The Breaking Point

by Robert A Doughty

  Only the almost quixotic attacks by the newly formed 4th Armored Division under Colonel Charles de Gaulle at Montcornet on 17 May and then at Crécy-sur-Serre (fifteen kilometers north of Laon) on 19 May served to delay the Germans. The counterattack on 21 May by the small British “Frankforce” also managed to gain the attention of the German High Command. Nevertheless, little or nothing lay between the Germans and the English Channel on the morning of 16 May.

  Except for some final desperate struggles, the battle was lost.

  CHAPTER 11

  Conclusion

  Within the broader context of the battle, the breakthrough by the XIXth Panzer Corps at Sedan and its subsequent pivot to the west did not by itself lead directly to the defeat and collapse of the French Army. The German forces that moved through the Ardennes made three major penetrations of French defenses along the Meuse: Sedan, Houx, and Monthermé. When coupled with the penetration at Sedan, the crossings of the Meuse by the XVth Panzer Corps near Dinant and by the XLIst Panzer Corps near Monthermé occurred on a broad front and opened a huge hole in French defenses. Without the two other crossings, the penetration made by the XIXth Panzer Corps would have been extremely vulnerable and would probably not have had the strategic effect the three crossings had. In particular, the crossing at Monthermé on 13 May and the subsequent exploitation that occurred when the 6th Panzer Division moved to Montcornet on the evening of 15 May demolished any chances of the French sealing the breach in the Charleville-Mézières area.

  When General Touchon's army pulled back to the Aisne River on the morning of the 16th, the Germans continued to advance. Unlike Napoleon in Russia, the Germans did not head toward the capital, but concentrated on destroying the Allied armies by severing the left wing of their forces from the right. As the cutting edge of the kesselschlacht strategy of encirclement and annihilation, the Panzer divisions of the XVth, XLIst, and XIXth corps raced west and then turned northwest, enveloping the right flank of Army Group 1 (and the B.E.F) and separating it from the rest of the French Army. During the unfolding of the Dunkirk saga, the remnants of the French army continued to fight, but the final scene had already been written.

  THE BLITZKRIEG

  The noted military theorist Major General J.F.C. Fuller acknowledged the importance of the fighting around Sedan and the decisive nature of the campaign when he referred to the fighting in 1940 as “The Second Battle of Sedan.”1 In his classic study of military history, Fuller argued that the basis of the blitzkrieg was the “attack by paralyzation,” which he had conceived in May 1918 and developed in his famous “Plan 1919.” Although the Germans may have been seeking a “sharp, rapid, and short war,” as Fuller asserted, there is little to suggest that the German High Command was purposefully adhering to his ideas for an “attack by paralyzation.” Similarly, if concepts later associated by some analysts with the blitzkrieg circulated among the members of the German military hierarchy, only a few officers such as Guderian and perhaps Manstein accepted them completely. The sharp struggle between von Kleist and Guderian that resulted in Guderian's resignation on the 17th clearly demonstrates the concerns of the German High Command about the pace and vulnerability of the XIXth Panzer Corps.

  At the same time, the evolution of the German plan suggests that the purpose of the phalanx of forces moving through the Ardennes was the traditional kesselschlacht strategy of encirclement and annihilation. Although the weapons were significantly different, the fundamental methods were not dramatically different from those used at Ulm in 1805, Sedan in 1870, or Tannenberg in 1914. When the Germans broke through the French defenses on the morning of the 16th, their objective was not to “make straight,” as Fuller said, for divisional, corps, and army headquarters; instead, they headed west toward the English Channel in an exploitation strongly resembling similar operations conducted on numerous occasions in the past by horse-mounted cavalrymen.

  As for the campaign itself, Fuller argued that the German Army “was fashioned into an armour-headed battering ram which, under cover of fighter aircraft and dive-bombers—operating as flying field artillery—could break through its enemy's continuous front at selected points.”2 While the XIXth, XLIst, and XVth Panzer corps did function as the leading force through the Ardennes, the strongest Allied resistance (Bodange, the “mushroom” of Glaire, Vendresse, La Horgne, Bouvellement) was overcome by hard infantry fighting, supported by artillery and tanks. The only time the tanks of the XIXth Corps functioned as a “battering ram” was when they overran the relatively weak French covering forces in Belgium. Not until long after 1940 did the important contributions of the infantry and the reliance on combined infantry-armor actions south and southwest of Sedan become evident.

  Fuller's comments about the German Luftwaffe also are not completely correct. Although German aircraft did provide some support, they did not function as “flying field artillery.” The continued reliance on the “ground” artillery is obvious in the Germans’ having crossed elements of the 73rd Artillery Regiment at Gaulier as soon as the two rafts were completed. The most important contribution of the Luftwaffe in the area of Sedan was the prolonged bombardment on the 13th, which significantly weakened the will to fight of the 55th Division. While German air strikes did assist the forward movement of the ground forces, aerial attacks did not destroy significant numbers of tanks or bunkers. In fact, the Second Army reported only two tanks being destroyed by aircraft.3 Similarly, French bunkers were seized through the skilled fighting of German infantry, sometimes assisted by highly accurate firing from antitank guns, accompanying weapons, and a few tanks—not by their being knocked out by aircraft. The accidental wounding of the 1st Armor Brigade commander and the killing of the 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion commander by an errant Luftwaffe air strike on the 14th demonstrate the tenuous links between the ground and aerial forces.

  Thus Fuller's assessment of the blitzkrieg may accord with many of the initial reports of the campaign, but newly available information suggests a much more complicated and sometimes chaotic campaign. In particular, the campaign consisted of something far more complex than a rapid rush of tanks through the heavy forests of the Ardennes and across the wheat fields of northern France. German tanks and aircraft may have received the lion's share of the credit for the success of the German blitzkrieg, but the tough, well-trained infantry deserve at least the same amount of credit. One should also give substantial credit to the assault engineers and the artillery. Without the important role played by these two, the XIXth Panzer Corps would not have crossed the Meuse successfully.

  THE FRENCH COLLAPSE

  To explain the military reasons for the defeat of France, one cannot avoid evidence of significant failures occurring throughout her system. France's strategy proved to be particularly vulnerable to a thrust through the Ardennes. At the operational level, her commanders could not react adequately to the challenge of the German breakthrough and the massing of her Panzers. At the tactical level, German infantry and tanks fought their way through French defenses that were occasionally strong but usually were weak.

  Compounding the problem, France's intelligence system failed to identify the main enemy thrust, and as late as the morning of the 13th, only hours before the XIXth Panzer Corps crossed the Meuse, French commanders and analysts continued to believe the main attack was coming through central Belgium. They made the worst mistake one can make in intelligence estimates; they focused primarily on the information supporting their preconceived notions about the Germans’ intentions and placed less emphasis on their capabilities and on reports that the enemy was doing something else.

  In short, a sound military system may fail because of failure at a single level, but the French system failed because it was fundamentally inadequate. These failures have as much to do with the startling German success as do actions by Manstein, Guderian, Balck, Rubarth, and others.

  At the root of many of the French failures is the startling contrast between two modes of warfare that were based on
completely different doctrines. While the French prepared to fight a carefully controlled, methodical battle that stressed firepower, the Germans prepared to fight a highly mobile battle that stressed surprise and speed. Since the French expected to fight a carefully controlled, highly centralized battle, their soldiers and units were not prepared for hasty counterattacks or audacious maneuvers. In comparison to the Germans, they seemed at times to be moving in slow motion. General Lafontaine's delay of almost nine hours and his preference for counterattacking with fire rather than soldiers amply illustrate the French approach and its significant weaknesses.

  The technique of the methodical battle may have succeeded against an enemy who was a mirror image of the French, but it was completely inadequate against the much more mobile and aggressive Germans. With the French desperately trying to respond, the Germans gained and maintained the initiative with swift attacks against their opponent's weak points. By being stronger at the decisive points at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, the Germans overwhelmed the French, who could not react in an appropriate and timely fashion. The German practice of attacking deeply without excessive concern for flanks further disrupted French reactions.

  The recent combat experience of the Germans in Poland provided them an important advantage. After encountering numerous difficulties in the September 1939 campaign, the Germans worked diligently to improve their system and to make their officers and units more responsive. As Williamson Murray has noted, the willingness and ability to identify problems and then to correct them enabled the Germans to make important adjustments.4 Though some significant weaknesses remained, the fruits of this effort were readily apparent in the 1940 campaign.

  In marked contrast, the French had what proved to be unwarranted confidence in their doctrine and were unwilling to acknowledge possible weaknesses. After the fall of Poland, the French accelerated their development of large armored formations but failed to reconsider their doctrine. Additionally, the angry response of General Huntziger to Pierre Taittinger's pointed criticisms of defenses in the Sedan area perhaps provides the epithet of the French Army. He wrote, “I believe that no urgent measures are necessary to reinforce the Sedan sector.”5 Consequently, the Second Army did not modify the level or focus of its effort, which also appeared suitable to the High Command.

  AUFTRAGSTAKTIK AND COMMAND STYLE

  Another important advantage possessed by the Germans was their tradition of auftragstaktik (mission-oriented tactics), which contrasted sharply with the more doctrinaire approach of the French. While the Germans taught their leaders to take the initiative and to make decisions that would contribute to the accomplishment of the mission, the French emphasized the following of orders, the application of doctrine, and the suppression of innovation. The actions of Captain de Courbière and the capture of bunkers number 104 and 7 bis stand as a fine example of the German adherence to mission-oriented tactics. Similarly, the failure of General Lafontaine to act decisively and launch a counterattack until he received written orders from the Xth Corps stands as an example of the French adherence to plans and formulas.

  Clearly, not all aspects of auftragstaktik were positive. The conflict between von Kleist and Guderian stemmed from the German tradition of providing leeway to subordinate commanders and in other circumstances may have had disastrous consequences. Interestingly enough, having a corps commander frequently disregard the orders of his superior, such as in Guderian's steadfast refusal to cross west of the Ardennes Canal, simply would not have been tolerated in the French Army. While French soldiers may have gained the reputation of often being unkempt and undisciplined, French officers obeyed their superiors to a far greater degree than did the Germans. About the only clear disobedience of an order by a French division commander came with the refusal of General Etcheberrigaray on 14 May to counterattack with the 53rd Division. He recognized that he simply did not have time to carry out the order. One could also cite General Brocard of the 3rd Armored Division for having disobeyed the orders of General Flavigny to counterattack, but Brocard's failure was linked more to his inability to resupply and move his division than to his having willfully disobeyed an order. Flavigny relieved Brocard for his failures, not for his disobedience.

  Nevertheless, the German emphasis on having leaders forward and making decisions according to the circumstances gave them a distinct advantage. Other than the practical necessity for commanders to be farther forward during an offensive, one of the most important reasons for German commanders’ being able to be away from their command posts revolves around their tradition of giving chiefs of staff at division, corps, and field army level a high degree of authority. While French leaders remained in the rear and attempted to manage the flow of resources and units, German division and corps commanders moved forward and relied on their chiefs of staff to make management decisions in the rear.

  Because of their tradition of a strong General Staff, the Germans believed a commander should inform his subordinate commanders and his chief of staff of his intent and then provide his chief of staff the authority to ensure his intentions were followed. This left the chief of staff in charge of the detailed workings of the headquarters and permitted the commander to move forward where he could influence the battle personally. If problems arose or additional guidance were needed, the chief of staff would communicate with his commander, but he would not burden him with administrative minutiae. Also, since the Germans believed in giving subordinate commanders the freedom to act in accordance with their understanding of the mission and their commander's intentions, they recognized the chief of staff sometimes had to address important command issues when the commander was temporarily not available.

  The French method was very different, for they believed the commander should remain at his command post “on the handle of a fan” and control the movement and allocation of men and materiel. The weakness of this system can be seen in the role played by General Lafontaine in the 55th Division. As the commanding general of the division, Lafontaine rarely left his command post and made no attempt to go forward where the decisive fighting was occurring. The role of his chief of staff was little more than that of a senior staff officer. When the 55th Division's command post moved from Fond Dagot to Chémery, Lafontaine left Colonel Chaligne, who was the commander of the division's infantry, in charge of the old command post, while he moved to Chémery. Chaligne later went to the command post of the 71st Division and searched for the 205th Regiment, but he too remained tethered to the command post. Additionally, while Lafontaine and Chaligne supposedly helped to stem the flight of panicked soldiers past Fond Dagot, Lafontaine meekly accepted the chaos and jumble of units fleeing through Chémery. He found time to assist in the siting of an artillery unit, but he did not find time to halt the expanding panic. Apparently schooled in playing his role at “the handle of a fan,” he was unequal to the larger task of sustaining the fighting spirit of his division.

  The different roles played by the German and French commanders can also be seen by comparing the actions of Guderian to those of Grandsard and Huntziger. While Guderian moved forward and personally intervened to hurry tanks across the bridge at Gaulier, Grandsard and Huntziger remained tied to their command posts. Grandsard passed on the responsibility to the 55th Division for leading the counterattacks by the 205th and 213th Infantry regiments and the two tank battalions. Huntziger also remained in his command post at Senuc and did little to ensure the energetic entry of the 3rd Armored Division into the battle.

  Others aspects of the French style of command seem curious in retrospect, but they harmonized with the doctrine of the methodical battle. In particular, General Flavigny's giving General Bertin-Bossu, commander of the 3rd Motorized Infantry Division, control over the 3rd Armored Division and responsibility for the conduct of the counterattack on the 15th seems inappropriate. This delegation of authority served primarily to insulate Flavigny from the battle and to increase pressure on Bertin-Bossu. In fact, Flavigny was so insu
lated from the actual fighting that he had no reports about the launching of the much-desired counterattack by the 3rd Armored Division except for the report of a pilot who happened to see some French tanks advancing.

  LEADERSHIP

  Though General Kirchner of the 1st Panzer Division was extremely successful, the ability of Lieutenant Colonel Balck to maintain the will to fight of his regiment stands as the best example of the German style of leadership on the battlefield. Because of his great energy, determination, and charisma, the 1st Infantry Regiment almost single-handedly punched through the French defenses at Sedan and moved to Cheveuges. Not one to lead from the rear, Balck's personal example maintained the momentum of the attack when some of the German soldiers faltered between Bellevue and La Boulette. Farther southwest, his leadership at Baâlons and Bouvellement also convinced the German infantry to make another assault, even though they were exhausted and had lost many small-unit leaders. During these crucial instances, his will and character instilled in his soldiers the conviction that they had to continue and had to carry out their mission.

  Balck's contribution as a leader, plus those of other German leaders who were closer to the fighting than their French counterparts, was one of the most important edges possessed by the Germans at Sedan. That his talents were extraordinary, however, is perhaps best demonstrated by his subsequent commands in the German Army: 1st Armor Brigade in the 1st Panzer Division, 11th Panzer Division, XLVIIIth Panzer Corps, Fourth Panzer Army, and Army Group G. The only French officer in the Sedan region who was as talented as Balck may have been General de Lattre de Tassigny, who commanded the 14th Infantry Division.