The Xth Corps was prepared to send units forward of the position of resistance, but except for one lone infantry battalion, all the units to be sent forward were cavalry squadrons. This included the cavalry squadron that was organic to corps headquarters, as well as the cavalry squadrons from the two infantry divisions. In the event of a German attack, the cavalry squadrons went forward with the other cavalry forces from the Second Army.
On the northern bank of the Meuse, the Xth Corps placed a number of fortified houses (maisons fortes) along avenues of approach leading from Belgium toward Sedan. With eight of them in the Sedan sector and seven in the Mouzon sector, the fortified houses provided a security line forward of the principal line of resistance and guarded against a surprise attack. With the Belgian frontier being only ten, and sometimes fewer, kilometers away, the French wanted something between the frontier and their main position of resistance. In the vicinity of Sedan, a company of border guards manned four fortified houses at Bellevue (not the Chateau but near Hill 242 northwest of St. Menges), at the woodline on the road between St. Menges and Mouzaive, at La Hatrelle northeast of Fleigneux, and at Olly northeast of Illy. After delaying an attacking enemy, the border guards were supposed to pass through French lines and revert to the control of one of the infantry battalions.
The fortified houses were little more than reinforced fighting positions with a bunker surrounded by barbed wire. They did not have antitank weapons and in fact constituted only advanced posts. After the war, one of the battalion commanders in the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment explained that the fortified houses were placed on the principal axes of penetration but were “easily overrun.” According to him, their main weakness was the inability of the artillery, which was on the left bank, to provide support.13 Nevertheless, after passing through this line of fortified houses, the cavalry that had been in Belgium reverted from the control of the Second Army to the control of the Xth Corps.
Behind the two divisions on the position of resistance, the Xth Corps kept an infantry regiment as a reserve. In May 1940 the 213th Infantry acted as this reserve. After the cavalry returned from Belgium and passed through the position of resistance, it also became part of the reserve for the corps. In his work published after the war, General Grandsard explained that the reserves were not as large as they should have been for the length of front defended by the Xth Corps.14 Though his comments reflect his knowledge of what happened in May 1940, he apparently did not vigorously demand additional reserves before the German attack. He understood his corps was part of an economy of force operation, and he evidently knew other sectors had a higher priority for receiving additional units. In short, he was prepared to fight with the units he had, and he did not expect to need a large reserve. He did, however, expect to receive assistance from the Second Army.
In April 1940 the corps conducted an exercise on the employment of a counterattack in the Sedan area. In this exercise, the attack was conducted by an armored division and two infantry divisions who moved forward only after enemy armored elements had been halted south of Sedan. According to Grandsard, General Huntziger participated in this exercise and approved of the manner in which the counterattack was conducted. The Second Army and the Xth Corps intended for units assigned to the Xth Corps to delay or halt an attack and then for units from the Second Army to halt the enemy forces completely and to drive them back across the Meuse.15
The Xth Corps thus had two divisions on line, an infantry regiment in reserve, a light screening force to its front in fifteen strong points, and various cavalry units scheduled to revert to its control after returning from Belgium. The Xth Corps also had a number of units organic to it, including combat engineers, construction engineers, signal units, and others. Its reconnaissance squadron had two of its four troops still mounted on horses, but according to General Grandsard, it was the “best” organic unit in the corps. He did not have the same favorable view of the artillery. He explained, “With the cadre coming from colonial [units], it was mediocre. The reserve officers who constituted almost the entire cadre had not maintained in peacetime their knowledge of the artillery, the active duty officers being hardly better. The cadre of noncommissioned officers was poor, without the capacity and without the will for command.” He added that more than 110 of the 280 noncommissioned officers had to be relieved.16
The aerial observation battalion also suffered from serious deficiencies. With eight ancient aircraft, it was not permitted to fly beyond friendly lines. The battalion turned in its eight aircraft in November and did not receive replacements until April when the corps received three aircraft, only one of which was “modern.” In his assessment of the battle, Grandsard complained that the organic elements of the corps had an “unequal” value: “mediocre” for the artillery, “worthless” for the aviation. In general, they lacked sufficient training to undertake operations immediately, with serious deficiencies existing in the cadre as well as the soldiers.17
Shortly after mobilization, the corps began emphasizing the conduct of training. The goal was to devote two-thirds of the time to building fortifications and obstacles and one-third to training. Ideally, a unit devoted an entire day to training or to work. Because of the effects of the bad winter of 1939–40 and because of the huge amount of work to be done, devoting an entire day to training became unproductive, and corps headquarters soon directed that half a day a week be devoted to training.18
Some specialists, such as machine gunners, mortarmen, and so on, initially underwent training at Verdun. After this proved inefficient, corps headquarters organized two regimental-sized training areas in the corps’ rear. Among other facilities, these included rifle and grenade ranges. But the bitter cold of winter interrupted this training, and it was not until the beginning of March that two regiments—one from the 55th and the other from the 71st—began a three-week training session in the new sites. When they finished, a third regiment—the 213th—moved to the training site. Since the 71st Division reverted to Second Army control in early April, it did not send a regiment to the new site but began training on its own in the army's rear. Thus only one of the regiments in the 55th Division that faced the German attack on the Meuse on 13 May had undergone special training.
The regiments and divisions in the Xth Corps spent most of the period from October through April improving their positions. Evidently concerned about the effect of the bad winter on the work, Grandsard asked the corps engineer in March 1940 to determine the number of man-days of work required to complete the ongoing projects in the corps sector. His answer was an astonishing 90,500 man-days and did not include much of the work being done by the divisions.19
For months, corps headquarters had required the divisions to provide weekly reports on progress in building fortifications. Requiring such reports obviously sent important messages to all subordinate commanders about priorities within the corps. General Grandsard strongly supported the building of as many bunkers as possible and obviously did not support the need for training as strongly. Tragically for France, a corps in a position that turned out to be critical in the fight against the Germans, with troops that desperately needed additional training, focused most of its energies and resources on improving and building fortifications rather than improving the fighting skills of its units and men.
THE 55TH INFANTRY DIVISION
In October 1939 the 55th Infantry Division occupied a defensive position along the Meuse that included the Sedan area. Its mission was to defend the “position of resistance,” which extended seventeen kilometers from a point near where the Canal des Ardennes runs into the Meuse River to a point near the town of Petit-Remilly. As it prepared its defensive position, it divided its front into three subsectors: Villers-sur-Bar, which extended from the division's left boundary to the crossroads near the Chateau of Bellevue; Frénois, which extended from Bellevue to a point east of Pont Maugis; and Angecourt, which extended from Pont Maugis to the division's right boundary at Petit-Remilly.
To
defend the river line, the division commander left the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment in the position it occupied when France mobilized. This regiment, which was organized to occupy the blockhouses and centers of resistance along the Meuse, manned the defensive positions along the entire front of the division, with the 3/147th, 2/147th, and 1/147th corresponding, respectively, to the subsectors from left to right. The individual battalions were attached to the regimental headquarters that had responsibility for each subsector.
In the subsector of Villers-sur-Bar on the division's left, Lieutenant Colonel Lafont, who was commander of the 331st Infantry Regiment, had the 3/147th Fortress Infantry, the 1/331st Infantry, and one company from the 11th Machine Gun Battalion. In the subsector of Frénois in the division's center, Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud, who was commander of the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment, had the 2/331st, the 2/147th, and the 2/295th Infantry. In the subsector of Angecourt on the division's right, Lieutenant Colonel Demay, who was commander of the 295th Infantry, had the 1/147th, the 3/295th, and two companies from the 11th Machine Gun Battalion. Thus the division had two battalions (plus one machine gun company) in the left, three battalions in the center, and two battalions (plus two machine gun companies) in the right subsector.20
For artillery support, the left sector had two battalions in direct support, the center three, and the right sector two. The 55th Division also had four battalions, plus two additional batteries, from the Xth Corps artillery in its sector to support the division. With four tubes in each battery or twelve tubes in each battalion, the division had 140 artillery tubes in its sector at the beginning of May.21 Since the standard allocation of tubes to an infantry division was sixty (thirty-six 75mm, twenty-four 155mm), the division had more than double the normal allocation of artillery.
The number of artillery tubes increased after the Germans entered Luxembourg on 10 May. Corps headquarters ordered three additional artillery battalions on 12 May to move into the Sedan sector. Though one of the battalions never arrived, two did, one of which particularly impressed the divisions’ leaders with its expertise and its accurate firing.22 The addition of these two battalions meant that the 55th had 174 artillery tubes available for support on 13–14 May.
Except for one battalion in reserve, another battalion committed to moving forward and defending the Semois River in Belgium, and the reconnaissance squadron committed to going into Belgium with the 5th Light Cavalry Division, every battalion in the division prepared to defend the position of resistance that had been designated by the Second Army. Though the position of resistance varied across the division front, it ranged in depth from one to four kilometers. Because of the bend in the river at Sedan, the deepest positions were in the Bellevue and Torcy areas and were, respectively, 4.0 and 3.5 kilometers deep. The shallowest two were at Donchery and Wadelincourt, which were, respectively, 1.1 and 2.0 kilometers deep.23
The 55th Division maintained control over only one battalion as its reserve (the 3/331st Infantry on 10 May). The battalion that was scheduled to move to the Semois (1/295th) also became part of the reserve after its return, as did the reconnaissance squadron after being released by the 5th Light Cavalry Division. Having such a small reserve accorded with French doctrine, which emphasized the placement of units in the position of resistance. By a process called colmater, or filling, the division expected to meet a penetration by having its reserve, as well as corps and army units, move in front of attacking enemy troops and gradually slowing them down until they were halted. In the division's analysis of counterattacks, it focused on three major locations and directions for corps units to roll back an enemy thrust. These were east of Wadelincourt, east of Frénois in a northwesterly direction, and between Donchery and Villers-sur-Bar.24
But the real focus of the division was not on counterattacks but on holding the ground it was assigned. In accord with French doctrine, the operations orders from the Xth Corps described explicitly the proper way to conduct a defense:
In all the depth of the position on the principal line [of resistance], as well as the stopping line or between these lines, the defense will be organized into circular fighting positions [points d'appui] or centers of resistance, capable of defending themselves when isolated, even if bypassed by enemy infantry and tanks. As a consequence the fighting positions or centers of resistance will be interlocked with obstacles of terrain, woods, villages, etc.25
By holding the centers of resistance, the French expected to break up or disrupt an enemy attack, which would eventually halt under concentrated artillery fire and against newly established defensive positions to its front. According to French doctrine, counterattacks could roll back an enemy penetration but halting the enemy's forward movement was the first priority.
As a consequence of this doctrine, the 55th Division's reserves did not prepare to come to the aid of a particular regiment but were placed in a central position, so they could be moved quickly into a threatened area. Once moved, they were not to charge into an exposed enemy flank but to retard the enemy attack and then eventually to assist in a larger counterattack.26
All in all, the 55th Division—despite its panic and collapse on the evening of 13 May—was not an exceptionally bad division. Like the other 18 series B divisions in the French Army in May 1940, which were numbered from 51 to 71, the 55th Division consisted primarily of older reservists who had performed their military service as many as twenty years before. Though some may have previously served in the navy or in the air force, the overwhelming majority had previously served in the army.
Upon its mobilization, the division was not designated “for battle” as were some of the series B divisions, which consequently received a slightly larger active duty contingent as a cadre. Of its officers, only 4 percent were regulars, including the commander of each infantry regiment. Though small, this number was larger than that of the 71st Division, which received only two of its major commanders from the active Army and in which the majority of its active officers were recently commissioned lieutenants from military schools.27
On 10 May the 55th Division had only 80 to 85 percent of its prescribed strength present for duty, a significant number of the men having departed on pass because of the Pentecost holiday. Although the prescribed strength of an infantry division was 16,110 noncommissioned officers and soldiers, plus 500 officers, the division's situation report on 21 April reflected the assignment of an estimated 15,053 men (93.4 percent) and 442 officers (88.4 percent). Assuming 80 percent of those assigned were present for duty on 10 May, the division may have had as few as 12,429 men and 359 officers available when the alert occurred early that morning.
The actual number of men present for duty on 13 May was possibly somewhat larger. By the time the Germans attacked, many of the men undoubtedly had returned from pass, giving the division a strength on 13 May closer to its assigned strength on 21 April. More importantly, the strengths cited do not include the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment and the 11th Machine Gun Battalion, which had, respectively, 71 officers and 2,898 men and 28 officers and 927 men, and which reinforced the division on 10 May.28 Also, General Grandsard, the corps commander, later asserted that the 55th's shortages in personnel had been filled with replacements at the beginning of May. Thus the figures given earlier for 10 May may be smaller than the actual assigned strength.29
Even though the men may have been lacking in training and motivation, the 55th was almost completely up to strength in infantrymen. With an authorized strength in an infantry regiment of 80 officers and 3,000 noncommissioned officers and soldiers, the 295th, 213th, and 331st infantry regiments had 222 officers (92.5 percent) and 8,829 noncommissioned officers and soldiers (98 percent) assigned for duty on 21 April. Similarly, with an authorized strength of 120 officers and 3,750 noncommissioned officers and soldiers in the two organic artillery regiments in an infantry division, the 55th Division had 113 officers (94.1 percent) and 3,552 noncommissioned officers and soldiers (94.7 percent).30
The m
ajor personnel shortages came from the absence of organic antitank and engineer units. Nevertheless, on 10 May the 55th Division was reinforced with additional antitank and engineer units, thereby diminishing significantly this shortage. Clearly, if the division had severe personnel problems, it was not with the number of men assigned.
In his postwar book on the battle, the commander of the Xth Corps offered harsh criticisms of the men of the 55th and 71st divisions. Grandsard said, “All the officers, except for the higher commanders, were reservists [and]…not really capable of command.” He added, “The noncommissioned officers…were promoted in the reserves without having exercised in the active army a command higher than that of a corporal…. Hardly knowing their duties, they neither dared nor wanted to command. They were incapable of imposing [their will] on the men who were their comrades, sometimes their bosses, in civilian life.” He also criticized the soldiers. “Instances of disobedience were rare, but an ardour for work, for training, and a desire to fight were even rarer.”31
Despite his postwar criticisms, Grandsard did not express such harsh views before the German attack. His prewar views filtered through his book when he described the building of fortifications and entrenchments in the Sedan sector. He later explained that “it was impossible to obtain better [results] in the 55th Infantry Division, energetically led by its commanders, Generals Britsch, then Lafontaine….”32 Unless they were cleverly concealed, his negative views also did not percolate up to the Second Army before May 1940. In fact, the severest criticisms of the men came from the commander of the Second Army, General Huntziger, in a sharp message to his division commanders on 1 March 1940, but they did not concern training and a will to fight.
It has certainly not escaped you, nor me, that an important part of the personnel under our orders, and in particular numerous officers, even those in a higher grade, seem to believe that work on the organization of the terrain or in the preparation of rear areas constitutes an inferior form of military activity.
The Breaking Point Page 15
