The Breaking Point

by Robert A Doughty

  GERMAN AERIAL OPERATIONS OVER SEDAN

  To coordinate aerial attacks in support of the Meuse crossing by the XIXth and XLIst Corps, Panzer Group von Kleist broke down the projected crossing zones into six large areas, with two being north of Charleville, two between Flize and the Ardennes Canal, and two between the Canal and Pont Maugis. In each case, one area lay alongside the river, while another lay deeper in the French defenses.5

  The XIXth Panzer Corps also broke down its zone into large areas and then further subdivided the areas into small area targets. Most targets included an area of about a quarter to half a square kilometer. For example, the Germans designated the area in the “mushroom of Glaire” as area “K” and drew circles or ovals around ten different numbered targets: the “buckle” of the Meuse, Glaire, the road between Glaire and Torcy, the northwestern part of Torcy, the southwestern part of Torcy, the area west of the junction of the railway and the Bellevue-Torcy road, Les Forges, the extreme western part of the railway in the mushroom, the area northeast of the road junction at Bellevue, and the area north of the same junction. The area south of the mushroom was designated as area “L,” and targets were circled and numbered within it. Other areas were also marked in the same manner.6

  The identification of preplanned targets facilitated coordination between the air and the ground forces. Use of the preplanned targets had been practiced during war games preceding the attack, and only slight modifications to the targets used in the most recent war game had to be made for the 13 May 1940 aerial attacks around Sedan. From Guderian's perspective, however, much of the work in coordinating the air attacks with the ground operation was negated by von Kleist's decision to have a short, rather than a drawn-out bombing attack.7

  On the 13th, before the attack across the Meuse began, Guderian waited anxiously for the scheduled air attack. To his surprise, only a few bombers and dive bombers (with the protection of fighters) appeared over Sedan and began an extended wave of attacks. Guderian was elated, for he was convinced a drawn-out bombing attack would disrupt the French artillery. Later that night, he telephoned Lörzer to thank him for the excellent air support. During that conversation, he learned that the request from von Kleist for a massive attack had arrived too late to be implemented and consequently Lörzer had continued with the previously agreed upon approach.8 As it had been for much of the campaign, luck was again on Guderian's side.

  About one thousand aircraft supported Group von Kleist on the 13th, most of which operated around Sedan. As hundreds of German aircraft circled above them and launched their attacks, the French 55th Division had little or no defenses. The Second Army had only two battalions of 75mm air defense for its entire front, but placed one near Sedan. Despite the massive number of enemy aircraft, the battalion (the 3/404th) claimed only one downed aircraft on the 13th. A battery of 25mm antiaircraft weapons from the 1st Colonial Infantry Division was ordered to move into the Sedan sector sometime after 10 May, but the battery apparently never arrived.9 Thus when wave after wave of German aircraft struck the Sedan sector on the 13th, the 55th Division had little more than its organic rifles and machine guns to combat them.

  The daily log of the French Xth Corps emphasized the importance of the German aerial attacks. One entry stated: “German aviation played a preponderant role, even a decisive [one]. Its incessant attacks were launched against the [principal] line of resistance…[and] on the rear areas…. Its action was continuous and massive.”10

  Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud, who commanded the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment at Sedan, described the attacks. He wrote:

  Beginning at 0500 hours, numerous enemy aerial reconnaissance [aircraft] flew over the sub-sector…. Around 0930 hours, German aviation began to bombard the position. The bombardment was especially heavy on the principal line of resistance, on the train station in Sedan, and on Torcy where numerous fires were started…. After 1100 hours, the aerial bombardment became more intense and was mixed with lulls until 1700 hours…. [T]he entire position but especially the principal line of resistance was covered by a thick cloud of smoke. The attacks were executed by successive waves, each including around 40 bombers; fighters participated in the action by firing their machine guns.11

  Captain Carribou, who commanded the 2/147th Fortress Infantry Battalion, also described the aerial attacks. In his report, he said,

  The pounding of the position began around 1100 hours by around 40 bombers and continued until approximately 1700 hours under the form of five successive waves, each with an approximate duration of one hour. The telephonic communications [that were] regularly interrupted under each bombardment were reestablished during the lulls as best we could, but communications proved to be more and more difficult. Every individual seen was followed and machine gunned by the enemy fighters who defiantly confirmed their absolute mastery of the air. I requested authorization to use the radio. Permission was refused.12

  Despite the length and intensity of the attacks, very little damage—except to communications—actually occurred. The real damage inflicted by the aircraft came to the will of the defenders to fight. Captain Foucault, who commanded the 2/331st Infantry at Bellevue, noted that the effect on the morale of the French defenders was much greater than any actual physical destruction by the planes.13

  Although the infantry was affected, the effect on the French artillery was particularly important. Even though many of the tubes were not deeply dug in and well protected, very few were actually destroyed. But their firing against the massed and exposed Germans on the northern bank of the Meuse ceased almost completely as the crews sought cover against the air attacks. Additionally, the constant attacks increased their nervousness and contributed significantly to the enormously disruptive panic that swept the 55th Division and the artillery in its rear on the evening of the 13th.

  As the attacking German infantry moved beyond the river line, aircraft provided immediate and usually effective support. The use of numbered targets continued, and dive bombers rattled the occupants of several bunkers, enabling the Germans to move more closely to them and ultimately to destroy them. The machine gun fire and bombs from aircraft also had an important effect as the 1st Infantry Regiment swept through the French defenders and raced toward La Boulette. Without aerial support, the infantry would have had little more than their mortars and their accompanying small arms to use against the entrenched French.

  Thus, by sapping the will of the French defenders to fight, by disrupting the fire of the numerous artillery batteries, and by providing immediate fire support, German aircraft made an important contribution to the land battle on the afternoon of the 13th. Without excellent support from the Luftwaffe, the XIXth Panzer Corps’ mission would have been significantly more difficult.

  WITH THE 1ST PANZER DIVISION AT GAULIER

  At the 1st Panzer Division, the headquarters did not have time to complete a detailed plan for the attack on the 13th, so it ordered its subordinate units to implement the plan that had been prepared for a map exercise in Koblenz, Germany, on 21 March. As with the corps’ plan, the division's plan had not been intended for wartime use, but it did provide the basic concept for identifying and occupying assembly areas and for executing the attack over the Meuse. Though the modification of an existing plan reduced substantially the amount of effort needed to issue precise orders, subordinate units did not receive orders until very late at night. The 2/1st Infantry, for example, did not receive the regimental order until 0130 hours on 13 May.14 This left it very little time to conduct last-minute planning and preparation even though it was supposed to be one of the first units to cross the Meuse.

  Confusion also existed about when the attack would begin. Even though Guderian returned to his command post about 1700 hours on the 12th with orders for the attack to begin at 1500 hours on the following day, the divisions received a warning order that told them the attack would occur on the morning of the 13th. The corps’ plan with the correct time for the attack was not completed until 07
15 hours on the 13th.15 Until early on the morning of the 13th, the 1st Panzer Division thought it was supposed to launch its attack at 0900 hours. Subsequent changes altered the attack time to 1415 hours and then later to 1500 hours. The division did not learn until 0700 hours that the attack scheduled at 0900 hours had been delayed. The 2/1st Infantry evidently did not learn of the change until the last minute.16

  The 1st Panzer Division used the evening of the 12th and the night of the 12–13th to push units into their forward assembly areas. The rough terrain along the Semois River near Bouillon made this movement particularly difficult. Amidst the narrow, winding roads, long lines of marching troops and moving vehicles slowly made their way toward Sedan. In their comments after the battle, the German soldiers noted the effect of the “clogged streets,” the burning and destroyed buildings, the bomb craters, and the “stinking corpses of horses.”17 Getting sufficient artillery forward became especially difficult and thus important.

  Final preparations for the attack, particularly those relating to units moving into assembly areas or attack positions, were difficult to accomplish because of the open terrain on the eastern bank of the Meuse. From the high ground on the western bank of the Meuse, French forward observers could see six to eight kilometers to their front and could place massive concentrations of artillery against any exposed troops or equipment. Even individual guns or artillery tubes received fire when they were carelessly exposed. The leaders of the 1st Panzer Division remained extremely worried about their ability to bring everything forward in time for the attack. Though their task remained difficult, delaying the attack from 0900 until 1500 hours served slightly to lessen their worries.

  The massive concentration of forces on the eastern bank of the Meuse created good targets for the French. In the 2/1st Infantry Battalion, the 6th and 9th companies suffered particularly high casualties during the night of 12–13 May even though they had dug entrenchments.18 However, the following day saw the effectiveness of the artillery decrease significantly. The heavy attacks by German aircraft against the French artillery almost completely silenced its firing during the crucial period when German troops moved to and then crossed the Meuse. The Germans also used the terrain to their advantage by skillfully moving troops so the folds in the ground partially concealed and covered their advance.

  Most of the artillery support for the attack of the 1st Panzer Division came from the 73rd Artillery Regiment and the 2/56th Artillery, which were organic to the division. Since the 2nd and 10th Panzer divisions each gave up an artillery battalion to support the division, which had responsibility for the corps’ main attack, the 2/45th Artillery and the 1/105th Artillery moved into the division's sector. Later, after the Germans had crossed the river successfully, a small part of the artillery crossed the Meuse using two rafts the Germans had placed in the river. When the bridge was finally completed, the remainder moved across more easily and quickly.

  Because of the small amount of time available for planning, no detailed fire plan was completed. Nevertheless, the Germans had identified exactly the direction they wanted the infantry units to go, and they planned on using artillery fires to help the infantry maintain their direction of attack. By 1300 hours most of the firing batteries had occupied their positions and were prepared to fire, and some artillerymen prepared to move forward with the infantry. The battery commander of the 6th Battery, 73rd Artillery, for example, prepared to accompany the 3/1st Infantry across the Meuse and thereby provide especially effective support.19

  THE 1ST INFANTRY REGIMENT CROSSES THE MEUSE

  The 1st Infantry Regiment led the main attack by the 1st Panzer Division across the Meuse River. From the crossing of the Meuse on the 13th to the breakout on the 16th, the 1st Infantry Regiment performed superbly. Among the most important reasons for its remarkable success was the outstanding leadership of its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Balck. A highly decorated veteran of World War I who engendered a great deal of respect from those under his command, Balck was one of Germany's best combat leaders. Though only a lieutenant colonel in 1940, he eventually commanded Army Group G in western Europe in 1945. Over the course of the war, he was subsequently promoted higher and faster than either his brigade or division commander in the 1st Panzer Division. On 13 May 1940 it was the misfortune of the 55th French Infantry Division and the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment to be facing a regiment commanded by him.

  The 1st Infantry Regiment—reinforced by the 8th Company of the 2/1st Panzers, 1st Company of the 8th Heavy Antitank Battalion, 660th Assault Gun Battery, and the 702nd Heavy Infantry Weapons Company—had the mission of attacking across the Meuse near Gaulier. To the west was the Gross Deutschland Regiment. The boundary between the two regiments initially followed the streambed of the Ruisseau de Glaire and then ran along a line that extended from a point 400 meters east of Frénois to the farm of St. Quentin, about one kilometer southwest of Chaumont.20 The 1st Regiment planned on attacking across the Meuse with two of its battalions, while the Gross Deutschland Regiment planned on crossing with one battalion and then having its other battalions follow.

  Since the Gross Deutschland Regiment had an organic combat support battalion, the XIXth Panzer Corps did not reinforce it, but the 1st Infantry Regiment was provided tanks and assault guns. While the two armored regiments of the division remained in assembly areas near Corbion, one tank company (with Mark IV tanks armed with 75mm cannon) came forward to accompany the 1st Regiment as it moved to the river and to support the crossing of the infantry. Additionally, the 660th Assault Gun Battery, which had 75mm cannons similar to that on the Mark IV, also supported the regiment. When the 1st Infantry Regiment crossed the Meuse, the accurate and powerful fire of the 75mm guns proved to be very effective in silencing the French bunkers. The regiment also had 150mm cannons, mounted on the chassis of a Mark I, from the 702nd Heavy Infantry Weapons Company supporting its attack. While the 150mm cannon did not have the accuracy of a 75mm gun, it could provide close, accurate, and devastatingly powerful fire support.

  Engineer units provided crucial support for the crossing. The 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion controlled the movement of the regiment across the Meuse, while the 37th Armored Engineer Battalion began establishing a ferry to move troops and equipment across the river. At the same time, the 505th Engineer Battalion began preparations for the construction of a sixteen-ton bridge.21

  The 43rd Assault Engineers had a particularly challenging task. The battalion had received special training in the destruction of enemy bunkers and played a key role in the attack against several bunkers near the crossing site. The 37th Engineers also played a key role. Though it arrived late, the battalion assisted in the movement of troops and equipment across the river, which was about sixty to seventy meters wide at the crossing point. The complexity of their task is suggested by the number of rubber boats used in the crossing. For transportation across the Meuse, the 1st Panzer Division was furnished forty-two large and sixty-six small rubber boats and nine assault boats, some of which were carried forward on motorcycles because of French artillery fire. About a third of the boats were to be used by assault engineers, the remainder by the infantry.22

  Despite intense preparation and efforts, the engineers who were supposed to operate the rubber boats for the 1st Infantry Regiment did not arrive at the crossing site in time. Lieutenant Colonel Balck grabbed the commander of the engineer battalion in the Gross Deutschland Regiment and ordered him to have his men operate the boats, but the engineer officer refused, saying his men had been trained as assault engineers, not boat operators. Balck had no choice but to use his infantrymen to operate the boats.23

  Around 1500 hours on the 13th, the 1st Infantry Regiment began the assault across the Meuse River. Using direct fire from tanks, antitank guns, and assault guns against bunkers and using indirect fire from artillery against less-protected positions, the Germans first silenced several key emplacements. Then almost precisely at 1500 hours, the 2nd and 3rd battalions of th
e 1st Infantry Regiment crossed the Meuse at Gaulier, the 2nd Battalion on the right (in the west) and the 3rd Battalion on the left (in the east). The 1st Battalion followed the two lead battalions.

  Despite the silencing of several French positions, the crossing engineers and infantrymen came under heavy machine gun fire. A few artillery rounds fell, but the enemy's guns were almost silent in comparison to the rate of fire before the sustained aerial attack. The 7th and 8th companies led the 2nd Battalion across the river and lost several men. One large rubber boat was damaged by a grenade. Another large rubber boat of the 8th Company was also damaged badly by heavy fire. When they reached the far side, the infantry hesitated for a moment under the heavy enemy fire, but the battalion commander had crossed the Meuse with the 7th Company, and by his personal actions propelled the 7th Company forward.24 During this momentary crisis and others to come, the personal courage and close proximity to the fighting of the German leaders proved to be one of the most important elements in the eventual German success.

  The wartime journal of the 1st Panzer Division described the initial fighting.

  The first obstacles are overcome in a rapid advance, and the first bunkers rolled up. Despite this, French resistance comes back to life. Enemy artillery begins to shoot at the crossing point. The crews in the bunkers desperately defend against the advancing infantrymen. One bunker after the other, antitank guns, machine guns, and field fortifications are taken in individual combat and through the personal example of all the leaders who advance in front of their men. Antitank and antiaircraft [weapons] also play a tremendous role in the reduction of the enemy, and they destroy the French in relentless actions, sometimes at point-blank range.25