At about the same time, around 1000 hours, a motorcyclist gave the regimental commander a written order telling him to withdraw south and defend the edge of the Bois de Raucourt. The 4th Tank Battalion was already withdrawing, and the two infantry battalions quickly followed, moving toward the Bois de Raucourt again. The 3rd Battalion remained in the small wooded area west of Raucourt.47
Unfortunately, the withdrawal became a rout. The commander of the 2nd Battalion tried to move his companies back in a controlled fashion under the cover of machine gun fire from the 1st Battalion, which was still to the rear. Despite the best efforts of him and his company commanders, they lost control of the movement, and the battalion raced back in uncoordinated pieces through German artillery and aerial fire. Part of the battalion continued to fight, mingling with the 1st Battalion south of Maisoncelle.
As they entered the woods, the commander of the 2nd Battalion attempted to rally his battalion by getting them to move to the southern edge of the Bois de Raucourt. He thought he and his cadre could regain control of the soldiers and then lead them forward to the northern edge of the woods. At the same time he wanted to save some vehicles and machine guns that had been left on the northern edge of the woods. But his efforts were futile, for his battalion was out of control and German elements had already reached the western edge of the Bois de Raucourt.
In a report written less than a week later, the battalion commander argued that his unit had attacked as ordered and had withdrawn only after being told to do so by Colonel Chaligne. Offering a partial defense of his unit, he insisted it had withdrawn under fire only after elements on the left had yielded. He offered no excuses for its collapse and disintegration other than the cadre and the men being “discouraged” from having to withdraw under fire.48
Except for the 3rd Battalion, which continued fighting around Raucourt, the remnants of the 205th Regiment collected in the woods of the Bois de Raucourt. The Germans continued to fire at them, and a few enemy elements moved around their rear. In midafternoon the 1st Battalion and elements of the 2nd Battalion fought their way south into French lines.
But the worst indignity for the regimental commander had not yet occurred. As his regiment moved south, Lieutenant Colonel Montvignier Monnet moved ahead of them, supposedly searching for a higher headquarters from which he could receive additional orders. A gendarmerie post picked him up, initially accusing him of being a German parachutist and then of having abandoned his regiment. A local official finally took him to the headquarters of the 71st Division where he met with General Baudet who apparently accepted his explanation of why he was not with his regiment. However, Montvignier Monnet later had to appear before another general officer who accused him formally of having abandoned his regiment in combat and then confined him to a room in the Hotel Vauban at Verdun. Though he later was released and allowed to fight against the Germans, he eventually lost his rank as a lieutenant colonel and simultaneously lost the Legion of Honor, which he had held since 1920.49
Regardless of whether or not he deserved this treatment, his regiment had failed completely to deliver the important counterattack.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE 55TH DIVISION
With the failure of the counterattack by the 205th and 213th regiments, General Lafontaine decided to pull his forces back to the edge of the woods of Mont Dieu and Raucourt to the south.50 Colonel Chaligne made his way to the 71st Division to inform General Baudet about what had happened on his left flank. After completing his report, Chaligne drove back to the area of Stonne where General Lafontaine had indicated the division would withdraw. Arriving there he found “only a few isolated [soldiers], without ammunition, without leaders, completely exhausted and asking to eat. It was around 1330 hours [on the 14th]. The division no longer existed.”51
According to Lafontaine,
Having reported to the command post of the corps at Berlière at 1400 hours, I received the order from corps to move to Bayonville where I could regroup as many as I could of my troops. The morning of the 15th, I moved southwest of Machault where I endeavored to complete this regroupment.
During the night of 16–17, the division was sent to the area of Saint-Soupplet (C.P.) and then in the night of 17–18, to that of Mancre (C.P.). On the morning of the 18th I received notification from the commander of Second Army that by order of the Commander-in-Chief on the Northeastern Front [General Georges] I was placed at the disposition of the Minister of National Defense and War and my division would be dissolved.52
CHAPTER 9
The Second Army and XXIst Corps
The French did not rely solely on the 55th Division and the Xth Corps to halt the XIXth Panzer Corps. They began to transport other forces into the area of the German penetration and to concentrate massive amounts of air power against the vulnerable German bridgehead. Until the Germans actually crossed the Meuse on 13 May, however, the units along the Ardennes had a very low priority for the allocation of air power.
ALLIED AERIAL OPERATIONS
With the opening of the campaign in the west, the Luftwaffe concentrated on destroying the opposing air forces and then providing support to operations on the ground. A significant number of its aircraft supported airborne and commando operations in Belgium and Holland. When the Germans crossed into Luxembourg on the morning of 10 May, their planes crossed the French border almost immediately and began bombing airfields and key installations. The Luftwaffe's targets ranged across Holland, Belgium, and France.
The attacks against Belgian and Dutch airfields yielded significant results, since the small countries lacked the space for alternative fields where aircraft could be dispersed. During the first morning, the Belgians lost fifty-three aircraft, and the Dutch sixty-two. Against France, the Germans focused on airfields, railways, and military facilities, but their attacks ranged across northern France. By scattering their bombing across a broad area, they hoped to conceal their intentions to make their main attack across eastern Belgium and toward Sedan and to make the French think the main effort was taking place in northern and central Belgium. The spreading of the attacks, however, resulted in the French having only four aircraft destroyed and thirty damaged on the ground.1
From the beginning of these attacks, French fighters rose to combat the German planes and to protect the ground forces below them. The French concentrated their aerial resources above the units marching into Belgium. Air Group 23, which was supposed to protect the Second Army near Sedan, received orders to reinforce Air Group 25, which provided cover for the Seventh Army on the extreme left of the French. The initial actions thus coincided with the preconceived notions of the French about the main effort eventually coming through the Gembloux Gap.
Though the Germans crossed into Luxembourg at 0435 hours, Allied aviation did not receive orders until 0800 hours, when it was told to limit its activity to fighters and reconnaissance aircraft. Bombers had to remain on the ground until Allied reconnaissance identified enemy columns moving toward the French frontier.2 Gamelin evidently remained extremely sensitive to the possibility of initiating bombing attacks in which civilians could become casualties and probably feared the likelihood of German reprisals if France initiated such attacks.
Despite the requests of the aviators, the French and British air forces did not receive permission from the High Command until 1100 hours to bombard enemy columns as first priority and occupied positions (including airfields) as second priority. The commander of the French Air Force added further limitations. The bombers could not attack industrial centers and had to avoid “at all costs” the bombardment of built-up areas. While these extra precautions underlined the French concern about German reprisals, they severely limited the potential striking power of the bombers. The advancing German columns often had to weave their way through the narrow streets of villages, and the entire plan for interdicting an enemy advance focused primarily on the vulnerability of the columns in these numerous choke points. Permission to bomb villages did not come until around 1600
hours on the following day.3
Air Marshal A. S. Barratt, who was commander of the British air forces in France, felt particularly constrained by Gamelin's unwillingness to unleash his bombers against the advancing Germans. While fighters rose to combat the attacking Germans, long-range fighters from England protected the seaward flank of the French Seventh Army, and reconnaissance aircraft sought out the invading columns, the medium-range bombers sat on their airfields awaiting orders to attack. Barratt finally lost his patience and on his own ordered Air Vice Marshal P.H.L. Playfair, commander of the British Advanced Air Striking Force, to attack the enemy with his medium bombers. Interestingly, the first target attacked was a German column that had been spotted by French reconnaissance aircraft several hours earlier while advancing through Luxembourg.
Eight British Battle bombers (a single-engine aircraft that was slow, short-ranged, and poorly defended) soon attacked the enemy column in the Ardennes. The Germans met them with a hail of machine gun and small-arms fire and shot down three of the eight aircraft. Of the thirty-two Battles used that day, thirteen were lost and the rest damaged.4 Despite the heavy losses, they apparently had little or no effect on the German column.
Around noon on the 11th, General François d'Astier de la Vigerie (the commander of the Northern Zone of Aerial Operations, which corresponded with Army Group 1) received an order from General Georges. The general wanted him to attack the bridges over the Meuse River near Maastricht that were being used by the Germans. Not having much faith in the ability of the Belgians to hold on long enough for the Allies to reach the Dyle River, Georges hoped the aerial forces could delay the move of the Germans against the Belgians and thereby provide the Allies more time to reach their designated defensive positions in Belgium.
At 1630 hours on the 11th, General Gamelin telephoned d'Astier and told him to “do everything [you can] to slow the German columns coming from Maastricht, to Tongeren, to Gembloux and do not hesitate to bomb towns and villages to obtain the desired results.”5 The order annulled the earlier directive about avoiding built-up areas and resulted in the French daytime bombers carrying out their first mission. Around 1800 hours the bombers departed to attack the bridges but damaged only one of them. This was the first daylight attack by the bombers.6 Nighttime bombers had launched attacks the night before.
Since Gamelin was not yet aware of the Germans’ having launched their main attack through Luxembourg and eastern Belgium, he did not recognize the vulnerability of the massed enemy columns along the narrow roads in those areas. One can only surmise how devastating massed Allied aerial attacks would have been on the march routes of the cumbersome and tangled German columns.
On the night of the 11th, the commander of Army Group 1 indicated the priority for the employment of aircraft on the 12th would be, first, to the First Army along the axis Maastricht-Tongeren and, second, to the Seventh Army and the B.E.F. This decision about priority for air support continuing to go to northern Belgium occurred about the time the XIXth Panzer Corps reached the Semois River.
At 0600 hours on the 12th, the commander of Army Group 1 confirmed the priorities issued on the previous evening for the use of air power but added the area north of Mézières to the list of second-priority targets. Finally, at 1600 hours, General Georges reversed the priorities completely. He ordered that first priority go to the Second Army and second priority to the cavalry forces fighting southwest of Tongeren in front of the First Army near Maastricht.7
General Billotte, the commander of Army Group 1, ignored this order. He directed that two-thirds of the aerial effort be used in support of the First Army and one-third in support of the Second Army. Unfortunately, he had recently moved his command post nearer to the First Army and was evidently unaware of some of the recent communiqués identifying the increasing danger on the right flank of his army group. Not until the morning of the 13th, when his army group occupied the defensive line designated in the Dyle Plan, did Billotte finally begin to understand what the Germans were doing.
Aerial reconnaissance on the night of 12–13 May confirmed the existence of the threat on the right flank of Army Group 1. Acknowledging that the French had discovered their trick, the Germans turned on their vehicles’ lights and increased their rate of march across eastern Belgium. After being informed of the results of the reconnaissance, Billotte directed the aerial forces at 0940 hours on the 13th to give first priority to the Second Army. His order, however, indicated that he expected the Germans to build up their forces for several days before attempting a deliberate river crossing.8
Later on the afternoon of the 13th Billotte again modified the priorities for the allocation of aerial resources from the Second Army to the Ninth Army. Before daybreak on 13 May, elements from General Erwin Rommel's 7th Panzer Division had successfully crossed the Meuse at Houx, just north of Dinant in the Ninth Army's area, but the crossing was not confirmed by Army Group 1 until almost noon.9 Explaining his altering of priorities, Billotte said that the front of the Second Army still had the protection of its artillery but that the Ninth Army's front had been “broken.”10 Unfortunately, this change in priorities changed about the same time the German XIXth Panzer Corps began to cross the Meuse at Sedan.
For hours before the German infantry crossed the Meuse at 1500 hours, German aircraft flew numerous sorties against the poorly protected French defenders and were hardly bothered by opposing fighters. They massed more than 310 medium bombers, 200 dive bombers, and 200 fighters over Sedan. Throughout the 13th, the French launched only one attack against the concentration of Germans at Sedan. The seven bombers that made the attack returned, but most were badly damaged.11 They apparently inflicted very little damage on the Germans and were hardly noticed by the nervous ground troops.
Because of heavy losses, Air Marshal Barratt decided to rest and repair his bombers on the 13th. On 10 May the British had had 135 bombers in Playfair's force, but by the end of the 12th, they had only 72. Throughout the 13th, the British bombers launched only one small mission, a strike against a target in the Netherlands. The attack sought to help the Seventh Army on the left flank of Army Group 1, which was now withdrawing more quickly than it had advanced. Sensing the unraveling of the Allies’ defenses, Barratt also ordered Playfair to begin planning for a withdrawal.12
During the night of 13 May, Georges and Billotte ordered a massive aerial attack at dawn against the German bridges over the Meuse at Sedan. Billotte said, “Victory or defeat depends on those bridges.” On the morning of the 14th, the Allies launched their desperate aerial attack. According to General d'Astier, more than 152 bombers and 250 fighters concentrated over Sedan and completed more than 550 flying hours, while suffering 11 percent losses. To oppose them, the Germans flew more than 800 sorties.13 Unfortunately for the Allies, they committed their aircraft in about 27 piecemeal attacks, usually consisting of no more than 10 or 20 aircraft. And they were met by more than 200 antiaircraft guns located around the single crossing site at Gaulier.
In the early morning, ten British bombers attacked the German bridges near Sedan and did not encounter enemy fighters. About 0900 hours the French launched their first attack against the concentrated enemy. Around noon the few remaining French bombers (only thirteen) attacked the same area, but they suffered such severe losses that they cancelled operations for the remainder of the day. Between 1500 and 1600 Playfair's entire force of bombers, supported by twenty-seven French fighters, struck at Sedan, but of the seventy-two bombers participating only forty returned. The official British history notes, “No higher rate of loss in an operation of comparable size has ever been experienced by the Royal Air Force.”14 That evening long-range bombers from Bomber Command made another strike. Though they encountered fewer enemy fighters than the earlier strike, they suffered 25 percent losses.
Conflicting orders to the French air forces began to appear. On the evening of the 14th, Georges ordered d'Astier to maintain fighter cover over Sedan on the 15th even if it were extremely we
ak. He hoped the sight of some aerial support would buttress the morale of the troops on the ground.15 The following morning around 1100 hours, d'Astier received different instructions through Air Force channels. He was told that the first priority of his bombers should go to the area around Mézières. As for his fighters, first priority (50 percent of his assets) should be Mézières, second priority (30 percent) Sedan, and third priority (20 percent) Dinant. At about the same time, General Billotte compounded the confusion by also giving different instructions for the employment of French fighters. He said that 60 percent of d'Astier's assets should support the newly formed Army Detachment under General Robert Touchon, 30 percent should support the Second Army, and 10 percent should be divided between the Ninth and First armies.16 Amidst these conflicting orders, d'Astier's actual allocation is not completely clear, but the soldiers who continued fighting around Sedan hardly mention the presence of French aircraft on the 15th.
On the morning of the 6th, General d'Astier withdrew his headquarters to Chantilly and lost contact with Barratt and Billotte. The responsibility for coordinating the air battle fell largely into the hands of his superiors. At about the same time, the British Advanced Air Striking Force stopped participating in much of the fighting, taking only a minor part in further bombing missions, primarily at night.
Despite heavy losses, Allied air operations had not significantly delayed or affected the German attack.
COLMATER: GENERAL HUNTZIGER AND THE SECOND ARMY
As the Germans moved through the Ardennes on the 10th and 11th, General Georges (who commanded the French forces along the northern and northeastern frontiers) and General Billotte (who commanded Army Group 1, which included the Second Army plus other field armies west to the English Channel) began taking actions to strengthen the Second Army. Neither Georges nor Billotte believed the Germans would make their main attack through the area of Sedan; both apparently considered the German forces in the Ardennes to be part of a secondary effort aiming farther north and contributing to the main German effort through the Gembloux Gap. Nevertheless, the possibility existed of a German thrust moving around the left wing of the Maginot Line and then circling behind the important fortifications through the Stenay Gap. Consequently, in a classic colmater operation, the high-level commanders began moving units toward Sedan to reinforce the sector west of the Maginot Line.
The Breaking Point Page 34
