and began moving in a counter-clockwise circle around them to its designated crossing site on the Semois. This movement resulted in very little pressure being placed against the cavalry brigade, which eventually withdrew “in liaison with the 5th Light Cavalry Division toward the Semois.”34
As the French cavalry pulled back from phase line 02 to the Semois between Bertrix and Bouillon, the Germans aggressively charged ahead. This made the French withdrawal particularly difficult, especially since some of the cavalrymen could not move as quickly as the Germans on their heels. Some of the slower-moving elements were forced to leave the roads and retreat through the woods, thus permitting a few German elements to reach the Semois before all the French cavalry had crossed.
Throughout the day, the operations of the French cavalry were hampered by a flood of refugees. Coming from Luxembourg and Belgium, many walked or rode bicycles. Others pushed carts carrying many of their precious belongings. Some of the more fortunate rode in automobiles. Those who were farmers could easily be recognized by the strong farm horse that pulled their wagon or by the cow that followed in tether. Despite the best efforts of the French cavalrymen to convince them to return east, the discouraged and frightened refugees became ever larger in numbers and occasionally delayed the movement of French forces.
The poor performance of the French cavalry, however, cannot be blamed on the refugees. Though the Second Army did not expect its cavalry to halt a German advance, it expected it to delay an advance. Despite these expectations, the German 1st Panzer Division moved about fifty kilometers on the 11th. All things considered, the best explanation for the cavalry's failure is probably found in its being unprepared for a thrust from Witry to the rear of Neufchâteau. The unexpected German thrust caught it completely by surprise. Additionally, its chances for successfully delaying the Germans were reduced by the extremely large frontage it occupied, its relatively small number of tanks and antitank weapons, and the overwhelming size of the force it encountered. The relatively greater mobility of the Germans also provided them important advantages. Nevertheless, the French cavalry force that was sent into Belgium and charged with identifying the main attack of the enemy had almost completely collapsed under the unexpected pressure of large numbers of tanks on its right.
Of great significance is the failure of the 5th Light Cavalry Division to recognize it was facing the main German attack and then to communicate this information to the Second Army. This failure provided the Germans an important advantage in time. Everyone, including the cavalrymen, expected the French to achieve better results along the rugged terrain of the Semois River. Additionally, the ease with which the Germans swept aside the 5th Light Cavalry Division increased their confidence and weakened the resolve of the French.
ON THE SEMOIS
Fortunately for the French, several infantry battalions occupied key passage points along the Semois River. Since they were already in place, they assisted the relatively disorganized cavalry units to get across the river and halted the rapid advance of the Germans. The 1/295th Infantry occupied positions through which most of the 5th Light Cavalry passed. As an organic battalion in the 55th Division, the 1/295th had the mission of reinforcing and strengthening the cavalry's defenses along the Semois. The battalion had arrived on the banks of the river around 1800–1900 hours on the 10th, having departed Sedan around noon.
The 1/295th occupied a position between Mouzaive (ten kilometers northwest of
Bouillon) and a bend in the river known as Han-du-Han (three kilometers east of Bouillon). Though the straight-line distance between the boundaries on its two flanks was about thirteen kilometers, the twists and turns in the river made the actual frontage for the battalion almost three times larger. To its right was the 3/12th Zouaves, an infantry battalion from the 3rd North African Division.
To defend its extended front and the difficult terrain along it, the commander of the 1/295th, Captain Clausener, placed his three companies on line, with the 1st Company on the right, 2nd Company in the center, and 3rd Company on the left. On the right, the 1st Company had responsibility for Bouillon, and on the left, the 3rd was just beyond eyesight of the footbridge and ford at Mouzaive, which lay outside its sector and in that of the 3rd Brigade of Spahis (part of the Ninth Army).35
Since the principal route through the Semois region passed through Bouillon, that city quickly became the scene of a major effort by the Germans. The city itself is located in a large bend in the river that protrudes, almost like a fist at the end of a muscular arm, from the south to the north. With the river flowing around the arm and fist and the ancient fortress sitting atop the fist, the city had grown up around the fortress in centuries past and had expanded across the river to the east. Two bridges extended from the “arm” of the city to the bank on the right.
According to Captain Picault, who commanded the infantry company whose sector included Bouillon, the bridges in the city were destroyed shortly before the Germans arrived in the eastern part of the city around 1730 hours. One of the most difficult problems his men faced was clearing the bridges of the “numerous and disorderly” refugees, so the explosives could be detonated. Immediately following the destruction of the bridges, the company came under fire from German infantry and tanks, as well as dive bombers, but it managed to destroy at least one German tank. After a short delay, the Germans quickly gained control of the eastern part of Bouillon and soon—Picault said—began infiltrating to the west of the fortress and north of the river. The German accounts indicate no infantry was in the first troops arriving in Bouillon.
According to Captain Picault, the French cavalry withdrew after enemy machine gun fire began pouring in from the eastern part of the city. He explained that his company had only one machine gun and was threatened with encirclement. After supposedly trying to reach the battalion commander twice, Picault pulled his company back from the river at 2030 hours.36 Thus, after little or no fighting, he abandoned the defense of Bouillon and opened the route through the city. Fortunately for the French, the Germans were unaware of the withdrawal and pulled back out of the city because of heavy artillery fire.
After withdrawing from Bouillon, Captain Picault and his men occupied a position about two kilometers to the south of Bouillon at the road junction known as Moulin à Vent. The roads from Bouillon and Corbion merge here and become a single route to Sedan. Though the reasons for his stopping are not clear, the captain may have halted there because he had orders to occupy the position after pulling back from Bouillon, or he may have halted because a commander of one of the motorized battalions in the cavalry division directed him to defend the important road junction. Whatever his reasons for finally halting, the most important point is that he and his company abandoned the defense of Bullion after offering half-hearted resistance at best. Around 0800 hours on the next morning, just as the motorized battalion with Picault was preparing to move forward and reoccupy positions along the Semois, the Germans attacked with a force that included three tanks.37 Any advantage that could have been gained by a tough defense along the Semois had been lost.
After resisting for “perhaps an hour,” Picault's company and the motorized battalion withdrew south, moving through La Chapelle and halting north of Givonne. He soon received orders to withdraw further, so he marched his company back to an area on the edge of Sedan known as Vieux Camp. Since the enemy placed very little pressure on his company in its new position, Captain Picault held this position and began sending portions of his company across the Meuse. The last elements crossed around 1900 hours.38
Picault's company and the cavalry had performed poorly at Bouillon, but as far as the Second Army and the 5th Light Cavalry were concerned, the gravest mistake in the defense of the Semois was committed by the 3rd Spahis Brigade, which was on the extreme right of the Ninth Army and thus on the extreme left of the Second Army. Though some of the dissatisfaction with the Spahis brigade probably came from the age-old tendency of soldiers to doubt the will to fight and capabilities of units to their flanks, most criticisms were based on a single, unfortunate event. For reasons having more to do with luck than incompetence, the Spahis brigade never actually occupied the area of the Semois River that includes the crossing site at Mouzaive. This mistake permitted the Germans to seize a crossing site over the Semois and eventually to turn the flank of the 5th Light Cavalry Division. While the bridge at this point was nothing more than a footbridge, the river could be forded easily, and large bodies of troops were soon rushed down the road from Mouzaive and Alle toward Sedan.
According to the commander of the 3rd Spahis Brigade, Colonel Marc, when the 1st Troop, 1/2nd Spahis Regiment (Moroccan) withdrew west toward the crossing site at Mouzaive, it unexpectedly encountered German elements who had already seized the site. After a sharp battle, the French cavalrymen managed to fight their way across the river, but they continued south and left the Germans in control of Mouzaive and the crossing site. This unfortunate event occurred shortly after nightfall, and in the dark the Spahis were unable to make contact with the 5th Light Cavalry on their right.39
Shortly after midnight on the 11–12th, Colonel Marc called the Ninth Army and informed the duty officer of the situation. Because of the obvious buildup of forces on his right flank at Mouzaive, he explained that he wanted to withdraw toward the Meuse at 0200 hours. Even though he had not heard from the Ninth Army, Marc gave the order at 0230 for his brigade to withdraw, and most of it crossed the river between 0600 and 0900 hours.40
According to the assistant Chief of Staff of the Second Army, Army Group 1 called at 0400 hours on the 12th and stated that the 3rd Spahis Brigade was withdrawing toward the Meuse with the intention of crossing the river south of Mézières. This information obviously caused great concern for the Second Army, for it indicated the opening of the left flank of the 5th Light Cavalry Division to the enemy. After a staff officer from the Second Army frantically called the Ninth Army, he received a promise that the Spahis brigade would do what they could. But he received no promises that the Spahis would fight their way back to the Semois. Not until 0900 hours did Colonel Marc receive orders to move back to the Semois, but by then it was too late to roll back the Germans.41
At 0800 hours the 5th Light Cavalry Division learned that enemy armored vehicles had appeared on the northern bank of the river near Mouzaive. At 0900 hours the division received reports of enemy tanks south of Mouzaive. At about the same time, reports arrived of German infantry having reached the road junction at Maison Blanche (eleven kilometers east-southeast of Bouillon); the enemy apparently had crossed the Semois near Mortehan (ten kilometers east of Bouillon).42 The cavalry division faced the extremely unfavorable situation of having enemy forces to the rear of both its flanks.
After reporting the rapidly deteriorating situation to General Huntziger, the commander of the 5th Light Cavalry, General Chanoine, was promised reinforcements consisting of another divisional reconnaissance squadron. As German pressure on the axis Mouzaive-Sedan increased and as the number of enemy tanks multiplied, however, Chanoine again reported to Huntziger and received permission to withdraw to the line of “fortified houses” (maisons fortes) that lay about halfway between the Semois and the Meuse and that were essentially strong points. At 1100 hours he gave the order to withdraw and to explode all the demolitions between the Semois and the line of fortified houses.43
As the cavalry pulled back, its withdrawal proceeded more smoothly than that of the 1/295th. T
hough the 1st Company under Captain Picault on the right of the battalion withdrew in order, the other two companies were almost cut off by the rapid German push beyond Mouzaive. Many of the infantrymen in the 2nd Company in the battalion's center and the 3rd Company on the left were captured and made prisoners. The remainder moved through the woods, closely pursued by enemy infantry and armored vehicles. The remnants of the 2nd and 3rd Companies crossed the Meuse around 1430–1500 hours.44 As mentioned earlier, the 1st Company crossed around 1900 hours. Hardly more than two hundred soldiers in the battalion managed to return from the Semois; among those killed was the battalion commander.
The 5th Light Cavalry Division managed to hold along the line of fortified houses for only a short period. It pulled back to the edge of Sedan at 1400 hours and remained there until its last elements crossed the river between 1700 and 1800 hours. Much to the disappointment of the French High Command, the performance of the cavalry had not been any better between the Semois and the Meuse than it had been forward of the Meuse.
The cavalrymen had done little to delay the Germans, and they had not discerned the location of the main enemy attack. Perhaps more importantly, their bedraggled appearance and chaotic withdrawal across the Meuse proved to be unsettling to many of the inexperienced French troops and may have created the first significant dent in their will to fight.
IDENTIFYING THE LOCATION OF THE MAIN GERMAN ATTACK
By the evening of 12 May, the French High Command in Paris still did not understand that the main German attack was coming through the Ardennes.45 This failure to comprehend the strategic design of the Germans occurred despite the existence of a significant amount of information suggesting a major move through the Ardennes.
After the Germans crossed into Luxembourg at 0435 hours on 10 May, the French received a number of intelligence reports indicating the presence of enemy forces in Luxembourg and eastern Belgium. As the reports arrived, the French intelligence community recognized the presence of enemy forces in those two countries, but they did not believe the enemy forces comprised the main German attack. For almost two decades the French had expected the Germans essentially to follow the same strategic plan that had been used in 1914. That is, they expected the main attack to come across the Albert Canal and Meuse River and then to move through the Gembloux Gap toward Paris. When reports arrived early on 10 May of the Germans having gotten across the Albert Canal and Meuse River near Maastricht and having attacked the fortress at Eben Emael, French military leaders immediately assumed their previous assessments had been correct. As they concentrated on the reports coming in from the Netherlands and northern Belgium, they did not recognize the threat coming through the Ardennes until it was too late to respond adequately.
The Breaking Point Page 12
