To the left (west) of 7th Company was the 3rd Company, 1/331st, which performed slightly better. Though this company pulled back without offering extremely spirited opposition to the Germans attempting to push through La Boulette toward Cheveuges, it was later cited by the battalion commander and by Colonel Chaligne for having fought well. The 1st Company, 1/331st, occupied the stopping line to the left (west) of the 3rd Company, 1/331st, and did not come under as much pressure as that placed against the 3rd Company. Yet it withdrew about the same time as its sister company.
Of the companies in the 331st Regiment that had the opportunity to participate in the hard fighting around Sedan, the 5th Company, 2/331st, occupied the most critical position. Inserted into the defenses between Bellevue and a point east of Frénois as part of the second line of resistance, the 5th Company performed poorly, but it performed far better than the 6th Company or the 7th Company, which fled without offering any significant resistance to the Germans. Its performance may have been somewhat better had twelve men from the company's headquarters not been lost to an aerial attack and had its position not come under assault on the left by the 1st Infantry Regiment and on the right by the Gross Deutschland Regiment. In the final analysis, it too seemed to lack the will to fight that is essential for a strong defense.
Any criticism of the 331st Regiment, however, must be tempered by an acknowledgment of other units having panicked or having had soldiers flee. The problem was far too widespread to blame one regiment, but the cowardly performance of so many soldiers in the 331st severely crippled French defensive efforts.
In their explanations for the panic or for the failure to resist the Germans strongly, several officers later criticized the reservists at Sedan. One officer, Lieutenant Drapier, who commanded the 9th Company, 3/147th, west of Bellevue and south of Donchery, was particularly blunt. Having commanded the company for about four months, the officer witnessed the baptism of fire of his unit under what he called “less than brilliant conditions.” In a report written in May 1941, he described incidents during the fighting of dirty and malfunctioning weapons that suggested the men were not familiar with their equipment. He complained that the cadre was “worthless,” his unit having only two noncommissioned officers who were effective. In his opinion, “Only the elements with active [rather than reserve] cadres fought.”70
Captain Carribou, who commanded the 2/147th, which was a reserve unit, also complained about some of the reservists, but he was far more critical of the personnel policies of the 55th Division and the Xth Corps that weakened the cohesion of front-line units. In particular, he lamented the gradual loss of cohesion in his battalion in the spring of 1940. As part of the covering force on the frontier, his unit had trained and operated together for several months and had developed a very high esprit and sense of camaraderie. Nevertheless, the creation of temporary company teams by mixing companies and platoons from different battalions and the mindless swapping of personnel from one unit to another seriously weakened the cohesion of the battalion. He later complained bitterly about the “incoherence” that came from the haphazard mixing of personnel and units, and he sharply criticized the fleeing of the 6th Company, 2/331st Infantry, a reserve unit that lacked any sort of identification with his battalion even though it was attached to him.71
Though the insertion of the 71st Infantry Division into a position along the Meuse on the night of the 12–13th was not mentioned frequently in after-action reports as significantly disrupting French defenses, the hustle and bustle associated with a relief in place had to be unsettling to many of the inexperienced soldiers. These soldiers already had grave apprehensions about what was going to happen on the 13th, and the sudden shifting of units probably weakened their confidence. It may also have contributed to the green soldiers’ uncertainty and fears of being abandoned.
In his explanation for the poor performance of the 55th Division, General Lafontaine later mentioned many of the same points as other officers. He particularly lamented the “small number” of active officers and experienced sergeants. He also complained about the personnel policies that had forced the mixing of soldiers between the 55th Division and 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment and remarked that the “cohesion” of the division “was momentarily compromised….” Regarding the will to fight of his men, he added, “Without combat experience, they were surprised by the violence of fire and by the use of new combat procedures. They did not strictly follow their mission of defending without withdrawing, and numerous units abandoned their position in disorder under the menace of tanks.”72
Many of the men who fled evidently believed they were being abandoned by the French Army. While under constant aerial assault on the 13th, they saw little or no effort by the French aerial forces to defend them. They concluded, “We have been betrayed.” Moreover, they often said, “Our officers have abandoned us.”73 These perceptions at least partially stemmed from the movement of several command posts out of the Bulson area. The sense of betrayal was undoubtedly accentuated by the subsequent movement of the command post of the 55th Division around 1900 hours on the 13th from Fond Dagot to Chémery. Though the reason for the move was ostensibly to enable the headquarters to control a counterattack more effectively, the command post obviously moved out in haste, leaving vehicles, equipment, and disrupted communications in its wake. Possibly without complete regard for the truth, General Lafontaine later explained that the staff of the Xth Corps had ordered the division to move its command post to Chèmery.74
Regardless of the reasons for the moves, the hasty packing up and moving out of several command posts clearly increased the fears of the individual soldiers and heightened their sense of abandonment. And the panic that swept through the 55th Division on the evening of the 13th provided the Germans an easy opportunity to capitalize upon their initial gains. Beyond a doubt, the fleeing of the artillery in the Sedan sector seriously weakened French defenses and enabled the Germans to move south without enduring heavy concentrations of artillery fire and suffering high casualties in the narrow bridgehead around Wadelincourt, Torcy, Frénois, and La Boulette. Even without the panic, the Germans eventually may have broken through the French positions, but they would have paid a much higher price.
AWAITING THE MORNING
Both the French and the Germans used the night of the 13–14th to prepare for subsequent operations. Despite the depth of the German penetration into the French lines, almost ten kilometers, the German bridgehead remained small and extremely vulnerable. By comparison, however, the French immediately along the edge of the bridgehead were in a desperate situation. Captain Foucault and Carribou's battalions had only a few men and could not offer serious resistance to the Germans. Captain Gabel at the French military cemetery and Noyers was in better condition. Though he received some reinforcements, his position came under increasing pressure from the 10th Panzer Division.
Throughout the evening, Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud and Lieutenant Colonel Lafont, who commanded the 331st Regiment to the west, attempted to put together another defensive line along a line that ran from Cheveuges to Bulson. Sometime after midnight, the 55th Division's headquarters gained a better appreciation of the situation of its front-line units, which was fragile at best. If the Germans were to be halted, additional reinforcements and a counterattack were required.
CHAPTER 7
The German Pivot and Breakout
After carving out a small bridgehead over the Meuse River, the XIXth Panzer Corps began pushing units across the river and expanding the area under its control. With his objective being a penetration and breakout, Guderian did not want to use valuable time building up a large force before he pushed his men forward. In the race against time with the French, who were moving forces forward to seal off the breach, he wanted to keep advancing and prevent his opponents from establishing solid defenses to his front. As he pushed forward, however, the German High Command became concerned about the corps’ advancing too rapidly. On 17 May, General Halder noted
in his diary, “Rather unpleasant day. The Führer is terribly nervous. Frightened by his own success, he's afraid to take any chance and so would rather pull the reins on us.”1
THE 1ST PANZER DIVISION'S PUSH TOWARD THE SOUTH
Despite sporadic artillery fire, the German engineers finished the bridge at Gaulier around 2300 hours on the 13th. In preparation for crossing, the 1st Panzer Division ordered the Armor Brigade to assemble and prepare to move its two regiments across the bridge. Both regiments occupied assembly areas southwest of Corbion (four kilometers west of Bouillon). As the Panzer brigade marched south toward the Meuse, the 1/73rd Artillery became the first heavy unit to cross the river. It had moved close to the river so it could provide support to the rapidly advancing infantry, and portions of the battalion had already crossed the river using the two rafts. Thus it could move the remainder of its elements over the bridge quickly. After the artillery battalion crossed, the tanks followed.
The crossing proceeded slowly. The daily log of the 1st Panzer Division recorded the events:
Delays in road marches north of the Meuse manifested themselves during the night. The delays were caused on the one hand by the desire of every organization to get forward and on the other hand by the continuous firing of enemy artillery along the approach routes. A smooth crossing did not occur until the beginning of daylight.2
Getting several hundred vehicles across a single bridge can be extremely complex, but the Germans’ task was made more difficult by their having to work throughout the night. The fatigue of the soldiers, who had been on the attack for almost four days, obviously compounded the problem.
As the Panzers began crossing the Meuse, the commander of the 1st Panzer Division decided to take advantage of the penetration that had been made by the 1st Infantry Regiment and to move the Gross Deutschland Regiment around and into the rear of the enemy at the French cemetery and Noyers. While a portion of the regiment moved to their front directly through the Bois de la Marfée, the others moved through Frénois and La Boulette toward Bulson and Stonne (about eight kilometers south of Bulson). After bypassing the persistent French defenders east of Hill 247 and then attacking them from the rear, elements of the Gross Deutschland Regiment could continue moving south toward Bulson and Maisoncelle. At the same time, the 1st Infantry Regiment could continue attacking south toward Chémery.
As the two infantry regiments pushed out of the bridgehead and toward Chémery and Bulson, they did not fight alone. Two companies of the 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion accompanied the 1st Infantry Regiment, and the 1/73rd Artillery provided it fire support. The 2/73rd Artillery supported the Gross Deutsch/and Regiment. However, only the 1/73rd Artillery moved across the Meuse early enough to provide fire support against the French counterattack on the morning of the 14th.
Before the Germans pushed the 1st Infantry Regiment toward Chémery and the Gross Deutschland Regiment around to the rear of the French defenders at Noyers and the French cemetery, they continued to expand the bridgehead at its shoulders and south of Wadelincourt. The bridgehead remained hardly more than a kilometer wide between La Boulette and Chehéry. At 0130 hours on the 14th, elements of the 1st Infantry reached a point just north of Chehéry; two hours later they were just south of Chehéry. For the remainder of the night, the 1st Infantry Regiment apparently consolidated its position and rested. The 1st Battalion secured La Boulette, the 2nd Battalion remained near Chehéry, and the 3rd Battalion remained near the St. Quentin farm about two kilometers northwest of Bulson.3 By occupying these positions, the battalions of the 1st Regiment protected the vulnerable flanks of the important but narrow penetration made by the regiment. With its narrow width and length of about four kilometers, however, the penetration by the 1st Regiment resembled an extended and exposed neck, which could have been severed by an aggressive French counterattack.
To enlarge and also protect the bridgehead, the Gross Deutschland Regiment moved its units around 0545 hours toward Cheveuges, Bulson, and Maisoncelle.4 Though many of its units passed through the Bois de la Marfée, the movement pattern of the regiment resembled a large hook that turned in a counterclockwise direction. After reaching Bulson and thereby bypassing the French defenders near Noyers and the French cemetery, the two regiments would be on line and the shoulders of the penetration could be greatly expanded.
Around 0430 hours reports reached XIXth Panzer Corps headquarters about French armored forces moving up from the southwest near Rethel and from south of Mont Dieu for a counterattack. These evidently were elements of the French 3rd Armored and 3rd Motorized divisions. Instead of digging in where they were and waiting to fight the French from strong defensive positions, the Germans attempted to move more forces on line with the 1st Infantry Regiment, to push the 1st Regiment farther forward, and to get more tanks across the Meuse. The audacious decision to continue the attack rather than defend what had been seized contrasted sharply with the more conservative methods used by the French.
Even though Guderian's actions increased the traffic and congestion problems at the single crossing site, he ordered the 1st Panzer Division to permit the 2nd Panzer Brigade of the 2nd Panzer Division to cross the Meuse using the 1st Panzer Division's bridge at Gaulier.5 Though attempting to make room for the tanks of the 2nd Panzer Division, the 1st Panzer Division tried to hurry its forces even more. While the Gross Deutschland Regiment was moving forward and while the Germans were desperately hurrying tanks across the river, the first reports of enemy reinforcements arrived. General Kirchner's decision was to give “absolute right of way to the Armor Brigade.”6 Over the next hour, the division received additional reports of French tanks at Chémery, the Bois de la Marfée, and Connage. At the same time the Allies began strong air attacks against the bridge at Gaulier, but the bridge almost miraculously remained undamaged. Had the bridge been damaged even slightly, the Germans’ situation would have been precarious, for most of their bridging had been used in the move through the Ardennes. It would have taken hours to bring additional materials forward if a lucky Allied hit had destroyed the bridge.
In a reversal of the previous day's experience, the Germans initially had almost no fighter cover to protect themselves or the bridge from heavy Allied aerial attacks, which began early in the morning of the 14th, but the massive Allied air threat against the bridge soon resulted in the air being filled with German fighters. As the Germans rushed tanks across the single bridge, and as Allied aerial attacks continued, they had to be extremely nervous about their vulnerable position. But the presence of many fighters overhead and about 200 air defense guns around the bridge served to reassure them.
On the morning following its deep penetration, the 1st Infantry Regiment did little except adjust its positions for the anticipated French counterattack. As the Gross Deutschland Regiment moved to the east into the Bulson area, the 3/1st Infantry moved from the vicinity of the St. Quentin farm around 0800 hours and placed one company at Connage, another at Omicourt, and another at Chehéry.7 By placing the companies in these positions, the Germans protected themselves against the possibility of a French counterattack from the southwest, which would have to come from Chémery toward Connage or from the southwest through Omicourt. The regiment also placed itself in a strong position for turning west when the 1st Division and the XIXth Panzer Corps began to pivot to the west.
The adjustments by the 3/1st Infantry apparently occurred as the 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion, the 14th Antitank Company, and elements from the 4th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion moved south along the road leading to Chémery. The division commander had organized this unusual task force and ordered it to move to Chémery, seize the bridge across the Ardennes Canal, and prevent French reinforcements from moving across it. Around 0800 hours these elements reported that they were being attacked near Connage by fifty French tanks coming from the direction of Chémery,8 though in fact they were being attacked by no more than a tank company. As will be explained the solid performance of this task force enabled the Ger
mans to turn aside the French counterattack.
Meanwhile, the division continued to rush as many elements as it could across the river. The 2/56th Artillery, a heavy artillery battalion, moved to the southern bank around 0800 hours, as did the 2/73rd Artillery around 1100 hours.9 The 1/73rd Artillery had crossed earlier. The 37th Antitank Battalion, which had been in the St. Menges area, also hurried across the river. After one and a half antitank companies had crossed, General Guderian personally intervened and gave priority to some tank units that were waiting to cross. Without waiting for the rest of the battalion, the commander of the antitank company that was across the river located the Gross Deutschland Regiment and accompanied it.10 Despite these reinforcements, the number of units that had crossed the single German bridge at Gaulier remained small, particularly early in the morning of the 14th.
THE ATTACK TOWARD BULSON AND MAISONCELLE
As the Germans rushed forces south, the 1st Panzer Division sent units in two directions. While one group moved toward the south from La Boulette, to Chehéry, to Chémery, the other moved toward the east from La Boulette, to Bulson, to Maisoncelle. The 1st Infantry Regiment provided most of the infantry in the west, and the Gross Deutschland Regiment provided the infantry in the east.
Before the Gross Deutschland Regiment reached the area south of the Bois de la Marfée, reconnaissance patrols from the 4th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion encountered the French at Chaumont (two kilometers north of Bulson). The German patrols probably had moved along the road from Cheveuges toward Bulson. After a sharp fight, they captured numerous artillery pieces and took a “large number” of prisoners.11 To the west, other elements from the reconnaissance battalion apparently moved south along the route from La Boulette toward Chémery.
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