COUNTERATTACK BY THE 55TH DIVISION: THE 213TH REGIMENT AND 7TH TANK BATTALION
Despite his reputation as a strong regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe did not relish the prospect of attacking the Germans. After receiving the order and shortly before departing the division's command post, he said, “This is a mission of sacrifice that you ask of my regiment.”33 With Labarthe lacking enthusiasm for the mission, the counterattack began about an hour after the battalion commanders received the attack order from their regimental commander.
To the north, the situation of Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud's force became even more desperate early on the morning of the 14th. Pinaud had lost telephonic communications with division headquarters during the night and had been reduced to sending messages by runners. Around 0500 hours the French north of Chaumont were attacked by a strong enemy force, and half an hour later the forces west of Chaumont also were attacked, apparently by elements of the Gross Deutschland Regiment. At 0600 hours Pinaud gave the order to withdraw, and his few remaining men moved in the direction of Haraucourt. By 0645 hours the Germans had occupied Chaumont.
Pinaud then moved south to the command post of the 55th Division at Fond Dagot, intending to report to the division commander and inform him of his order to withdraw. To his surprise, he found the command post unoccupied, and only later did he learn of the soon-to-be-unleashed counterattack. After establishing a thin line of defenders near the old division command post, Pinaud moved toward Maisoncelle. About 500 meters north of the town he encountered Colonel Chaligne first and then General Lafontaine and provided them a full report of what had happened in his subsector. About the time he met his commanding general, the counterattack by the 213th Regiment began.34
The progress of the 1st Battalion on the regiment's right has been described by Second Lieutenant Penissou from the 2nd Company, 1/213th. Shortly after the battle, he reported:
The tanks lead the attack. The company moves at 0645 hours, the sections and platoons in perfect order. The men are calm and disciplined.
The company arrives at Hill 278 [one kilometer north of Maisoncelle]; it is 0700 hours. Several bursts of machine gun fire pass over our heads. Then the left of the company receives enemy automatic weapons fire.
I push my platoon toward [Hill] 261 [about one and a half kilometers north of Maisoncelle], then into the woods of Rond Caillou [to the northeast] where I move around the western edge. The woods seem to be empty…. The French tanks move toward Bulson…. I send a runner to the captain to tell him that since I am not being stopped by fire, I will continue to move forward. At the edge of a small strip of woods that borders the road, the platoon receives bursts of machine gun fire that seem to come from Hill 320 [500 meters southeast of Bulson]. A 25mm cannon, served by elements of the colonial infantry, is in position and pointed toward Hill 320.
It is around 0715 hours. The French tanks are at the forward edge of the woodline. I move to Hill 320 with a squad…to see what is happening behind the crests of Hills 320 and 322 [500 meters southwest of Bulson]. An enemy aircraft fires its machine guns at us several times, then the bursts of machine gun fire become heavier and heavier. At [Hill] 320, one cannot see what is happening at Bulson. I move forward to the edge of Bulson, and I see at a distance of 300 meters large Germans tanks that are moving slowly toward [Hill] 322.
The [enemy] aircraft continues to fire its machine guns at us, and from the northwestern edge of [the woods of] Rond Caillou, the small arms fire is very heavy.
It is necessary to prevent the imminent attack of the tanks. I send a runner to my captain, and I rejoin the 25mm cannon. It is 0800 hours. I give a report to Captain Boury of the 295th Infantry Regiment who has pulled back from Bulson and is next to the 25mm cannon.
Believing that the attack would go toward [Hill] 322, we rapidly maneuver the cannon, and the German attack begins. The French tanks that are not destroyed go back down the slope and withdraw in the direction of Maisoncelle.
Immediately thereafter, 3 German tanks cross [Hill] 322 and move toward Fond Dagot. They are taken under fire by the 25mm at around 500 meters. The first is hit and bursts into flames; the second in turn is hit and bursts into flames; the third is immobilized and is hit with about fifteen 25mm shells. The other tanks remain in turret defilade and cover us with bursts of machine gun fire.
With the German tanks immobilized, the soldiers exit with automatic weapons and fire at the 25mm [gun]. They are fired at immediately with submachine guns and rifles, and at the end of a few minutes, the enemy fire ceases. It is around 0900 hours.
But the enemy moves forward on the [left]…through the woods of Réserve, Blanche Maison, and Pré de Mars, and on the [right]…infiltrates through the ravine in [the woods of] Rond Caillou.
We fire on all sides against the enemy that surrounds us. The small arms fire is heavy. The crew of the 25mm [gun]…is killed or wounded at their weapon. The telescope on the cannon is broken. We are completely encircled, and the ammunition is almost gone. It is around 1100 hours.35
As the Germans continued south, they moved directly toward Maisoncelle. In the center of the 213th, the 3rd Battalion was not attacked as strongly as either of the battalions on its flanks. One company commander from the 3rd Battalion watched about twenty-five German tanks move toward Maisoncelle and said, “The 1st Battalion seemed to be volatilized in an instant.”36 As the Germans overran the 1st Battalion, the 3rd Battalion began moving rapidly toward the rear.
To the west, the 2nd Battalion began moving at 0630 hours from Chémery toward Chehéry with one company moving along the road in the valley north of Chémery and another company moving along the heights just to its east. The regimental commander kept the remaining company (7th Company) of the battalion at Chémery to act as a reserve for the regiment. Much as the 55th Division commander had done, he did little to strengthen his left flank and in reality weakened the battalion that soon received the heaviest attack from the Germans (from Cheveuges and Chehéry toward Chémery).
Very little coordination occurred between the tanks and the infantry before the attack. The commander of the 213th Regiment later stated that the 3rd Tank Company, which had the mission of supporting the 2nd Battalion, did not arrive at Chémery until 0645 hours and hurried forward in front of the infantry without receiving instructions from the commander of the 2nd Battalion. The commander of the 7th Tank Battalion, however, later argued that the 3rd Company was the last tank company to arrive at Chémery, but that it passed through the central part of Chémery at 0600 and attacked with the 2nd Battalion at 0630.37 Despite the disagreement between the two commanders about arrival time for the tanks, the key point is that the tanks and the infantry in this important area had little or no time for coordination and familiarization.
At 0715 hours the 2nd Battalion received small-arms, machine gun, and antitank fire from small German elements to its front. The battalion pushed forward, however, and at 0800 hours the commander reported that his unit had reached the intermediate objective along the line between Connage and Bulson. For the next hour the regiment seemed to be doing well, the only difficulty being to fulfill a request from the 2nd Battalion for a resupply of ammunition. At 0830 hours Labarthe moved his reserve, the 7th Company, about 300 meters outside Chémery on the heights overlooking the road to Chehéry.
Then suddenly the situation changed dramatically. Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe has described the action:
0900 hours: New report from the 2/213th, “being attacked by heavy tanks.”
I hear a cannonade coming from the direction of Connage. I am surprised to see…three friendly tanks pulling back into Chémery. Is the situation being modified drastically? Small-arms fire from Bulson indicates a brief engagement in front of the 3rd and 1st battalions.
I decide to organize a defensive line on the heights of Chémery with the uncommitted elements. The 7th Company is next to me. I give the order to hold the woodline northeast of the village. [I give the] order to the commander of
the [troops in the village] to occupy with the engineers the southwest corner of Chémery [and] to watch the right bank of the Bar [River]. I report the situation to the commander [of the 55th Division] with the chief of my motorcycle section who has come to me with information. He confirms that the 1st and 3rd battalions are progressing toward the north.
0930 hours: I attempt to establish contact with the commander of the 2/213th. The messenger cannot find his command post on the route toward Sedan.
1000 hours: A wave of enemy tanks breaks out in front of the 7th Company [which is] installed at the northeastern edge of Chémery. This company, having not a single antitank weapon, can do nothing against these vehicles. Under enemy fire, I attempt to rally them….
The enemy tanks quickly move down the main street [of the village], blasting and machine gunning the few defenders who are there. I pull back to the eastern edge. An enemy tank, sitting sideways on a corner of the road, machine guns us at point blank range; my assistant and I fall. I have a bullet in my thigh. The tank fires its cannon again. He misses us and sets on fire several cans of gasoline against which we had fallen. Taking advantage of the smoke that is produced, I escape.38
A few minutes later Labarthe found the commander of the 2/213th. The captain reported that his battalion had been attacked by tanks, accompanied by 88mm guns. Though several of the German tanks had been destroyed by 25mm antitank fire, they had “annihilated” the French tanks. Around 1600 hours Labarthe was captured by the Germans. As a prisoner and helpless bystander, he watched numerous armored vehicles move through Chémery and thereby witnessed the German exploitation of the failure of his regiment's counterattack.
In summary, the 213th Infantry had attacked at 0630 hours with the support of three tank companies from the 7th Tank Battalion. The battalions had moved forward two or three kilometers when they came under heavy attack by tanks around Bulson and Connage. In the ensuing fighting, the 7th Tank Battalion lost 50 percent of its personnel engaged and 70 percent of its vehicles in only a few minutes. The entire staff of the 213th Regiment was captured, and the 1st and 2nd battalions suffered extremely high casualties.
In his report, which was written after he returned from captivity, Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe described the major reasons for his regiment's failure and in doing so wrote the epithet for his unit. He stated, “From information later collected from captured officers of my regiment, it appears the 1st and 3rd battalions moved forward confidently and resolutely, pushing back enemy elements to the dominant terrain south of Bulson. There, they received an enemy attack composed of tanks accompanied by 105mm [sic] cannons. Our tanks, poorly armed, could not protect our infantry, devoid of antitank weapons and forced to fight in open terrain. The success of the enemy could only have followed.”39
A group of French general officers and colonels that had gathered north of Maisoncelle to watch the attack quickly disappeared as the Germans approached their location. Colonel Chaligne moved toward the 205th Regiment, where he informed them—as will be explained—of the German thrust toward Maisoncelle from Bulson and from Chémery.
COUNTERATTACK BY THE 55TH DIVISION: THE 205TH REGIMENT AND 4TH TANK BATTALION
On 10 May the 205th Infantry Regiment, which was organic to the 71st Division, was the reserve for the Xth Corps and was working on a defensive line between Omont and Sapogne. Sapogne is about ten kilometers southwest of Sedan, and Omont is about ten kilometers to its south. The line was evidently designed to strengthen the defenses in the sector should the Germans cross the Meuse to the west of the Maginot Line and then attempt to turn west.
Late on the 11th, the 205th Regiment received orders to move southeast of Sedan. After two night marches, it occupied a position south of Raucourt (six kilometers east of Chémery) and east of Stonne. One battalion was in the Bois d'Yoncq (four kilometers southeast of Raucourt), another in the Bois de Franclieu (three kilometers east of Stonne), and another in the Bois de Raucourt (three kilometers south of Raucourt).
Late on the 13th, a captain from the staff of the 71st Division delivered a verbal order to Lieutenant Colonel Montvignier Monnet, who commanded the regiment, to occupy a defensive position between Raucourt and Maisoncelle-et-Villers (three kilometers east of Chémery). The regimental commander moved the 3rd Battalion into a small wooded area west of Raucourt and the other two battalions into the woods of the Bois de Raucourt. He intended to move the 1st Battalion from these woods into a position along the line between Raucourt and Maisoncelle-et-Villers. He placed one of the companies of the 4th Tank Battalion in the open north of the woods without infantry support.40
As the 3rd Battalion was moving forward and before the 1st Battalion began moving, a motorcyclist arrived at regimental headquarters and delivered an order for the regiment to await further orders. Unbeknownst to the regimental commander, the Xth Corps had decided to use the regiment in a counterattack under the control of the 55th Division.
The poor communications of the 55th Division greatly affected subsequent events. Since the division did not know the location of the 205th Regiment or of the 4th Tank Battalion, which would support the attack, an officer departed the command post around 0330 hours in search of the regiment, and at 0500 hours Colonel Chaligne departed to conduct his own search. Around 0530 hours Chaligne arrived at the command post of the 71st Division along the route between Raucourt and Autrecourt about ten kilometers east of Chémery. He met with the division commander, General Baudet, and after explaining the situation to him, asked if he could talk with the colonel who commanded the 205th Regiment. Baudet answered that the 71st Division had no telephonic communications with the regiment but that the commander of the regiment was located in the Bois de Raucourt about five kilometers east-southeast of Chémery. Chaligne had driven by these woods en route to Baudet's command post.
Around 0615 hours he arrived at the Huttes de Raucourt on the northern edge of the Bois de Raucourt, where he first encountered the battalion commander of the 4th Tank Battalion, Major de Saint Cernin. The two officers then met with the commander of the 205th Regiment.
According to Lieutenant Colonel Montvignier Monnet, he received the following order:
The 205th Infantry Regiment will counterattack in the direction of Bulson.
Objective: Bois de Thelonne [three kilometers northeast of Bulson].
The counterattack will be supported by the battalion of tanks of Major de Saint Cernin.
Departure from the Bois de Raucourt: 0800 hours.41
After Chaligne departed, the regimental commander asked the tank battalion commander about the employment of the tanks, and the armored officer expressed a desire to move as a separate and distinct unit. In doctrinal terms, the tanks expected to be used as “tanks for a mass maneuver.” That is, they would operate as a battalion and would not be split up amongst the infantry.42
With less than an hour to prepare before the regiment was supposed to move, the regimental commander decided to attack with two battalions, one battalion following the other, in the general direction from Maisoncelle-et-Villers (three kilometers east of Chémery), toward Bulson, and then toward the Bois de Thelonne. Though it had only two companies, one having been detached, the 2nd Battalion under Captain Auffret would lead and would move through the intermediate objective of Maisoncelle-et-Villers toward the woods north of this village. The 1st Battalion would follow behind the 2nd Battalion and would abide by orders from the regimental commander, who apparently intended to use the battalion to attack to the right or left flank of the lead battalion or to reinforce it. The 3rd Battalion would remain in its position west of the village of Raucourt and await orders.
At 0800 hours the 2nd Battalion departed from the Bois de Raucourt, moving north toward Terres de la Malmaison and then turning northwest. The 4th Tank Battalion followed, 2nd Company on the left, 1st Company in the center, 3rd Company on the right.43 The units moved extremely slowly.
As the soldiers marched forward, they received small-arms fire from an unknown di
rection, and several soldiers were wounded. The regimental commander later asserted that this fire came from the 4th Tank Battalion, but the commander of the 2nd Battalion thought the fire may have come from German “parachutists or spies.”44 Continuing forward, the battalion spied about sixty infantry to its front but could not tell if they were German or French. Not taking any chances, the men opened fire. The sixty or so men to their front immediately displayed several white flags and then disappeared behind the crest of a hill. They probably were the few brave souls who had fought with Pinaud to the last possible moment.
The 2nd Battalion entered Maisoncelle-et-Villers at 0945 hours; the soldiers had moved about three and a half kilometers in one hour forty-five minutes. As they entered the village, French soldiers fleeing from the north and probably from the 1/213th passed through them. Continuing to move north, the battalion was barely out of the village when its northwest flank came under heavy enemy fire, including an air strike. The tanks on the northwest edge of the village also came under enemy tank fire, several of them having their armor punctured by enemy rounds. After a short, intense fight, the tanks quickly withdrew at full speed along the route to Raucourt. Having no 25mm antitank guns and having only a single low-velocity 37mm gun and a few mortars, the 2nd Battalion was left in the open with no defense against the tanks.45
At this moment Colonel Chaligne appeared and supposedly told the battalion commander that the attack was “going well” but that it was being threatened on the left by a strong German attack and by the yielding of the 213th Regiment on the left. General Lafontaine had decided that given the collapse of the 213th Regiment, an attack by the 205th would be useless. Chaligne told the French captain to withdraw his battalion “immediately.”46
The Breaking Point Page 33
