The German tactic was to use the band of hills to the south to protect their flank but at the same time to break through the hills and continue moving west. To accomplish this, the 1st Panzer Division organized its forces into two battle groups. With most of its forces already being located near Omicourt, Battle Group Krüger, which was commanded by the commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade, was supposed to move from Omicourt, through the Forêt de Mazarin, to Singly, a straight-line advance of about nine kilometers. Battle Group Nedtwig, which was commanded by the newly installed commander of the 1st Armor Brigade, was supposed to move from Chémery, through Vendresse and the hill mass to its rear, to Singly, which is about seven kilometers northwest of Vendresse. Battle Group Krüger had the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 1st Infantry Regiment, reinforced by at least one Panzer company, while Battle Group Nedtwig had the four battalions of the two Panzer regiments, plus the 2/1st Infantry, which was attached later to the Armor Brigade.
Battle Group Nedtwig (1st Armor Brigade) encountered heavy resistance around Vendresse. The first advance early in the afternoon toward the village by the tank-heavy force was “beaten back” by “strong antitank and enemy tank forces.” During the intense fighting around Vendresse the armored battalions used up most of their ammunition. In the middle of the afternoon, the French again attacked the crossing site at Malmy, and subsequent intelligence reports convinced the Germans that they were preparing to launch a counterattack against Vendresse. As mentioned earlier, the possibility of another French counterattack led the 1st Panzer Division to attach the 2/1st Infantry to Battle Group Nedtwig.64 Using the infantry battalion on its northern flank near the Forêt de Mazarin, the battle group fought for control of the village. At 1700 hours division headquarters received a report saying that the enemy resistance at Vendresse had been broken and that an advance was possible.65
At 1930 hours, however, the Panzers had advanced no further than the outskirts of Vendresse. Losing “many officers” and having only a quarter of its tanks “combat ready” clearly weakened the ability and will of the armor forces to move forward aggressively. Losses of senior personnel had been particularly severe in the 2nd Panzer Regiment, and these losses clearly affected its combat effectiveness.
At the same time, some confusion existed at higher headquarters about the situation west of Chémery. Around 1830 hours the division received a message from corps prohibiting the crossing of the Ardennes Canal until 2030 hours because of a planned air attack against Vendresse and Omont.66 By the time the order arrived, the division had had forces across the Ardennes Canal for about six hours. Fortunately, the Germans managed to prevent the Stukas from attacking their own armored forces and again inflicting significant damage on the Armor Brigade.
To the north of Vendresse, Battle Group Krüger (1st Infantry Brigade), which included the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 1st Infantry Regiment and perhaps a few tanks from the 2nd Panzer Regiment, advanced quickly and easily through the Forêt de Mazarin. By 2200 hours the advance guard of the German infantry reached Singly, even though Battle Group Nedtwig had not advanced beyond Vendresse. With Colonel Balck (the commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment) accompanying them, the 3/1st Infantry and elements from the 37th Antitank Battalion occupied Singly at 2300 hours. Shortly thereafter, the 1/1st Infantry occupied Villers-le-Tilleul (two kilometers east of Singly).67 With apparently very little artillery and armor support, the infantry had moved seven kilometers ahead of the tanks and had bypassed the French defenders west of Vendresse.
The daily log for the 1st Panzer Division includes the following entry: “If May 13, 1940, were to be considered the main fighting day for the infantry, then the 14th of May was the main day for the tanks. Despite considerable and unbroken counterattacks by the French, relentlessly led by infantry and tanks, the division was successful in not only maintaining the area reached on the 13th, but also in expanding it.”68 While one cannot denigrate the important contribution made by the tanks in repulsing the French counterattacks north of Chémery and Maisoncelle, one also cannot overlook the vital role played by the 14th Antitank Company, the 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion, and the 1st Infantry Regiment. The combined forces of the antitank company and the engineers blocked the French advance north of Connage until the tanks arrived, and with armor support, they led the attack against Chémery. Similarly, the 1st Infantry Regiment permitted the division to pivot successfully to the west when it moved through the Forêt de Mazarin and seized Singly. This deep thrust bypassed the French resistance and greatly enlarged the penetration made by the Germans. Without the seizure of Singly, the attack by the 1st Panzer Division may have faltered at this crucially important moment.
The 14th of May may have been the day of the tanks, but it was also the day of the tanks operating in close combination with the infantry, engineers, and antitank forces. Without the contributions of all these arms, the Germans may have been halted by the bitter opposition around Chémery and Vendresse and may not have made the pivot successfully. Success had come from the use of combined arms, not simply from the tanks.
THE BREAKOUT: ADVANCING TOWARD RETHEL
After Battle Group Krüger reached Singly, the night of the 14–15th passed quietly. Some time during the night, corps headquarters decided that the day's objective for the 1st Panzer Division on the 15th would be just north of Rethel (eighteen kilometers southwest of Singly). To get to Rethel, the division had to cross the line of hills running south of Chémery, Vendresse, and Singly.
On the morning of the 15th, the Germans planned on attacking at 0445 hours, but corps headquarters delayed the attack until 0545 hours. Continued difficulties with the bringing forward of heavy weapons and artillery delayed the attack further. When the attacks finally began, the main thrust of Battle Group Krüger went against La Horgne (three kilometers southwest of Singly), and the main thrust of Battle Group Nedtwig went against Chagny (seven kilometers southwest of Vendresse). The Germans had to break through the line of hills to their front if they were to reach Rethel by the end of the day.
Despite the gains made by the Germans on the 13th and 14th, the 15th included some of the heaviest fighting of the entire campaign for the 1st Panzer Division. Among the key events of the day, the infantry with Battle Group Krüger struggled to force its way through determined French resistance at La Horgne. If the 1st Panzer Division was going to open a way for itself through the hills south of Singly, it had to defeat the French at La Horgne.
When the German infantry initially moved against La Horgne, the attack encountered fortified French positions, and German leaders shifted the attack toward the north, evidently intending to bypass the strong enemy defenses. There they found less resistance, but they drifted into the zone of the 2nd Panzer Division. With elements from this division, they managed to push aside the French, but they were soon ordered back to the south.
During the subsequent fighting at La Horgne, the 1st Infantry Regiment was stopped by enemy fire for the first time in the campaign. After the attack halted, Lieutenant Colonel Balck moved forward to survey the situation and to encourage his men. When he appeared at the entrance to the village on the front line, his soldiers renewed their attack and managed to enter the first few houses in the village. Then they were pinned down again.69
According to Balck's regimental adjutant, the second halting of the attack provoked a “crisis,” but Balck restored calm and morale with his personal presence. Determined not to let the attack halt completely, he sent a battalion around the rear of the defenders and, accompanying it, managed finally to enter the village and capture its defenders. Balck's personal courage and example had been the key to his regiment's success.70
After the resistance in La Horgne collapsed late in the afternoon, Battle Group Krüger (1st Infantry Brigade) concentrated on forcing its way through the hills south of Singly by attacking along the road from Villers-le-Tilleul (two kilometers east of Singly), to Baâlons, to Bouvellemont. The soldiers of the 1st Infantry Regiment soon e
ncountered enemy resistance in the heights alongside the road that leads to Baâlons, but overcame the small French forces fairly quickly.
As they moved down the slope of the hills, Lieutenant Colonel Balck ordered his 3rd Battalion to clean out Baâlons, while the 1st Battalion bypassed that small village and attacked Bouvellemont about one kilometer to the south. Having received intelligence reports saying that Bouvellemont was occupied by strong French forces, the brigade commander placed artillery and heavy weapons in support of the 1st Battalion and ordered the attack to begin. After days of hard fighting, however, the German soldiers were exhausted. The infantry companies had lost many men, including most of their officers. Despite the exhaustion of his men, Balck's personal example again propelled his soldiers forward.71
While daylight was still available, the 1st Battalion fought its way through the French village. The daily log of the 1st Panzer Division notes, “After an hour and a half of fighting by companies leapfrogging through its houses and gardens, Bouvellemont was taken.”72
In the meantime, the Panzer forces under Battle Group Nedtwig had not met success. With Battle Group Krüger on its right (west), the armor-heavy forces moved southwest along the road from Vendresse, to Omont, to Chagny. If they reached Chagny, they could break through the line of hills southwest of Vendresse. But they could not force the French out of Chagny and the high ground to its rear. Because of intelligence reports about enemy forces massing to the south, Lieutenant Colonel Nedtwig retained large reserves and did not commit all his forces, which as mentioned earlier had been seriously weakened by the fighting on the 14th. The reports of enemy activity also led division headquarters to move two engineer companies to the south of Vendresse for securing the division's flank. With significant forces remaining uncommitted and perhaps weakened from the previous day's losses, the tanks could not fight their way through the rugged terrain south of Omont.
Recognizing that the tanks could not punch their way through the French defenses, Nedtwig attempted to bypass the enemy's positions by moving his infantry around their flank, but when an enemy counterattack threatened to envelop the 2/1st Infantry, he withdrew his entire force to the southern edge of Omont. There he established a defensive position oriented toward the southwest for the night.73 In contrast to the success of the infantry of the 1st Panzer Division on the 15th, the tanks had achieved very little. They had moved only a few kilometers on the 15th and were far from the day's objective.
As had occurred on the Meuse and at Vendresse, however, the infantry opened the way for the tanks. By capturing Baâlons and Bouvellemont, the 1st Infantry Regiment broke through the hill line to the front of the 1st Panzer Division and enabled the Armor Brigade to advance. By breaking through at Bouvellemont, the German infantry convinced the French to withdraw and occupy another position in the rear. This withdrawal permitted the German tanks to resume their advance.
Guderian appreciated the superb performance of the German infantry and visited the 1st Infantry Regiment early on the morning of the 16th. He described his meeting with the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Balck, who later assumed command of the Armor Brigade after Colonel Nedtwig collapsed from exhaustion.
The troops were over-tired, having had no real rest since the 9th of May. Ammunition was running low. The men in the front line were falling asleep in their slit trenches. Balck himself, in wind jacket and with a knotty stick in his hand, told me that the capture of the village [of Bouvellemont] had only succeeded because, when his officers complained against the continuation of the attack, he had replied: “In that case I'll take the place on my own!” and had moved off. His men had thereupon followed him. His dirty face and his red-rimmed eyes showed that he had spent a hard day and a sleepless night. For his doings on that day he was to receive the Knight's Cross. His opponents…had fought bravely.74
Though events on the 15th suggest that the French may have had an opportunity on the 16th to slow the advance of the 1st Panzer Division, an important opening for German forces appeared on the morning of 16 May after the French pulled back from their defensive position along the hill line south of Vendresse. The French had been able to halt the armor-heavy forces of Battle Group Nedtwig, but they had not been successful in halting the infantry-heavy forces of Battle Group Krüger or in delaying the advance of the 2nd Panzer Division, which was farther to the north and west.
The daily log of the 1st Panzer Division described the events of the night of 15–16 and the morning of 16 May.
The battle groups established contact with one another during the night, reorganized and set up security. Reconnaissance troops from Battle Group Krüger stayed with the enemy; Battle Group Nedtwig reported no contact. The order to move out onto the dictated avenues of advance at 0700 hours arrived early by radio. According to reports by the battle groups, the soldiers are extremely tired. The day and the night were very difficult. The French fought bravely and toughly.
Reconnaissance initiated during the night report Louvergny and Sauville along the southern flank free of the enemy. Reconnaissance carried out in the early morning hours at Chagny reports this village unoccupied. The penetration of Battle Group Krüger and the capture of Bouvellemont appear to have had their effect. Now it is important to thrust forward without consideration of casualties and exhaustion before the French have had the opportunity to set up again.
There is no time for half-stepping now.75
THE EXPLOITATION
Army commanders above Guderian remained concerned about sustaining the breakthrough and parrying an anticipated French counterattack. Late on the 15th, the Twelfth Army completed its order giving missions for the 16th. The order directed Panzer Group von Kleist to “expand” the bridgehead and then “under all circumstances to halt.” The Twelfth Army wanted von Kleist to “arrange” his forces to “counter an eventual counterattack by strong enemy forces.”76 In his order for the 16th, however, von Kleist said, “Group von Kleist continues advancing in a westerly direction.”77 According to Guderian, von Kleist approved continuing the advance only after a “heated” conversation. But the approval late on the 15th was only for another twenty-four hours so additional space could be acquired for the infantry units following the XIXth Panzer Corps.78
As he had done throughout the campaign, Guderian moved as far forward on the 16th as he could. He, too, was convinced that there was no need for “half-stepping.” Better than the commanders above him, he sensed the end was near.
But he also ignored the directive from von Kleist about moving forward for only twenty-four hours. Late on the 16th, he sent out orders by radio to continue the advance on the following day, and his orders were monitored by a German radio intercept unit and reported to von Kleist. The XIXth Corps immediately received the order to halt in place and for Guderian to meet with the Panzer Group commander on the following morning.79
According to Guderian, he met General von Kleist at an airstrip very early on the following morning. When Guderian's boss arrived, he sharply reprimanded the impetuous corps commander for having disobeyed orders on several occasions. Refusing to accept the reprimand docilely, an angry Guderian immediately submitted his resignation. Much to Guderian's staff's surprise, von Kleist accepted it.80
Though Guderian assumed his corps had been halted so he could be reprimanded by von Kleist, commanders above von Kleist had ordered the halt. During an interview by B. H. Liddell Hart after the war, von Kleist observed that his forces were halted on the 17th for a day, apparently because Hitler feared an attack into the corps’ left flank.81 Time was also needed to move forward the field armies to the rear of the Panzer Group and to strengthen the extended flank that had opened up between Guderian's leading elements and the bridgehead at Sedan. The commander of Army Group A, General von Rundstedt, was particularly concerned about threats to this weakly defended flank.82
Immediately after Guderian's rash resignation, the commander of the Twelfth Army traveled to the XIXth Corps and informed the angry corps c
ommander that his resignation would not be accepted. He also informed him that Army Group A had approved the launching of a “reconnaissance in force.” Guderian recognized that this approval could be manipulated and used to enable him to do as he wished, and his Panzers were soon advancing aggressively toward the west. To prevent other interference from his superiors, however, Guderian had a communications line laid from his main corps headquarters to his advanced command post.83 His orders would no longer be monitored by higher headquarters.
CHAPTER 8
The “Counterattack” by the 55th Division
As the Germans poured forces across the Meuse River and energetically expanded their bridgehead, the French sought to slow or halt the enemy's advance and then to counterattack. The first of these counterattacks came under the control of the 55th Division and included two infantry regiments and two tank battalions.
ASSESSING THE SITUATION
As the Germans fought their way through the 55th Division on the evening of the 13th, General Lafontaine had some information about developments in the Sedan sector, but all in all, he was poorly informed. Part of the problem of inadequate information stemmed from the lack of information being provided to the regimental commanders. With many of the communications lines broken, company and battalion commanders encountered significant difficulties sending information to their higher headquarters and had to rely on runners. The destruction of the division headquarters’ radio antenna by an aerial attack further crippled communications within the division, but the problem was exacerbated by a steadfast refusal to permit use of the few radios that were functioning and available. The reason for this refusal is not at all clear, except for an excessive concern about the German ability to monitor radio transmissions.
But the coup de grace to tight control over the division came from the panicked actions of a switchboard operator in the division command post. Around 1900 hours on the 13th, after the Xth Corps gave the 55th Division responsibility for conducting a counterattack with an infantry regiment and a tank battalion, General Lafontaine moved his command post from the large bunker at Fond Dagot to a private home in Chémery where it would be in a better position to control the counterattack. Though it is not clear whether Lafontaine requested permission to move his command post or was ordered to move it by the corps commander, individual soldiers around the headquarters apparently perceived the move occurring because of the imminent arrival of German tanks and troops. In preparation for the move, the soldiers began burning secret documents and codes. Amidst the bustle of loading and moving, a nervous switchboard operator destroyed the central switchboard for the division. The division had been ill informed up to this point; now it had almost no communications with anyone, including only limited links to corps headquarters.1
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