The Breaking Point

by Robert A Doughty

  At 0430 hours on the 15th, elements of the 3rd Brigade arrived at La Horgne. Of all the battles fought during the 1940 campaign, none subsequently was as revered or commemorated by the French as the valiant struggle by the two Moroccan and Algerian regiments at La Horgne.25 Using barricades and trenches along the small roads leading into the village, the cavalrymen fiercely resisted the German attacks from 0900 to 1700 hours. Though the 3rd Brigade did not fulfill its mission of holding La Horgne for twenty-four hours, it significantly delayed the advance of the 1st Panzer Division. But this was not accomplished without significant losses. More than half of the Algerians and Moroccans who fought at La Horgne died there. And among the dead were twelve of the thirty-seven French officers who fought there, including the commander of one of the regiments and his successor.26

  Although the cavalry fought bravely at Vendresse, La Horgne, and other areas, it nevertheless failed to halt the Germans. With the 2nd Panzer Division on the north beginning to advance more rapidly than the 1st Panzer Division to the south, the French sought desperately to throw other units into the gap.

  THE COLLAPSE OF THE 53RD INFANTRY DIVISION

  In their attempt to seal the breach made by the Germans, the French relied heavily on the 53rd Infantry Division.27 The process by which the series “B” division was thrown into the maelstrom began at 0815 hours on the 12th when General Georges decided to assign it to the Ninth Army.28 As with other divisions in the General Reserve, the 53rd Division had earlier been identified as probably being employed by the Ninth Army, and its leaders had studied the possibility of being employed on the Ninth Army's right and left flanks. After receiving the order attaching his division to the Ninth Army and meeting with General Julien F. R. Martin, who commanded the XIth Corps on the field army's right flank, the division commander, General Etcheberrigaray, received the mission of occupying a position south of Mézières along the Meuse River.

  The division was supposed to occupy the same area as the 148th Fortress Infantry Regiment between the Vence and Bar rivers. Since the 148th Regiment had three battalions on line, Etcheberrigaray decided to have each of his three regiments occupy the same sector as a fortress battalion. A battalion from each regiment was supposed to remain slightly to the rear of the remainder of the regiment; these three battalions were to become part of the corps reserve. According to the plan approved by the XIth Corps, which was the higher headquarters of the 53rd Division and which had responsibility for the sector on the extreme right of the Ninth Army, the division's artillery would move into line during the night of 12–13 May and the three infantry regiments during the night of 13–14 May.

  On the afternoon of the 13th, before his regiments started moving toward the Meuse, General Etcheberrigaray set out to visit the headquarters of the units to the right and left of his new position. Beginning his visits on his right, he arrived at the command post of General Lafontaine of the 55th Division around 1700 hours, about two hours after the Germans had crossed the Meuse. In their discussions, Lafontaine informed him of the presence of two massive groups of tanks, each having at least 100 tanks, north of the Meuse. As Etcheberrigaray monitored the rapidly deteriorating situation from the 55th Division's command post, an officer arrived and reported that the Germans had taken Wadelincourt. Etcheberrigaray departed immediately. It was around 1800 hours, and his return was delayed by elements of the 55th Division and the Xth Corps that were already fleeing. He reported, “I personally made two artillery battalions from the Xth Corps which had left their positions on the Bar [River] make an about-face….”29

  That night at 2300 hours, while its regiments were still moving toward their designated positions on the Meuse, the division received a new mission from the XIth Corps. This order resulted in the division's being placed directly in front of Guderian's corps. Because of the rapid German advance on the right, according to the new mission, the 148th Regiment would remain alone along the Meuse, while the 53rd Division marched south and faced east along the Bar River and Ardennes Canal. The 3rd Spahis Brigade and the division's reconnaissance squadron were ordered to cover the right flank of the division in the vicinity of Omicourt and Vendresse. Because of his fears that a change of mission and direction in the middle of the night would cause disorder, Etcheberrigaray delayed issuing a new order until around 0330–0400 hours on the 14th.30 Unfortunately, some of the battalions did not receive the new order until several hours later, and the division commander had to resort to sending a member of his staff to verify their location and activity. Etcheberrigaray also sent the staff officer to Vendresse to verify that it was not occupied by the Germans.

  For several hours early on the 14th, the 53rd Division struggled to move south and face east. Etcheberrigaray attempted to organize his defenses with two regiments facing east and one regiment in a second position to their rear just east of the Vence River. To ensure good control of his regiments, he placed Colonel Rivet, who commanded the infantry in the division, in charge of organizing the new defenses, which were to the west of the Bar River and Ardennes Canal. Though the river and canal offered some potential as an obstacle to hinder a German move toward the west, he elected not to defend along them. He apparently expected the cavalry to defend the water obstacles to his division's front.31

  Before the 53rd Division's battalions were in place, the 2nd Panzer Division moved west along the Meuse and crossed the Bar River and Ardennes Canal at Pont à Bar around 1200 hours on the 14th. The Panzer division advanced rapidly in a counterclockwise direction through Hannogne, Sapogne, and Boutancourt. According to the reports of the 148th Fortress Infantry, the Germans also moved directly west toward Dom-le-Mesnil and cleared that sector completely by 1530 hours. Around 1700 hours the Germans reached Boutancourt as part of their counterclockwise movement, hitting only one battalion of the 53rd Division during their circular journey. In fact, until around 1700 hours, no unit of the 53rd Division had made contact with the Germans.32

  Beginning around 1500 hours, the 1st Panzer Division began pressing hard against Vendresse, which was on the division's right flank but which was being defended by the 5th Light Cavalry Division and the 1st Cavalry Brigade. Some of the 53rd Division's battalions were still moving into their new positions at this time, particularly those of the 208th Infantry Regiment on the division's second line along the Vence River. As mentioned earlier, these positions were behind the line occupied by the cavalry. That evening, the Germans managed to get beyond Vendresse and appeared to fan out in two directions, one column moving northwest toward Villers-le-Tilleul and Singly, and the other moving west toward Omont and then southwest toward Chagny.

  Before the fall of Vendresse, General Etcheberrigaray received an order around 1530 hours from the XLIst Corps, his new superior headquarters, that revealed their complete lack of understanding about what was happening to the 53rd Division. The liaison officer carrying the order acknowledged that his headquarters had told him to obtain information about the 53rd Division, since they were “ignorant” of its situation, but the new order nevertheless directed the division to counterattack. The corps headquarters ordered, “Seal the gap between Second and Ninth armies by counterattacking with the aid of an armored division which will intervene on the left of the Second Army…[at] 1600 hours.”33 After learning of the order, Etcheberrigaray recognized it was “impossible” to launch a counterattack at 1600 hours (about thirty minutes after his being notified of the mission) and refused to do so. He also knew nothing about the armored division that was supposed to participate in the counterattack. At the moment he refused to counterattack, it is very possible that no element of his division had yet made contact with the Germans.

  Fearing the imminent collapse of Vendresse, but apparently having little or no contact with the 5th Light Cavalry Division, Etcheberrigaray wanted to pull back his division by holding firm on the left flank and then rotating the right flank in a counterclockwise direction. Before he could give the orders for this withdrawal, however, he learned of the
German attack on Sapogne and Dom-le-Mesnil, and then the Germans began pressing against both flanks of his division between 1600 and 1700 hours on the 14th. Ignoring the order from the XLIst Corps, he decided to withdraw the forward regiments behind the Vence River, about a dozen kilometers to the rear and along the division's second line.34 His decision was eased by the 5th Light Cavalry Division's, which had been defending Vendresse, receiving orders to fall back about the same time the 53rd Division began to receive pressure on both flanks.

  Around 1800–1830 hours, Etcheberrigaray sent a message to Colonel Rivet ordering him to move the infantry to the rear, behind the Vence River. He sent this order, even though his division had thus far experienced only moderate pressure from the Germans. About the time Etcheberrigaray sent out the order to pull back the infantry, the Germans began pressing hard against his left flank. Before the 329th Infantry Regiment on the division's left flank received the order to withdraw, the colonel commanding the regiment reported at 1830 hours that he was “encircled” by enemy tanks.35 Despite this heavy pressure, the regiment somehow managed that night to make its way back to the Vence River.

  In essence, the division moved in a giant circle on the 13th and 14th. After spending the previous night marching northeast toward the Meuse and the entire day on the 14th shifting toward the south, the division began another move. This time it marched toward the west.

  The decision to withdraw weakened the French position significantly and enabled the German XIXth Panzer Corps to advance more rapidly, for it had just fought its way through the 5th Light Cavalry Division. With the withdrawal of the 53rd Division, the Germans had very few French units to their front. Perhaps more importantly, the decision to withdraw came even though the 53rd Division was not involved in extremely heavy fighting and had not offered significant resistance to the Germans. The soldiers of the division had been constantly on the move, but most had had little or no contact with the Germans when they began moving toward the rear. Nevertheless, they were exhausted, and their morale had been substantially affected by the continuous flow of deserters through their positions and their constant shifting of positions. Obviously the division commander's will to fight had also been affected.

  Most of the battalions managed to make their way back to the Vence River, but several encountered major problems. Exhausted from the marching, the 3/239th Infantry stopped to rest on the grounds of the large castle in Singly, and around 2230–2245 hours on the 14th was surprised by elements of the German 1st Infantry Regiment. Half of it was captured.36 Throughout the night, a significant portion of the division's strength—particularly in the 329th Regiment—slowly began melting away into the darkness.

  Nevertheless, the division received another modification to its order around 2330 hours on the 14th. Instead of generally facing east along the Vence River, it was to move south and face northeast along a line between Barbaise (five kilometers west of Poix-Terron) and Bouvellemont (five kilometers west of Omont). The modification to the order required the sending of troops forward on the right of the division. Etcheberrigaray later wrote, “For all practical purposes, I could not count on the two regiments on the left, [which were] very weak and badly commanded; the 208th [Regiment] was in place and commanded by a fiery leader….”37 Consequently, he moved the 208th Regiment forward on his right, where it soon became intermingled with elements of the 3rd Spahis Brigade at La Horgne and the 14th Infantry Division at Baâlons and Bouvellemont.

  By midmorning on the 15th, the 53rd Division had the much-reduced 329th Regiment in the Jandun-Barbaise-Rallicourt area west of Poix-Terron. The 239th Regiment, which had been ordered to occupy the center of the division's new position, had lost so many men through desertions that it never reached its position. Hence the 208th Regiment extended itself into the division's center and soon occupied a front beginning at a point southwest of Poix-Terron and stretching to Bouvellemont.38 In the hard fighting that occurred on the 15th, actions by the 53rd Division became almost indistinguishable from those of the 14th Infantry Division, which occupied much of the same sector.

  THE 14TH INFANTRY DIVISION: SEALING THE GAPS AT OMONT AND POIX-TERRON

  Of all the French units in the vicinity of the German penetrations at Sedan and Monthermé, the 14th Infantry Division had perhaps the best reputation. Part of this reputation came from the abundant abilities of its commander, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, who later became one of the most important leaders of the Free French in the continued fight against the Germans after 1940. In addition to having excellent leadership, the division was a unit that was well trained and well equipped. When Touchon met with de Lattre about 2300–2400 hours on the 14th, the 14th Division was in the process of moving forward into the gap between the Second and Ninth armies. At 0800 and 1200 hours on the 12th, it had received a warning order and a formal order, respectively, to move toward the Second and Ninth armies. Some combat elements of the division departed at 0700 on the 13th, and the last ones left at 0200 hours on the 15th.39

  As the division moved forward, General de Lattre received orders attaching his unit to the Ninth Army and giving it the mission of covering the right of the Ninth Army. The division was supposed to occupy the heights around Omont (west of Vendresse) and establish contact with the left of the Second Army. Acting quickly, General de Lattre responded on the 14th around 1600 hours by ordering the 1/152nd Infantry to move immediately by truck to Omont and by preparing the remainder of the division to follow.

  Not until 2200 hours that night, however, when he met with the commander of the Ninth Army, General Corap, did he gain a full appreciation of the confused situation existing in the vicinity of the Ardennes Canal between Dom-le-Mesnil and Mont Dieu. At the same time he learned that the 5th Light Cavalry Division had been engaged in bitter fighting at Vendresse, which was about five kilometers east of Omont where his division was supposed to move. During the meeting with Corap, de Lattre received the mission of occupying a position farther to the rear (west) than he had originally been told. The division was supposed to occupy a line from Poix-Terron to Signy-l'Abbaye (about eighteen kilometers to the northwest). Unfortunately, elements of the 152nd Regiment had already arrived west and south of Omont and had moved into position when de Lattre received the new mission. These elements soon became deeply involved in the fighting north of the Aisne River, more than twenty-five kilometers from Signy-l'Abbaye.40

  Between 2300 and 2400 hours on the 14th, General de Lattre met with General Touchon and learned that his division had been placed under Touchon's command. According to an official report written after the war, Touchon supposedly preferred to place the entire 14th Division along the Aisne and not move it forward, but de Lattre convinced him to leave some elements of the division forward of the Aisne so they could slow the enemy's advance and provide time for elements withdrawing across the Aisne.41 Though the exact instructions given by Touchon are not clear, de Lattre's new commander did not modify substantially the mission previously given him. While the 14th Division continued to defend Rethel, de Lattre was to strengthen his forces near Omont and establish additional defenses between Signy-l'Abbaye and Poix-Terron. In other words, the division was to defend a front of more than twenty-five kilometers, but unfortunately it hardly had the equivalent of three battalions in the area.42 Whether Touchon or de Lattre knew anything about the 53rd Division is not clear.

  As the battle unfolded, much of the division did not move forward into the defensive sector assigned it. The explanation for the delay comes partially from aerial attacks’ having restricted forward movement and from fleeing troops’ having jammed and restricted movement on the main roads. Since most of the division—except for the 152nd Regiment—was in the process of being transported forward on the night of the 14th, problems with railway and road communications delayed their movement and prevented them from arriving early enough to participate in the battle. Thus elements of the 152nd Regiment, which had begun moving around 1600 hours on the 14th, were thrown into
heavy fighting in an area assigned to the entire division. Nevertheless, the remainder of the division moved successfully to the Aisne River and established a bridgehead around Rethel.

  Colonel Trinquand, who commanded the infantry in the 14th Division, had been ordered by de Lattre to supervise the advance elements as they moved into the vicinity of Tourteron, which lay about ten kilometers southwest of Omont. Around 1800 hours on the 14th, Trinquand ordered the 1/152nd Infantry to move to Chagny and Bouvellemont with the division antitank company. These two small villages lay about halfway between Tourteron and Omont. As the 1st Battalion marched forward, it moved in behind elements of the 3rd Spahis Brigade and the 5th Light Cavalry Division.

  After learning of the order from Touchon to occupy a position farther west, Trinquand decided to leave the 1st Battalion in place to cover the right flank of the division. Around 0230 hours on the 15th, he sent the motorized company of the division's reconnaissance squadron to the right (east) of the 1st Battalion, seeking contact with the Second Army. He also sent the 2/152nd Infantry north toward Poix-Terron. He soon discovered that infantry of the 208th Infantry Regiment from the 53rd Division was between the two battalions of the 152nd Regiment and that elements of the 3rd Spahis Brigade and 5th Light Cavalry Division were to their front.43 A horse cavalry unit, the 3rd Demi-Brigade de Chasseurs, occupied a position to the west of the 2nd Battalion. Trinquand dispatched the horse cavalry elements of the division's reconnaissance squadron to the left flank of this unit. These thin elements stretched almost from Signy-l'Abbaye to south of Vendresse, a distance of about thirty kilometers.