Neo-Conned! Again
Page 14
Many members of the so-called Christian right share the view that America has a special mission, but give this notion a triumphalist religious cast beyond the moralism typical of neo-Jacobin ideology. They believe that the United States, as led by a man of God, has a virtually messianic role to play, especially in the Middle East, where God's chosen people, Israel, must be supported by the United States against their enemies. Breaking sharply with the mainstream of traditional Christianity, which has made a distinction between the things of God and the things of Caesar, this form of religion identifies a particular political power, America, with God's will. George W. Bush's rhetoric has sometimes suggested that he is drawn to such thinking. “Evangelical” Christianity of this kind may rest on rather simplistic theological, biblical, and historical assumptions and arguably have virtually no influence over America's dominant national culture, but it provides considerable political support for neo-Jacobinism, which does have such influence. In its practical effects on United States foreign policy, this religious triumphalism puts a religious gloss on neo-Jacobinism. It does not Christianize U.S. foreign policy, but makes it less humble and more belligerent.
Both in domestic and international affairs the new Jacobins are strongly prejudiced against the traditions of old, historically evolved nations and groups. These only retard the emergence of a new order based on what they consider universal principles. In their view, the distinctive traits of different societies and cultures should yield to the homogeneity of virtuous democracy. The new Jacobins are trying to clear away obstacles to the triumph of their ideology and of their own will to power. They exhibit a revolutionary mindset that will inexorably lead to disaster. Alongside what President Bush called “history's unmarked graves of discarded lies”1 lie the graves of the self-righteous, the people whose moralism concealed, even from themselves, their importunate will to power. As Ronald Reagan preached, the idealistic utopians and the well meaning are responsible for some of the world's worst evils. Self-righteousness blinds one to one's own sins.
Even if the opinions examined in this article are assessed in the most generous and charitable spirit, their element of political-ideological imperialism is hard to miss. A philosophically and historically inclined observer is reminded of the terrible and large-scale suffering that has been inflicted on mankind by power-seeking sanctioned or inspired by one or another kind of Jacobin moral and intellectual conceit. Communism, one of the most radical and pernicious manifestations of the Jacobin spirit, has disintegrated, at least as a major political force. But another panacea for the world is taking its place. The neo-Jacobin vision for how to redeem humanity may be less obviously utopian than that of communism. It may strike some as admirably idealistic, as did communism. But the spirit of the two movements is similar, and utopian thinking is utopian thinking, fairly innocuous perhaps if restricted to isolated dreamers and theoreticians but dangerous to the extent that it inspires action in the real world. The concern voiced here is that neo-Jacobinism has come to permeate American public debate and is finally within reach of controlling the military might of the United States.
Prudence, realism, compromise, and self-restraint are indispensable qualities in politics. They have been reflected in traditional American institutions, in great decisions made by American statesmen, and sometimes in American public opinion. They have constituted the first line of defense against all manner of foreign and domestic threats, including surges of passion and eruptions of extremism. Given the atrocities of 9/11 and the need for a firm American response, the prominence of crusaders in the Bush administration is perhaps not surprising. But it is also a sign that needed old American virtues are weakening or disappearing. The continued ascendancy of neo-Jacobinism would have disastrous consequences. By acting under its influence America's leaders may be setting in motion fateful developments that they and their successors will not be able to control.
1. Remarks, National Cathedral, September 14, 2002 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09).
2. Statement to the U.S. Congress, June 18, 2002 (http://www.whitehouse/gov/news/releases/2002/06).
1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Basic Political Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), Social Contract, Bk. I, Ch. I, p. 141.
1. Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 153.
2. James David Barber, “… And Democracy Needs Help,” Washington Post, January 25, 1990.
1. William Kristol and David Brooks, “What Ails Conservatism,” Wall Street Journal, September 15, 1997.
2. Robert Kagan, “The U.S.-Europe Divide,” Washington Post, May 26, 2002.
3. Kristol and Brooks, “What Ails,” loc. cit.
1. Ben Wattenberg, “Chance to Champion Freedom,” Washington Times, December 1, 1988.
1. Ibid.; “Showdown Time … Wake-up Slap,” August 8, 1990; and “To Sow Seeds of Freedom,” August 1, 1990.
2. Ben Wattenberg, “Peddling 'Son of Manifest Destiny,'” Washington Times, March 21, 1990.
3. Charles Krauthammer, “Bless Our Pax Americana,” Washington Post, March 22, 1991.
1. Michael Novak, “Human Rights at Christmas,” Washington Times, December 23, 1988.
1. Irving Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1979, originally published, 1924), pp. 337, 295. It is a national misfortune that Americans have paid less attention to one of their truly great thinkers than to a number of lesser European lights who impress by their denser, more technical, less essayistic philosophical style.
2. Woodrow Wilson, Thanksgiving Proclamation, Nov. 7, 1917, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Arthur S. Link et al. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966–93), pp. 44, 525; and Address at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Papers, pp. 30, 254. For an in-depth study of Woodrow Wilson and his notion of America as servant of mankind, see Richard M. Gamble, “Savior Nation: Woodrow Wilson and the Gospel of Service,” Humanitas, Vol. XIV, No. 1, 2001.
3. Babbitt, Democracy, p. 314.
1. Secretary of State James A. Baker, speech to the Aspen Institute in Berlin, Germany, June 18, 1991.
2. Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop,” New York Times, March 8, 1992.
3. Wall Street Journal, lead editorial, March 16, 1992.
4. Washington Post, January 9, 1993. The designation “neoconservative” for the mentioned individuals is taken from this article.
1. Remarks of President to United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America 2002 Legislative Conference, June 19, 2002 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06); Peter Slevin, “The Word at the White House: Bush Formulates His Brand of Foreign Policy,” Washington Post, June 23, 2002.
2. Remarks of President to West Point Commencement, June 1, 2002 (http://www.white-house.gov/news/releases/2002/06). The same kind of imagery had been used by General George C. Marshall at the Commencement exercises in 1942, and the President began his speech by quoting Marshall, who had expressed the hope that “our flag will be recognized throughout the world as a symbol of freedom on the one hand, and of overwhelming power on the other.”
3. Remarks, National Cathedral, September 14, 2001 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914–2.html).
1. Robert Kagan, “We Must Fight this War,” Washington Post, September 12, 2001.
2. Statement of three of the co-directors of Empower America, September 12, 2001.
3. Charles Krauthammer, “Peace Through Democracy,” Washington Post, June 28, 2002.
1. Midge Decter, “Unnecessary Wars,” Imprimis, September 2002, p. 5.
1. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 17, 2002 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html) and Karen DeYoung and Mike Allen, “Bush Shifts Strategy From Deterrence to Dominance,” Washington Post, September 21, 2002.
2. “Six Degrees of Preemption,” Washington Post, Outlook section, September 29, 2002.
1. Richard C. Hoolbroo
ke, “It Did Not Have to Be This Way,” Washington Post, February 23, 2003.
2. Remarks by President George W. Bush, in taped interview with Bob Woodward, Washington Post, Nov. 19, 2002; excerpted from Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002).
1. Address to Congress, September 20, 2001.
THE EDITORS' GLOSS: There is one fact about the rhetoric that comes from the American political establishment that confirms the truth of Dr. Sniegoski's essay beyond anything we could possibly add. This is the constant, frankly tedious reference to 9/11 in conjunction with the Iraq war. Ideologically and rhetorically, Sniegoski suggests, the neoconservatives, Israel-firsters, and Israeli politicians have sought to portray “regime change” in Iraq as a legitimate response to 9/11, in order to carry it out for various reasons of their own. Anyone inclined to balk at this notion as somehow “anti-Semitic” would do well to read Michael Meacher's article for the British Guardian of September 6, 2003, subtitled “The 9/11 attacks gave the U.S. an ideal pretext to use force to secure its global domination,” which offers substantial confirmation of Sniegoski's thesis.
Now 9/11 is being offered as the reason why it's essential to “stay the course” in Iraq. As the President told the American Legislative Exchange Council (August 3, 2005), “We're at war with an enemy that attacked us on September 11, 2001 …. We're at war against an enemy that, since that day, has continued to kill.”
Never mind that the argument from the pro-war crowd before the war was that Saddam the secular Ba'athist was a sponsor of “international terrorism,” and if not a financier of al-Qaeda at least a moral supporter of the attacks on 9/11. Now they maintain that Iraq is the “central front” in the war on terror because it is not a clash so much with secular, proSaddam Ba'athists as with Islamic fanatics who have allegedly taken the opportunity to strike back at the Great Satan.
The problem for the administration message, however, is that the facts get in the way – notwithstanding “spin” – for those willing to look at them. The “Iraq-equals-war-on-terror” line doesn't hold up now, as Col. de Grand Pré explains later, nor did it do so before the war, as Dr. Sniegoski indicates in what follows. What it did do for those who were making the claim, though, is the other – and perhaps more interesting – side of the story.
CHAPTER
6
Neoconservatives, Israel, and 9/11:
The Origins of the U.S. War on Iraq
………
Stephen J. Sniegoski, Ph.D.
THE NEOCONSERVATIVES WERE the driving force for the war on Iraq. Their leading role has been noted by numerous observers1 even though noting that role has been condemned as “anti-Semitic,”2 and thus is considered taboo in certain mainstream circles. The public record clearly reveals that the neocons had a Middle East war agenda that long pre-dated the September 11, 2001, terrorism. Their position also dovetailed with the goals of the Israeli Right (the Likudniks), which sought to weaken and fragment Israel's Arab and Islamic neighbors so as to enhance Israel's power and security. But it was only the traumatic effects of the 9/11 terrorism that enabled the agenda of the neocons to become the policy of the United States of America. The following essay will detail this development.1
Although the term neoconservative is in common usage, a brief description of the group might be helpful. Many of the first generation neoconservatives were originally liberal Democrats, and even Marxists and Trotskyites. They drifted to the right in the 1960s and 1970s as the Democratic Party moved to the anti-war McGovernite left. Concern for Jews and Israel loomed large in their change. They adopted a pronounced anti-Soviet policy as the Soviet Union aided Israel's enemies in the Middle East and prohibited Soviet Jews from emigrating. As political scientist Benjamin Ginsburg puts it:
One major factor that drew them inexorably to the right was their attachment to Israel and their growing frustration during the 1960s with a Democratic party that was becoming increasingly opposed to American military preparedness and increasingly enamored of Third World causes (e.g., Palestinian rights). In the Reaganite right's hard-line anti-communism, commitment to American military strength, and willingness to intervene politically and militarily in the affairs of other nations to promote democratic values (and American interests), neocons found a political movement that would guarantee Israel's security.2
Over the years, due to their media power and support from, or control of, numerous well-funded think tanks, such as – to name a few – the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), the Hudson Institute, and the Center for Security Policy (CSP), the neocons have taken the dominate position in American conservatism. As historian Paul Gottfried writes regarding neocon power today: “At this point they control almost all Beltway 'conservative' think tanks, the 'conservative' TV channel, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Post, and several major presses, together with just about every magazine that claims to be conservative.”1
In moving over to the right, the neoconservatives have not adopted traditional American conservatism but have changed it to fit their own beliefs and interests. Looking back, Irving Kristol, the “godfather of neoconserva-tism,” maintains that
the historical task and political purpose of neoconservatism would seem to be this: to convert the Republican party, and American conservatism in general, against their respective wills, into a new kind of conservative politics suitable to governing a modern democracy.2
In his 1996 book, The Essential Neoconservative Reader, editor Mark Gerson jubilantly observes:
The neoconservatives have so changed conservatism that what we now identify as conservatism is largely what was once neoconservatism. And in so doing, they have defined the way that vast numbers of Americans view their economy, their polity, and their society.3
A more negative evaluation of the neoconservative domination of American conservatism has been made by the evolutionary biologist Kevin MacDonald, who writes that the
intellectual and cumulative effect of neoconservatism and its current hegemony over the conservative political movement in the United States (achieved partly by its large influence on the media and among foundations) has been to shift the conservative movement toward the center and, in effect, to define the limits of conservative legitimacy. Clearly, these limits of conservative legitimacy are defined by whether they conflict with specifically Jewish group interests …. The ethnic agenda of neoconservatism can also be seen in their promotion of the idea that the United States should pursue a highly interventionist foreign policy aimed at global democracy and the interests of Israel rather than aimed at the specific national interests of the United States.4
In justifying American support for Israel, Irving Kristol, explicitly eschewed national interest on the grounds that
large nations, whose identity is ideological, like the Soviet Union of yesteryear and the United States of today, inevitably have ideological interests in addition to more material concerns …. That is why we feel it necessary to defend Israel today, when its survival is threatened. No complicated geopolitical calculations of national interest are necessary.1
The Middle East position of the neoconservatives has paralleled that of the Israeli right, the Likudniks, which has been that weakening and destabilizing Israel's Arab enemies would, by cutting off external support, ultimately facilitate a solution to the Palestinian demographic problem, which threatens the very raison d'être of Israel as an exclusivist Jewish state. An extensive, early articulation of this policy was an article by Oded Yinon, entitled, “A Strategy for Israel in the 1980s,” which appeared in the World Zionist Organization's periodical Kivunim (Directions) in February 1982. Oded Yinon had been attached to the Foreign Ministry and his article undoubtedly reflected high-level thinking in the Israeli military and intelligence establishment. The article called for Israel to bring about the dissolution of all of the Arab states and their fragmentation into a mosaic of ethnic and sectarian groupings. Yinon believed that t
his would not be a difficult undertaking because nearly all the Arab states were afflicted with internal religious dissent. In essence, the end result would be a Middle East of powerless mini-states that could in no way confront Israeli power. Lebanon, then facing divisive chaos, was Yinon's model for the entire Middle East. Yinon wrote:
Lebanon's total dissolution into five provinces serves as a precedent for the entire Arab world including Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula and is already following that track. The dissolution of Syria and Iraq later on into ethnically or religiously unique areas such as in Lebanon, is Israel's primary target on the Eastern front in the long run, while the dissolution of the military power of those states serves as the primary short term target.2
Note that Yinon sought the dissolution of countries – Egypt and Saudi Arabia – that were allied to the United States.
Yinon looked upon Iraq as a major target for dissolution, and he believed that the then ongoing Iran-Iraq war would promote its break-up. It should be pointed out that Yinon's vision for Iraq seems uncannily like what has actually taken place since the U.S. invasion in 2003. He wrote:
Iraq, rich in oil on the one hand and internally torn on the other, is guaranteed as a candidate for Israel's targets. Its dissolution is even more important for us than that of Syria. Iraq is stronger than Syria. In the short run it is Iraqi power which constitutes the greatest threat to Israel. An Iraqi-Iranian war will tear Iraq apart and cause its downfall at home even before it is able to organize a struggle on a wide front against us. Every kind of inter-Arab confrontation will assist us in the short run and will shorten the way to the more important aim of breaking up Iraq into denominations as in Syria and in Lebanon. In Iraq, a division into provinces along ethnic/religious lines as in Syria during Ottoman times is possible. So, three (or more) states will exist around the three major cities: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and Shiite areas in the south will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish north. It is possible that the present Iranian-Iraqi confrontation will deepen this polarization.1