Neo-Conned! Again
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2. Just Cause: The purpose of the war must be to defend one's country or an ally against aggression. Recently, some just-war theorists have added humanitarian intervention, the defense of innocent persons within another country, as a just cause.
3. Right Intention: The intention must be the restoration of peace, not domination, wealth or revenge.
4. Last Resort: All peaceful means of avoiding the conflict must first be exhausted.
5. Reasonable Hope of Success: It is wrong to bring about death and destruction, and to ask soldiers to sacrifice their lives, in a futile war.
6. Proportionality: The military action must not produce more evil than the good to be achieved; one must avoid using force in excess of that necessary to achieve the objective of the war.
7. Discrimination: Noncombatants may not be directly targeted and care must be taken to minimize killing them indirectly.
The first five are classified as criteria of jus ad bellum (the justice of going to war) and the last two as criteria of jus in bello (the justice of conducting war), though some writers count proportionality as a jus ad bel-lum criterion. A particular war must satisfy all of these criteria in order to be just.
Just War and the War in Iraq
When the invasion of Iraq is evaluated in terms of these criteria, it fails the test. This war was not declared by a legitimate authority, because it was not declared at all.1 Iraq posed no threat to the United States, nor to any of our allies – unless one regards Israel, which has been caught several times in the act of spying against us, as an ally. We did not exhaust all peaceful alternatives before deciding to go to war. There was a reasonable hope of success, only if success was understood to mean merely removing a tyrant from power, not subsequently restoring the peace. The magnitude of the death and destruction is disproportionate to whatever good may be achieved.
Disintegration of Just-War Reasoning
There is disagreement among Catholics who have attempted to assess the ethical status of our invasion of Iraq in terms of the just-war criteria. Among those who have found it to be just is Robert Royal, of the Faith and Reason Institute. In order to make his case, however, he must argue that just-war theory as we know it is inadequate for the present situation:
In my view, current weapons technologies, which will inevitably find their way into the hands of some nasty characters around the world, make it inevitable that the world community will have to take strong action to preserve peace and international order. We cannot shirk this responsibility by mechanically invoking traditional categories of last resort and demanding proof of an immediate threat. Our situation is new, and our moral response to it must be as well, not only for Iraq but for the whole post-cold war world.1
At all points in history, not just the present, the traditional categories of just-war theory should be invoked prudentially, not mechanically. Furthermore, the just-war tradition is in need of continual development.2There is a profound difference, however, between developing a tradition and abandoning it. To say that all nations, not just the United States and her allies, are free to go to war without first exhausting peaceful alternatives and obtaining evidence of an immediate threat would give a green light to far more wars than are permitted by the traditional just-war criteria.
Another innovation of some Catholic just-war theorists is the addition of “comparative justice” to the criteria of jus ad bellum. The U.S. Catholic Bishops tell us in “The Challenge of Peace”:
The category of comparative justice is destined to emphasize the presumption against war which stands at the beginning of just-war teaching. In a world of sovereign states recognizing neither a common moral authority nor a central political authority, comparative justice stresses that no state should act on the basis that it has “absolute justice” on its side. Every party to a conflict should acknowledge the limits of its “just cause” and the consequent requirement to use only limited means in pursuit of its objectives. Far from legitimizing a crusade mentality, comparative justice is designed to relativize absolute claims and to restrain the use of force even in a “justified” conflict.1
This is an unnecessary innovation and an unfortunate choice of terminology. We live at a time when many Christians believe that ethics is relative. According to ethical relativism, ethical truth differs from one person or group of persons to another. The alternative is ethical absolutism, which claims that ethical truth is the same for all of us. Much confusion results from the fact that “absolutism” is sometimes also used to mean that all ethical principles are applicable under all circumstances, and “relativism” to mean that whether we should follow certain ethical principles depends upon the situation. Although Joseph Fletcher's theory of “situation ethics” is erroneous, St. Thomas tells us that “human actions are good or evil according to circumstances.”2 Killing another person is wrong under most circumstances, but not in situations such as self-defense and just war. Sexual intercourse between two persons may be either moral or immoral, depending upon how they are related to one another.
In the sense that the ethical status of an action is related to the circumstances under which it is performed, ethics is indeed “relative.” A common error is to start from the fact that there are exceptions to rules such as “Do not kill,” and then to conclude that ethics is relative. This is a mistake, because it is true for everyone, without exception, that it is unethical to kill another person, except under certain exceptional circumstances. (Some writers attempt to reduce confusion by making a distinction between “absolutism” and “universalism,” though there is no universal agreement about the proper use of these two terms.)
What, then, do the Bishops mean by “absolute” and “relative” when they write that “comparative justice is designed to relativize absolute claims”? Although it is far from clear, they seem to mean that all causes for war are less than totally (“absolutely”) just, and that the use of force should be proportionate to the degree of justice of the cause. Thus, if a cause for war is two-thirds just, then the use of force should be limited (“relativized”) by one-third. If this interpretation is correct, one of the many problems is determining how the criterion of comparative justice stands in relation to that of just cause. A cause for war is either just or unjust. If it is merely partially just, then it is not a just cause. The standard is a high one, intended to limit the resort to warfare as a means of solving problems. But it appears that the criterion of “comparative justice” can be satisfied as long as one's cause for war is more just (i.e. less unjust) than that of one's enemy.
All justice is “comparative.” Justice is “a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will.”1 Determining what is due each person requires comparison. Determining whether a cause for war is just or unjust requires comparing the actions of different persons. But it is unclear how the traditional criterion of just cause and the new criterion of “comparative justice” can be reconciled with one another.
In the primary senses of “ethical absolutism” and “ethical relativism,” Catholic moral doctrine, including just-war theory, is absolute. Despite the fact that sovereign states recognize neither a common moral authority nor a central political authority, the criteria that determine whether a war is just or unjust are the same for all states. We do not need a new criterion to relativize the absolute character of the traditional criteria, because they already address the presumption against war, the limitation of means in pursuit of objectives, and restraint of the use of force. Nor do we need additional confusion about ethical relativism and ethical absolutism.
Subversion of Just-War Thinking
In addition to writers who are altering the just-war tradition from within, there are others who, from within other moral traditions, maintain the language of “just war.” Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars is widely regarded as the most important recent treatise on just war. This book, however, is not written within the one moral tradition within which just-war theory was developed
and is coherent – that of natural law and moral virtues – but is instead based on the dichotomy between rights and utility, which is what normative ethics is left with following the rejection of the Catholic moral tradition: “The morality I shall expound is in its philosophical form a doctrine of human rights, though I shall say nothing here of the ideas of personality, action, and intention that this doctrine probably presupposes. Considerations of utility play into the structure at many points, but they cannot account for it as a whole.”2
Walzer attempts to write about “just and unjust wars” with what MacIntyre has described as “the fragments of a conceptual scheme.”1According to Walzer, “Justice and prudence stand in an uneasy relation to one another.”2 This statement confirms that he stands outside the moral tradition within which just-war theory was developed. Within the tradition of natural law and human virtues, as St. Thomas explains, there is no conflict or tension, only harmony and collaboration, between prudence, an intellectual and moral virtue, and the moral virtues themselves, including justice.3 Walzer, a modern liberal, understands prudence, not as a virtue, but as a principle or motive of action that can conflict with morality.
Walzer also writes about “moral law,” but not within the tradition of natural law. For him, “the moral law” is “those general principles that we commonly acknowledge, even when we can't or won't live up to them.”4 As Walzer defines “the moral law,” no such thing exists, because, following the rejection by most of us of the Catholic moral tradition, there are no general principles that we commonly acknowledge.5
When Walzer applies his incoherent interpretation of just-war theory to the world in which we live, the Middle East in particular, the result is that unjust actions are justified. His bias is readily apparent: “Contemporary terrorist campaigns are most often focused on people whose national existence has been radically devalued: the Protestants of Northern Ireland, the Jews of Israel, and so on.”1 Discussing the history and morality of Catholic-Protestant relations in Ireland and Britain would exceed the scope of this essay. More relevant to the present argument are the simple facts that more Palestinians have been killed by Israeli terrorism than Israelis by Palestinian terrorism, and that the national existence of the Arabs of Palestine has been far more radically devalued than that of the Jews of Israel.
Walzer regards Israel's 1967 Six-Day War as a just war, on the grounds that Egypt was the aggressor:
Often enough, despite the cunning agents, the theory [of aggression] is readily applied. It is worth setting down some of the cases about which we have, I think, no doubts: the German attack on Belgium in 1914, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, the Japanese attack on China, the German and Italian interventions in Spain, the Russian invasion of Finland, the Nazi conquests of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Belgium, and Holland, the Russian invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Egyptian challenge to Israel in 1967, and so on – the twentieth century makes for easy listing.2
Although he does not deny that Israel attacked first, Walzer insists that Egypt was the party guilty of aggression:
The Israeli first strike is, I think, a clear case of legitimate anticipation. To say that, however, is to suggest a major revision of the legalist paradigm. For it means that aggression can be made out not only in the absence of a military attack or invasion but in the (probable) absence of any immediate intention to launch such an attack or invasion.3
Noam Chomsky – like Walzer, a Jew; unlike Walzer, a non-Zionist4 – demonstrates the falsity of the claim that Israel started the war in 1967 in response to aggression:
Walzer offers no argument or evidence to show that the “Egyptian challenge” to Israel stands on a par with the “clear cases” of aggression cited. He simply states that Israel had a “just fear” of destruction – which, even if true, would hardly substantiate his claim. Israeli generals take a rather different view. The former Commander of the Air Force, General Ezer Weizmann, regarded as a hawk, stated that there was “no threat of destruction” but that the attack on Egypt, Jordan and Syria was nevertheless justified so that Israel could “exist according to the scale, spirit and quality she now embodies.” Citing corroboratory statements by Chief of Staff Chaim Bar-Lev and General Mattityahu Peled, Amnon Kapeliouk wrote that “no serious argument has been advanced to refute the thesis of the three generals.” … Furthermore, the interactions leading up to the war included provocative and destructive Israeli actions and threats, which Walzer ignores, alongside of Egyptian and other Arab actions such as the closing of the Straits of Tiran, which Egypt claimed to be an internal waterway.
Among others who, unlike Walzer, have doubts about the Egyptian “challenge” as a “clear case” of aggression is Menachem Begin, who had the following remarks to make: “In June 1967, we again had a choice. The Egyptian Army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.” Begin of course regards the Israeli attack as justified, “This was a war of self-defense in the noblest sense of the term.” But then, it may be recalled that the term “self-defense” has acquired a technical sense in modern political discourse, referring to any military action carried out by a state that one directs, serves or “supports.” What is, perhaps, of some interest is that an American democratic socialist dove goes well beyond Menachem Begin in portraying Israel's actions as defense against aggression. However one evaluates these complex circumstances, it is plainly impossible to regard the “Egyptian challenge” as a “clear case” of aggression, on a par with the Nazi conquests, etc. Rather, this is a “clear case” of the style of apologetics adopted by many supporters of Israel.1
Disregard of Just-War Thinking
The Joint Service Conference on Professional Ethics (JSCOPE) is an annual, academic conference on the ethics of the profession of arms. Although it is open to everyone and has no official relationship with the Department of Defense, many of the papers presented are by military officers and by those – both military and civilian – who teach military ethics to present and future officers. Consequently, the papers (which may be found at the U.S. Air Force Academy's website) provide a fairly accurate picture of the kind of military ethics that is taught to and believed by American military officers.
Although JSCOPE papers are written within a variety of ethical traditions – Kantian, consequentialist, etc. – most are more or less closely related to the just-war tradition. To take one example, Major Richard C. Anderson of the U.S. Military Academy presented a paper in January 2003 shortly before the invasion of Iraq, entitled “Redefining Just War Criteria in the Post-9/11 World and the Moral Consequences of Preemptive Strikes.” He relies primarily on Walzer's rendition of just-war theory (JWT), while observing that it “is unique, in that it gives no mention to the traditional JWT criteria of just cause, proper authority, right intention, reasonable chance of success, proportionality of ends, and last resort.”
Major Anderson provides an excerpt from President Bush's 2002 West Point graduation address: “Homeland defense and missile defense are part of stronger security, and they're essential priorities for America. Yet the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge” (Anderson's emphasis). He then observes: “President Bush's remarks that day were more than just encouraging words to the newest batch of U.S. Army junior leaders. The remarks signaled a dynamic change in our nation's traditional stance regarding preemption and the justified use of force.” Anderson's conclusion is that we should not redefine the criteria of just war:
In order to maintain the moral justification for our response to the 9/11 attacks, and the threats of the post-9/11 world, we must remain committed to our pre-9/11 understanding of JWT. Although we should certainly reevalu-ate our security posture, and our political and economic relationships with certain countries, we should not change our moral perspectives regarding the difference bet
ween just and unjust wars. If we maintain that human rights and dignity are universally inalienable, then we cannot violate the rights of some in order to secure the rights of others; nor can we violate the rights of nations before they actually threaten us. Therefore, our JWT is in need of re-affirmation and clarification, not redefinition.1
If decisions about whether to go to war were made by soldiers, rather than by politicians, America would fight fewer unjust wars. But we believe in the constitutional principle of “civilian control of the military” (which, like the constitutional principle of “separation of church and state,” cannot be found in the Constitution). Although they may question the words of their Commanders-in-Chief during academic conferences, American officers obey their commands to go to war. And if our recent Commanders-in-Chief have made any attempt to rely on just-war theory to decide when and when not to start wars, they have succeeded in keeping it secret.
The explanation of the U.S. Government's many decisions to involve us in unjust wars is not that just-war theory has been distorted, but that it has been disregarded. In May 1999 during NATO's U.S.-led aerial war of aggression against Yugoslavia, President Clinton wrote an opinion piece for The New York Times entitled “A Just and Necessary War.” Despite the title, the text of the article has almost nothing whatsoever to do with just-war theory.1 I am not aware of any attempt by an official of the U.S. Government to justify the invasion of Iraq to the American people in terms of the criteria of just war. The available evidence leads to the conclusion that most officials of the U.S. Government either do not know or do not care that just-war theory exists.
In fact, President Bush and the U.S. Government decided to launch the unjust war against Iraq for a variety of converging reasons that had little to do with just-war criteria. There was no evidence that, even if Saddam Hussein did possess weapons of mass destruction, he was capable of employing them against the United States, or that he contributed to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Perhaps President Bush wished to finish the job that his father had left uncompleted.2 He may really believe that it is appropriate to invade and occupy a non-democratic country in order to transform it into a democracy. William Engdahl has documented the role of oil in most of the wars fought by Britain and the United States during the twentieth century,1 and oil certainly played some role in this first Anglo-American war of the twenty-first century.