Leaving Colonel Chaligne, who was the commander of the infantry in the division, behind with a skeleton staff, General Lafontaine moved with the major part of his headquarters toward Chémery. At a time when the German threat was intensifying, Chaligne was left with little or no ability to control the actions of the division. Ignorant of the details about what was happening and lacking any communications except for messengers, he was almost helpless, but he had more control over the division than did the division commander. The course of subsequent events suggests that Lafontaine and his headquarters were ill prepared to move from their comfortable and relatively attractive bunker at Fond Dagot.
The little information received at the skeleton command post at Fond Dagot was alarming. Around 2100 hours Colonel Lafont of the 331st Regiment reported, “The enemy has crossed the Meuse at Donchery and is moving into the principal line of resistance with strong forces.” Around 2300 hours the intelligence officer from the 331st Regiment appeared at the division command post at Fond Dagot and provided a fuller picture to Colonel Chaligne about what was happening. He reported:
The enemy is in Croix Piot. Infiltrations are occurring along the route to Cheveuges and particularly to the east of this route. The [regimental] command post at Moulin Mauru risks being encircled at any moment. Reports have been received about the noise of armored vehicles on the left bank of the Meuse and in the small valley leading to La Boulette.2
Although no German tanks had yet crossed the Meuse, the French thought they had and were deeply disturbed. Chaligne recognized that if the Germans moved beyond La Boulette and entered the valley of the Bar River, they could sever the division into two parts. Consequently, he began desperately trying to send forces toward the 147th Regiment to halt the German movement. The forces he sent forward, however, moved toward the right (east) of the division, rather than toward the left (west) where Balck's regiment had made significant gains.
USING THE RESERVES OF THE 55TH DIVISION
Unfortunately, the division had very few forces available. Theoretically, the division had two battalions in reserve, the 1/295th and the 3/331st. The 1/295th was the battalion that had been sent forward to the Semois River in Belgium, and casualties had reduced it to being little more than a large company. Furthermore, the loss of its battalion commander and other key leaders had weakened its leadership. As for the 3/331st, this battalion had been ordered to send one company to provide security for rear elements at Haraucourt and another company, plus a machine gun section, to provide security for the division's headquarters. Consequently, it too was reduced to being hardly more than a company.3
The largest number of troops made available to the division commander for use as reserves came from the relief and movement of the 71st Division into the Angecourt subsector. The 3/295th Infantry and part of the 11th Machine Gun Battalion pulled back from their positions along the Meuse and moved to the area south of Chaumont. On the morning of the 13th, the 506th Antitank Company, a colonial infantry unit, also arrived to reinforce the division.
Since all the division's reserves were located in the general area of Bulson-Chaumont, some of them were affected by the panic that swept that area around 1800 hours on the 13th, but they were not as severely affected as the artillery. Nevertheless, the division had relatively small reserves even though it theoretically had three infantry battalions and part of a machine gun battalion as a reserve. Perhaps more importantly, the division chose to employ most of its small reserves on its right flank near the French cemetery and on its center, north of Bulson, rather than against the rapidly expanding penetration from Bellevue, to La Boulette, to Chehéry.
As the German advance moved forward on the evening of the 13th, the situation became particularly desperate for Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud and remnants of the three battalions operating under the control of the 147th Regiment. Division headquarters, however, initially did not recognize the extent of the damage inflicted by the Germans. At 1745 hours on the 13th, Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud had requested reinforcements. He was given an infantry company and a machine gun section from the 3/295th, and at 1815 hours he was given the remainder of the battalion. Though it was getting late in the day, Pinaud later insisted that he wanted to counterattack with the battalion, but the slow movement of the 3/295th forced him to relinquish any idea of a counterattack. He finally decided to send the battalion to the region of Noyers, where it was to link up with the 2/295th at the French military cemetery. Unfortunately, the 3/295th was unable to accomplish its mission completely and did not link up with the 2/295th until around 2200 hours on the 13th. According to Pinaud, many of its men fled before it reached its designated position.4
At 2000 hours Colonel Chaligne sent elements of the 11th Machine Gun Battalion to reinforce the 147th Regiment. Led by the battalion commander, the elements consisted of two infantry platoons, a mortar platoon, and three 25mm cannon. While moving forward, the battalion commander encountered the 1st Machine Gun Company, which had been in the Angecourt subsector until the 71st Division had moved forward and occupied that portion of the line. The 1st Machine Gun Company rejoined its battalion, and the size of the force effectively doubled. When they arrived at Chaumont, Pinaud ordered the battalion to occupy a position extending about one kilometer from Chaumont toward the St. Quentin farm (one kilometer to the west). Around midnight, the machine gun unit moved into position.5
Buttressed by the new reinforcements and promised others, Pinaud worked desperately to establish a new line of resistance in front of the Germans, but for inexplicable reasons he remained primarily concerned about his center and right flank. Though he may have had some information about reinforcements arriving in the division, he probably did not learn until later in the evening of the Xth Corps’ plans to move an infantry regiment toward his left into the area between Bulson and Chehéry.
Around 2200 hours Colonel Chaligne ordered other forces forward. The 3/331st Infantry, which was located in the Bois du Roi midway between Chaumont and Bulson and consisted of little more than a company, was ordered to organize an antitank position and prevent the movement of any German tanks from Cheveuges to Bulson. The 506th Antitank Company, a colonial infantry unit that had arrived in the area on the morning of the 13th, received orders to place an antitank section on Hill 298 (midway between Cheveuges and Bulson) and to place another section at Bulson. The 1st Company, 11th Machine Gun Battalion, also received orders to move northwest along the route between Bulson and Cheveuges and assist in the halting of any German armored attack. Colonel Chaligne was unaware that this machine gun company had linked up with the commander of the 11th Machine Gun Battalion and had moved with him to Chaumont.6 By 2400 hours the 55th Division had reestablished a thin and shaky line of defenders around the southern and eastern edges of the German penetration.
Very little strengthening occurred on the western edge, and no concerted action came against the German seizure of Cheveuges and their preparations for moving farther south. In fact, the route from Bellevue, to Cheveuges, to Chehéry, to Chémery proved to be the major avenue of approach used by the Germans. Instead of rushing reinforcements into this ever-widening penetration, the 55th Division moved its meager reinforcements toward Bulson, Chaumont, and Noyers.
The explanation for this strengthening of what proved to be the less important sector and the failure to strengthen the decisive sector may reside partially in the movement of the 213th Infantry Regiment from the south toward Chémery. But it may also reside in the apparent perception that if the Germans broke through at Sedan, they would probably turn east and seek to turn the flank of the Maginot Line, rather than turn west. The failure to halt the move toward Chémery may also have been rooted in the perception that if the division could hold the shoulders of the penetration, the Germans could not break out of the Sedan area, particularly since they obviously had very little artillery support. Unfortunately for France, this perception of the limited threat of a penetration failed to take into account the great mobility of ar
mored vehicles and the replacement of traditional artillery support by aviation.
Despite the depth of the German move into French lines, almost ten kilometers, their bridgehead remained small and extremely vulnerable. By comparison, however, the French immediately along the edge of the bridgehead were in a desperate situation.
At 0130 hours on the 14th, Colonel Chaligne received a message from Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud outlining the precarious position of his regiment. According to the report, Captain Foucault occupied a position along the road between Cheveuges and Bulson with no more than forty men. Captain Carribou held Chaumont with only twenty men. Captain Gabel had two companies and had been reinforced by the 3/295th. Elements of the 11th Machine Gun Battalion had arrived, but the final company did not appear until 0200 hours. Pinaud emphasized the urgency of the situation by asking, “Am I going to receive reinforcements?” Earlier, he had been promised a reinforcing regiment and a battalion of tanks.7 Hours later, his entire force probably added up to less than a normal infantry battalion.
In a short written order completed at 0200 hours, Pinaud told the elements of the five battalions that were now under him to “hold the line” between Noyers, Chaumont, and the St. Quentin farm (one kilometer west of Chaumont). His order did not mention the 3/331st Infantry, which was supposedly in the Chaumont area. In his order, he told Captain Carribou and his meager forces to move out of the line and become the reserve for the regiment.8
On Pinaud's right flank, Captain Gabel's forces at the French military cemetery and Noyers remained in good condition and continued to offer strong resistance to the Germans. Elements from the 3/295th had reinforced his battalion, which had taken fewer casualties than the other two battalions originally assigned to the 147th Regiment. But as the 10th Panzer Division moved more and more troops across the Meuse, Gabel's task force came under increasing pressure. Fresh attacks on the regiment's right flank pushed the French defenders out of the French military cemetery until they held only the German cemetery and the high ground at Noyers.9
The French tried to resupply the fighting units during the night, but neither food nor munitions made their way forward. In one of those lunatic actions that sometimes occur in desperate moments, the supply depot at Bulson refused to provide supplies without a written order from the commanding general of the division. The supply depot one kilometer southeast of Cheveuges was burned by the Germans. Apparently, only the 11th Machine Gun Battalion received some supplies. Under the personal command of the battalion commander, a column moved to the rear and obtained ammunition.10
Both the French and the Germans used the early hours of the morning to prepare for subsequent operations. For the French, it was apparent that the position of the defenders around the German penetration was tenuous and that reinforcements were required. Though the situation required an extraordinary performance from the units of the Xth Corps and 55th Division, subsequent events proved they could not provide it.
THE 55TH DIVISION: PREPARATION FOR COUNTERATTACK
Before the Germans crossed the Meuse on the 13th, the Second Army and Xth Corps commanders became concerned about the possibility of a crossing and a penetration into their sectors and decided to take precautions. Grandsard decided to move the reserves of his corps to the rear of the position of resistance along the Meuse. From west to east, the line went from Chehéry, to Hill 311, to Bulson, to Haraucourt. During a tactical exercise in April, corps headquarters had considered the best place to locate a second line of defenses and had decided that the line between Chehéry and Haraucourt was the best location.11
The exercise at the end of April had occurred because General Huntziger, the commanding general of the Second Army, wanted a special exercise on the conduct of a counterattack against a “rupture” in the Sedan area. Initially scheduled for 25 March, the exercise was delayed until the end of April. It studied the possibility of an enemy armored division crossing the Meuse in the region of Sedan, penetrating the line of defenses between Frénois and Wadelincourt, and then moving south along the axis Bulson-Maisoncelle-Stonne. The exercise also studied the possibility of a counterattack by a French armored division against this penetration.12
Evidently because of their having recently examined a scenario close to what appeared to be happening on 13–14 May, the initial response by the Second Army and the Xth Corps essentially followed the procedures that had been worked out and tested in April. In a clear colmater fashion of pushing units forward toward the penetration until the enemy was halted, the key steps in this response included the movement of additional infantry and tank forces into the threatened sector. These forces included two infantry regiments and two tank battalions, all of which had been at least partially under the control of the Second Army but which were released to the Xth Corps on the 13th. Beyond simply halting the Germans, however, the Xth Corps wanted to launch a counterattack that would upset their timetable and perhaps disrupt their forward movement. Under the best circumstances, it might also hurl the Germans back across the Meuse.
Between 1445 and 1515 hours on the 13th, about the time of the German attack across the Meuse, the Xth Corps directed the 205th and 213th regiments, supported by two tank battalions, to occupy the line between Chehéry, Bulson, and Haraucourt that had been used in the April exercise. The Second Army had released the two tank battalions that morning to the Xth Corps but did not want them to move during daylight hours because of the threat of enemy air strikes. According to General Grandsard, the 213th Regiment could march to this line in two hours, the 4th Tank Battalion in one hour fifteen minutes, and the 7th Tank Battalion in one hour fifty minutes.13 Subsequent events proved him to be grossly in error.
On 10 May the 213th Regiment was located in the area around the small village of Boult au Bois, which is thirty kilometers south of Sedan and ten kilometers east-northeast of Vouziers. From 23 October 1939 until 6 May, the regiment had occupied the Villers-sur-Bar subsector west of Bellevue, but had been relieved by the 331st Infantry for three weeks of training. On 9 May the regiment closed in at Boult au Bois and was scheduled to begin its training on 13 May. During its period of training, the regiment also functioned as a reserve for the Xth Corps but could be committed only with the approval of the Second Army.
After the Germans attacked into Luxembourg on 10 May, Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Labarthe, the commander of the regiment, reported to the headquarters of the Xth Corps. He was ordered to move his regiment on the night of 10–11 May toward the north. Beginning its road march at 2300 hours, the regiment moved its headquarters into Chémery, one battalion two kilometers south of Chémery and two battalions on the other side of Mont Dieu ten to fifteen kilometers south of Chémery. The move went smoothly even though the roads were filled with refugees moving south.14
After establishing his command post at Chémery on the 11th, Labarthe was visited at different times by Generals Grandsard and Lafontaine. The corps commander informed him that the tactical situation north of the Meuse was developing “normally.” Except for several aerial attacks that caused only slight damage and the continued movement of the civilian population, the day was quiet.
On the 12th around 1400 hours, the Xth Corps ordered Labarthe to move his regiment on the night of 12–13 May to the northern woodline of the Bois du Mont Dieu. That night, while the 3rd Battalion remained in place two kilometers south of Chémery, the 2nd Battalion moved to the vicinity of Artaise-le-Vivier (three kilometers southeast of Chémery), and the 1st Battalion moved into the northern woodline of Bois du Mont Dieu (five kilometers south of Chémery and one kilometer east). Again, the move went very smoothly.
On the morning of the 13th, the regiment came under aerial bombardment, but only one company suffered significant losses (two killed, twelve wounded). That afternoon the intensity of the air strikes increased, but according to the regimental commander, the units did not suffer significant losses. Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe explained that many of the men had dug entrenchments after moving into their new p
ositions during the night and had improved their protection during the air strikes in the morning.15
A more telling comment came from a platoon leader in the 2nd Company, 1/213th. He said, “During the entire day, enemy squadrons followed each other, launching their bombs at the top of the trees without being bothered by a single friendly aircraft. Alone, an antiaircraft battery reacted weakly. This was the baptism of fire for the 213th Infantry Regiment. The men were very affected by the whistling of the bombs and by the sight of the dead and wounded.”16
At 1630 hours the regiment received orders from the Xth Corps to move forward along the line between Chehéry and Bulson. After issuing a warning order at 1650 hours, Labarthe met with his battalion commanders at 1730 and provided them more detailed information. On the left the 3rd Battalion would secure Chehéry, in the center the 1st Battalion would secure Hill 311 and ensure contact with the battalions on the right and left, and on the right the 2nd Battalion would secure Bulson. Had everything gone well, the regiment probably could have marched to its new position in about two hours.
The Breaking Point Page 31
