Neo-Conned! Again

by D Liam O'Huallachain

  The Iraq invasion and occupation has been a nuclear-strength credibility buster for George W. Bush, his neoconservative advisors, and the Pentagon brass that went along with them in hopes of advancing their careers. On the other hand, as a long-serving soldier in the field in Iraq, “Big Al,” as he is known affectionately, has credibility to spare: he is truthful, he puts his country first, and he honors the Constitution. Batting zero in all three of these categories, it is no wonder that Bush, his war advisors, and the Pentagon brass became more than a little agitated over Al's article.

  In that article that follows Al lists five why we cannot win in Iraq. And as a senior military officer I maintain that he is absolutely, if tragically, correct. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz alike would recognize his perceptiveness and appreciate his strategic understanding. Meanwhile, thousands die or are maimed, and billions of our hard-earned tax dollars are wasted.

  Victory in Iraq – if such is ever claimed by Washington – won't be “winning” as defined by Webster, or anyone else. The permanent military bases and American corporate advantage in some future Iraq may provide this administration its Pyrrhic victory. But no one will call it winning.

  The non-commissioned officer has always been the backbone of the American military. This has never been more true than today, when so many commissioned officers in key positions are more politicized and less courageous than ever before. But Al is still, as of this writing, under overt and veiled threat to stay quiet. He has paid, and continues to pay, a great price for telling the truth.

  Read his article. Then read it again. You'll see why I see Big Al as one of those people – they are few and far between, today – who sacrifice their personal peace, prosperity, and security so that others might have a better peace, a greater security, and a more authentic prosperity. We call them heroes.

  CHAPTER

  16

  Why We Cannot Win

  ………

  Staff Sgt. Al Lorentz, USAR

  BEFORE I BEGIN, let me state that I am a soldier currently deployed in Iraq, I am not an armchair quarterback. Nor am I some politically idealistic and naïve young soldier, I am an old and seasoned non-commissioned officer with nearly 20 years under my belt. Additionally, I am not just a soldier with a muds-eye view of the war, I am in Civil Affairs and as such, it is my job to be aware of all the events occurring in this country and specifically in my region.

  I have come to the conclusion that we cannot win here for a number of reasons. Ideology and idealism will never trump history and reality.

  When we were preparing to deploy, I told my young soldiers to beware of the “political solution.” Just when you think you have the situation on the ground in hand, someone will come along with a political directive that throws you off the tracks.

  I believe that we could have won this un-Constitutional invasion of Iraq and possibly pulled off the even more un-Constitutional occupation and subjugation of this sovereign nation. It might have even been possible to foist democracy on these people who seem to have no desire, understanding or respect for such an institution. True the possibility of pulling all this off was a long shot and would have required several hundred billion dollars and even more casualties than we've seen to date but again it would have been possible, not realistic or necessary, but possible.

  Here are the specific reasons why we cannot win in Iraq. First, we refuse to deal in reality. We are in a guerrilla war, but because of politics, we are not allowed to declare it a guerrilla war and must label the increasingly effective guerrilla forces arrayed against us as “terrorists, criminals and dead-enders.”

  This implies that there is a zero sum game at work, i.e. we can simply kill X number of the enemy and then the fight is over, mission accomplished, everybody wins. Unfortunately, this is not the case. We have few tools at our disposal and those are proving to be wholly ineffective at fighting the guerrillas.

  The idea behind fighting a guerrilla army is not to destroy its every man (an impossibility since he hides himself by day amongst the populace). Rather the idea in guerrilla warfare is to erode or destroy his base of support.

  So long as there is support for the guerrilla, for every one you kill two more rise up to take his place. More importantly, when your tools for killing him are precision guided munitions, raids and other acts that create casualties among the innocent populace, you raise the support for the guerrillas and undermine the support for yourself. (A 500-pound precision bomb has a casualty-producing radius of 400 meters minimum; do the math.)

  Second, our assessment of what motivates the average Iraqi was skewed, again by politically motivated “experts.” We came here with some fantasy idea that the natives were all ignorant, mud-hut dwelling camel riders who would line the streets and pelt us with rose petals, lay palm fronds in the street and be eternally grateful. While at one time there may have actually been support and respect from the locals, months of occupation by our regular military forces have turned the formerly friendly into the recently hostile.

  Attempts to correct the thinking in this regard are in vain; it is not politically correct to point out the fact that the locals are not only disliking us more and more, they are growing increasingly upset and often overtly hostile. Instead of addressing the reasons why the locals are becoming angry and discontented, we allow politicians in Washington, D.C. to give us pat and convenient reasons that are devoid of any semblance of reality.

  We are told that the locals are not upset because we have a hostile, aggressive, and angry Army occupying their nation. We are told that they are not upset at the police state we have created, or at the manner of picking their representatives for them. Rather, we are told they are upset because a handful of terrorists, criminals, and dead enders in their midst have made them upset, that and of course the ever convenient straw man of “left-wing media bias.”

  Third, the guerrillas are filling their losses faster than we can create them. This is almost always the case in guerrilla warfare, especially when your tactics for battling the guerrillas are aimed at killing guerrillas instead of eroding their support. For every guerrilla we kill with a “smart bomb” we kill many more innocent civilians and create rage and anger in the Iraqi community. This rage and anger translates into more recruits for the guerrillas and less support for us.

  We have fallen victim to the body count mentality all over again. We have shown a willingness to inflict civilian casualties as a necessity of war without realizing that these same casualties create waves of hatred against us. These angry Iraqi citizens translate not only into more recruits for the guerrilla army but also into more support of the guerrilla army.

  Fourth, their lines of supply and communication are much shorter than ours and much less vulnerable. We must import everything we need into this place; this costs money and is dangerous. Whether we fly the supplies in or bring them by truck, they are vulnerable to attack, most especially those brought by truck. This not only increases the likelihood of the supplies being interrupted. Every bean, every bullet and every bandage becomes infinitely more expensive.

  Conversely, the guerrillas live on top of their supplies and are showing every indication of developing a very sophisticated network for obtaining them. Further, they have the advantage of the close support of family and friends and traditional religious networks.

  Fifth, we consistently underestimate the enemy and his capabilities. Many military commanders have prepared to fight exactly the wrong war here.

  Our tactics have not adjusted to the battlefield and we are falling behind.

  Meanwhile the enemy updates his tactics and has shown a remarkable resiliency and adaptability.

  Because the current administration is more concerned with its image than it is with reality, it prefers symbolism to substance: soldiers are dying here and being maimed and crippled for life. It is tragic, indeed criminal that our elected public servants would so willingly sacrifice our nation's prestige and honor as well as the blood and treasure to pursue
an agenda that is ahistorical and unconstitutional.

  On the brink of war, and in front of the whole world, the United States government asserted that Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his nuclear weapons program, had biological weapons and mobile biological weapon production facilities, and had stockpiled and was producing chemical weapons. All of this was based on the assessments of the U.S. Intelligence Community. And not one bit of it could be confirmed when the war was over.

  —Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities

  of the United States Regarding Weapons of

  Mass Destruction, March 31, 2005

  THE PROFESSIONALS SPEAK II:

  THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE INTELLIGENCE DEBACLE

  THE EDITORS' GLOSS: This piece, originally published in the Summer 2004 Middle East Policy Journal, along with its companion in this section by Ray McGovern, pretty much says it all. We were sold a bill of goods, and none of it was a product of “intelligence failure.” The failure was one of integrity, honesty, and basic respect for the good of the nation, the reputation of the American people, and the lives and limbs of the members of their armed forces.

  As Dr. Sniegoski demonstrated, there was a political push for war that had little to do with the professional demands of statecraft. That political push translated into pressure, of various shades, on America's intelligence apparatus to come up with the “right answer.” A classic, tragic, life-and-death case of “when I want your opinion I'll give it to you.” What a shame; a scandal; and an outrage.

  Looking back over the past decade, Dave Lindorff wrote for Counterpunch: “Everyone agreed that it was not the sex. It was the lying, right?” Obviously, he was referring to our recently impeached President. “The audacious bending of the meaning of the word 'is' and the word 'sex.' Right?” Well how about the meanings of the words “we know Saddam has WMD”; the meaning of words “imminent threat”; the meaning of “reveal the identity of Valerie Plame”; the meaning of “no one authorized torture”? The list seems endless. “Has lying ever been practiced so blatantly,” Lindorff continues, “as it is being practiced today in the White House? … Where is the public outcry demanding that [Bush] be called to account for his shameless and bloody deception of the American public and the Congress?” Where indeed.

  God bless Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-Calif.) for at least asking the question. She's got a Resolution of Inquiry in the works, “requesting the President and directing the Secretary of State to transmit to the House of Representatives not later than 14 days after the date of the adoption of this resolution all information in the possession of the President and the Secretary of State relating to communication with officials of the United Kingdom between January 1, 2002, and October 16, 2002, relating to the policy of the United States with respect to Iraq.”

  What's the betting that obfuscation and still more lies will be the order of the day?

  CHAPTER

  17

  Drinking the Kool-Aid: Making the Case for War with Compromised Integrity and Intelligence

  ………

  Col. W. Patrick Lang, USA (ret.)

  THROUGHOUT MY LONG service life in the Department of Defense, first as an army officer and then as a member of the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service, there was a phrase in common usage: “I will fall on my sword over that.” It meant that the speaker had reached a point of internal commitment with regard to something that his superiors wanted him to do and that he intended to refuse even though this would be career suicide. The speaker preferred career death to the loss of personal honor.

  This phrase is no longer widely in use. What has taken its place is far more sinister in its meaning and implications. “I drank the Kool-Aid” is what is now said. Those old enough to remember the Jonestown tragedy know this phrase all too well. Jim Jones, a self-styled “messiah” from the United States, lured hundreds of innocent and believing followers to Guyana, where he built a village, isolated from the world, in which his Utopian view of the universe would be played out. He controlled all news, regulated all discourse and expression of opinion, and shaped behavior to his taste. After a time, his paranoia grew unmanageable and he “foresaw” that “evil” forces were coming to threaten his “paradise.” He decided that these forces were unstoppable and that death would be preferable to living under their control. He called together his followers in the town square and explained the situation to them. There were a few survivors, who all said afterward that within the context of the “group-think” prevailing in the village, it sounded quite reasonable. Jim Jones then invited all present to drink from vats of Kool-Aid containing lethal doses of poison. Nearly all did so, without physical coercion. Parents gave their children the poison and then drank it themselves. Finally Jones drank. Many hundreds died with him.

  What does drinking the Kool-Aid mean today? It signifies that the person in question has given up personal integrity and has succumbed to the prevailing group-think that typifies policymaking today. This person has become “part of the problem, not part of the solution.”

  What was the “problem”? The sincerely held beliefs of a small group of people who think they are the “bearers” of a uniquely correct view of the world, sought to dominate the foreign policy of the United States in the Bush 43 administration, and succeeded in doing so through a practice of excluding all who disagreed with them. Those they could not drive from government they bullied and undermined until they, too, had drunk from the vat.

  What was the result? The war in Iraq. It is not anything like over yet, and the body count is still mounting. As of August 2005, there were 1847 American soldiers dead, thousands wounded, and tens (if not a hundred) of thousands Iraqis dead, though the Pentagon is not publicizing the number. A PBS special on Frontline concerning Iraq mentioned that senior military officers had said of General Franks, “He had drunk the Kool-Aid.” Many intelligence officers have told the author that they too drank the Kool-Aid and as a result consider themselves to be among the “walking dead,” waiting only for retirement and praying for an early release that will allow them to go away and try to forget their dishonor and the damage they have done to the intelligence services and therefore to the republic.

  What we have now is a highly corrupted system of intelligence and policymaking, one twisted to serve specific group goals, ends and beliefs held to the point of religious faith. Is this different from the situation in previous administrations? Yes. The intelligence community (the information collection and analysis functions, not “James Bond” covert action, which should properly be in other parts of the government) is assigned the task of describing reality. The policy staffs and politicals in the government have the task of creating a new reality, more to their taste. Nevertheless, it is “understood” by the government professionals, as opposed to the zealots, that a certain restraint must be observed by the policy crowd in dealing with the intelligence people. Without objective facts, decisions are based on subjective drivel. Wars result from such drivel. We are in the midst of one at present.

  The signs of impending disaster were clear from the beginning of this administration. Insiders knew it all along. Statements made by the Bush administration often seem to convey the message that Iraq only became a focus of attention after the terrorist attacks on 9/11. The evidence points in another direction.

  Sometime in the spring of 2000, Stephen Hadley, formerly deputy to Condoleeza Rice at the National Security Council (NSC), briefed a group of prominent Republican party policymakers on the national-security and foreign-policy agenda of a future George W. Bush administration. Hadley was one of a group of senior campaign policy advisers to then-Texas Governor Bush known collectively as “the Vulcans.” The group, in addition to Hadley, included Rice, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle and had been assembled by George Shultz and Dick Cheney beginning in late 1998, when Bush first launched his presidential bid.

  Hadley's briefing shocked a number of the participants, according to Clifford Kiracofe, a pro
fessor at the Virginia Military Institute, who spoke to several of them shortly after the meeting. Hadley announced that the “number-one foreign-policy agenda” of a Bush administration would be Iraq and the unfinished business of removing Saddam Hussein from power. Hadley also made it clear that the Israel-Palestine conflict, which had dominated the Middle East agenda of the Clinton administration, would be placed in the deep freeze.

  Dr. Kiracofe's account of the pre-election obsession of the Vulcans with the ouster of Saddam Hussein is corroborated by former U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill's memory of the first meetings of the Bush National Security Council, which he attended in late January and early February of 2001. Ron Suskind's book, The Price of Loyalty, based on O'Neill's memory and notes, tells us of an NSC meeting, ten days into the Bush administration, at which both the Israel-Palestine and Iraq situations were discussed.

  Referring to President Clinton's efforts to reach a comprehensive peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians, President Bush declared, “Clinton overreached, and it all fell apart. That's why we're in trouble. If the two sides don't want peace, there's no way we can force them. I don't see much we can do over there at this point. I think it's time to pull out of the situation.”

  Next, Condoleeza Rice raised the issue of Iraq and the danger posed by Saddam's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. A good deal of the hour-long meeting was taken up with a briefing by CIA Director George Tenet on a series of aerial photographs of sites inside Iraq that “might” be producing WMD. Tenet admitted that there was no firm intelligence on what was going on inside those sites, but at the close of the meeting, President Bush tasked Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Hugh Shelton to begin preparing options for the use of U.S. ground forces in the northern and southern no-fly zones in Iraq to support an insurgency to bring down the Saddam regime. As author Ron Suskind summed it up: “Meeting adjourned. Ten days in, and it was about Iraq. Rumsfeld had said little, Cheney nothing at all, though both men clearly had long entertained the idea of overthrowing Saddam.” If this was a decision meeting, it was strange. It ended in a presidential order to prepare contingency plans for war in Iraq.