Though it began moving toward Gaulier around 0200 hours, the 2nd Panzer Regiment did not completely cross the Meuse with its 1st Battalion until around 0800 hours. It was the first German tank regiment across the Meuse. Recognizing the grave danger of a French counterattack, the regimental commander began sending individual companies forward as they crossed the river. He sent the 1st Battalion toward Bulson. After the 2nd Battalion crossed the Meuse, he sent it toward Chémery. By 0830 hours German tanks were engaged in heavy combat with the French near Connage, and at about the same time they were fighting French forces around Bulson.12
The arrival of the tanks came just in the nick of time for the Germans. As the French 213th Infantry Regiment and 7th Tank Battalion attacked north from Chémery, the Panzers arrived about the time they reached a line between Connage and Bulson. The attacking Frenchmen had pushed back only a few light German elements, but the tanks arrived and strengthened their fighting power only moments before the French brought their power to bear directly against the main German position. The propitious appearance of tanks had to be an extremely welcome sight to the German infantry.
After the 2nd Panzer Regiment crossed the Meuse and moved south, the 1st Regiment followed quickly with the 1/1st Panzers moving toward Chémery and the 2/1st Panzers moving toward Bulson.13 This placed a battalion from each of the Panzer regiments along the roads to Bulson and Chémery.
The 2/1st Panzers made their way across the bridge at Gaulier around 0900 hours. While still at the crossing site, the battalion commander learned that the 2nd Panzer Regiment was already in contact with French tanks. The battalion moved south along the road from Glaire, and when it reached Frénois, received the mission of attacking on the left or eastern wing of the 2nd Panzer Regiment.
Moving from Cheveuges toward Bulson, the battalion commander placed his 8th and 5th companies on the western side of the road and his 7th Company on the eastern side. When the tanks approached Bulson, they became intermingled with elements of the 2nd Panzer Regiment that were already heavily engaged. During the intense fighting, the 7th Company moved into a very favorable defensive position just as eight French tanks appeared south of Bulson. The company destroyed seven of the tanks, permitting only one to withdraw safely.14 More French tanks were destroyed by the other companies.
After the French began withdrawing from around Bulson, the German tank battalion and accompanying infantry moved closely behind the fleeing Frenchmen and attacked south toward the road between Chémery and Maisoncelle. Some of the Germans moved southwest from Bulson toward Chémery while others moved directly south toward Maisoncelle. As they approached Maisoncelle, they met additional French tanks and infantry from the 205th Infantry Regiment and 4th Tank Battalion. One of the German armor commanders described the actions of his company:
The Gross Deutschland Infantry Regiment closely followed the tanks in an excellent manner. Suddenly, reconnaissance revealed an enemy counterattack with tank support. The enemy's infantry were operating as if they were on a training exercise, and they were running directly into the fire of the company. Three enemy tanks were knocked out. The [German tank] company crossed over the road and continued attacking further toward the south. Close to the Chémery-Raucourt road east of Maisoncelle, the company occupied its position and secured the continued movement of the Gross Deutschland Regiment.
Suddenly, 10 French R-35 tanks [sic], grouped together closely in a column, appeared on the edge of Maisoncelle on the road to Raucourt. In a flash the [German tank] company opened fire with every gun tube. The enemy was completely surprised. He did not fire a single round. Three vehicles turned toward the south and, although hit, managed to escape. Four tanks remained in place, one of them burning in a fiery blaze. The last three vehicles could turn and drive back into the village. They were nevertheless so badly damaged that their crews abandoned them.15
Though the German account of the fighting against the 205th Infantry Regiment and 4th Tank Battalion differs somewhat from that of the French, the Germans had repulsed the counterattack by the French infantry regiment and tank battalion. In about four or five hours, German tanks had moved from Gaulier to Maisoncelle, apparently in one continuous movement but in reality in piecemeal fashion. In the fifteen kilometers of movement, the sharpest contacts had occurred at Chaumont, Bulson, and Maisoncelle. The Germans also captured a great deal of equipment and a large number of prisoners, including about 100 soldiers around Maisoncelle.
At the same time, their confidence and will to fight sometimes contrasted sharply with that of the French. The sharpest contrast, however, was the German willingness to attack in such a hasty and improvised manner. Their rapid advance bears little or no resemblance to the methodical technique used by the French. Trained to think in terms of a distant hasty attack, they easily overwhelmed the French, who had been trained to think only in careful, methodical terms.
THE GERMAN ATTACK TOWARD CHÉMERY
To the west of the attack toward Maisoncelle, the Germans also mounted an attack south toward Chémery. As they gathered forces together for an attack, the 1st Panzer Division kept the battalions of the 1st Infantry Regiment along the narrow neck of the penetration between La Boulette and Connage. The 1st Battalion secured La Boulette, the 2nd Battalion held Chehéry, and the companies of the 3rd Battalion spread out at Connage, Omicourt, and Chehéry. For the attack south of Connage, the division used the 14th Antitank Company and the 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion, which were later reinforced by tanks. These forces also received the brunt of the French attack, which came out of Chémery toward Chehéry.
The 14th Antitank Company of the Gross Deutschland Regiment, which was equipped with 37mm guns, crossed the Meuse during the night of 13 May with only two platoons and moved into Glaire and Villette. Though they came under heavy artillery fire during the night, they suffered little or no damage.
At dawn on the 14th, the two platoons marched to Frénois, where they were supposed to be met either by members of the regimental staff or officers from one of the battalions of the Gross Deutschland Regiment. The commander, Lieutenant Beck-Broichsitter, did not know what his mission would be, but about two kilometers south of Frénois in the curve of the road, he met the acting regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel von Schwerin, who told him his company was to assist the 1st Battalion of the regiment in seizing Bulson.16
While moving forward, however, and while only a few kilometers from where the company commander had met with the regimental commander, the company encountered General Kirchner, the commander of the 1st Panzer Division. He told Lieutenant Beck-Broichsitter that the village of Chémery was lightly defended and ordered him to take the village with his six weapons and to seize the bridge to its west. Though Beck-Broichsitter was diverting his antitank unit from a mission assigned it personally by the acting commander of the Gross Deutschland Regiment, he accepted the mission and ordered his company to move south. A reconnaissance unit accompanied them.
The 14th Antitank Company moved forward slowly. In Chehéry, aerial attacks and fighting had badly damaged the streets, and rubble from destroyed buildings partially blocked the road. While the reconnaissance vehicles easily crossed the obstacles, the antitank company experienced some difficulty and soon lost contact with the reconnaissance unit. As soon as all vehicles had crossed the obstacles, the company moved forward again.
Between 0700 and 0800 hours the company reached a point east of Connage near the location of the forwardmost company of the 3/1st Infantry. Almost immediately it came under fire from its left flank. At the same time a single French tank appeared suddenly on the unit's right in the west. Both platoons immediately went from march formation into fighting positions and quickly destroyed the enemy tank. A French horse cavalry unit—probably from the 5th Light Cavalry Division—also appeared on its eastern (left) flank from the Bois des Côtes and charged toward the antitank unit, but a single machine gun threw them into “disorder.” Moments later, more French tanks came from the south and so
uthwest of Connage. The German 37mm antitank guns could penetrate the French tanks’ armor plating only after several hits at the same point, and a few of the tanks came within 200 meters of the Germans’ fighting position before they were halted by highly accurate fire. Other French tanks attempted to go around the Germans’ flanks and attack them from the flanks and rear, but they were halted when the six guns formed a circular hedgehog position.17
Sometime around 0800 hours, a very excited German lieutenant entered the defensive position and explained that the reconnaissance unit that had been with them had come under heavy fire in Chémery and had several badly wounded men. He asked the antitank unit to move forward immediately, but the commander of the 14th Company refused his request. Beck-Broichsitter recognized that moving the antitank platoons toward Chémery placed them in danger of being destroyed and thereby opening a path directly into Bellevue and the German bridgehead. He decided that the two platoons would remain in position east of Connage.
The arrival of elements from the 2nd Panzer Regiment between 0830 and 1000 hours provided much-needed relief. With the 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion acting as infantry, the Germans soon moved forward of the antitank company's position and attacked toward Chémery. The antitank company supported the attacking force by destroying French tanks and machine guns.
When the Germans entered the village, according to the daily log of the 1st Panzer Division, “Both sides fought tenaciously.”18 Despite strong French resistance and a counterattack, the Germans drove them out of Chémery around 1100 hours. Though German tanks provided much-needed assistance, the key effort had come from an antitank company and an assault engineer battalion. The 14th Antitank Company later reported that it had destroyed forty-four French tanks in the fighting around Connage and Chémery and had not lost a single soldier. While the reported number of tanks destroyed is probably double the actual number, the performance of the antitank unit had been superb.
After the seizure of Chémery, the 14th Company assembled north of the village and then moved east toward Maisoncelle. As the company began moving, a German Stuka aircraft attacked Chémery, wounding several soldiers of the antitank company and killing the battalion commander of the 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion. The aerial attack also killed several officers from the 2nd Panzer Regiment of the 1st Panzer Division and seriously wounded the commander of the Armor Brigade.19 The German Air Force had evidently not been informed about the seizure of Chémery. The loss of these key leaders, however, did not immediately affect the attack. Lieutenant Colonel Nedtwig, who had commanded the 1st Panzer Regiment, replaced Colonel Keltsch as the commander of the 1st Armor Brigade, and Lieutenant Colonel Dittman assumed command of Nedtwig's old unit, the 1st Panzer Regiment.
Even before the decision was made about pivoting the XIXth Corps to the west, the 1st Panzer Division prepared to move west. On the morning of the 14th the objective of the day for the 1st Infantry Brigade was Singly, about twelve kilometers west-northwest of Chémery. After capturing Chémery around 1100 hours, the 1/2nd Panzers sent its 2nd Company toward the bridge across the Ardennes Canal at Malmy around 1130 hours. The Germans recognized the importance of the bridge across the Ardennes Canal between Chémery and Malmy if they were to move west and quickly secured it. They also sent a small force toward Vendresse (five kilometers west of Chémery), but it did not succeed in capturing the town. The daily log of the 1st Panzer Division concisely summarized the action: “An advance against Vendresse is beaten back by the enemy. Strong antitank and enemy tank forces there.”20
Almost simultaneously, the division began moving units from the Maisoncelle area toward the west. At Maisoncelle the 2/1st Panzers remained in position for some time, but early in the afternoon the battalion received orders to move west and reached Malmy (one kilometer west of Chémery) around 1400 hours. At 1500 hours it received orders to attack north of the road from Malmy to Vendresse.21 There it encountered strong French resistance.
If the division was going to continue west, it would have to fight its way through this new line of French defenders.
THE 2ND PANZER DIVISION MOVES WEST
Elements from the 2nd and 10th Panzer divisions moved much more slowly toward the south than the 1st Panzer Division. Most especially, the 2nd Panzer Division continued to have difficulties getting troops and equipment across the river near Donchery. When General Guderian, the XIXth Corps commander, learned early on the 14th that the French were sending reinforcements toward Sedan, he ordered the 2nd Panzer Brigade of the 2nd Panzer Division to follow the tanks of the 1st Panzer Division across the bridge at Gaulier. He later explained that he wanted to provide “sufficient armor” to meet the anticipated French attack.22
After crossing the Meuse at 1013 hours, the tanks of the 2nd Division moved west along the Meuse River. Assisted by infantry, the 2/4th Panzers seized the bridge over the Ardennes Canal at Pont à Bar at 1135 hours.23 As the bridge was being repaired by engineers from the 38th Armored Engineer Battalion, the tanks crossed over the canal and then turned south, clearing Hannogne (two kilometers south of the Pont à Bar bridge) two hours later. After moving quickly through Hannogne, the tanks continued southwest several kilometers along the road and moved northwest, one column turning midway between Hannogne and Sapogne and another turning at Sapogne. They continued northwest until they reached Boutancourt (about three kilometers northwest of Sapogne). Then they turned east and cleared Dom-le-Mesnil (about two kilometers west of Pont à Bar) around 1800 hours.24
In short, the tanks headed south from the bridge at Pont à Bar and then turned in a wide circle until they cleared a wide area south of the Meuse River and west of the Ardennes Canal. Other tanks from the 2nd Panzer Division turned south before they reached the bridge over the Ardennes Canal and headed toward St. Aignan (five kilometers south of Pont à Bar). On the afternoon of the 14th, the 2nd Panzer Division thus cleared an area about six kilometers wide and five kilometers deep on the southern bank of the Meuse. By gaining control over this terrain, the Panzer division protected the western flank of the penetration made by the 1st Infantry Regiment at La Boulette and facilitated the crossing of the remainder of the division at Donchery. The main difference between the French and German accounts of the attack was that the French claimed the Germans had moved west toward Dom-le-Mesnil at the same time that they headed south toward Hannogne.
As the area on the southern bank of the Meuse over which the 2nd Division had control expanded, the effectiveness of French artillery decreased. At 0900 hours on the 14th (before its tanks crossed the Meuse), the division finally was able to begin construction of a bridge at Donchery, but French artillery fire from Mézières and aerial attacks continued to disrupt work at the crossing site.25
As night fell on the 14th, the 2nd Panzer Division occupied a line running between Flize (five kilometers west of Pont à Bar), Boutancourt, Sapogne, and St. Aignan. The successful crossing of the river and the establishment of a bridgehead, however, was tempered by the division's not having moved as far south and west as initially planned for that day. The day's objective had been for the division to occupy Boulzicourt (ten kilometers west of Pont à Bar) and Singly (eleven kilometers southwest of Pont à Bar).26 Though not meeting the expectations of Guderian, the division had at least gotten across the Meuse. How far it would move on the 15th greatly depended on when the bridge at Donchery could be completed.
THE 10TH PANZER DIVISION MOVES SOUTH
Though the 10th Panzer Division had crossed the Meuse on the afternoon of the 13th with the 1/86th Infantry crossing near the Pont du Bouillonais and the 2/69th Infantry crossing near Wadelincourt, it encountered great difficulty breaking through the enemy's defenses at Noyers and the French cemetery. The terrain occupied by the French dominated the surrounding area, and their defense was much stronger and more spirited than that in other centers of resistance. Throughout the night, the 10th Division channeled small forces forward and tried to expand its two bridgeheads, but the French could not be f
orced out of their strong position overlooking the crossing sites. The efforts of the German division were partially hampered by its having only two light artillery battalions to provide fire support,27 its heavy artillery battalion having been attached to the 1st Panzer Division.
While pushing hard against Noyers and the French cemetery, the 10th Panzer Division continued its efforts to construct a bridge at Wadelincourt. Finally, around 0545 hours on the 14th, the bridge was completed, but traffic did not flow smoothly. From their position on the heights of Noyers and the French cemetery, the French could place small-arms fire into the area around the crossing site. Also, several times in the morning, “technical difficulties” of an unknown nature but perhaps caused by Allied aerial attacks forced the Germans to suspend using the bridge.28 Because of these “technical difficulties,” only one Panzer regiment got across the Meuse on the 14th; the 7th Panzer Regiment did not finish crossing until the early morning hours of the 15th.
After the bridge was completed at 0545 hours on the 14th, the Germans moved more forces across the river and began making stronger attacks against the entrenched French positions. But they still had relatively few forces across the river. The attacking forces consisted primarily of the 2/69th Infantry and the 1/86th Infantry, as well as an attached company from the 8th Panzer Regiment. Because of the strong French resistance at Noyers, however, they did not capture the high ground overlooking the Meuse until around 1300 hours.29 Among other reasons for their having finally surrendered, the movement of the Gross Deutschland Regiment to the rear of the French defenders at Noyers apparently weakened their will to fight.
The Breaking Point Page 27
