After capturing the high ground overlooking Wadelincourt, the 10th Panzer Division continued its attack south, but it still had only two infantry battalions across the Meuse. The XIXth Corps had not provided guidance about subsequent operations, but had assigned the 10th Panzer the initial objective of capturing the high ground east of Bulson around the Beau Ménil farm at Hill 257. This high ground lay about three kilometers south of Noyers and two kilometers northeast of Bulson. By late afternoon on the 14th and after much hard fighting, the division captured this high ground.30
The forward elements of the 8th Panzer Regiment moved as far south as Hill 320, about 500 meters southeast of Bulson. Major General Schaal, the division commander, moved forward in his radio command car to the position of his leading armored elements, and had the 8th Panzer Regiment continue the attack toward an objective southeast of Maisoncelle. Since he had not received instructions about objectives beyond Maisoncelle, he requested additional instructions at 1700 hours by radio from corps headquarters. After receiving no further instructions by 1800 hours, he again requested information from the XIXth Corps but still received no additional instructions.31 As darkness approached, the division commander did not know whether his division would be moving south toward Stonne or pivoting to the west.
The two alternatives of either moving south or pivoting to the west were given to General Schaal long before the German attack into Luxembourg. The reasoning underlying the choices was obvious. If a significant threat against the bridgehead appeared from the south, the 10th Division would defend along the high ground, which included Stonne and Mont Dieu. If not, the division would pivot west with the two other Panzer divisions in the corps, and follow-on forces would secure the high ground.
As Schaal sought additional information late on the 14th, his division continued to experience grave difficulties in crossing the Meuse. Beginning around 0800 hours on that day, the Allies had launched eight waves of aerial attacks against the bridge at Wadelincourt. One German antiaircraft battery claimed it shot down twenty-one enemy aircraft. Though delaying some crossings, the attacks did not halt movement across the bridge. Nevertheless, German troops and vehicles moved extremely slowly across the bridge, which continued to experience “technical difficulties” of an unknown nature. For most of the day, the 10th Panzer Division had only two infantry battalions and the 8th Panzer Regiment available on the west bank of the river. The arrival of the 7th Panzer Regiment was delayed even more because technical difficulties with bridging caused the regiment to take from 1500 hours on the 14th until 0200 hours on the 15th to cross the Meuse. Despite these difficulties, General Schaal apparently received an order from XIXth Corps headquarters sometime late on the 14th for his division to move west with the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions.32
Around 1800 hours on the 14th, the division operations officer arrived unexpectedly from the division command post in eastern Sedan. He flew to Maisoncelle in a light Fieseler-Storch aircraft and met with the division commander, who immediately sent him to corps headquarters to obtain additional information about the subsequent direction of attack for the division. The rest of the division staff did not enter Bulson until much later that night, around 0230 hours.
When the operations officer arrived at the corps command post, he received instructions for the 10th Panzer Division to capture the heights of Stonne by attacking southeast toward La Besace (six kilometers southeast of Maisoncelle) and then attacking southwest toward Stonne (five kilometers south of Maisoncelle). Around midnight, he returned to the division command post at Bulson with the new order. The Gross Deutschland Regiment, which was supposedly attacking toward Mont Dieu (seven kilometers southwest of Maisoncelle) but whose situation and exact location were unknown to the 10th Panzers, was attached to the division for the operation, as was the 1/37th Artillery. Though the information received by the operations officer differed from what the division commander had earlier been told, it clearly was what the XIXth Corps wanted the division to accomplish.
In the early morning hours of the 15th, General Schaal tried to communicate by radio with the Gross Deutschland Regiment but could not make contact. Lacking any knowledge about the situation of that regiment, he ordered the Armor Brigade to advance at night with weak elements toward La Besace and Stonne.33 He saw no reason to rush forward brashly with his entire division when the situation to his front and west remained unclear.
As it began moving forward cautiously, the 10th Panzer Division recognized that significant French forces still remained to its rear. Its daily log notes, “The line of bunkers on the south bank of the Meuse from Pont Maugis to the southeast has not yet been attacked and is still capable of fighting. However, the division is counting on the defenders surrendering to an attack by relatively weak forces in light of the successful breakthrough.”34 In truth, the 10th Division still had little more than “relatively weak forces” across the Meuse.
Thus neither the 2nd nor the 10th Panzer Division had encountered the same degree of success as the 1st Panzer Division. Both divisions still had significant forces on the northern bank of the Meuse, and the 2nd Division had failed to reach the day's objective assigned it by corps headquarters. The change in mission from pivoting to the west with the other divisions to moving south and occupying the heights around Mont Dieu-Stonne probably occurred because the 2nd and 10th divisions had failed to get the bulk of their forces across the Meuse quickly. As will be explained, the decision also was influenced by discussions between Panzer Group von Kleist and the Twelfth Army about halting the XIXth Corps and consolidating the bridgehead until additional follow-on forces were on hand.
TURNING THE XIXTH CORPS TO THE WEST
After the 1st and 10th Panzer divisions reached Chémery and Maisoncelle, the German commanders had to make a difficult decision about pivoting toward the west. Beginning with initial discussions before 10 May about the operation, the Germans had recognized the difficulty of turning to the west, but they had not been able to complete detailed planning about the turn, because they knew they could not anticipate the precise timing or conditions for the pivot. The general concept, however, was to use the Gross Deutschland Regiment and/or the 10th Panzer Division to protect the flank of the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions as the corps turned west.
Though there were some doubts in the minds of his superiors, Guderian clearly was prepared to pivot his corps to the west and continue to advance. The daily log of the 1st Panzer Division included the order given by corps to the division for the 14th: “Attack to Chémery—Maisoncelle…. Pivot at Vendresse toward Rethel while being covered along the southern flank by the Gross Deutschland Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of Stonne.”35 On the afternoon of the 14th, however, doubts began to appear about the ability of the corps to pivot without leaving additional infantry to cover its flank.
The doubts came from a series of reports about the enemy situation and about the condition of subordinate units in the division. Among these reports was one from the Armor Brigade of the 1st Panzer Division informing the headquarters that the French were attacking the crossing site at Malmy on the Ardennes Canal and that it could not hold the crossing site at Malmy without additional infantry support.
The daily log of the division includes the following entry:
Vendresse is bitterly contested. Because the enemy is reinforcing the forces at Vendresse more and more, and [because] he is apparently getting ready to conduct a counterattack, the 2/1st Infantry is attached to the [Armor] Brigade. The Armor Brigade reports that it is practically out of ammunition and fuel. Reconnaissance employed against the Bois du Mont Dieu [to the south of Chémery] encounters strong enemy forces along the northern edge of the woods and reports that advance into the woods is not possible.36
A later report added:
The Armor Brigade reports heavy casualties and losses in personnel and materiel. Many officers have been killed or wounded. Only a quarter of the tanks can still be counted on to be combat ready. The lack of ammunition and fuel makes itse
lf particularly noticeable.37
Considering the condition of the 1st Panzer Division, it is indeed remarkable that the division could even conceive of possibly pivoting toward the west, but its daily log included an analysis of the problem.
The leadership of the division is faced with the problem of whether to remain with the mission and pivot to the west without regard to the threat from the woods north and west of Stonne, or whether the enemy should first be beaten there before pivoting toward the west. The decision is difficult.
If the division pivots immediately, it would offer its flank and rear to the enemy. Relief by the 10th Panzer Division…could not be expected. Is the Gross Deutschland Infantry Regiment strong enough to defend against the expected attack of the French in the coming night and in the next few days? At this moment, the [Gross Deutschland] Regiment is heavily engaged, has attacked the entire day, and had been involved in the previous night in heavy combat for bunkers. Thrown forward after a long march to Sedan, it has not had any rest, and its losses are considerable.
On the other hand, the entire plan is at stake. Looking at it from the larger perspective, the division has to pivot to the west whenever any opportunity to do that presents itself. The enemy is beaten. He has withdrawn, sometimes almost in a rout. The counterattacks which have been conducted at different places in a disorganized manner—even though bitterly contested—prove that we still are not dealing with a unified counter-action of any great design. A new operation plan is necessary for the French.
Whenever one considers the methodical slowness in the execution of their plans, the possibility exists that the Gross Deutschland Infantry Regiment could hold out [in Stonne and Mont Dieu] against the present pressure as long as necessary until our leadership or the neighboring division brings forward new forces to strengthen the sector. It remains clear, however, that whenever the thrust to the west is executed, it must be with the bulk of the division. Despite the threat to the flank, there must be no frittering away of forces by [taking] strong action in the south and at the same time [conducting] an attack to the west with portions of the forces.
Based on the overall situation and trusting in the slowness of the French movements, the division therefore decides to pivot to the west with the bulk of its forces in order to initiate a further advance the next morning.38
Thus the division believed that despite its precarious position, the best course of action was to pivot and to move toward the west without leaving significant forces on its flank.
Although entries in the daily log of the 1st Panzer Division suggest that the decision about the pivot essentially was made by the division with little or no influence from the XIXth Corps, General Guderian played the most important role in the decision about making the pivot to the west. In his memoirs, he explained that he met with the division commander (General Kirchner) and the operations officer (Major Wenck) of the division and asked them whether the entire division could be turned to the west or whether a force had to be left facing south to protect the flank of the division. During their discussion in Chémery, only a few kilometers from the heavy fighting at Vendresse, Major Wenck used Guderian's own expressions about the proper way to employ armored forces to argue that the division should remain concentrated and should not be split into smaller groupings. Guderian apparently recognized the logic of the argument presented to him and issued orders immediately for the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions to change directions. The XIXth Panzer Corps was going to move west and break through the remaining French defenses.39
The second part of Guderian's decision concerned protection of the corps’ flank. Could the Gross Deutschland Regiment accomplish this mission alone, or did both the Gross Deutschland Regiment and the 10th Panzer Division, as well as elements from the 1st Panzer Division, have to be used in the mission? Apparently being concerned about the slowness of the 10th Panzer Division's crossing of the Meuse and of the movement toward Mont Dieu and Stonne by a French armored division and motorized division, Guderian decided a single regiment could not protect his corps’ flank. The Gross Deutschland Regiment was released from the 1st Panzer Division and attached to the 10th Panzer Division, which was charged with holding the corps’ flank until relieved by follow-on forces. Additionally, the 4th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion from the 1st Panzer Division remained behind.
The decision to pivot with the bulk of the German forces signaled the beginning of a new phase in the campaign. Because of the growing threat against its flank, the XIXth Corps would leave one division and a regiment to protect the bridgehead, but it would move west as far and as fast as it could with the remainder of its forces. While the 1st Panzer Division supported the concept of pivoting with virtually all its forces, corps headquarters pushed the division to move deep into the enemy's position—perhaps more deeply and quickly than the division preferred. For the 14th, the XIXth Corps wanted the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions to reach Singly (thirteen kilometers west of Chémery), and for the 15th, it wanted them to reach a point north of Rethel (thirty kilometers southwest of Singly). To the exhausted soldiers of the 1st Panzer Division, this distance must have appeared phenomenally far.
Considering the corps’ overall situation, the decision by Guderian to continue as planned was indeed remarkable. From the moment when three of the six main crossings failed, to the moment when corps headquarters recognized that neither the 2nd nor the 10th divisions had gotten most of their forces across the Meuse and that the 2nd Division had failed to seize the day's objective for the 14th, Guderian had to be especially nervous about the risk he was taking in charging full speed ahead toward the west. Despite the successes of the day, the corps was not in as strong a position as expected by Guderian and continued reports about the French massing troops to the south of the German forces had to increase his anxiety. The delay in providing a subsequent mission to the 10th Panzer Division and then the changing of this mission highlight the perplexity of the problem facing German leaders.
To complicate matters further, Guderian became embroiled in a debate late on the 14th with von Kleist about continuing the attack on the 15th. Von Kleist's primary concern was securing the bridgehead over the Meuse against an expected French counterattack. Part of his concern may have stemmed from his awareness that his superiors at the Twelfth Army and Army Group A were not fully informed about the difficulty of the crossing. At 2040 hours on the 13th, he confidently reported to Army Group A that all three of the divisions in the XIXth Panzer Corps had crossed the Meuse River and that on the 14th stronger forces would be pushed across the Ardennes Canal. Since his message did not mention the desperate struggles of the 2nd and 10th Panzer divisions to cross the river, his superiors initially may not have understood how vulnerable the bridgehead was.40
With reports coming in on the night of the 14–15th about French tanks moving up from the south, von Kleist wanted the XIXth Panzer Corps to delay pivoting to the west until after follow-on infantry arrived to reinforce the bridgehead. He wanted the corps to halt along a line between Poix-Terron and Bouvellemont, which was about ten kilometers west of Vendresse. Guderian was incensed and believed his commander was forfeiting his corps’ hard-won gains. In perhaps the sharpest exchange of the entire campaign, Guderian called von Kleist and argued that the time was ripe to strike deep into French positions. Von Kleist finally relented and granted Guderian permission to continue westward. Later that night, Guderian called again and complained about “faint-hearted higher headquarters.”41
From their positions far in the rear, the Twelfth Army and Army Group A were thinking in more conservative terms than Guderian or von Kleist. Lacking the same degree of confidence as Guderian and the 1st Panzer Division in the “slowness” of French movements, they considered the primary task of the XIXth Corps to be the securing of the heights around Stonne and the forest of the Bois du Mont Dieu, and thereby protecting the bridgehead that had been seized at Sedan. After learning that only five battalions from the XIXth Corps were across the river, t
he Twelfth Army wanted additional forces to cross the river and consolidate the German gains before the leading elements plunged ahead. In its order of the day for the 14th, the Twelfth Army commander explained the intentions of the German High Command; Group von Kleist was supposed “to move strong forces over the Meuse and then to execute an attack in a westerly direction.”42 The desire of German Army leaders to build up forces on the French side of the Meuse before another attack began could not have been clearer.
With little regard for the reservations of his superiors, Guderian sent out a message to his subordinate commanders confirming the following day's objectives. For the 15th, he wanted the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions to move about thirty kilometers toward the southwest and reach Rethel. Around midnight, von Kleist sent a message formally approving the XIXth Panzer Corps’ moving toward Rethel.43
Guderian was thinking in far broader and deeper terms than anyone in the chain of command above him, and his decision—with von Kleist's reluctant concurrence—to leave large but nevertheless minimum forces on the southern flank, pivot west, and then drive deep into French territory included a degree of risk that was undoubtedly unsettling to higher-level German commanders. In reality, they probably did not know a great deal about the detailed situation of the corps. If the Twelfth Army, Army Group A, or the High Command in Berlin had been better informed, particularly about the condition of the 1st Panzer Division and the degree of risk involved, their fears would have been much greater, and they undoubtedly would have ordered Guderian to halt.
Because of the debate over the XIXth Corps’ continuing westward, some confusion existed in corps headquarters and in the subordinate divisions on the night of the 14–15th. Consequently, the 10th Panzer Division did not immediately get the word about holding Mont Dieu and Stonne while the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions pivoted to the west. As mentioned earlier, the commanding general of the 10th Panzer Division radioed the corps headquarters at 1700 and again at 1800 for additional instructions. Eventually he received a message indicating the division would pivot west, but this mission was later changed. Not until the division operations officer visited corps headquarters and received orders for the division to continue toward Stonne and Mont Dieu, did the 10th Division learn what it was actually supposed to do on the 15th.
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