Regardless of causes, the combination of the late departure and the slow forward movement ensured that the division would attack extremely late, if it attacked at all on the 14th. The French units showed neither the ability nor the willingness to move forward as fast as elements of the 1st Panzer Division had moved from Gaulier toward Bulson and Chémery. While their exact arrival time is not certain, the tanks may have arrived at the southern edge of the woods of Mont Dieu around 1600 hours but were still two to three kilometers from the northern edge of the woods.
Though the generals differed by as much as two hours on the timing of events, Brocard met Flavigny at Alleux (about fifteen kilometers southwest of Mont Dieu) between 1400 and 1630 hours on the 14th. The conversation started off awkwardly because Brocard did not know how far the two columns in his division had moved. He had received a message about the progress of the division but had not been able to decipher it. After receiving an update on the situation of the division, particularly its problems with communications, the corps commander criticized the division for moving too slowly and demanded to know why it was late. The division commander explained that the reasons were the same ones he had given that morning. He added that the division could still launch the attack, even though it was late, since the days were long in May and since the motorized division was not yet ready to attack. Flavigny rejected these arguments, probably angrily, and stated that it was necessary to do something.
About an hour later, he ordered Brocard to place his tanks along likely avenues of enemy approach through the woods of Mont Dieu and La Cassine and to form blocking positions with mixed groups of heavy and light tanks. To comply with these orders, the division clumsily spread its tanks across a broad front on both sides of the Ardennes Canal. While Brocard later insisted the tanks were dispersed across twenty kilometers, Flavigny insisted the distance was no more than six or seven kilometers with excellent lateral routes of communication to the rear. Whatever its width, the division spread individual companies across the front and split up some of the platoons and companies so strong points could be occupied with two or three vehicles.
The different times given by the two generals in their postbattle description of events is significant, for Brocard provided the earlier times and Flavigny the later times. Obviously, if the earlier times were correct, the attack could have been continued, but if the later times were correct, the attack probably could not have continued. Conclusive proof about the exact time, however, may never be available. Suffice it to say, the XXIst Corps commander decided that the risks were too high for unleashing the attack late in the afternoon of the 14th.
The key decision, nevertheless, was the halting of the attack. In his postwar letter to the National Assembly, General Flavigny explained why he halted it.
The general situation had completely changed. The 55th Division which could have supported my units in the morning no longer existed as a fighting unit. The 5th Light Cavalry Division held the woods of Mazarin [to the northwest of Mont Dieu] with difficulty. The enemy had had the entire morning to cross the Meuse and to send reinforcements to the south of the river. It seemed impossible to make the counterattack…before night…. An attack led by weak, poorly trained troops seemed to me to be doomed to a failure that could have compromised the defense of Mont Dieu.55
General Flavigny also had been alarmed by the “nervousness” of the troops he encountered. In each of his later statements about events surrounding his decision to halt the attack on the 14th, he described meeting several soldiers who were fearful of facing a Panzer division and who repeated false rumors of German tanks’ having advanced much farther than they actually had moved. He also mentioned the armored crewmen's lack of confidence in their weapons. On top of this, Flavigny's discussions and meetings with General Brocard apparently created serious doubts in his own mind about the capabilities of the 3rd Armored Division and its commander. In a letter in August 1946 explaining his decision, he strongly emphasized the fragility of the B-1 tank and its many problems. He also stressed the inadequate training of the men in the armored division.56
Another important factor was Flavigny's lack of confidence in the French armored divisions. In a long account of his experience in the campaign, he described an exercise of the recently formed 2nd Armored Division on 8 May 1940, in which it had been ordered to conduct a counterattack that, according to General Flavigny, did “not correspond to the employment of a mechanized force in a rapid engagement.” In other words, the division received a fairly simply mission to accomplish, but it took more than four hours to move four kilometers and arrived “completely” disorganized. Flavigny concluded, “I had doubts about having to employ a unit so poorly trained.”57 Less than a week later, he faced exactly that decision and clearly was influenced on 14 May by his memories of the poor performance of the armored unit in the training exercise.
In short, Flavigny saw little possibility of an effective counterattack's being delivered on the 14th. Faced with the possibility of wasting precious lives and materiel, he chose to cancel the attack of the 3rd Armored Division. Fate, chance, friction, and inexperience had caused France to miss a fleeting but important opportunity. By the morning of the 15th, the Germans had significantly strengthened their forces across the Meuse and thereby decreased the vulnerability of their rapidly expanding bridgehead.
The events of the 14th also demonstrated an important difference between French and German armored units. Specifically, the French tanks were about as far from Mont Dieu at 0600 hours as the German tanks were from Chémery. However, the German tanks made the move successfully on the morning of the 14th; the French tanks did not finish the move until about 1600 hours. Leadership, experience, training, and doctrine account for the differences.
Nevertheless, the French did not abandon the possibility of counterattacking. During the night of 14–15 May, the armored division had two tank battalions west and two east of the Ardennes Canal. The division was already experiencing numerous difficulties with refueling, resupply, and maintenance; its dispersion across the broad front made its logistical problems even more onerous. Because of several tanks’ having been left at Reims and because of a limited ability to repair inoperable vehicles, the division had only forty-one of its sixty-two B-1 tanks operational on the morning of the 15th.58 It probably had a slightly higher percentage of H-39 tanks available.
On the morning of the 15th, the Second Army became concerned about holding the high ground running through Mont Dieu and Stonne, especially as enemy attacks against Stonne began to increase. For the next two days, some of the hardest fighting of the campaign occurred around Stonne. Around 0700 hours the Germans captured Stonne with a combined infantry, tank, and aviation attack. By concentrating dive bombers and tanks against the town's defenders and using infantry to infiltrate around them, the Germans forced the French to withdraw. The French immediately launched a counterattack with a company of B-1 bis tanks, another company of H-39 tanks, and infantry from the 67th Regiment of the 3rd Motorized Division.59 After some hard fighting, they recaptured the important town around 1100 hours, but the 3rd Company, 49th Tank Battalion, lost eight of its ten B-1 bis tanks during the fighting.60 Late that afternoon, the Germans launched another attack and recaptured the village. On the following morning, the French again attacked with the 67th Regiment, reinforced by a battalion from the 57th Infantry Regiment, and recaptured Stonne. As on the previous day, however, the Germans counterattacked and recaptured the town around 1500 hours.
Thus, on the 15th and 16th, Stonne changed hands frequently. As mentioned earlier, both sides claimed to hold Stonne from 0700 to 1500 hours on the 15th. In reality, the area was likely held by neither side.
Having become increasingly concerned about the German crossing of the Meuse, General Georges insisted that a counterattack be conducted at Sedan on the 15th. He had authorized the release of the 3rd Armored Division from the French Army's General Reserve and wanted it used in an attack toward the Meuse. At 0630
hours on the 15th, he formally ordered the Second Army to make the attack on Sedan. After receiving the order around 0800 hours, General Flavigny met at 0900 hours in Senuc with the commanding generals of the 3rd Armored and 3rd Motorized Infantry divisions. Since the combat units of these divisions were located near the line of departure, he believed an attack could be launched relatively easily by 1300 hours. With the 5th Light Cavalry Division attacking on the left, he ordered the armored division to lead the corps’ attack with the bulk of its heavy tanks moving through Bulson toward Wadelincourt. The motorized division would follow the armored division and seize three successive objectives: Chémery-Maisoncelle, Connage-Bulson, and La Boulette-Noyers.61 To ensure the attack proceeded smoothly, he placed the armored division under the control of the motorized division. Flavigny later explained, “The 3rd Armored Division appeared incapable of performing as an armored division; its tanks would be used to accompany the infantry, a method that all its cadre and crews understood.”62
During the meeting, the two generals informed Flavigny about the loss and subsequent recapture of Stonne and the use of French tanks in the successful operation. However, the commander of the armored division also reported that he could not attack immediately, for the movement on the previous evening and the fighting in the morning had exhausted his fuel supplies. He also had to reassemble his tanks from their dispersed positions. Flavigny had no choice but to delay the attack until 1500 hours.
At 1430 hours the commander of the motorized division (General Bertin-Bossu) and the commander of the brigade of tanks in the armored division returned to the XXIst Corps’ command post. They reported that the attack was “impossible,” for the tanks had not been refueled. The armored brigade commander explained that only eight of the B-1 tanks would be available for an attack at 1500 hours. Evidently furious about his orders being countermanded, Flavigny ordered them to return immediately to their units and to launch the attack. He caustically told them that even if a unit were unprepared to begin an attack, a subordinate commander had no authority to change the time of attack for his unit, especially when other units were prepared to attack on the specified time. Since they had Hotchkiss H-39 tanks, he told them to lead with the smaller tanks and to have the B-1 tanks follow.63
Later the commander of the motorized division met with the commander of the armored division at their collocated command posts and learned that the tanks still were not ready to attack. Seeing himself with no alternatives, General Bertin-Bossu told Flavigny the attack had to be delayed. Apparently somewhat more than half of the 132 B-1 bis and H-39 tanks were operable, but units were still being assembled and refueled. Bowing to the inevitable, the corps commander authorized the motorized division commander to delay the attack until the tanks were assembled. The attack was soon postponed until 1730 hours. Not relishing the prospect of fighting outnumbered, Brocard remained concerned about the small number of tanks available and noted that the scheduled attack could not reach the deep objectives originally identified.
Meanwhile an unfortunate incident reduced the number of tanks. One of the B-1 bis companies did not receive word about the attack being delayed and moved out at 1500 hours. After moving less than one kilometer, it encountered heavy antitank fire from the area south of Maisoncelle and Chémery and lost two tanks, as well as the company commander. Almost every tank was hit. By the end of the day on the 15th, one of the B-1 bis battalions had only twenty-one tanks, the other eight.64 Since the percentage of H-39 tanks that were available was probably about the same, the division had about 40 percent of its authorized strength in tanks. By the end of the day, the French had also lost Stonne again.
Throughout this ordeal, General Bertin-Bossu of the 3rd Motorized Division performed extremely well. While he nominally had an armored division under his control and was receiving much pressure from Flavigny to get the tanks moving, his division was engaged in bitter fighting around Stonne. Given these demands on Bertin-Bossu, one wonders why Flavigny did not personally assume control of the counterattack. As other French commanders had done, he remained insulated from the decisive point in the battle in his sector. The sharp contrast between this style of command and that of the Germans was clearly an important advantage for the Germans.
Around 1715 hours on the 15th, corps headquarters—according to the commander of the motorized division—canceled the scheduled attack. General Flavigny, however, denied having canceled it and thought it had been launched. After a pilot reported seeing French tanks fighting north of the woods of Mont Dieu, he telephoned the Second Army's command post and informed it that the attack had begun. The truth became apparent later, and he said, “In fact, the tanks had moved barely a hundred meters and the infantry had not followed.”65 Thus a strong attack by the 3rd Armored Division and 3rd Motorized Division never took place.
Except for a limited attack launched by the 1st Colonial Infantry Division and the 2nd Light Cavalry Division to the east of Mont Dieu and Stonne, the French XXIst Corps failed to launch a counterattack into the vulnerable flank of the XIXth Panzer Corps. In December 1939, when the Germans used a war game to test General Manstein's concept of a thrust through the Ardennes, their greatest concern had been the possibility of an attack on the German flank. Fortunately for the Germans, the object of their greatest fears was not realized.
CHAPTER 10
The Failure of The French Sixth Army
During the 1940 campaign, some of the most confusing yet important actions occurred on the western shoulder of the German penetration at Sedan. In the area of the Bar River and the Ardennes Canal between Dom-le-Mesnil (on the Meuse River) and La Cassine (southwest of Chémery), the French committed several units in piecemeal fashion in a desperate attempt to halt the rapid German advance. While the High Command wanted the XXIst Corps to halt Guderian's XIXth Panzer Corps and then counterattack, the main purpose of the units subsequently thrown in front of the Germans’ westward advance was to contain the enemy and prevent Guderian from making even larger advances.
To halt the XIXth Panzer Corps’ move toward the west, the French threw in the 3rd Spahis Brigade, the 5th Light Cavalry Division, the 53rd Infantry Division, the 14th Infantry Division, and the 2nd Armored Division. These units soon became embroiled in an extremely fluid battle in the region of Vendresse, Singly, and Poix-Terron. Farther to the north of Mézières, the 61st Infantry and 102nd Infantry divisions fought to retain control of the Meuse River against the advances of Reinhardt's XLIst Panzer Corps. As for the headquarters above the divisions, the French XXIIIrd and XLIst corps attempted to control units in the area where Guderian's corps was advancing, while the Ninth and Second armies, as well as a special field army headquarters under General Robert A. Touchon, attempted to exercise higher-level command.
Because of the fluid nature of the fighting, the battle against the Germans became almost a confusing sequence of oftentimes disconnected actions. Since the XIXth Panzer Corps maintained the initiative through an energetic and hard push west toward Poix-Terron and Singly and then Rethel, the French could do little more than react. And usually their reactions occurred too late.
THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL: GENERAL TOUCHON AND THE SIXTH ARMY
Shortly after the war began in September 1939, the French carefully analyzed possible areas in which the Germans could penetrate or bypass their defenses in eastern and northeastern France. Two scenarios seemed to demand special preparations, the first being a German move through Switzerland, and the second a penetration between the Second and Third armies in the vicinity of Longwy. To prepare for these contingencies, the French formed a new field army, the Sixth Army, and charged it with the responsibility of preparing for the contingency of German attacks through these areas. In February 1940 General Georges gave specific directions to the Sixth Army commander, General Touchon, to prepare his field army to move in between the Second and Third armies if a rupture of French defenses occurred.1
Of course, the Germans did not make a penetration in May 1940 bet
ween the Second and Third armies but instead created a large gap farther to the west between the Second and Ninth armies. Nevertheless, the French High Command responded to the unexpected penetration by using the command structure that had been created for the possibility of a penetration between the Second and Third armies.2 By charging General Touchon with sealing the rupture created between the Second and Ninth armies, General Georges simply modified the contingency plan and response that had already been carefully studied and designed. The one important change he made was that he did not place the entire Sixth Army headquarters in charge of the French riposte. Instead, in an awkward arrangement, he brought the Second Army under his own control at midnight on 13–14 May3 and at 1530 hours on the 14th initially placed Touchon's newly renamed “Army Detachment” at the “disposition” of General Huntziger.4 Supply and services, however, came from the Ninth Army.
Touchon was a gifted and effective leader who had made his reputation as a younger office while teaching at the Ecole Supérieure de la Guerre in the mid-1920s. A forceful and confident speaker, he gave frequent lectures on the infantry. More than anything else, these lectures revealed a faith in the “preponderant importance of fire” and a lack of faith in mobility and mechanization. In several of his lectures he was particularly critical of French thinkers before World War I who had misunderstood the effects of enemy fire. In other lectures, he also rejected the methods that later became the heart of German infiltration tactics. Amidst the security and quiet of the lecture hall, he questioned the possibility of driving deeply into or completely through an enemy's defenses, for such attacks would be limited by the complexity of coordinating the infantry and the artillery and by the difficulty of maintaining the rhythm of a deep attack. Little did he realize how extensively such an operation would later affect his life.
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