Escape From Rome

by Walter Scheidel

  13. See Findlay and O’Rourke 2007: 330–45 for the role of overseas trade in industrialization, esp. 334. For a model of this role that matches historical outcomes, see Findlay and O’Rourke 2007: 339–45. U.S. share of British cotton imports: Olmstead and Rhode 2018: 4, fig. 2.

  14. Vries 2013: 253.

  15. See Morgan 2000; cf. Vries 2013: 257.

  16. O’Brien and Prados de la Escosura 1998: 37–59, esp. 50–54, 58 for Britain; Magnusson 2009: 85 (entrepreneurs).

  17. Eltis and Engerman 2000, esp. 124, 141 (Caribbean sugar and the slave trade did not add much value and growth, probably helped industrialization but not more than other factors, and were not essential); Vries 2013: 258–62, on Blackburn 1997: 541. See Blackburn 1997: 509–80 on primitive accumulation and British industrialization; esp. 540–42 for the estimate that profits from the triangular trade could have provided between 20 percent and 35 percent of British gross fixed capital formation in 1770. Profits went to wealthy individuals who saved a higher proportion of their incomes.

  18. Goldstone 2009: 67; Vries 2013: 297–98, 301, 303. See, in general, Bryant 2006: 438, who stresses that contingencies are context-dependent, and thus external resources mattered only thanks to “their ‘timely activation’ by human agents whose technical skills, culturally informed ambitions, and organizational powers had reached an enabling level of development.”

  19. Pomeranz 2000: 283 (quote). For critiques of Pomeranz, see Vries 2001; Huang 2002; Bryant 2006: 418–35; Duchesne 2011: 117–63; Vries 2013: 290–98. Van Zanden 2009a: 250, 255–56 thinks the role of ghost acreages in overall development was small even in Britain, just as it was in the Netherlands.

  20. Access: Beckert 2014: 81. Cf. Belich 2009: 50: American independence did not cause a big rift in transatlantic economic relations. Substitution: Findlay and O’Rourke 2007: 336, 342; Beckert 2014: 255–57; Hanlon 2015: 76–78 (India and Egypt saved the British cotton industry in the 1860s). Cotton quality: Hanlon 2015: 75–76. Only in the 1860s did technological innovation respond to the challenge of processing lower-quality Indian cotton (Hanlon 2015: 81–97). See Olmstead and Rhode 2018 against some of the more sweeping claims regarding modern capitalism’s dependence on New World slave labor and other forms of coercion. Endowments: Pomeranz 2000: 277–78. Arguably, higher costs from other sources of cotton could have been borne given that technological change in Britain itself produced the largest benefits: Brenner and Isett 2002: 646. Eastern Europe (Baltic): Pomeranz 2000: 261–63.

  21. Ghost acreages explain breakthrough: Pomeranz 2000: 296–97. Vries 2013: 301 somewhat grudgingly concedes that ghost acreages were “a necessary condition at best but never a sufficient one.”

  22. O’Brien and Prados de la Escosura 1998: 58 (quote), even though they note that British agricultural productivity, coal, and skills mattered (even) more (59): for these factors, see chapter 12 in this volume. Innovation: Findlay and O’Rourke 2007: 338, 343–44. Even Vries 2013: 284 agrees.

  23. Inikori 2002: 479 (quote). But Inikori himself stresses the role of complementary factors.

  24. See Férnandez-Armesto 2006: 119–20 for this premise.

  25. Roller 2006: 22–50, esp. 23–27 for circumnavigation of Africa.

  26. Roller 2006: 57–91 (Pytheas), 51 (scholars).

  27. Férnandez-Armesto 2006: 43–50.

  28. Ibid., 51–59 (Norse), 122–37 (Middle Ages). These endeavors are best understood as analogous rather than homologous to ancient Phoenician and Greek seafaring: the enormous hiatus speaks against potent legacies.

  29. Roller 2006: 20–21, 26.

  30. Ibid., 112–32, esp. 112–13 (Iuba), 119–22 (Baltic), 123–24 (Britain), 125–27 (rhetoric).

  31. See Garza 2014: the Mughal empire acquired naval assets by absorbing existing smaller naval states in Gujarat and Bengal, and employed its navy to fight the Marathas and other regional challengers.

  32. Tsai 2001: 113, table 3.1 (census), 114 (land), 119 (canal), 123 (quote from Mingshi), 125 (palace); Dreyer 2007: 8 (undercount).

  33. Tsai 2001: 201 (ships); Dreyer 2007: 99–134, esp. 105, 112 (ships and personnel). Church 2005 offers a penetrating deconstruction of the tradition regarding ship size.

  34. Levathes 1994: 87–153; Tsai 2001: 201–8; Dreyer 2007: 46–97, 150–63.

  35. For the expenditure estimate, see Tsai 2001: 121–22; for revenue, see 123.

  36. Yield: Tsai 2001: 206; Dreyer 2007: 82, 90.

  37. For the fading of the program, see Levathes 1994: 173–81; Dreyer 2007: 166–71. See also Dreyer 2007: 91 (suspension and rescinding), 171 (1436), 172–73 (rival traditions).

  38. Tsai 2001: 57–76.

  39. Tsai 2001: 123–24, 186–98.

  40. Dreyer 2007: 3, 33 (quote from the Mingshi); see also 2–4, 28–35 on the purpose of the voyages. Glory: Elvin 1973: 220; Qian 1985: 111–12; Férnandez-Armesto 2006: 109 (“Perhaps because he was a usurper with a lot to prove, China’s Yongle emperor was willing to pay almost any price for glory”); Dreyer 2007: 208. Finlay 2000: 296 is more sanguine, contemplating militarization of the tribute trade system and the conversion of Siam and Java into client states as possible objectives. Yet even if true, it is not clear what benefits this would have brought.

  41. Not exploration: Finlay 2000: 297–99; Dreyer 2007: 3, 30.

  42. Elvin 1973: 220; Levathes 1994: 43, 55; Dreyer 2007: 3, 26. No benefit: Hoffman 2015: 171.

  43. Tsai 2001: 179–86 (Annam), 148–77 (Mongols).

  44. Elvin 1973: 220; Dreyer 2007: 167–68, 173 (quote); Ringmar 2007: 251–53.

  45. Dreyer 2007: 25.

  46. Tsai 2001: 177, 186, 190

  47. Levathes 1994: 175–77; J. Hall 1996: 41–42.

  48. Dreyer 2007: 175–77.

  49. For the importance of monopolistic power in this process, see Qian 1985: 112; Diamond 1997: 412. Critics: Dreyer 2007: 173 (quote from Shuyu Zhouzilu).

  50. See, e.g., Diamond 1997: 412–13; E. Jones 2003: 67; McCloskey 2016: 397. For context, see Wey Gómez 2008.

  51. Diamond 1997: 416 (quote). Mokyr 1990: 231: “No single European government could have stopped exploration”—although this mischaracterizes the purpose of the treasure fleets.

  52. Wallerstein 1974: 60 (quote).

  53. E. Jones 2003: 205.

  54. I. Morris 2010: 429 (quote). Rational response: Férnandez-Armesto 2006: 114–15; Findlay and O’Rourke 2007: 363. Marks 2002: 48, 156 fails to understand this fundamental point by treating China’s turn away from the sea as one of many “contingencies,” in the sense of outcomes that could just as well have been quite different (cf. 10).

  55. Contra Cook 2001: 99–101, who develops this fanciful counterfactual scenario.

  56. See, e.g., Férnandez-Armesto 2006: 116–17. Ratios: Deng 1997: 96, 161. State size: Hoffman 2015: 169.

  57. State: e.g., Vries 2015: 347–48, and see chapter 10 in this volume. Cities and social order: Abernethy 2000: 203–4. Quote: Wong 1997: 147. Power bases: Elvin 1973: 221; Hoffman 2015: 168.

  58. Waley-Cohen 1993: 1541–44 explores the complexities of this text. For a comparative perspective on the attributes of universal empire, see, e.g., Bang and Kolodziejczyk 2012.

  59. See also chapter 10 in this volume. Southern Song: Levathes 1994: 41; Deng 1999: 315–16 (quote 315); von Glahn 2016: 270–73.

  60. Levathes 1994: 41–54; von Glahn 2016: 284.

  61. K. Roy 2015: 168 (quote). Lack of incentives: Vries 2013: 165. Security: Pomeranz 2000: 203. Bans and restrictions: Deng 1999: 191; von Glahn 2016: 312, 319. See also chapter 10 in this volume.

  62. Lack of support: Mielants 2007: 84–85; Vries 2015: 358–59. Malacca: Abernethy 2000: 242–49. Manila and Batavia: Wang 1990: 409–12, 420; Pomeranz 2000: 202–3. Quote: G. Wang 1990: 401.

  63. Lorge 2005: 155–56.

  64. H. Thomas 2014: 241–58 (operations in the Philippines), 259–84 (plans).

  65. Pomeranz 2000: 205; Findlay and O’Rourke 2007: 358–59.

  66. Miela
nts 2007: 109–10, 117.

  67. K. Roy 2015: 164–70, 214. For Chola’s operations, see in greater detail Kulke, Kesavapany, and Sakhuja 2009. Merchants: Mielants 2007: 100–102, 112.

  68. Casale 2010: 114–15, 119–20, 138, 155 on the viziers and their downfall, 163, 177–79 on the shift to Yemen, and 87–88, 114–19, 155–56, 162–63, 182–83 on the “Indian Ocean faction” at the Ottoman court.

  69. Ibid., 182–83 (shift to private trade), 199–202 (crisis and losses), 202–3 (quote). For the crisis, see chapter 6 in this volume.

  70. Wallerstein 1974: 60 (quote).

  71. Abernethy 2000: 173–273, on which I draw in the following, remains the most compelling account of the causes of European colonial expansion.

  72. Ibid., 206–8 (quote: 208), and more generally 192–253 for the central role of competitive fragmentation. Cf. also Chirot 1985: 192. Logic: Vries 2015: 382.

  73. Constraints on expansion: Abernethy 2000: 184; Rosenthal and Wong 2011: 217. Extension: Vries 2015: 381. Contrasts: Abernethy 2000: 212–13, who speculates that a fragmented China might have behaved differently. Readiness: Wickham 2016: 232.

  74. Abernethy 2000: 192–202, 225–42 (quote: 205).

  75. Mitterauer 2003: 220–21, 228–33; Mielants 2007: 27–29.

  76. Férnandez-Armesto 2006: 157–64.

  77. We have already noted the contrast with imperial China’s diffidence. Deng 1999: 205–10 stresses the difference between Western and Chinese sea power.

  78. Vries 2015: 344–46.

  79. Abernethy 2000: 213–24. From early on, the Portuguese state had been strongly involved in trade: Subrahmanyam 2012: 48–52. For the development of the Portuguese overseas empire, see Disney 2009.

  80. Thus Hoffman 2015, esp. 7–15 for a summary (quote: 7). Sharman 2019 disagrees. Outgrowth: Mann 2006: 380–83 (quote: 383).

  81. Global share: Hoffman 2015: 2n4; see also Etemad 2007: 119–87 for quantitative analysis of the evolution of territory and population under colonial rule. For 1938 (42 percent of territory and 32 percent of population under colonial rule), see Etemad 2007: 123, table 7.1. 1760–1830: Etemad 2007: 125, table 7.2.

  82. See, e.g., Darwin 2008; S. Dale 2010; Stanziani 2012.

  83. Hoffman 2015: 69–81 (China) (see also I. Morris 2014: 176), 81–85 (Japan), 85–89 (India), 89–94 (Ottomans and Russia).

  84. Hoffman 2015: 94, 97–98 (prerequisites), 11–12, 96 (allies); Férnandez-Armesto 2006: 148–49 (withdrawal).

  85. Hoffman 2015: 158–66. This qualifies E. Jones’s (2003: 169) observation that lack of maritime exploration denied Asian empires “that special European windfall of food, raw materials, colonies, and … business opportunities.”

  86. Abernethy 2000: 205.

  87. See, e.g., Abernethy 2000: 180–81.

  88. For geographical constraints, see, e.g., Abernethy 2000: 183; Férnandez-Armesto 2006: 149; Findlay and O’Rourke 2007: 361; I. Morris 2010: 421, 427–31.

  89. For Rome’s eastern trade, see Young 2001; McLaughlin 2010, 2014; Evers 2017; Cobb 2018. For the scope of Roman pepper consumption, which points to the existence of a large nonelite market, see Mayer 2018; and also Evers 2017: 68–82.

  90. McLaughlin 2014: 134–38; Speidel 2016: 103–4, 106. Cf. Cobb 2018: 36–37 for doubts about the Aden episode. Sabaean coins of the late first century BCE that depict Roman busts might signal submission, and we cannot rule out some form of Roman military presence: Speidel 2016: 107–9.

  91. McLaughlin 2014: 116, 122–27 (East Africa); Speidel 2016: 89–94 and Cobb 2018: 118–20 (Farasan).

  92. McLaughlin 2014: 140, 168, 172–95; Speidel 2016: 111–9; Cobb 2018: 155–70.

  93. Thus McLaughlin 2014: 196–99, 202–3, 206, a maximalist account. Cobb 2018: 170–78 is more cautious.

  94. For discussion of extrapolations from the customs record, see Scheidel 2015d: 160–61, and most recently Evers 2017: 99–109. Volume: McLaughlin 2014: 89, 95, and Cobb 2018: 274–80, a critical assessment of specie outflows.

  95. Comparisons: McLaughlin 2014: 93–94.

  96. Roller 2006: 107–11.

  97. The Atlantic vs. monsoon argument is popular: see, e.g., Deng 1997: 160; Abernethy 2000: 178; Férnandez-Armesto 2006: 116; Hoffman 2015: 171.

  98. For the counterfactual of Pacific exploration via the Aleutians by more adventurous Chinese sailors, see briefly Cook 2001: 101.

  99. Contra I. Morris 2010: 421–22, who states that the Norse never had to negotiate more than 500 miles (800 km) of open sea whereas these Chinese would have had to cover 5,000 or 6,000 miles (8,000–9,000 km) using the Kuro Siwo Drift to reach Northern California, or closer to 10,000 miles (16,000 km) using the Equatorial Counter Current from the Philippines to Nicaragua (cf. also Cook 2001: 101 for the problems open sea routes posed for potential Chinese sailors). This misrepresents the actual trajectories of the most economical North Pacific crossing from northeastern East Asia, which would not have differed much from that taken by the Norse in the North Atlantic. To his credit, I. Morris, despite his emphasis on geography (2010: 427–31), acknowledges the role of domestic incentive structures.

  100. Férnandez-Armesto 2006: 199–203. Mortality: Hoffman 2015: 171.

  101. I. Morris 2010: 428 (quote).

  102. Menzies 2004. The whole story is, of course, pure nonsense, as has been pointed out ad nauseam.

  103. For Polynesian development, see Rolett 2002. The Polynesian example also undermines the idea that Chinese naval design was held back by the ease of conducting trade relations with Southeast Asia and in the Indian Ocean thanks to the monsoon winds (thus Deng 1997: 160): Polynesian outrigger canoes were no carracks either.

  104. Cost of competition: a perceptive point made by Vries 2015: 385. Funding: Abernethy 2000: 183 (quote).

  105. Vries 2015 is now by far the best account of this contrast.

  106. See Vries 2013: 347–50 for the lack of peripheral development under the Qing.

  107. Belich 2016: 104, 107 (quotes).

  CHAPTER TWELVE

  1. Mokyr 2017 is the most recent and comprehensive exposition of his position.

  2. Quote: Mokyr 2005: 339.

  3. Mokyr 2007, esp. 23–26; Mokyr 2017: 165–78, esp. 165–66.

  4. Hume’s “Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences,” quoted by Mokyr 2017: 166. Coordination failure: Mokyr 2017: 169.

  5. Fragmentation: Mokyr 2007: 23–24 (quote); see also 24: “European political fragmentation created the environment in which dissident and heterodox opinions could be put forward with increasing impunity.” Lack of efficacy: Mokyr 2017: 177. In absolutist states it took until the eighteenth century for suppression to morph into a largely “ritualized formality” (177–78).

  6. Playing off: Mokyr 2005: 342. Cf. for some of these examples Mokyr 2007: 24; 2017: 169–71. Polycentrism: Mokyr 2005: 342; Vries 2013: 385.

  7. Huff 2003: 133–39, 179, 251, and also 179–89, 317, and 339–45 for the role of universities in the rise of early modern science. Cf. also Lang 1997: 19. Exceptions: Mokyr 2017: 172–75.

  8. Mokyr 2017: 169 (competition), 149–50 (innovations). See Hobson 2004 for the scope of borrowing.

  9. H. F. Cohen 2015: 173–74.

  10. Mokyr 2017: 175–76 (mobility); Mokyr 2007: 5–6 (marketplace); Mokyr 2017: 179–224 (Republic of Letters), 179 (quote), 181 (mechanism). I turn to China later in this chapter.

  11. Mokyr 2007: 7–8; Mokyr 2017: 186, 189–91. Counterfactual: Mokyr 2007: 24 (quote); Mokyr 2017: 220–21.

  12. Costs: Mokyr 2017: 215 and the epilogue in this volume. Vernacular: Mokyr 2007: 31.

  13. See C. Murray 2003: 301–3 for an attempt at a census (see also 113–14, 158, 252, 297–98).

  14. Becker, Pfaff, and Rubin 2016: 10–20 provide an excellent survey of relevant social science research.

  15. Printing: Buringh and van Zanden 2009: 421–22. Literacy: Van Zanden 2009a: 193–95. Acting: Baten and van Zanden 2008: 226–33. The latter also observe a strong relations
hip between eighteenth-century human capital formation and nineteenth-century economic performance across a number of European and Asian countries (230–32).

  16. Davids 2013: 173–233, esp. 222, 228; cf. also Goldstone 2009: 118.

  17. Mokyr 2017: 227–46. For criticism of the role of Puritanism, see Davids 2013: 228. Accommodation: Jacob 1997: 51–72; Goldstone 2002: 370; Goldstone 2009: 156.

  18. Mokyr 2009: 37 (quote), 70–98 (Bacon); Goldstone 2009: 150–55 (divide), 158 (priority).

  19. Improvement: Slack 2015 gives a rich (and self-proclaimed “Whiggish”: 263) account of this mind-set. See also Friedel 2007: 2–5. Trend: Mokyr 2017: 247–66. Bayly 2004: 79–80 (quotes).