This is a false and dangerous notion….
[Physical] work is a procedure of combat, the same as fire and movement which it augments….33
The 55th Division devoted a great deal of time and effort to improving the training of its units and men. By rotating two regiments through training sessions in the rear of the corps, some improvement occurred. Great progress probably came from the division's own efforts. Because of its program for rotating company-sized units through training sessions in the division rear, many companies received instruction and gained skills that otherwise would not have been available to them. The events of May 1940, however, demonstrated that the additional training probably had not been sufficient.
In early 1940, perceptions of the attitudes and abilities of the 55th Division sharply differed from those that emerged after the war. For example, a January 1940 report to corps headquarters from the division explained that when it was mobilized, the division suffered from many deficiencies that affected its discipline and its morale. The report noted that morale was improving, but observed, “It is indispensable that shortages [of 25mm and 37mm guns] be made up as quickly as possible.”34 Only a few days before the Germans crossed the Meuse, General Lafontaine sent an urgent message to all officers and noncommissioned officers of the division. Instead of emphasizing discipline, obedience, and willingness to fight, the general again stressed the need for them “personally to direct the work” going on under them and to check such items as communications, barbed wire entanglements, and fields of fire.35 His comments indicate his main concerns, as well as those of his corps and army commander. Some of the most severe weaknesses of the 55th Division became apparent to the chain of command only after the Germans attacked.
French military leaders were aware of severe problems with materiel and frequently mentioned these problems after 1940. One clear weakness was an inadequate number of antitank weapons. The division had only fifty-six modern antitank weapons along its front of seventeen kilometers, giving it a linear density of 3.3 weapons per kilometer. This differed dramatically from the theoretical distribution of 10 weapons per kilometer, which was the basis of French antitank doctrine. Even though the number of antitank weapons was close to the figure of fifty-eight, which was the normal complement in an infantry division, the 55th had only one antitank company for its regiments and thus was short two antitank companies. Yet, it did have a divisional antitank battery with eight 47mm weapons and had been reinforced with an antitank battery of eight 47mm weapons from the army's General Reserve. More importantly, it also had twenty-two 25mm weapons from the 147th Fortress Infantry, three 25mm weapons from the 11th Machine Gun Battalion, and three 47mm naval guns. Though they were not very effective, the division also had nine of the older model 37mm cannon.36 Thus, despite the shortage of two antitank companies in the regiments, the division had essentially the number of modern antitank weapons in the Sedan sector that it was authorized.
In the final analysis, the question of the number of antitank weapons is probably insignificant, since the division collapsed before an appreciable number of German tanks crossed the Meuse River. The success of the Germans against the 55th, particularly in the successful crossing of the Meuse, came more from the excellent performance of its infantry than its tanks.
The division's major deficiency was in antiaircraft weapons. Unfortunately, this deficiency existed throughout the French Army. In its 1938 program, the Army sought to create 923 antiaircraft batteries with a total of 6,739 weapons, 90 percent of which were 25mm guns. But this huge number exceeded the production capacity of French industry, annual production being about 300 weapons per year, and the Army decided to give priority to other weapons. Though it wanted large numbers of 75mm weapons capable of destroying aircraft at high altitudes, it soon began accepting 90mm naval guns in their place.37
In 1939–40, the area along the Ardennes had a low priority for receiving antiaircraft weapons. The Second Army had two 75mm antiaircraft battalions in its sector, one of which was near Sedan. The 3/404 Air Defense Artillery Battalion moved into the Sedan sector in November and on 10 May had its 9th Battery near Noyers-Pont Maugis, its 8th Battery near Raucourt, and its 7th Battery near Beaumont. Although the 3/404th claimed it shot down nine German aircraft between 10 and 15 May, the 9th Battery near Noyers-Pont Maugis (which moved to Bulson on 12 May) claimed only one downed enemy aircraft during this period. The entire battalion claimed only one downed aircraft on 13 May (the day of heaviest enemy aerial activity), and pulled out of the area at 1945 hours when it received the false report that the Germans had tanks in the Bois de la Marfée.38
Other air defense units provided support on the outskirts of the Sedan sector. The 3rd North African Division on the corps’ right flank had a battery of 25mm antiaircraft weapons that shot down at least one plane.39 The battery organic to the 1st Colonial Infantry Division was ordered to move into the Sedan sector sometime after 10 May, but the battery apparently never left the Montmédy area.40
Thus, when waves of German aircraft struck the Sedan sector on 13 May, the soldiers of the 55th Division had only one antiaircraft battery in their immediate area, and it performed poorly. They had little more than their organic rifles and machine guns to combat the enemy aircraft.
The division also suffered from a lack of mines. Apparently the Second Army had no more than 16,000 mines for its entire area. It directed that 7,000 of these be given to the cavalry for use in Belgium and another 7,000 be placed on the right (east) bank of the Meuse. This left only 2,000 mines for use in the position of resistance.41
According to an inventory dated 23 April 1940, the Xth Corps headquarters had only 1,972 antitank mines. Of these mines, 472 were given to its cavalry squadron and 1,500 to the fortified houses for use on the Belgian side of the Meuse. Out of a theoretical allocation of 6,722 mines, the 55th Division received only 422 antitank mines.42 By the time the meager numbers were allocated to battalions, they received virtually no mines. For example, the 2/331st Infantry, which was in the area of Bellevue, put in a minefield in its sector near Frénois, but it had only 19 mines.43 Since most of the tanks of the 1st Panzer Division crossed through this area on 13–14 May, even the smallest increase in numbers may have made an important difference.
Though French military leaders planned on issuing mines to the cavalry forces entering Belgium, they did not pay significant attention to the question of antitank mines, particularly to the employment of antitank mines in the main battle area. Despite numerous analyses of antitank operations, they placed the greatest emphasis on antitank weapons and on the use of natural obstacles (such as rivers) to the front of French units, rather than on the use of antitank mines. Little or no thought was apparently given to using mines in the main battle area or to laying minefields in front of an enemy penetration. This myopia caused the French to overlook an inexpensive weapon that could have yielded important results in May 1940.44
Although the 55th Division had numerous deficiencies and problems, the commanding general of the division devoted considerable time and resources to the construction of a large concrete bunker for his headquarters. This bunker, which still exists at Fond Dagot, had several rooms for the staff and an attractive stone exterior. A commander who was expecting to move or who was truly concerned with the condition of his division would not have devoted such an extensive effort to build what can only be described as a luxurious headquarters.
THE 147TH FORTRESS INFANTRY REGIMENT
During the fighting around Sedan, perhaps no single unit played as key a role as the three battalions under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud, commander of the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment. Occupying the sector of Frénois, which included defenses along the Meuse River between the eastern part of Donchery and a point east of Pont Maugis, this regimental-sized unit received the brunt of the attack from the XIXth Panzer Corps, including the 1st Infantry Regiment of the 1st Panzer Division, the Gross Deutschland Regiment, and the 10th Panzer Division
. Important German crossings of the Meuse River were made in its area between Glaire and Torcy and at Wadelincourt. Also, after elements of the 147th were pushed out of Bellevue, the 2nd Panzer Division finally was able to cross at Donchery, which was to the west of Bellevue in another French regiment's area. Of the four major crossings made by the XIXth Panzer Corps, three were made in the 147th's sector, and the fourth was made possible after it pulled back.
The 147th Fortress Regiment was a type B regiment and was formed between 23 and 27 August 1939, primarily from the 3/155th Fortress Regiment at Sedan. As with the formation of other French regiments, the 3/155th was split up with most of its men being used to form three new battalions. The 9th Company provided the cadre for the 3/147th, the 10th Company for the 2/147th, and the 11th Company for the 1/147th.45 Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud, a reserve officer, commanded the 3/155th and was made commander of the 147th Regiment.
When formed, the 147th Regiment included fifteen officers, eighty noncommissioned officers, and 600 soldiers from the 3/155th. The reservists who filled the regiment to almost full strength (seventy-one officers, 2,898 soldiers present for duty on 21 April)46 came primarily from the Ardennes and the regions of Aisne and Paris. A third of them had been conscripted initially from 1918 to 1925, another third from 1926 to 1930, and the final third from 1931 to 1935. Thus the average age of a soldier was thirty-one, a lieutenant thirty-three, and a captain forty-two. The average age of more senior officers was fifty-one years.47
According to Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud, the regimental commander, the training level of the reservists was not very high. Though his assessment of their training was made after the bleak events of 10–15 May, he clearly had reservations before 10 May about his men being completely trained. When the regiment was formed, he tried to make each soldier a marksman, but he never received sufficient ammunition to train them thoroughly. In other portions of the regiment's training, he tried to emphasize the execution of final protective fires on the northern bank of the Meuse and on the river itself, but “these exercises were never accomplished.” The major reason for the inadequate training was the requirement to perform other duties.
Until 1 December 1939, training normally occupied two days a week and was conducted by each company under the supervision of the battalion commander. From December until 1 April 1940, the regiment spent a considerable part of its time building concrete blockhouses and performing other duties such as providing guards or fatigue details. Beginning on the first of April, a few companies underwent fifteen days of training at the rear of the regimental area. By 10 May, approximately half the regiment had received this training. But according to Pinaud, the training did little more than “verify” the inadequate preparation of the soldiers.48 Whether this failure was his fault or was due to other factors is not completely clear, but the regiment obviously was not as well trained as it could have been.
THE 147TH'S DEFENSIVE POSITION
As commander of the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud was responsible for the subsector of Frénois, which included a defensive front of about 8.5 kilometers along the Meuse from the crossroads at Bellevue to a point east of Pont Maugis. Two of the three organic battalions of the 147th occupied other areas along the Meuse, so Pinaud had a fortress and two regular infantry battalions under his command. These were: the 2/331st Infantry; the 2/147th Fortress Infantry; and the 2/295th Infantry.
Pinaud divided his subsector into three areas (Bellevue, Torcy, and Wadelincourt) and placed one battalion in each area. From left to right, he had the 2/331st, the 2/147th, and the 2/295th. The 2/331st and the 2/147th occupied the area that was known as the “mushroom of Glaire.” The commanders of each battalion had responsibility for a large center of resistance, which extended from the Meuse to the rear of the regimental sector.
Each commander further divided his subsector into three smaller centers of resistance. The 2/331st and the 2/147th, which were the left and the center battalions, placed one center of resistance along the principal line of resistance bordering the Canal de l'Est and the Meuse; one along the second line encompassing the blockhouses on the high ground between Frénois, west of Wadelincourt, and west of Pont Maugis; and one along the stopping line that followed dominating terrain between La Boulette, the Bois de la Marfée, the French military cemetery, and Noyers.
In addition to the company along the Meuse, the commanders of the 2/331st and the 2/147th thus placed one company along the second line and another along the stopping line. The company from the 2/331st that was on the second line occupied the first four blockhouses along the line between Frénois and Wadelincourt.49 Their intention was to force an attacker to break through three successive lines, each of which was linked to key terrain features and blockhouses. To strengthen defenses along the river, several platoons from infantry companies along the second line or stopping line were moved forward into the principal line of resistance along the river.
The commander of the 2/295th, which was the battalion on the right, also divided his area into three centers of resistance, but he did organize them into three successive lines. Taking care to place his companies so they could use the terrain to their advantage, he placed one company along the principal line of resistance but to its rear placed his remaining two companies side-by-side and arranged in depth. Each rear company occupied the stopping line, as well as the second line. Such an arrangement simplified fire control procedures and enabled troops pulling back from the second line to reinforce their own company at the stopping line. The two companies placed their stopping line along the French military cemetery and the small village of Noyers.50
On 13 May, the day the Germans crossed the Meuse, the Bellevue area was under the commander of the 2/331st Infantry, who had the 7th Company of the 2/147th Fortress Infantry, and the 5th and 7th companies of the 2/331st Infantry. The Torcy area was under the commander of the 2/147th, who had the 5th Company of the 2/147th, the 6th Company of the 2/295th, and the 6th Company of the 2/331st. The commander of the 2/147th also had a fourth company, a combination infantry and heavy weapons company that was organic to a fortress battalion. The Wadelincourt area was under the commander of the 2/295th Infantry, who had the 6th Company of the 2/147th Fortress Infantry and the 5th and 7th companies of the 2/295th.51
On the left with the 2/331st and on the right with the 2/295th, the 7th and 6th Fortress Infantry companies of the 2/147th—respectively—occupied positions along the river. The 5th Company of the 2/147th also initially occupied a position along the river and was under the control of the commander of the 2/147th, but when it departed for training, it was replaced by the 6th Company, 2/295th. Thus only two of the three companies along the river in Pinaud's subsector were fortress infantry companies.
Throughout Pinaud's subsector, the company-sized centers of resistance were further broken down into three, four, or five fighting positions (point d'appui). For example, five fighting positions were created in the center of resistance at Torcy and occupied by the 6th Company, 2/295th. Four were along the Meuse: one extending about 600 meters southeast from the streambed of the Ruisseau de Glaire, which is midway between Torcy and Glaire; one around Pont Neuf, the northernmost bridge in Sedan; one around Pont de l'Ecluse, the bridge leading to the center of Sedan; and one around Pont de la Gare, the bridge leading to the railroad station. The fifth fighting position was to the rear of the other four positions and encompassed the area between the railroad station and the cemetery in the northwest corner of Torcy.52
Similarly, the center of resistance at Bellevue included four fighting positions, which were occupied by the 7th Company, 2/147th. Three of these bordered the Meuse: one around the Chateau of Bellevue with fields of fire extending into Donchery; one around the bridge over the Canal de l'Est leading into Villette; and one that stretched from the town of Glaire to the streambed of the Ruisseau de Glaire. The fourth fighting position was to their rear and extended from the point where route D-29 crosses the railroad to the Les
Forges factory.53 The French apparently placed almost no troops across the Canal de l'Est into the “buckle” of the Meuse.
Despite the neatness of this placement, a great deal of turbulence occurred—beginning in April—in the placement of companies and platoons. Since the division wanted to provide special training to the battalions and companies, it rotated them through training sessions, but did not always return them to their original centers of resistance. As a consequence of this rotation, even though the 55th Division had been in the Sedan region for months, most of the infantry under Pinaud's command in the Frénois subsector had been in the positions they occupied on 13 May for less than a month. In fact, only one company—the 7th Company, 2/147th Fortress Infantry—was in the same position at Wadelincourt on 13 May that it had occupied in March.
Two of the three infantry battalions in the Frénois subsector were new to the area and to Pinaud's command. At the beginning of April, the 2/295th Infantry relieved at Wadelincourt the 1/331st Infantry, which had been under Pinaud's command for some time and which departed for training. The 2/331st Infantry assumed control of the Bellevue area at the beginning of May. It relieved the 3/213th Infantry, which had also been under Pinaud's command and which departed for training.
The arrival of these two battalions greatly affected the remaining battalion, the 2/147th Fortress Infantry. This battalion, which was responsible for the center part of the regiment's area, had only two of its organic companies (its weapons company and one of its regular fortress companies), for it had given up the two other fortress companies to occupy the blockhouses in the battalions’ areas to its left and right. In turn, it had received one company from the 2/295th and another company from the 2/331st, leaving those two battalions with their remaining two organic infantry companies. Changing the other two battalions in the regiment thus provided the 2/147th two new infantry companies for its area.
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