To Arms

by Hew Strachan

  French operations against the Cameroons had thus assumed a momentum before they received a direction. In Paris the general staff had no plans for an offensive in West Africa. But M. Merlin, the governor-general of Equatorial Africa, home on leave like the other senior colonial administrators of the day, took the opportunity to concert his thinking with that of Gaston Doumergue, foreign minister until 26 August 1914 and colonial minister thereafter.

  Both Merlin and Doumergue were convinced of the desirability of recovering the territory ceded in 1911. The war provided the opportunity not only to do so, but to go further—to eject the Germans from West Africa with British co-operation. The instructions which Merlin, therefore, delivered to Aymérich on his return to Africa on 15 September specified two objectives—one operational, to mount an offensive in the south and east, and so give indirect support to the British who would land at Duala; and the second political, to recover the ceded territory. However, the apparent congruity of these tasks, both with each other and with what Aymérich had already done, was unsustainable. The French offensive had already been commenced as an independent operation, and the impossibility of rapid communication with the British in the west would maintain that independence. Secondly, the fulfilment of the political objective gave the French attack an aim which was not secondary but primary.

  While France’s concerns were territorial, Britain’s were maritime. The Admiralty wanted to deny the use of Duala’s wireless station and port facilities to German cruisers. The irrelevance of territorial conquest was confirmed by Dobell, who in a memorandum of 3 August advised the Committee of Imperial Defence’s subcommittee that the seizure of Buea, Victoria, and Duala would be sufficient to strangle the enemy. The attractiveness of Duala as the focus for British operations was confirmed by the Colonial Office’s reports of black disaffection in the Cameroons. Although exaggerated, they were not without foundation for the coastal region, where British influence had dominated until 1884 and was still far from extinguished in 1914.65 A plan to develop Duala as a white settlement by forcibly removing the black population had aroused the ire of Rudolf Bell, the German-educated paramount chief of the Duala. Bell was charged with high treason in May. Then a message to the French from Martin-Paul Samba of Ebolowa, announcing his intention to lead a revolt, was intercepted by the Germans. Both Bell and Samba were executed on 8 August. The Germans in Duala expended as much military effort in controlling the local population as in preparing to meet a British landing.66

  The formation of the Cameroons expeditionary force took a month. A landward thrust from Nigeria towards Duala was rendered inadvisable by the nature of the intervening country. Therefore troops had to be collected along the West African coast, and the shipping assembled for a seaborne invasion. The interval allowed the completion of Togoland’s conquest, and the consequent isolation of Duala from Germany by the destruction of the Kamina wireless.

  On one level the Cameroons expeditionary force met Merlin’s and Doumergue’s objectives. It included a French contribution of 2,000 Senegalese from Dakar under the command of Colonel Mayer. Thus, of the total of 13,000 Entente forces deployed in the Cameroons, the majority (7,000) were French. The expeditionary force, therefore, served France’s political objectives by enhancing its claim to be the dominant voice in the eventual partition of the Cameroons. But it did not serve the operational purposes relayed to Aymérich. The orders given Dobell, who was to command the force, were to seize Buea, Victoria, and Duala. He had no instructions to undertake the further conquest of the colony, and thus Merlin’s idea of a reciprocating effect between Dobell’s advance and Aymérich’s was, at this stage, complete fantasy. From the outset of the war the War Office had recognized that the Germans were likely to continue their defence from the interior,67 but not until 29 September did the CID subcommittee ask itself how Dobell could break off his attack at the coast. It concluded that he could not: to secure Duala, the conquest of the colony must be completed and more men would be required. But its recommendation to that effect was ignored by the government, both then and thereafter.68 The original British strategy, to secure German ports and wireless stations, and to use only minimal local ground forces, remained valid well into 1915.

  The contribution of the West African Frontier Force to the Duala expedition was limited to 2,500 men, because the primary concern of Britain’s local forces in relation to the Cameroons was, like that of France, defensive. Furthermore, again like France although for different reasons, those defensive arrangements were in disarray.

  On 1 January 1914 a new administrative structure, amalgamating the emirdominated north and the largely acephalous south, had been imposed on Nigeria. The Nigeria Regiment contributed 70 per cent of the West African Frontier Force. When war broke out, the defensive scheme for Nigeria, revised in the light of the administrative and regimental amalgamation, was still in draft. The confusion was compounded by the fact that Sir Frederick Lugard, the colony’s governor-general, had taken the only available copy home on leave. Moreover, neither it nor the regiment’s primary tasks had prepared the latter for what it was now expected to do. Training, on Lugard’s insistence, had been kept to company level; the main attention in dealing with an external threat had been to coastal defence, and the troops were therefore more adept at entrenching than at mobile operations. Like the Schütztruppen, they had no indigenous staff organization or technical services. It had been assumed that operations would be conducted within Nigeria, and that consequently these would be provided by the local infrastructure.69

  Nigeria’s defensive scheme allowed for the formation of five columns on the Cameroons border, two in the north at Maidugari opposite Mora, one at Yola on the Benue river opposite Garua, one at Ikom on the River Cross facing Nsanakang, and one near the coast at Calabar. On 6 August the Colonial Office, anxious for the internal security of Nigeria, ordered the columns not to advance into the Cameroons without further instructions.70 However, Lugard’s absence and the uncertainties about the offensive-defensive implications of the new plan helped to create a vagueness about what was intended. The cause of clarity was not served by communication difficulties between Lagos and Kaduna, the headquarters of Colonel C.H.P. Carter, commanding the Nigeria Regiment. On 15 August a retired British officer told Carter that the German garrison at Garua had on 11 August known nothing about the outbreak of war. A day previously London had authorized reconnaissances by the northern and southern columns. Carter now requested permission to attack Garua, and when this was granted extended his order to include an attack on Mora. Thus in late August all five columns were advancing into enemy territory.71

  Carter’s advance was of course unwittingly directed at the guts of the German defences. Both Mora and Garua were the main northern guardians of Ngaundere and the highland plateau. Garua’s specific task was to support the Schütztruppen deployed further north in Mora and Bornu, and to provide a rallying point in the event of their retreat.72 Its defences consisted of five self-contained circular works, positioned to give each other supporting fire, and whose approaches were broken up with barbed wire and traps; their trenches, 7 metres deep, with overhead protection and deep dugouts, represented the techniques of modern war. Those at Mora were similarly well-constructed, and rose to 500 metres, atop precipitous and intersected slopes. Both would require heavy artillery for their reduction. Carter had only 2.95-inch mountain guns. Moreover, the French garrison at Fort Lamy, under Colonel Largeau, could not assist in the attack on Mora. Its efforts were concentrated on suppressing the German post at Kusseri, whence it was repulsed in August, and which it did not take till 25 September. By the end of August the British attack on Mora had fallen back to the south, adopting a position designed to block Mora’s links with Garua. At Garua itself the rebuff was more severe. Von Crailsheim, the German commander, had picked up sufficient from the unusual movements on the Nigerian frontier to increase his garrison to three companies. The British attack, undertaken with insufficient reconnaissance over open g
round, was a complete failure, the Nigerians breaking under a German counter-attack, and the commanding officer being killed. The Cross river column took Nsanakang, but on 6 September was surprised by the Germans and suffered 50 per cent casualties as well as losing eight of its eleven British officers. Thus, all along the Nigerian frontier the British were forced onto the defensive. The effect on the German askaris’ morale was of crucial significance; never before had they fought the enemies of other European powers, and yet in all the initial engagements in the north they had proved victorious. Almost as impressed were the tribes of the Benue valley. In September and October the ambitions of the northern Abteilung at Garua had grown sufficiently for it to push strong patrols into Nigeria itself, to Yola, and also northwards towards Marua and its links with Mora.

  Carter’s attacks, however misconceived, did at least serve one broader purpose—they confirmed the Germans in their neglect of Duala. Dobell, who left Lagos on 20 September, instructed the frontier columns in the south to remain on the defensive, and those in the north and centre to concentrate against Garua. Carter was replaced in command by Colonel F. Cunliffe. Cunliffe’s task was to support the main thrust on Duala.

  By early September a flotilla of small craft had clustered around the British cruiser HMS Cumberland, and on 5 and 6 September anchored in Ambas Bay, off Victoria. The original intention was to land here and cut across Cape Cameroon to Duala. However, the rainy season rendered the intervening rivers impassable. By the time the convoy had changed plans and proceeded round the cape into the Cameroon estuary the converse pressure had begun to apply. Although the Germans had not mined the rivermouth, they had sunk mine ships across its main channel. A direct advance on Duala along the shore was impossible. Therefore, the only means of ingress was up the rivers and creeks leading off the bays of the Cameroon estuary, using the smaller boats in the shallow waters. When the rainy season ended the water would fall and further advance become impossible. Thus, the middle weeks of September were passed in a series of navigational thrusts and in running battles between British and German light craft. On 16 September the German gunboat Nachtigal was sunk, and by the 22nd the survey was complete and a channel 19 feet deep cleared to within 5,000 yards of Duala.

  On 25 September Dobell, his command now assembled at the entrance to the channel, issued an ultimatum calling on Duala to surrender. His plan was to push his main force up the Lungasi river to Japoma, where the river was bridged by the railway to Eseka. Thus he would cut off the town and its garrison from the south and east. But the Lungasi was blocked by a boom, and on 27 September Dobell readied himself for a frontal attack on Duala. The Germans, meanwhile, had no intention of fighting for Duala. Realizing from Dobell’s ultimatum that attack was imminent, they fell back inland on 26 September, taking what they could in transport and destroying what they could not. On 27 September Dobell captured Duala without a shot being fired. On 6 October the Senegalese, this time in the face of stiffer opposition, took the Japoma bridge.

  The immediate British objectives, certainly in the eyes of the Admiralty, had been gained. However, the Germans had not withdrawn far. Some had followed the northern line towards Bare and Dschang; most had gone east along the Wuri river to Jabassi or south-east on the midland line to Edea. All three concentrations had to be cleared in order to render Duala safe from German attack.

  While the rains lasted Jabassi was the most accessible. Using the river, and mounting a 6-pounder gun on a dredger, a British force attacked on 7 October. However, its movements lost unity in the thick bush, and once into open ground the West Africans wilted under the concentrated fire of machine-guns. The waters of the Wuri then fell, and the attackers retreated to Duala. On 13 October the water-level rose again. The attack on the following day was directed up both banks of the river, and was better co-ordinated by Gorges, the British commander, as he stayed afloat to be able to observe the progress of operations. He was rewarded with success.

  The value of riverine transport was even more graphically illustrated in the capture of Edea. The obvious route followed the railway line. But the British established that the Sanaga and Njong rivers, both issuing into the bight of Biafra, the former from Edea, and the latter linked to Edea by a track from Dehane, were navigable by small craft. Using the vessels released by the fall of Jabassi, British and French columns pushed up on Edea from the south, while a third column followed the railway. Again the Germans fell back without fighting, and Edea was taken on 26 October.

  The advance up the northern railway, being less dependent on water navigation, was left until December. On 2 January 1915 the British took Dschang. However, having advanced beyond the railhead they destroyed the fort of Dschang, and then fell back onto securer lines of communication at Bare and Nkongsamba. Similarly, when the Wuri fell Jabassi was abandoned for a post further downstream which could be more readily supplied.

  By the end of 1914 Dobell had achieved all his immediate objectives. The obstacles he had overcome had been almost entirely navigational and logistical; at no point, except at the Japoma bridge, had the Germans mounted a sustained defence. Even Dobell himself recognized that he had encountered at best only two of the twelve regular Schütztruppen companies;73 most of his opposition had been provided by the police or by European reservists, and it had not been their job to mount major operations in the coastal areas.

  In part, the ease of his task was attributable to Cunliffe’s columns on the Nigerian frontier. But the major contribution in 1914 was made by Aymérich’s attack in the south and east. It would be wrong to say that Cunliffe and Aymérich cleared the path for Dobell at Duala, because the Germans had never proposed to block the latter’s advance in the first place. But Merlin’s strategy succeeded to the extent that it was defence of the New Cameroons that caused most worry for Zimmerman in 1914.

  Since its acquisition in 1911 the Germans had had little opportunity to survey the new territory or to incorporate it within the original colony. They had stationed no troops on the River Sanga south of Nola. The three companies of Schütztruppen on the upper Sanga, both east of the river and west as far as Dume, had an area of 200,000 square kilometres and a front of 1,700 kilometres to defend. The easternmost company, having initially planned an offensive from Carnot towards Singa, was recalled by Eymael, commanding the Ostabteilung. Thus, throughout August the only German troops east of the Sanga and south of Nola were police detachments.

  The tempo of Morisson’s and Hutin’s advances was therefore dictated by the constraints of supply rather than by enemy action. None of the French columns had the lines of communication or the forward stocks necessary for immediate offensive operations. The navigability of the Sanga compensated for the pre-war deficiencies as far as Hutin was concerned. His most vulnerable point was Wesso, on the confluence of the Sanga and the Dscha, and just inside French territory. But an attack mounted by the Germans from Yukaduma miscarried because of the swollen state of the rivers. Morisson’s initial difficulties were far greater. The Lobaye was not navigable, and therefore forward movement was impossible until porters were organized.

  Aymérich’s intention was that both columns should converge on Nola, and he anticipated a joint attack on 16 or 17 October. But the co-ordination of the two columns was impossible. Lateral communications took eight to thirteen days. When Morisson was first apprised of the plan to take Nola (the order was received on 21 September), he reported his supply problems as so great that Aymérich revised his instructions, suggesting a defensive role on the Lobaye. This second set of orders was dispatched by Aymerich on 30 September and reached Morisson on 7 October. In the interim, however, Morisson had resolved his logistical difficulties, and on 2 October had begun his advance on the line Carnot-Bania (north of Nola) as originally instructed. On 17 October Morisson entered Carnot without opposition. Hutin, meanwhile, acting in accordance with his orders from Aymérich to take Nola in conjunction with Morisson (orders given on 29 September), arrived there the day after Morisson entered
Carnot. The news of Nola’s capture did not reach Morisson until 24 October, and Aymérich (who, understandably uncertain where he could best position himself, had moved to Wesso) two days later. But by now the information was out of date. Hutin became worried about the supply of so many troops so far forward, and feared that the Germans on the Dscha would try to cut his communications at Putu. Leaving a single company at Nola to link with Morisson, he withdrew his main body back to Wesso.

  On 29 October Morisson, perplexed as to his next move, asked Aymérich for further guidance. However, what Morisson could not afford to do was to stay still while he awaited Aymérich’s reply. For much of October the Africans had been on half rations and on the 21st the Europeans were put on two-thirds. So he advanced. By the end of the month the problems were resolved as he was into territory fertile enough to enable him to requisition. But, as his troops ate off the surrounding land, so they needed to move to find fresh sources of supply. Therefore he continued to advance. He captured Baturi on 9 December. But the further he went, the remoter became his contact with Aymerich. From Baturi to Brazzaville, telegrams took between thirty and thirty-five days, and replies a further twenty to twenty-eight days. While Morisson pushed westwards, in obedience to one scheme of operations, Aymérich developed another.74

  The collection of porters and the co-ordination of command for Le Meillour’s and the Miquelard’s columns proved even more complex than it had been for Morisson’s. Orders from Libreville to Miquelard’s base at Mitzvic took between nine and twenty-seven days, and then a further nine days elapsed before they reached Le Meillour at Mvahdi. One letter from Brazzaville to Mitzvic took fifty days, and another, from Mvahdi to Libreville, forty-four days. Aymérich’s decision to go forward from Brazzaville to Wesso left the two Gabon columns to their own devices. The original intention was to put the weight on Miquelard’s, directing it along the southern border to Muni, and then north to Ojem, so cutting the German links with neutral Spanish territory. However, in mid-September, at Mimbang, midway between Ojem and the border, the French column ran into the Germans; its officers suffered heavy casualties, and its three companies broke and ran. In October the Germans advanced up to and across the border. Their victory was a major one. The decision not to defend Duala heightened the value of Muni as the Germans’ point of contact with Europe and the wider world: supplies, including ammunition, continued to enter the Cameroons via Muni at least until early 1915.75