General Huntziger, who commanded the Second Army, began the process of reinforcement. On the night of 11 May at 2220 hours, a staff officer from the Second Army called the Xth Corps and said, “The 71st Infantry Division is at this moment placed at the disposition of Xth Corps. This unit has been alerted with a warning order. She should enter the [front] line during the nights of 11–12 and 12–13.”17 A written order followed that confirmed the telephone call. In his headquarters, General Grandsard began making preparations for the entry of the 71st Division between the 55th and 3rd North African divisions. Although the operation entailed a lengthy night road march by the 71st Division and the conduct of a complex night relief-in-place, no one apparently questioned whether the insertion of the division could be accomplished.
The following morning, 12 May, the Second Army began reinforcing the artillery of the Xth Corps. With a warning order issued at 0730 hours and formal orders issued at 0935 and 1120 hours, the Second Army placed two artillery regiments, which were already in the vicinity of Sedan, under the control of the Xth Corps.18 Increasing the artillery support for a threatened sector accorded completely with French doctrine, for such an action added to the defensive capability of the sector while placing sufficient forces on hand to conduct a counterattack with fire, rather than troops.
As explained in the previous chapter, the Second Army also began moving additional infantry and tank forces into the sector. On 11 May at 2300 hours, it ordered the 4th Tank Battalion, which had operated under the control of the 1st Cavalry Brigade in Belgium, to pull back from its position near Carignan and move to Beaumont, which is about nine kilometers east of Stonne. On 12 May at 1105 hours, it sent out a warning order that said that the 4th and 7th Tank battalions could come under the control of the Xth Corps. The message ordered the Xth Corps to consider using the 7th Tank Battalion in a counterattack on the western flank of the corps and the 4th Tank Battalion in a counterattack between the Chiers and Meuse rivers in the direction of Douzy (about ten kilometers southeast of Sedan). The latter was an area on the western edge of the 3rd North African Division's sector before the entry of the 71st Division. The two tank battalions, however, were not yet released from the Second Army to the Xth Corps. They came under the Xth Corps’ control at 1430 hours on 13 May, about half an hour before the Germans attacked across the Meuse.19
The Xth Corps also sent infantry forward. As previously explained, the commander of the 213th Infantry Regiment received orders from the Xth Corps to move his regiment forward on the night of 10–11 May. On the 12th around 1400 hours, the Xth Corps ordered the 213th Regiment to move forward on the night of 12–13 May to the northern woodline of the Bois de Mont Dieu. Also, late on the 11th, the 205th Regiment received orders from the Xth Corps to move to a position east of Stonne. By the morning of 13 May, both regiments occupied positions south of Sedan near the high ground between Mont Dieu and Stonne. On the morning of the 14th, the 4th and 7th Tank battalions combined awkwardly with the 213th and 205th Infantry regiments to deliver the ill-fated and poorly executed counterattacks of that day.
Meanwhile, the XXIst Corps, which was under the command of General J.A.L.R. Flavigny and part of the General Reserve, received a warning order on the evening of 11 May. Up to this point, the corps had the mission of preparing to be committed in either the Second or Ninth Army's sector, but the warning order advised Flavigny that his corps would “probably” be committed in the Second Army's sector.20 Since his corps had no combat divisions and consisted only of a corps headquarters and organic support units, he expected to assume control of two to three divisions after being committed.
At 0815 hours on 12 May, General Georges met with key members of his staff and decided to retain control over the XXIst Corps. Though he did decide in this meeting to give the 53rd Infantry Division to the Ninth Army and the 1st Colonial Infantry Division to the Second Army and to move the 14th Infantry Division to the vicinity of the hinge between the two field armies, he was not yet willing to relinquish control of Flavigny's corps headquarters.21
On 13 May at 1330 hours, the Second Army issued an order to the Xth, XVIIIth, and XXIst Corps; this was a contingency plan for the use of the XXIst Corps if it came under Huntziger's control. If the Second Army were attacked, the XXIst Corps would move into line between the Xth and XVIIIth corps. From left to right, the Xth Corps would command the 55th and 71st divisions, the XXIst Corps the 3rd North African and 3rd Colonial divisions, and the XVIIIth the 1st Colonial (which would move forward into line) and the 41st Infantry divisions.
The order from the Second Army on 13 May also addressed the possible employment of the XXIst Corps on the western edge of the field army's sector. If the Germans crossed the Meuse successfully and ruptured French defensive lines west of Sedan, the XXIst Corps would occupy a position to the left of the Xth Corps and receive control of divisions in that area.22 Despite this possibility, the primary concern of the contingency plan was for the center and right of the Second Army, not the left.
The contingency plan from the Second Army of 13 May also mentioned the commitment of the 3rd Motorized Infantry Division and “eventually” the 3rd Armored Division. While serving as part of the General Reserve, the 3rd Motorized Division received orders at 2000 hours on the 12th to move toward Stonne. With the first group departing at midnight, the bulk of the division moved on the 13th, and the final group closed in on the morning of the 14th.23 At midnight on 12–13 May, the Second Army told the Xth Corps to select the exact position of the motorized division but restricted the Xth Corps’ options by saying the motorized division had to be employed in the vicinity of Stonne and the woods to its east.
The 3rd Armored Division also began moving toward the Second Army's sector. After receiving a warning order issued around 1430–1445 hours on 12 May, the division received an order around 1500 hours to move northeast as quickly as possible. Although the division initially expected to move only one demi-brigade, the division commander was soon told to move his entire division. He did not learn the final destination of the division until 1700 hours but began moving most of his combat elements forward on the night of 12–13 May and the remaining elements on the following night.24
Thus, before the Germans crossed the Meuse at Sedan, significant preparations had occurred for strengthening the Second Army. With plans being completed for the employment of the 71st Infantry, 1st Colonial, 3rd Motorized, and 3rd Armored divisions, plus two regiments of artillery and a corps headquarters as well as the 2nd and 5th Light Cavalry divisions and the 1st Cavalry Brigade, and with all units already moving and soon to be in place, the French seemed well prepared for an enemy thrust from Sedan into the rear of the Maginot Line. Significantly, however, the major focus of the preparation had been to prevent a counterclockwise encirclement coming from east of Sedan toward the southeast. That the Germans would cross the Meuse and then pivot to the west was apparently given little or no thought by the Second Army before the afternoon of the 14th, which was about the time the Germans began turning toward the west.
Before he gained control of the 3rd Motorized Infantry and 3rd Armored divisions, General Huntziger expressed some concern to General Georges’ headquarters about the need to strengthen the left of the Second Army. At 1025 hours on 12 May, Colonel Lacaille, the Chief of Staff of the Second Army, called Georges’ office and explained why Huntziger wanted a supplementary division for his left flank. With the 1st Colonial Division available on the field army's right, the general believed another division was needed behind his left. At 1330 hours the Second Army called again, this time explaining that Huntziger was “very desirous of having an armored division moved into the region of Attigny.” At 1515 Colonel Lacaille called again. The entry in the log for General Georges’ office summarized his points: “Situation on the left of the Second Army (Sedan) is very urgent. Heavy losses. Request an infantry division to strengthen the left which would not affect the movement toward the north of the armored units.”25
Since Ge
orges had departed his command post at 0935 hours to meet in Mons with the King of Belgium, his staff decided at 1520 hours to order the 3rd Motorized and one demi-brigade of the 3rd Armored Division to move forward on the left of the Second Army. At 1530 hours Georges’ office called and informed the Second Army of this decision. Forty-five minutes later, the Second Army requested that the 3rd Motorized Division be moved to Vouziers, which was in its left rear, but was told that the division would be moved in its center to a position southeast of Stonne. Despite Colonel Lacaille's strong insistence on its being moved farther west, the headquarters of the northeastern front refused to alter its order.26
As far as the higher headquarters was concerned, the two divisions were moving to the left flank of the Second Army, but Lacaille and Huntziger wanted them farther west. Georges’ headquarters evidently believed the greatest threat was of a German breakthrough into the Stenay Gap and the rear of the Maginot Line from the right of the Second Army, but Huntziger had become increasingly concerned about his left flank. For months Huntziger's main concern had been with his right, a concern leading him to place his best divisions in his right and his weakest (the 55th Division) on his left.27 The arrival of the 3rd Motorized and 3rd Armored divisions behind his left flank, however, served to quiet most of his fears.
Despite Huntziger's concern with his left flank, he apparently did not believe the Germans would push across the Meuse and then pivot to the west. From his perspective, the threat seemed to be a push through the left of the Second Army and then a push forward or a turn toward the rear of the Maginot Line, not a pivot west into the right flank of the Ninth Army. Nevertheless, about the time the Germans reached La Boulette, he did order the 5th Light Cavalry to move forward and occupy positions along the Canal des Ardennes and the Bar River. Though, by facing east, the cavalry could plug any gap that emerged between the Second and Ninth armies, Huntziger's main concern apparently was not the possibility of the Germans’ pivoting to the west. An operations order published by the Second Army on 14 May at 1300 hours, which was about the time the first elements of the 1st Panzer Division were pivoting west, explained that German tanks were “progressing toward the south and the southeast.”28 By continuing in this direction, according to Huntziger's expectations, the Germans would meet the 3rd Armored and 3rd Motorized divisions.
In his report written on 10 August 1940, General Georges portrayed the decisions of 12 May as intending to reinforce the area west of Sedan. From his report, one can infer that he anticipated the Germans moving west from Monthermé and pivoting west at Sedan,29 but the record of decisions and movements made by subordinate units suggests otherwise. Though Georges was actually away from his headquarters for most of the 12th, being in Mons to meet the King of Belgium, the debate between the Second Army and his headquarters clearly shows the concern of his headquarters with a turning movement behind the Maginot Line. Thus neither Georges nor Huntziger (nor their headquarters) divined the intentions of the Germans.
In other words, decisions made on 12 May about the reinforcement of the Second Army increased its defenses against an enemy move in a southeasterly direction but did little to prevent a German pivot to the west. In fact, as will be explained in the next chapter, Georges gave little or no thought to the possibility of a German move toward the west until the night of 13–14 May when he formed a special Army Detachment under General Robert Touchon to close the rapidly expanding gap between the Second and Ninth armies. Unfortunately for France, the strengthening of the Second Army occurred without any significant reinforcement of the Ninth Army's right except for decisions on the 12th concerning the insertion of the 53rd Division on its right flank and the movement of the 14th Infantry Division toward the hinge between the two field armies. This resulted in very few units being available to halt the Germans once their move toward the west began in earnest. These actions played directly into German hands and made the effects of their breakout even more destructive than they otherwise may have been.
Throughout the preparatory phase of reinforcing the Second Army, time—in the eyes of the French—seemed to be on their side. Although they expected the Germans to halt on the north bank of the Meuse, perhaps for a few days, and concentrate forces and materiel for a deliberate river crossing, they did not rule out the possibility of a hasty crossing. If a hasty crossing were made, however, significant forces were being massed to halt it and perhaps throw it back across the river. Except for the 3rd Armored and 3rd Motorized divisions, which would close in on the morning of the 14th, most of the other units would be in place on the 13th. Given the complexity of a river crossing under fire and given the difficulty and bottlenecks inherent in moving units across a river, the French confidently believed sufficient forces could be in place on the 13th and 14th of May to halt the Germans. In many ways, the smoothness and efficiency of the French units moving toward the Meuse must have lulled General Huntziger and his superiors into being optimistic about the results.
THE MOVEMENT OF THE SECOND ARMY'S COMMAND POST
Another indication of the optimism of the French concerned the planned movement of the Second Army's command post. On 7 February 1940 the Chief of Staff of the Second Army approved the movement of the field army's headquarters about forty-five kilometers from Senuc southeast to Verdun.30 The movement was supposed to commence at some undetermined future time, shortly after an alert that would accompany the launching of a German attack. From February until May, soldiers worked on preparing the new headquarters at Forts Regret, Landrecourt, and Dugny, which were part of the circle of forts around Verdun and which lay south and southwest of the city. For this complicated move, preparations included the laying of at least 117 communication lines and the emplacing of 186 telephones. About 38 tons of communications wire were used, as well as 9 tons of lead-encased wire with 56 lines.31 One cannot help but wonder what would have happened if this wire and effort had been made available to front-line units instead of being used in establishing a new headquarters.
The first increment of people and equipment from the headquarters began moving at 2100 hours on 13 May, about the time the Germans reached the heights of La Boulette south of Sedan. The second increment followed the next day. Over 2,683 people were moved, including 1,281 in the headquarters and 1,402 from its supporting communications unit.32
During subsequent weeks, other field armies had no choice but to move their headquarters, but the transfer of the Second Army's command post from Senuc to Verdun occurred at an extremely awkward moment when the efficiency of the headquarters needed to be at its peak. Though Huntziger and a small staff remained at Senuc, and though surviving files suggest the command post continued to function, some disruption and decline in performance clearly occurred. That General Huntziger would even consider such a move during the crucial night of the 13th, when the Germans were rushing forces across the river, must be considered clear evidence of his confidence in his field army and of his believing he had plenty of time to react to German actions. Subsequent events demonstrated his error in judgment. He soon learned that the friction of war and enemy actions often lay waste to the most perfectly designed plans.
COUNTERATTACK BY THE XXIST CORPS
Among the preparatory steps made by the French to respond to the German move toward Sedan, the decisions concerning the XXIst Corps assume prime importance. At 1900 hours on the 13th, the Second Army issued a written order to the XXIst Corps to prepare for a counterattack with the 3rd Motorized, 3rd Armored, and 5th Light Cavalry divisions. At midnight on the 13–14th, it issued another written order for the XXIst Corps to halt the enemy along the field army's second position (Mont Dieu–Stonne) and then to counterattack toward Sedan.33 In essence, the flow of the battle had risen out of the Xth Corps’ control and was now in the hands of the Second Army.
As one considers the possibility of a counterattack against the vulnerable flank of the pivoting XIXth Panzer Corps, it is important to recognize that the Second Army had approximately 280 modern tanks as
signed to it. This includes 132 tanks in the 3rd Armored Division, approximately 120 tanks in three independent tank battalions, and 28 tanks in two light cavalry divisions. Additionally, the two light cavalry divisions had a total of 58 lightly armed machine-gun vehicles that compared favorably to the Mark I's of Germany.34 The Second Army thus had approximately 338 armored vehicles to the organic 876 (including 200 Mark I's) of the XIXth Panzer Corps. Considering losses between 10 and 15 May, the Germans may have had no more than twice as many tanks as the French Second Army in the area of Sedan.
Most of the tanks in the Second Army eventually came under the control of the XXIst Corps, which was placed at the disposition of the Second Army by the High Command on 13 May. Except for the tanks in the three independent tank battalions and one of the light cavalry divisions, the rest of the armored vehicles in the Second Army (146, plus 29 machine-gun vehicles) eventually came under the control of General J.A.L.R. Flavigny, who commanded this corps.
Of all the French general officers on active duty in May 1940, none had as much experience with armored operations as Flavigny. As director of the Department of Cavalry in 1933, he had proposed to General Maxime Weygand (who was Vice-President of the Superior Council of War for the French Army and thus its designated commander in the event of war) the formation of a mechanized cavalry division and later the development of a cavalry tank. The tank he helped develop was the SOMUA S-35 tank, the best tank France had in 1940. When the first light mechanized division (division légère mécanique) was formed in 1935, General Flavigny became its first commander. Throughout the 1930s the French Army recognized him as its foremost proponent and authority on mechanized operations, even though he concentrated on cavalry rather than tank-heavy forces.35
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