THE SECOND ARMY
The Second Army occupied defensive positions that extended from west of Sedan to Longuyon, a straight-line distance of about sixty-five kilometers but actually about seventy-five kilometers because of the tying of the defense to favorable terrain. Its defensive sector included portions of the Maginot Line and the area to its left, which had relatively few fortifications. Unlike the other field armies to the west, which planned on moving into Belgium when the Germans attacked, the Second Army did not have to move forward and occupy new positions. While it remained in place, its western boundary served as a hinge for the Ninth Army on its left and the other field armies of Army Group 2, which prepared to rush forward.
In the broadest sense, the mission of Second Army was to cover the left flank of the Maginot Line and to anchor the right of Army Group 1, for which it was the easternmost element. To accomplish this, the Second Army had not only to defend along the line assigned to it, but also to prevent the Germans from entering the so-called Stenay Gap. A quick move through this gap offered the possibility of turning the flank of the Maginot Line by thrusting west toward Reims or east toward Verdun.
While the Second Army had an important responsibility in its task of defending the flank of the Maginot Line and acting as the hinge for the mobile armies to the west, it essentially performed an economy of force operation. Because of the difficult terrain to the Second Army's front, the French assumed a higher degree of risk in this area so they could maintain higher force levels in what they considered to be more critical areas. By giving the area a low priority in units and equipment, the French could concentrate larger forces for the establishment of forward defenses in Belgium and Holland. Of the five divisions in the Second Army on 10 May, two were series B divisions, one was North African, and one was a colonial unit from Senegal. The series B units had an extremely small component of active duty soldiers and officers, most of their forces coming from the oldest conscription classes.
As the Second Army prepared to organize and defend its position, it divided its front into four major sectors: Sedan, Mouzon, Montmédy, and Marville, from left to right. The Sedan sector extended from the left boundary of the army to a point east of Pont Maugis, with the Mouzon sector stretching from there to about one kilometer west of La Ferté-sur-Chiers. Next came the Montmédy sector, which extended from La Ferté to a few kilometers east of Velosnes. The final sector, Marville, ended at Longuyon, the eastern boundary of the Second Army. Beginning at La Ferté, the main fortifications of the Maginot Line extended east through the entire Montmédy and Marville sectors. Half the position of resistance for the Second Army was thus anchored in the Maginot Line, while half stretched across a front with a comparatively small number of blockhouses.2
The main area of concern for the Second Army remained the sectors on its right flank, not Sedan. From the time work began on the fortifications on the northeastern frontier, the High Command in Paris was extremely concerned about the possibility of the Germans launching a surprise attack around the flank of the Maginot Line. By rushing through the southern part of Belgium in the large open valley between Arlon, Etalle, Tintigny, Jamoigne, and Florenville, the Germans did not have to make a difficult crossing of the Semois River and could move quickly toward Carignan and Mouzon. For more than fifty years, this avenue of approach had been known as the Stenay Gap, the town of Stenay being about fifteen kilometers southeast of Mouzon.
As a consequence of its assessment of the terrain and enemy capabilities, the Second Army saw the major threat coming from the east toward Carignan and Mouzon, rather than toward Sedan. The headquarters knew that for the Germans to attack Sedan after crossing through some of the most treacherous terrain in the Ardennes would be a much more difficult operation than attacking farther east. Throughout the Ardennes, the only area between Sedan and Germany that approached being as good an obstacle as the Semois was the area around Martelange and Bodange in Belgium on the Luxembourg frontier. Ironically, the XIXth Panzer Corps passed through both these areas.
One only has to visit portions of the Semois that are east and west of Bouillon to understand why the French considered it such a strong obstacle. Though beautiful and now covered with tourists, the Semois area is one of the most rugged in all of western Europe with banks on the sides of the river sometimes being more than 200 meters higher than the shallow waters below. The defensive strength of the area came from its broken terrain, not from the easily forded river. Filled with thick forests and cut up with many steep embankments, the area offered an even more extensive and difficult obstacle than the meandering Meuse. By contrast, the avenue of approach from Florenville to Carignan seemed an easier and more suitable area for rapidly moving motorized and mechanized forces. By blocking this eastern avenue of approach, the Second Army could cover the flank of the Maginot Line, bar the Stenay Gap, and prevent German forces from moving toward Verdun or Reims.
The analysis of possible approaches into the French defenses led the Second Army to believe that the best units had to be on its right flank. Although the composition of the Second Army changed several times after mobilization, the army had two corps headquarters and five infantry divisions under its command by the spring of 1940. Huntziger placed the XVIIIth Corps on the right and the Xth Corps on the left. For a reserve, he maintained control over one division and four independent tank battalions, as well as the air forces in its sector. He placed his best division (the 41st Infantry Division) on the far right in the Marville sector and then a colonial division (the 3rd Infantry) in the Montmédy sector. These two divisions became part of the XVIIIth Corps.
For the remaining part of the front, which was under the Xth Corps, Huntziger believed the Mouzon sector to be more difficult to defend than the Sedan sector. Though Sedan had fewer blockhouses, he believed it had excellent defensive positions in the high ground overlooking the Meuse and had the advantage of having the river as an antitank obstacle. Consequently, he assigned his next best division to the Mouzon sector. For several months, the 71st Division occupied the sector but weaknesses in its leadership and training soon convinced the Second Army that it had to be replaced. Huntziger wanted a stronger division occupying the key Mouzon sector. In April he moved the 3rd North African Division from the army reserve into the front line of the Mouzon sector and placed it under the Xth Corps.
In his analysis of the campaign, General Ruby, who served on the staff of the Second Army, emphasized the strengths of the 3rd North African Division: “The two north African regiments, well encadred including a large number of career military, were solid and disciplined….” He also referred to it as the “last good division.”3 Because of its apparent weaknesses, the 71st Division reverted to being reserve for the army and began a period of training.4 Army Group 1 identified the 1st Light Mechanized Division (division légère mécanique), which was located farther to the rear as part of the army group's reserve, as possibly reinforcing the Second Army, but deleted this mission when the division became part of the 7th Army on the far left flank of the French Army.
Though not considered as strong as the 41st 1nfantry, the 3rd Colonial, or the 3rd North African divisions, the 55th Division appeared reasonably strong in comparison to the 71st. This was particularly true of the division commander, for the commander of the 71st apparently lacked physical stamina, did not inspire confidence in his men, and was on the verge of being relieved. According to Ruby, General Lafontaine, who succeeded General Britsch as commander of the 55th on 1 March 1940, appeared energetic and seemed to have “heart” or a will to fight. He understood his men and his area of responsibility, and he worked hard to strengthen the division.5 Thus, in May 1940, the Second Army had its strongest divisions forward and was working energetically to improve the quality of the 71st.
As it prepared to meet a possible German attack, the Second Army occupied itself with two separate and frequently conflicting tasks; while trying to conduct training, the field army devoted a great deal of time and effort to
building fortifications and obstacles. Huntziger was particularly concerned about fortifications. One can understand his concern, since his army was the only French army that did not have fortifications to its front and was not scheduled to leave its positions and move into Belgium. By comparison to positions further east, the sector seemed almost bare.
Throughout the period of the phony war, the French made numerous improvements in the defenses around Sedan. By May the density of blockhouses in the Second Army area had increased from 2.5 to 5 per kilometer. To attain this figure, the army poured more than 52,000 cubic meters of cement.6 It also worked on the preparation of a second line of defenses about fifteen kilometers behind the principal line of resistance. This effort included some extremely large blockhouses that were larger than most of the ones in the Sedan sector. The fruits of these efforts were evident to Huntziger, who appreciated the enormous effort to achieve them.
The Second Army also attempted to improve the training of its soldiers. Recognizing that many of them had had little or no formal training except for what they had received during a year's active duty, army headquarters encouraged the two corps to establish training areas and schools and to rotate units and men through them. Ideally, entire divisions would have been rotated through training cycles, but the requirement to keep four divisions in the main line rendered this almost impossible to accomplish. Huntziger also encouraged the playing of sports to improve the agility of many of the older soldiers, who had become somewhat flabby and sluggish as they reached the age of thirty.
Despite the best of intentions, the first priority of the army remained focused on improving fighting positions. Ruby noted that less than half a day a week was devoted to training. Considering the obvious deficiencies of the units in the Second Army, particularly the 55th and 71st, much more was needed, and the events of May 1940 soon demonstrated that the men needed better skills and higher discipline more than they needed additional fortifications.
Even though the Second Army considered Sedan to be the least vulnerable of its four sectors, the defense of Sedan caused several difficult problems for the army's headquarters. The first problem concerned the location of the principal line of resistance. The city sprawled out on the northern bank of the Meuse River and had little or no natural defensive terrain to its north. Since the city was only ten kilometers from the frontier and was at the bottom of a long slope beginning in Belgium, the military believed it had no choice but to relinquish the city to an invading force. They preferred to locate the position of resistance along the Meuse just south of the city and thereby to gain not only the advantage of the river as a natural obstacle but also the high ground on the left bank.
In November 1939 the High Command in Paris responded to the concerns of local civilian leaders, who did not wish to see their city abandoned to an invading force, and ordered the Second Army to study the possibility of moving the defensive line forward a few kilometers to protect the city. But the response of the Second Army was a firm recommendation to leave the position of resistance along the Meuse behind the city. Moving the line forward, according to the Second Army, forced the building of a continuous line of antitank obstacles around the city and the construction of at least a dozen blockhouses, as well as barbed wire entanglements. Erecting a new line also required at least a regiment of infantry to man it and created severe problems for the artillery. If artillery support had to be provided, artillery units would have to move to the forward slope of the hills to the south of Sedan and thus expose themselves to enemy observation and fire. The logic for making no changes seemed compelling, and the High Command acquiesced in the plan to abandon the city of Sedan.7
Another major concern was the bend in the river on the southern edge of Sedan. The French recognized the vulnerability of this salient, which was known as the “mushroom of Glaire” because of its shape. To complicate matters further, another large bend in the river, known as the “buckle,” was on top of the “mushroom.” Because of the difficulties of defending the meandering route of the river, they analyzed the possibility of moving the principal line of resistance a few kilometers south from the edge of the river and thereby creating another line of defense that ran between Bellevue (at Frénois) and Wadelincourt. The shorter line had the advantage of being on higher terrain and of economizing forces, but it suffered from the absence of a natural obstacle for tanks. According to General Ruby, who was on the staff of the Second Army, the French worked on both lines but “wavered” about actually moving the principal line of resistance to the rear. The corps commander in the area saw the situation somewhat differently. According to him, the decision on moving the line was made in November 1939. But by May 1940, work on the new blockhouses and obstacles had not been finished and the principal line of resistance remained along the Meuse.8
Clearly, some confusion existed in the minds of battalion commanders in the area. Some referred to the line of fortifications between Frénois and Wadelincourt as the “second principal line of resistance” (ligne principale de résistance bis); others referred to it as the second line (ligne de doublement).
The question of how best to defend Sedan became an extremely controversial issue in March and April 1940. Pierre Taittinger, a deputy from Paris who served as a member of the Chamber of Deputy's Commission on the Army, submitted a report that contained severe criticisms of the defenses at Sedan. Following a visit in which he inspected Maubeuge, Givet, Mézières, Sedan, Carignan, and Montmédy, he wrote Edouard Daladier (the Premier of France) and Gamelin about “grave insufficiencies” at Sedan and about “urgent measures” being necessary to improve its “rudimentary” defenses. He was not impressed by the quality of the series B divisions in the sector and emphasized their almost complete lack of air defense weapons. Taittinger explained that the Germans had demonstrated in 1914 that they could move easily through broken terrain and woods. If they wanted to bypass the strong defenses at Montmédy, they could move in the direction of Sedan, which he called a “particularly weak point” in the defensive system. He “trembled” at the thought of what would happen if the Germans attacked through Sedan.9
Taittinger mailed the letter on 21 March to Daladier (whose government had just fallen but who continued as Minister of National Defense) and Gamelin, who asked General Georges, commander of the northern and northeastern front, to prepare a response. Georges in turn asked General Huntziger, the Second Army commander, to prepare a response. In a word, Huntziger was furious. In a sharply worded response, he strongly emphasized the numerous improvements that had been made in the fortifications and obstacles in the Sedan sector since mobilization. He rejected the doubts of Taittinger about the degree of Belgian resistance, the difficulties of crossing the Ardennes, and the value of the Meuse as an obstacle. Reflecting more confidence than was due, he stated that measures taken to hamper a German move across the Ardennes would “seriously” delay an attack and would enable the French to reinforce their position before an enemy attack could be launched across the river. Huntziger concluded sharply, “I believe that no urgent measures are necessary to reinforce the Sedan sector.”10 Consequently, the Second Army did not increase the level of its effort, which also appeared suitable to the High Command. Huntziger was unwilling to accept criticisms about his army not doing its duty.
The Second Army remained satisfied with its mission and with its ability to accomplish that mission. Such satisfaction—as demonstrated by subsequent events—was clearly not merited.
THE XTH CORPS
As part of the Second Army, the Xth Corps had the mission of ensuring “the integrity of a position of resistance” that extended some thirty-seven kilometers along the Meuse and Chiers rivers. The Chiers River was little more than a large stream that flowed into the Meuse about six kilometers southeast of Sedan. The left boundary of the corps coincided with the boundary between the Second and Ninth armies and ran along a line between Vrigne-aux-Bois, Vrigne-Meuse, Hannogne, Omont, and east of Chagny. The right boundary ran along
a line between Williers (south of Florenville), Puilly-et-Charbeaux, Villy, Malandry, Inor, and west of Luzy-St. Martin. The corps’ position of resistance followed the Meuse River to Petit-Remilly and then ran northeast to Brévilly across the high ground between the Meuse and the Chiers. It then followed a line formed by the meeting of the plain of the Chiers River and the high ground between the Chiers and the Meuse until it reached Villy.11
One kilometer southeast of Villy, on the right boundary of the corps, the French had placed two casemates at La Ferté-sur-Chiers; these were the westernmost fortifications of the Maginot Line. As part of the fortified sector of Montmédy, a line of casemates followed a circular line from La Ferté and eventually reached Thonnelle and Montmédy. The line of casemates between La Ferté and Montmédy was not constructed as part of the original building of the Maginot Line but was added in the late 1930s. Though weaker and generally smaller than the larger and more extensive fortifications beginning at Montmédy, the casemates between La Ferté and Montmédy (in the sector of the XVIIIth Corps) seemed larger and stronger than the ones in the Mouzon and Sedan sectors (in the sector of the Xth Corps). Such a contrast obviously increased the Second Army and Xth Corps’ interest in improving the fortifications on the left of the field army.
From September until May, the Xth Corps had two divisions along the position of resistance, with the 55th Division in the Sedan sector in the west and the 71st Division, later the 3rd North African Division, in the Mouzon sector in the east. In early April the 3rd Division replaced the 71st, which became the reserve for the Second Army and began additional training. The Sedan sector had a front of about seventeen kilometers, while that of Mouzon had twenty kilometers. The boundaries between the two divisions ran along a line between Rubecourt-et-Lamecourt (northwest of Douzy), Petit-Remilly (on the Meuse), and Raucourt-et-Flaba.12
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