The movement of the infantry from the positions with which they were extremely familiar also affected the individual companies of the fortress infantry. The positions occupied by two of the three fortress companies on 13 May were not the same ones they had been occupying in the regimental sector early in March. To replace a fortress infantry company that was scheduled to receive training, division headquarters formed a provisional company from the 213th Infantry at the beginning of March by taking an infantry company and reinforcing it with machine guns. This company then replaced the 6th Company of the 2/147th Fortress Infantry along the Meuse at Torcy.
When the 6th Company finished its training, it did not return to Torcy, but instead replaced the 5th Company, 2/147th, at Wadelincourt on 25 April. The 5th Company then began training. The 6th Company from the 2/295th, plus a machine gun platoon, was moved into the Torcy sector on 5 May and occupied the center of resistance and blockhouses along the Meuse. This company relieved the company from the 213th Infantry, which had been at Torcy but which departed for training on 5 May. When the Germans entered Luxembourg on 10 May, the 5th Company, 2/147th, did not move back into the principal line of resistance, but occupied the La Prayelle center of resistance, which included the high ground near Hill 247. The 6th Company of the 2/295th remained in the center of resistance at Torcy along the Meuse. Thus, on 10 May, two of the three fortress companies of the 2/147th were in new positions. Perhaps more importantly, a new company to the Sedan area—the 6th Company, 2/295th—occupied a key position between Glaire and Torcy, while a fortress company that had trained in that position for about six months remained to its rear.54
As a consequence of all these changes, only one company—the 7th Company, 2/147th—of the nine companies under Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud's command had been in its position on 10 May for more than forty-five days. Of the other two companies along the river, one moved into position on 25 April, and the other on 5 May. Most of the companies under Pinaud's command had been in position for less than a month. Even though the 55th Division had occupied the left bank of the Meuse near Sedan since 20 October 1939, its individual companies in the critical area under Pinaud's command had spent relatively little time getting to know their defensive positions intimately. Tragically for France, these companies received the major part of the German attack across the Meuse from the XIXth Panzer Corps. Ironically, the 7th Company, 2/147th, which had been in position longer than the other two companies along the river, performed more poorly than either of them.
PROBLEMS WITHIN THE 147TH REGIMENT
The battalion task forces also were not as cohesive as they could have been. Captain Carribou, who commanded the 2/147th, strongly emphasized this lack of cohesion. In his report completed after the collapse of France, he said that the 147th Regiment had “total” cohesion shortly after it was formed. He explained, “The 147th had one ‘spirit’; it was ready.” This cohesion came from the familiarity of the men with each other, particularly after the special training received following their mobilization, and by the excellent preparation received in peacetime by the men of the 3/155th, which had provided the nucleus for the forming of the 147th. Although veterans of the 3/155th provided a valuable infrastructure for the 147th, the cohesion of the regiment was weakened by the introduction of older reservists as replacements. Coming from the 55th Division, these older men were apparently not as well trained and may have lacked the same level of spirit as the younger men.
The commander of the 3/147th, who occupied defenses south of Donchery, complained bitterly about the exchange of personnel between the 147th Regiment and the 55th Division. In his report written after the battle, he said: “[A]ll the units of the 147th Regiment lost by successive exchanges their young soldiers…, [who were] emptied into the units of the 55th I[nfantry] D[ivision]…in exchange for older soldiers…. The patient work of four years [training in peacetime]…was brutally wiped out….” Many of the soldiers in the 147th knew their responsibilities in the smallest detail, but their skills for defending fortresses or firing machine guns were useless in regular infantry units.55
Additionally, the confidence and interrelationships of the infantry units were somewhat diluted at the beginning of May with the addition of another group of replacements, which brought their strength closer to its authorized levels. In units that had already experienced the exchange of personnel between the 55th Division and the 147th Regiment, another wave of soldiers moved into the 55th Division. Clearly, the French High Command was far more interested in numbers than it was in cohesion or skills gained through special training, and General Lafontaine later admitted that the cohesion of the division was “compromised” by personnel turbulence.56
The cohesion of the 147th Regiment was also weakened by the mixing of companies from other battalions and regiments. As companies returned from training, they usually did not return to their original position or battalion. On 10 May Captain Carribou's 2/147th battalion task force consisted of two companies from the 2/147th, one from the 2/295th, and one from the 2/331st. Arguing that the mixing of companies led to “incoherence,” he sharply criticized some of the reservists from the 6th Company, 2/331st, who fled under German fire before he could do anything about their panic. Other members of the fortress units severely criticized the tendency of the infantry units, which should have provided protective fires for the blockhouses, to run. Carribou concluded, “A man holds [ground] because he knows that his neighbor at his side will hold.”57 The price paid for the assignment of companies to battalions without regard to previous service was the loss of familiarity among the soldiers and a lessening of confidence.
The French obviously believed that additional fortifications could make up for personnel and materiel weaknesses. The interest of the Second Army, Xth Corps, and 55th Division commanders in fortifications obviously stemmed from their belief that concrete could provide protection and could increase the staying power of the infantry. As mentioned earlier, the contrast between the Sedan sector and the Maginot Line to the east evidently increased their interest in fortifications. Unfortunately, the French placed an inadequate emphasis on training and devoted most of their time to the physical labor of improving their defensive positions.
For the 147th Regiment, most of the fortifications in the Frénois subsector were located along the second line between Bellevue and Wadelincourt, but a few blockhouses were located at bridges across the Meuse, such as the one leading into Villette and the three crossing into Sedan. Two blockhouses located immediately to the west of Pont Neuf were the only strong fortifications in the vicinity of where the German 1st Infantry and Gross Deutschland regiments crossed. Because of the blockhouses’ strength and fortunate location, their occupants inflicted many casualties on the infantry in the Gross Deutschland Regiment before they were finally silenced.
Along the river between Glaire and Torcy, where the German 1st Infantry Regiment crossed, there were only three small bunkers, and they were designated as “simple to construct.” The “simple” bunkers were usually built of concrete, but logs were apparently used in the three bunkers between Glaire and Torcy, making them weaker than the blockhouses by the bridges or on the second line. One of the small bunkers was on the edge of Glaire and two were side-by-side but facing opposite directions where the streambed of the Ruisseau de Glaire ran into the Meuse. Once the Germans passed these bunkers, the next blockhouses were at Les Forges and near the Chateau of Bellevue. Farther to the Germans’ front was the line of blockhouses between Bellevue and Wadelincourt.
The French carefully placed their 25mm and 47mm antitank weapons. They did not expect the Germans to use tanks while crossing the river but did expect them to use tanks to attempt a breakthrough of the French defenses if they crossed in the Bellevue-Glaire-Torcy area. Consequently, antitank weapons were needed primarily along the regiment's second line to prevent a breakthrough.58 Unfortunately, they placed the antitank weapons inside the blockhouses to give them protection from enemy fire and did not provi
de for removing them and using them elsewhere. This meant that the weapons could only fire into designated zones and could not be moved to more critical zones. The French thus sacrificed the mobility of the weapons for protection. This weakness proved to be much more important than the relatively small number of weapons.
After the collapse, the debate over the causes of France's defeat often touched upon the inadequate number of blockhouses in the Sedan area and their often lacking metal protective shields to cover firing ports. In some ways, the intensity of this debate suggests that the participants had not learned an important lesson about the weaknesses of fortifications in modern warfare. Nevertheless, most of the bunkers that were being built or being planned to be built were located along the line between Bellevue and Wadelincourt. While a few were planned for the river's edge, the main concern of French commanders during the phony war was the requirement to add depth with more blockhouses and to strengthen the second line between Bellevue and Wadelincourt. Though they would have liked to increase the number of blockhouses along the principal line of resistance, they gave a higher priority to strengthening the second line and preparing to move the principal line of resistance from the river's edge to the rear. In trying to do too much, the French ended up doing too little in what proved to be a very critical area.
THE LACK OF COHESION AND TRAINING
Thus, despite having occupied the Sedan sector from October to May, the 55th Division suffered from a lack of cohesion and training. With Generals Huntziger and Grandsard being more interested in the building of fortifications than in the conduct of hard, demanding training, the division had little or no opportunity to make much-needed improvements. Consequently, after replacing General Britsch as commander of the 55th on 1 March, General Lafontaine did not make substantial improvements in the division. Unfortunately for France, the lack of cohesion and the inadequate training of the division affected its combat performance far more than the missing or incomplete bunkers.
The problems with cohesion and training are particularly noticeable when compared with the Germans. After having previously experienced combat in Poland and after a long period of intense training, the German units were models of preparedness.
The irony is that Lafontaine, Grandsard, and Huntziger were reasonably satisfied before May 1940 with the preparedness of their troops. General Huntziger's response to Pierre Taittinger's report of significant weaknesses around Sedan stands as a startlingly clear statement of their satisfaction with ongoing programs. He wrote, “I believe that no urgent measures are necessary to reinforce the Sedan sector….”59
On 13 May the forces of General Guderian demonstrated the glaring error of this statement.
CHAPTER 5
The German Attack Across the Meuse
The question of how the XIXth Panzer Corps would cross the Meuse had concerned Guderian and von Kleist since their commands had received the mission of attacking across the river. The two leaders had differed about the location of the crossing, for von Kleist wanted the majority of the corps to cross west of the Ardennes Canal, while Guderian preferred to have the entire corps cross east of the canal. On 11 May the operations order from Panzer Group von Kleist for the 12th specifically ordered the XIXth Corps to “place its main thrust…west of the Ardennes Canal.”1 On 12 May the operations order from Panzer Group von Kleist for the 13th ordered Guderian to make the “Meuse crossing around 1500 hours between Flize and Sedan.”2 (Flize was twelve kilometers west of Sedan and five kilometers west of the Ardennes Canal.) Von Kleist's directives to the XIXth Corps could not have been clearer. Stretching to the limit the operational freedom provided him by the German philosophy of command, however, the strong-willed Guderian nevertheless prepared to cross east of the Ardennes Canal.
During the preparation of the XIXth Panzer Corps to cross on both sides of Sedan, two important questions appeared that dramatically affected the conduct of the river crossing. The first concerned the timing of the attack; the second concerned air support. While Guderian successfully ignored von Kleist's orders about where to make the crossing, he soon discovered that his commander would not yield on the important questions of time and air support.
THE GERMAN PLAN
When the XIXth Panzer Corps approached Sedan, its units were scattered along the many roads used by the corps to move west. The units of the 1st Panzer Division were closer to Sedan than those of the other two divisions, for the division had been blessed with the best marching route and had preempted the 2nd Panzer Division at Mouzaive. To the east, the 10th Panzer Division was experiencing some difficulty reaching the Meuse because of the tortuous route it followed to Mortehan. To the west, some of the advance elements of the 2nd Panzer Division were approaching the river, but the bulk of the division was still far behind the Semois. Guderian was particularly concerned because much of the corps’ artillery was far to the rear.
Late in the afternoon of the 12th, a Fieseler-Storch aircraft arrived at Guderian's headquarters to transport him to von Kleist's command post. There von Kleist ordered him to attack across the Meuse at 1500 hours on the 13th and emphasized his concerns about the XIXth Panzer Corps preparing to cross east of the Ardennes Canal. Guderian expressed strong reservations about making the crossing on the following day because the 2nd Panzer Division probably could not arrive on the Meuse in time, but he acknowledged the advantages of making a hasty river crossing before the French could strengthen their defenses. He then shrewdly pointed out that if his corps had to shift west so it could cross west of the Ardennes Canal, it would not be ready until the 14th. Trapped by time and space constraints, von Kleist had no choice but to accept a crossing east of the Canal.
However, von Kleist then gave another order that, in Guderian's words, was “far less pleasant.” In early May, Guderian had coordinated with the Luftwaffe for support during the Meuse crossing. He and General Lörzer of the Second Air Corps had agreed that Luftwaffe aircraft would provide continuous support to the ground forces when the river crossing and assault were made. Instead of making a massive attack with bombers and dive bombers during a short period, German aircraft would maintain a continuous but relatively low level of attacks, particularly against the exposed enemy artillery. This would force the enemy to seek cover and would affect his ability to continue firing, as well as his will to fight.
Much to Guderian's dismay, von Kleist had arranged for a short but massive bombing attack, which would be coordinated with German artillery preparation. Guderian considered his entire attack plan to be in “jeopardy,” for he believed a massive bombing attack would not substantially affect the enemy's artillery. Recognizing the increased importance of German artillery in silencing or disrupting the enemy's artillery, Guderian demanded a delay in the crossing until the 14th to be certain the artillery had sufficient time to occupy its designated positions and provide supporting and counter-battery fires. Despite Guderian's strongest efforts, von Kleist refused to change his orders. If his Panzer group were to cross the Meuse successfully, the XLIst and the XIXth corps had to attack at the same time, and delays by one corps or both could place the entire campaign in jeopardy. The same reasons that forced von Kleist to accept the XIXth Corps’ new crossing site forced Guderian to accept the change in plans for air support. Guderian departed for Bouillon, obviously upset about the turn of events.3
After returning to his command post, Guderian decided to modify and issue the order that had been used in the war game for the crossing of the Meuse. As he noted in his memoirs, the major change was in the timing of the attack. To break through the French defenses, he planned on having the XIXth Panzer Corps cross the Meuse River with its three divisions abreast: the 2nd Panzer in the west at Donchery, the 1st Panzer with the main attack in the center at Sedan, and the 10th Panzer in the east at Wadelincourt.
In the west, the 2nd Panzer Division was supposed to cross the Meuse and occupy Croix Piot, the high ground overlooking the Meuse. In the center, the 1st Panzer Division was supposed to sei
ze the heights of La Boulette and the Bois de la Marfée and then push south to a line running between Chehéry and Chaumont (two kilometers north of Bulson). To ensure the success of the main attack, the 1st Division was reinforced by the Gross Deutschland Infantry Regiment and by the heavy artillery battalions from the two divisions on its flank. In the east, the 10th Panzer Division was supposed to cross at Wadelincourt and Bazeilles and then push south toward Bulson.
After successfully crossing the Meuse and seizing the high ground to its south, Guderian apparently planned on pivoting to the west toward Rethel and punching through the last French defenses. The bridgehead in which the corps would turn to the west would be no deeper than about fifteen kilometers. To protect the flank of the corps, he planned on using the Gross Deutschland Regiment or the 10th Panzer Division, or both units, to occupy the heights around Mont Dieu and Stonne. Because he could not predict the enemy's response, however, he delayed making a decision about the exact details of the pivot to the west until after the crossing.
Nevertheless, he obviously preferred to have the 10th Panzer Division pivot and accompany the other two Panzer divisions in the corps. If it had to remain behind to protect the bridgehead by defending along the heights of Stonne-Mont Dieu, or even worse, if that division, the Gross Deutschland Regiment, and additional units from the 1st Panzer Division had to remain behind to protect the bridgehead, the capability of the corps to move deep into French defenses would be dramatically curbed. Much depended on how rapidly the Germans could push units across the Meuse and on how rapidly the French could bring reinforcements into the Sedan area.
After von Kleist had forced the XIXth Corps to attack on the afternoon of the 13th with major modifications in the planned methods for employing the air force, Guderian evidently had serious doubts about the potential success of the river crossing. The daily log of the XIXth Panzer Corps includes a lengthy analysis of Guderian's concerns about the width, depth, and timing of the attack. The log notes, “The order of the Group…is completely different from the conception of the commanding general [of the XIXth Corps]….”4 Almost as if a court case were being readied, the extent and nature of the comments suggest that Guderian was fully prepared to blame von Kleist if the crossing failed.
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