In 1931 Colonel Touchon became the commandant of the School of Application for Infantry and Tanks and soon suggested the conduct of a special exercise to experiment with “modern” methods of combat. The tests he suggested were conducted in September 1932 at the Camp de Mailly and were one of the most important endeavors in the attempt by France to develop modern armored forces. As chief umpire of the exercises, Touchon questioned the potential of mechanized units. Among his criticisms was the inability of armored forces to attack a strongly defended position. According to General Weygand, the negative report on the 1932 exercises virtually halted the movement toward independent armored forces.
The French Army noticed Touchon's talents and liked his ideas, and in 1936 made him a member of the commission that wrote a new version of the French equivalent of the field service regulations. In 1938 he served as the president of the commission that wrote the new infantry regulations. By 1940 he was clearly acknowledged to be one of France's brightest and most capable leaders.5 Thus it was most ironic that General Touchon—an officer who had played such a key role in France's failure to develop mobile armored forces—was placed in charge of sealing the gap made by the German armored forces.
The requirement to create a special force for insertion between the Second and Ninth armies appeared because of the advance of the German XIXth Panzer Corps on 13–14 May. As the Germans pushed back the French 55th Division toward Mont Dieu, they separated the Second and Ninth armies and soon opened a large gap between them. With the right of the Ninth Army touching Dom-le-Mesnil along the Meuse (five kilometers west of Donchery) and the left of the Second Army touching Omont (ten kilometers west of Chémery), an opening of about twelve kilometers existed between the two armies. After the collapse of the 55th Division and the insertion of the 3rd Motorized and the 3rd Armored divisions by the Second Army into positions along Mont Dieu, elements of the hard-pressed and tired 5th Light Cavalry Division and 3rd Brigade of Spahis attempted to fill the gap between the 3rd Motorized Division and the 53rd Infantry Division, which was on the extreme right of the Ninth Army. Yet, even before Guderian pivoted west, it was clear that additional forces had to be moved forward to strengthen the two sorely pressed cavalry units.
Though he did not yet know the results of the anticipated counterattacks on the 14th by the Xth Corps (with two infantry regiments and two tank battalions) and on the 15th by the XXIst Corps (with the 3rd Motorized and 3rd Armored divisions), General Georges began planning on the night of 13–14 May for the possibility of a German penetration between the Second and Ninth armies. In the middle of the night, General Touchon, who commanded the Sixth Army, received a telephone call ordering him to report to Georges’ office the following morning. During a meeting at 0800 hours on the 14th, Georges informed Touchon of his intention to place him in charge of the forces that would “colmater the breach [in the] vicinity of Sedan.” Revealing a late-blooming concern with the possibility of the Germans’ heading west, Georges wanted Touchon's forces to be employed so the direction between Sedan and Laon could be “interdicted.”6 This discussion is the first indication of a high-level French concern with a German move or pivot to the west. It may have come from the recognition that the Germans crossing the Meuse near Dinant, Monthermé, and Sedan could combine their forces and pose a serious threat to the French center.
Following his attendance at a long briefing, which was also attended by General Gamelin, Touchon left the headquarters at 1100 hours. Before he departed Georges’ headquarters, Colonel Lacaille, the Chief of Staff of the Second Army, described the situation at Sedan and provided an unnecessarily optimistic report. He said, “We have the situation in hand. We have created a field of battle where we will encounter the enemy with equal if not superior forces.”7 The reasons for this optimism are inexplicable, for by this time the counterattack by the Xth Corps with two infantry regiments and two tank battalions had failed and the Germans had moved through Chémery. Lacaille's report to Georges is clear evidence of the French High Command's failure early on the 14th to appreciate what the Germans were doing.
Shortly after arriving at Soissons, Touchon was recalled to Georges’ headquarters. At 1140 hours Colonel Lacaille had provided another report, but this one gave a more realistic assessment of the deteriorating situation at Sedan.8 After arriving at Georges’ headquarters, Touchon learned that the German “pocket” had become much larger and was continuing to expand at an alarming rate. Georges told him that he must act quickly and “assist General Huntziger in sealing the breach.”9
At 1500 hours on the 14th, General Touchon arrived at Senuc where he met with Huntziger and learned more about the gravity of the situation. At 1530 hours he received a written order, which provided him his mission: “General Touchon is placed temporarily at the disposition of General Huntziger to reestablish the situation at the boundary between the Second and Ninth armies. His mission specifically will be to coordinate the actions of large units operating at the junction of the Second and Ninth armies.”10 Though the order was signed by Georges, it initially provided him only a provisional cavalry squadron and six training battalions. Other units would later be placed under his control. Rarely has the destiny of a nation ridden on the back of such a relatively small force.
After leaving Senuc, Touchon drove about sixty-five kilometers along a circuitous route toward the northwest from Vouziers, to Mazagran, to Machault, to Rethel. At Mazagran he encountered the colonel who commanded the 57th Infantry Regiment of the 36th Infantry Division. This division was moving north into position along the Aisne River, which ran roughly parallel to and about fifteen kilometers south of the line of hills near Singly and Vendresse. Since Touchon was unable to establish contact with the commanding general of the 36th Division, he ordered the commander of the 57th Regiment to defend the area around Vouziers. He wanted the 36th Division to defend along the Aisne River between Vouziers and Attigny.11
At Machault he expected to meet with General Grandsard of the Xth Corps, but he was nowhere to be found. The only personnel Touchon could locate were three communications officers from the Xth Corps who were ignorant of Grandsard's location. He drove on to Rethel.
Between 2300 and 2400 hours on that same day, Touchon met with General de Lattre de Tassigny, who commanded the 14th Infantry Division but who had only one regiment in the area. As will be explained, he ordered de Lattre to “hold” Rethel and to establish contact with the 36th Division at Attigny. More importantly, he ordered the division to defend along a twenty-kilometer front between Poix-Terron and Signy-l'Abbaye.12 These two towns lay northwest of Vendresse and Singly and were on the northern edge of the long line of hills that extended northwest from Stonne and Mont Dieu. Only two hours before, de Lattre had met with General André G. Corap (to whom his division had been attached up to that point) and received orders from the Ninth Army's commander to occupy the Poix-Terron to Signy-l'Abbaye line.
Sometime around midnight of the 14–15th, General Germain, who commanded the XXIIIrd Corps, arrived at Touchon's headquarters. Touchon placed the 14th Infantry Division under his command and ordered him to establish contact with the Second Army on his right. An hour later, General Keller, the Inspector General of tanks, arrived to inform him that the 2nd Armored Division was placed at his disposition and would be disembarking near his headquarters.13 Shortly after the meeting with Keller, de Lattre learned that the 2nd Armored Division would move into the area to the left of the 14th Division near Launois (eight kilometers west of Poix-Terron).
On 14 May several decisions had increased the number of units under Touchon's control, and at 0715 hours on the 15th, Georges’ headquarters published an order placing Touchon's field army directly under his control rather than Huntziger's and identifying the units under Touchon's control. These were the XXIIIrd Corps, which had the 14th Infantry Division, 2nd Armored Division, and a number of training battalions; and the XLIst Corps, which had the 53rd Infantry Division, 61st Infantry Division, 102nd Infantry Division, a
nd 3rd Brigade of Spahis.14
While the order did not change Touchon's mission, it did specify the line along which he was supposed to halt the Germans. The line was shaped roughly like a giant V leaning on its side with the point aiming west toward Montcornet and the top center on Mézières. The bottom part of the V extended about thirty-five kilometers northwest from Omont to Liart (about ten kilometers northwest of Signy-l'Abbaye), while the top part extended about twenty-five kilometers northeast from Liart to Rocroi. Based on orders given by Touchon on the 14th, the 36th Infantry and 14th Infantry divisions would hold the bottom part of the V, while the 2nd Armored Division would occupy part of the line and then attack directly into the V. Georges’ order also indicated that three additional infantry divisions would disembark between 16–18 May just beyond the point of the V, about twenty kilometers west and northwest of Liart.
Thus, around midnight of the 14–15th, the situation probably did not appear impossible to Touchon. Though the Germans had penetrated through the French defenses and had advanced much more rapidly than expected, the experience of World War I suggested that their rapid advance soon had to halt. Major advances in that war had rarely lasted longer than a week before physical exhaustion, dwindling supplies, and heavy logistical tails usually forced an attacker to halt. More importantly, significant forces were assembling near the Sedan breakthrough and would soon enter the fight against the XIXth Panzer Corps. However, if these forces were to occupy the positions designated by Touchon, much depended on the front units’ delaying the advance of the Germans.
If Touchon were optimistic, his views undoubtedly became less optimistic on the following morning when he again tried to visit with General Grandsard.
On the route, there was an uninterrupted stream of deserters, the majority in automobiles and impossible to halt…. In the village of Rozoy he found numerous military [personnel], almost all without arms and panicked…. The general continued on and loaded in his vehicle at the edge of the village a military policeman wounded by a bullet in his shoulder.15
Such a demoralizing spectacle had to affect even the most optimistic and capable French leader. What Touchon actually thought is unknown.
THE CAVALRY AT VENDRESSE AND LA HORGNE
In the effort to prevent the XIXth Panzer Corps from heading west, French cavalry initially played the most important role. On 13 May the cavalry units of the 5th Light Cavalry Division rested in the area around Le Chesne (twelve kilometers southwest of Chémery). After its hard fight in Belgium, the division used the time to rest its personnel, to repair its equipment, and to resupply its units. Throughout this period, German aerial attacks continued “incessantly.”16
After the Germans crossed the Meuse on the 13th, General Huntziger called the division commander, General Chanoine, to his headquarters late that afternoon and briefed him on the situation. Because of the Germans’ having pushed beyond Sedan, Huntziger told Chanoine to prepare his division to be employed at a yet-to-be-determined location; he also attached the 1st Cavalry Brigade to his division.
At 2200 hours a liaison officer arrived at Chanoine's headquarters and relayed an order from Huntziger for the employment of the cavalry division. Since the Germans had crossed at Sedan and reached La Boulette, the 5th Light Cavalry Division was to move that night and occupy positions along the Canal des Ardennes and the Bar River. Extending from north to south and facing east, the division was to defend passage points over the canal and river from the Meuse to a point south of Chémery and was to maintain contact in the north with the Ninth Army.17 On its right in the Second Army would be the 3rd Motorized and 3rd Armored divisions.
In addition to the 1st Cavalry Brigade, which was a horse-mounted unit, the 3rd Spahis Brigade, which was also horse-mounted, operated in the same area as the 5th Light Cavalry Division. The brigade included a Moroccan and an Algerian regiment. After its fight in Belgium, the Spahis Brigade withdrew across the Meuse and through the Ninth Army and then moved to Poix-Terron during the afternoon of 13 May. At 0130 hours on the 14th, the brigade received orders to cover the right flank of the 53rd Division (which was moving to the extreme right of the Ninth Army) and to assure “effective” liaison with the Second Army. The brigade commander immediately ordered his two regiments to move east from Poix-Terron toward Vendresse.18
At a meeting between the commanders of the 3rd Spahis Brigade and the 5th Light Cavalry Division at 0700 hours on the 14th, General Chanoine and Colonel Marc agreed on the procedures for maintaining contact between the Ninth and Second armies. Colonel Marc agreed to occupy the area between Sapogne (three kilometers south of Dom-le-Mesnil) and St. Aignan (four kilometers south of Pont à Bar). The cavalry division assumed responsibility for the sector from St. Aignan to an area south of Chémery.19
Thus, assuming all units managed to reach their assigned locations, the arrangement of units from left to right would have been 53rd Division, 3rd Brigade de Spahis, 5th Light Cavalry Division, and 3rd Motorized Division. By occupying these areas, defensive lines along the western edge of the German penetration could be reestablished and effective liaison between the Ninth and Second armies maintained.
Before the 3rd Brigade de Spahis and the 5th Light Cavalry Division fully occupied their assigned positions, however, German forces began to infiltrate across the canal and river line to their front. The 2nd Troop, 12th Chasseurs à Cheval from the horse cavalry brigade of the 5th Light Cavalry Division held Malmy (one kilometer west of Chémery) and was reinforced by two motorized platoons from the cavalry division. Unlike many other French units, it had placed mines around the bridge over the canal and had thereby blocked passage into Malmy. According to German reports, however, the mines were not buried. From behind the water obstacle and minefield, the commander of the horse cavalry troop, Captain Ethuin, watched German tanks move south from Chehéry toward Chémery. At 1015 hours a badly wounded motorcyclist arrived and informed him that the Germans had crossed the bridge at Omicourt (three kilometers north of Malmy).20
After receiving this alarming news, Ethuin placed a hasty minefield (but did not bury it) to the north of Malmy toward Omicourt, and a short time later received an order from his colonel to withdraw. Unfortunately, one of his subordinate elements pulled back too early and failed to cover with fire the mines near the bridge over the canal. The Germans took advantage of this mistake and quickly located and disarmed the mines. Moments later, they sent two tanks into Malmy.
Busily engaged in preparing his cavalry troop to withdraw, Captain Ethuin did not realize the route from Chémery to Malmy was open and was extremely surprised to see these two tanks emerge from Malmy, only 500 to 600 meters from his position. Since the cavalrymen had no antitank weapons, most of them dashed to the west on their horses or hid in the scanty cover to the west of Malmy. They were lucky momentarily, for the German tanks pulled back toward Malmy a few minutes later. Unfortunately, the tanks and others soon returned and attacked the troop. Though one platoon was almost completely wiped out, strong antitank fire from near Vendresse and behind the unlucky cavalrymen forced the Germans to withdraw again.21
Beginning around 1400 hours, the Germans launched an armor-heavy attack against Vendresse and an infantry attack supported by tanks from Omicourt through the Forêt de Mazarin. Though the French units were jumbled together in Vendresse and the high ground to its north, the cavalry units managed to delay the German advance. As enemy pressure increased against Vendresse and as the enemy moved around Vendresse through the woods to the north, General Chanoine decided to pull the cavalry back toward the west and southwest, but not to break contact with the Germans. Elements of the cavalry division withdrew toward Bouvellemont, Baâlons, and Chagny, while the 1st Cavalry Brigade, which retained control of all armored vehicles, covered the withdrawal by occupying and defending the high ground near Omont (four kilometers west of Vendresse). After the other cavalry units had withdrawn safely, the 1st Brigade withdrew south toward Chagny.22
As for the 3rd Spahis Brigad
e, this cavalry unit never actually occupied the area between Hannogne and St. Aignan. After Colonel Marc met with General Chanoine at 0700 hours, the regiment was supposed to move about six kilometers north of Vendresse toward its designed position between Sapogne and St. Aignan. This position extended generally along the northern edge of the Forêt de Mazarin. At 0830 hours the brigade was moving toward its position, with most of its units still in the Vendresse area, when Marc received an erroneous report that German armored elements had seized Omicourt. Because of the confusing situation east of Vendresse, he prepared his units to block the route that runs northwest from Vendresse toward Singly. By 1130 hours, according to Marc, “The menace against Vendresse momentarily appeared to dissipate.” The two regiments again began moving toward the woodline between Sapogne and St. Aignan. The German attack in the middle of the afternoon, however, caught the brigade in the middle of its move, and it quickly became deeply engaged in the fighting near Omicourt and Vendresse.23
When the 5th Light Cavalry Division began withdrawing around 1700 hours, the 3rd Spahis Brigade pulled back with it and occupied a position on its left that extended northwest from Bouvellemont. The two cavalry units thus occupied the high ground and key routes through the line of hills south of Vendresse and Singly. At 1900 hours a liaison officer from the XLIst Corps informed Colonel Marc of the withdrawal of the 53rd Infantry Division west toward the Vence River. The liaison officer returned at 2330 hours and passed the corps commander's order to the 5th Light Cavalry Division and the 3rd Spahis Brigade to organize “centers of resistance to contain the enemy advance for 24 hours.” While the 5th Light Cavalry blocked the routes running through Omont-Chagny and Baâlons-Bouvellemont, the 3rd Brigade would block the route running through La Horgne.24
The Breaking Point Page 38
