The roots of evil: The origins of genocide and other group violence

by Ervin Staub

  Effective socialization of the young will create individuals whose personal values and conduct accord with those of the system. It is unlikely that Roman soldiers who killed enemies defeated in battle experienced remorse: their socialization and experience made killing defeated enemies and enslaving women and children normal operating procedures. In some societies violence against people seen as outsiders is a way of life. We do not assume that members of such a society should have resisted a way of life integral to their social-cultural system. We do not blame individual Mundurucú headhunters, because being a Mundurucú male meant being a headhunter.6 When a long cultural continuity of this type exists, which creates synchrony between the characteristics of the individual and the group, the social organization, not the individual, is responsible. In the modern world, however, even violence-prone societies or subsystems of societies, such as the Argentine military, usually also hold and transmit moral and social values that prohibit violence. This creates individual responsibility. Usually person and system each carry a share of the responsibility.

  Socialization and experience in most modern societies result in a wide range of personal characteristics, so there will be people whose values, sympathies, self-interest, and current needs suit a violent and inhumane system and others who are opposed to such a system. The degree of opposition and conformity to a new social order depends on the nature of the preceding society. But human malleability continues through life. People not initially involved in creating the new system often undergo resocialization. This can be slow or fast and may affect a smaller or larger segment of the population. The speed and amount of change depend on the degree to which the original culture and therefore personal characteristics are at variance with the new system, how effective the new system is at resocialization, and the magnitude of life problems and resulting needs.

  When we ask how people could do this, we must not judge only by universal moral standards that represent our ideals but must also appreciate how people are influenced by systems. Ultimately, we must ask how to create cultures and social systems that minimize harm-doing and promote human welfare, in part by how they shape individuals.

  The roots of evil

  Evil is not a scientific concept with an agreed meaning, but the idea of evil is part of a broadly shared human cultural heritage. The essence of evil is the destruction of human beings. This includes not only killing but the creation of conditions that materially or psychologically destroy or diminish people’s dignity, happiness, and capacity to fulfill basic material needs.

  By evil I mean actions that have such consequences. We cannot judge evil by conscious intentions, because psychological distortions tend to hide even from the perpetrators themselves their true intentions. They are unaware, for example, of their own unconscious hostility or that they are scapegoating others. Frequently, their intention is to create a “better world,” but in the course of doing so they disregard the welfare and destroy the lives of human beings. Perpetrators of evil often intend to make people suffer but see their actions as necessary or serving a higher good. In addition, people tend to hide their negative intentions from others and justify negative actions by higher ideals or the victims’ evil nature.

  Most of us would not regard it as evil to kill to defend one’s own life or the life of one’s family, or to protect others’ lives. In contrast, most of us would regard terrorist violence against civilians (who are not responsible for the suffering of either the terrorists or those whose interests they claim to represent) as evil.

  But any kind of group violence has evil potential. It is rarely directed only at people who cause suffering. Its aim is rarely just to protect people or alleviate their suffering. And its intensity and the circle of its victims tend to increase over time, as our discussion of genocide and mass killing will show. This is also evident in the history of torture. In the Middle Ages, when torture was part of the legal system, the circle of victims expanded over time. Starting with low-status members of society accused of a crime, progressively higher-status defendants and then witnesses were tortured in order to extract evidence from them.7

  Ordinary psychological processes and normal, common human motivations and certain basic but not inevitable tendencies in human thought and feeling (such as the devaluation of others) are the primary sources of evil. Frequently, the perpetrators’ own insecurity and suffering cause them to turn against others and begin a process of increasing destructiveness.

  But the same needs and motivations that cause evil can be fulfilled, and probably more completely, by joining others. This may be a more advanced level of functioning, requiring more prior individual and cultural evolution toward caring and connection. The tendency to pull together as an ingroup and turn against an outgroup is probably more basic or primitive. Threats and stress tend to evoke more primitive functioning.

  There are alternative views of the roots of evil, of course. Some believe that because power and self-interest are strong human motives, human beings are basically unconcerned about others’ welfare and will therefore do anything to satisfy their own interests. Thomas Hobbes developed this view most fully, and Freud’s thinking is congenial to it.

  According to Hobbes, people must be controlled externally, by society and the state, to prevent them from harming others in fulfilling their own interests. According to Freud they must acquire a conscience through socialization, which then controls them from within. However, assumptions about human nature cover a wide range. Some regard humans as basically good but corrupted by society (Rousseau). Others regard them as good but capable of being shaped by experience with parents and other significant people in such a way that they become unloving and unconcerned about others (the psychologist Carl Rogers).

  Human beings have varied genetic potentials, and the way they develop is profoundly shaped by experience. Human infants have a strong genetic propensity to develop powerful emotional attachment to their primary caretakers. However, the quality of attachment varies greatly. One widely used classification system differentiates between infants who are “securely attached” (who are secure and comfortable in their relationship to caretakers), those whose attachment is anxious/conflictful, and those whose attachment is avoidant.8 Infants with secure attachment to their parents or caregivers develop more successful relationships with peers in preschool and early school years.9

  Moreover, the behavior of the caretaker seems to powerfully affect the quality of attachment. Greater responsiveness to the infant’s needs, more eye contact, and more touching and holding are associated with secure attachment.10 While the infant’s own temperament and actions are likely to influence – evoke or diminish – such caretaking behaviors, their principal determinant is the caretaker. Once a certain quality of attachment appears, it is still changeable. More or less stress in the life of the mother can change the quality of the infant’s attachment, presumably because the mother’s behavior changes.11

  We have the potential to be either altruistic or aggressive. Security, the fulfillment of basic needs, the propagation of one’s genes, and satisfaction in life can be ensured as much by connection to other people as by wealth and power. But feelings of connection to many or all human beings require a reasonably secure and trustworthy world or society.

  Differences in socialization and experience result in different personal characteristics, psychological processes, and modes of behavior. Some people develop dispositions that make them more likely to act violently and do harm, especially in response to threat. At the extreme, the desire to diminish, harm, and destroy others can become a persistent characteristic of a person (or group). People may also learn to be highly differentiated, good in relation to some while evil in relation to other humans.

  Groups as evil or good

  Reinhold Niebuhr regarded human beings as capable of goodness and morality, but considered groups to be inherently selfish and uncaring.12 It is a prevalent view that nation-states are only concerned with power and self-interest
. Only fear prevents them from disregarding human consequences in pursuing power and self-interest.

  I see evil in groups as similar, though not identical, to evil in individuals. It arises from ordinary motivations and psychological processes. Like individuals, groups can develop characteristics that create a great and persistent potential for evil. But they can also develop values, institutions, and practices that promote caring and connection (see Chapters 17 and 18).

  Moral constraints are less powerful in groups than in individuals. Groups are traditionally seen as serving the interests of their members and the group as a whole, without moral constraints or moral obligations to others. There is a diffusion of responsibility in groups.13 Members often relinquish authority and guidance to the group and its leaders. They abandon themselves to the group and develop a commitment that enables them to sacrifice even their lives for it.14 This can lead to altruistic self-sacrifice or to joining those who turn against another group. Combined with the group’s power to repress dissent, abandoning the self enhances the potential for evil.

  But in both individuals and groups the organization of characteristics and psychological processes is not static but dynamic. As a result, very rarely are either evil or good immutable. Influences acting on persons and groups can change their thoughts, feelings, motivations, and actions.

  The more predisposing characteristics a society possesses and the more it progresses along the continuum of destruction – the more the motivation for genocide and the associated institutions and practices develop – the less potential there is to influence the society peacefully. Here my view converges with that of Hobbes: there is a point at which only inducing fear by the use of power will stop perpetrators from destruction. At times not even that will work, because fanaticism overcomes the desire for self-preservation. Single individuals with a strong potential for evil might be checked by the social group. But who is to inhibit groups? Powerful nations or the community of nations have not customarily assumed this responsibility, perhaps because of the tradition that nations are not morally responsible.

  Comparison of personal (and social) goal theory and other approaches

  There is a substantial historical and descriptive literature on each genocide and mass killing that I examine in this book but surprisingly little analysis of the psychological, cultural, and social origins, except in the case of the Holocaust, but even here no in-depth psychological-cultural analysis exists. To provide a basis for comparison and contrast with my own conception, which uses personal goal theory as a starting point, focuses on motivation and social evolution (and might be called social goal theory), I will briefly discuss some prominent ideas about the origins of the Holocaust.

  Compartmentalization of functions and euphemistic language. Raul Hilberg focused on bureaucratization of functions as an important facilitator of the Holocaust.15 Germany had a tradition of bureaucracy with functions and responsibilities divided. Each person could focus on his or her job, without seeing the whole. A person could schedule trains transporting Jews to extermination camps and keep the relationship of this activity to the genocide out of awareness. As Scott Peck noted, the same division of functions and compartmentalization characterized officers in the Pentagon during the Vietnam War.16

  Hannah Arendt and Raul Hilberg both emphasized the use of euphemistic language that veiled reality not only from outsiders but also from the perpetrators themselves.17 Instead of extermination squads, there were Special Troops (Einsatzgruppen); the extermination of the Jewish people was described as the “final solution of the Jewish question.” Euphemistic language was used even by the victims.

  Bureaucratic compartmentalization and euphemistic language serve to deny reality and distance the self from violent actions and their victims. Denial of obvious reality, though it consumes much psychological energy, allows perpetrators to avoid feeling responsibility and guilt and allows victims to avoid feeling dread.

  However, bureaucratization and euphemistic language are not the source of or the motivation for genocide or mass killing. Nor are they crucial. In Cambodia and Turkey there was little bureaucratic organization.

  Obedience to authority and the authoritarianism of culture. Stanley Milgram’s research on obedience to authority showed that many ordinary people can be induced, even by someone with limited authority, to administer what they believe to be extremely painful and life-threatening electric shocks.18 Milgram suggested that people can enter an “agentic” mode in which they relinquish individual responsibility and act as agents of authority.

  While obedience is an important force, it is not the true motive for mass killing or genocide. The motivation to obey often comes from a desire to follow a leader, to be a good member of a group, to show respect for authority. Those who willingly accept the authority of leaders are likely to have also accepted their views and ideology. Guided by shared cultural dispositions, the shared experience of difficult life conditions, shared motivations that result from them, and shared inclinations for ways to satisfy motives, people join rather than simply obey out of fear or respect. We must consider not only how those in authority gain obedience but how the motivations of the whole group evolve. Milgram’s dramatic demonstration of the power of authority, although of great importance, may have slowed the development of a psychology of genocide, as others came to view obedience as the main source of human destructiveness.

  The role of authority is also stressed by Erich Fromm and Alice Miller. According to Fromm, individuals who grew up in the authoritarian culture of Germany would have trouble assuming responsibility for their own lives.19 In trying times they could escape from freedom by following a leader, a group. Fromm identified an intrinsic desire for submission that arose from an inability to cope. In Alice Miller’s view, children who grow up in punitive, authoritarian families do not develop separate, independent identities.20 They cannot stand on their own but need guidance and leadership. With modification, these views can be incorporated into my “evolutionary” conception. A society’s strong respect for authority is one source of genocidal violence. A tendency to like and obey authority is one characteristic of perpetrators.

  Psychosocial consequences of World War I on German youth. German youth were influenced by war experiences, the deprivation of food and fathering, and chaotic conditions after the war. Children old enough to be influenced by authoritarian fathering before the war must have experienced a vacuum upon the return of their defeated, powerless fathers from the war. In this view, Hitler had extraordinary influence because he fulfilled important needs.21 Erik Erikson suggested that he served as a rebellious older brother, with whom young Germans could join in rebellion.22

  This thinking is congenial to my conception. The special needs of young Germans, which became part of their personality, may have made their problems especially difficult to bear. These needs may have joined the even more crucial long-standing characteristics of German culture to intensify the need for authority and the security it would provide.

  The soldiers also suffered long-term effects from their experiences on the battlefield. The traumatic aftereffects of extended combat have long been recognized. Research on “posttraumatic stress disorder” in Vietnam veterans uncovered persistent personality changes. In many Vietnam veterans these changes are still evident in 1989, fifteen years after the end of the war. It was also fifteen years between the end of World War I and Hitler’s rise to power. Posttraumatic stress probably made German veterans more susceptible to Hilter’s appeal.

  Anti- Semitism in Germany. Germany’s long history of anti-Semitism has been offered as one reason for the genocide. Although of great importance, prejudice and even discrimination against a group can persist for a long time without resulting in large-scale violence. How devaluation and negative image produce extreme destructiveness must be explained.

  The role of the family. One focus of Israel Charny is the role of the family, and the child’s experiences in it that make him a “genocider.”23
I also stress the profound importance of the child’s experience, in the family and with people in general, in shaping his or her personality and moral values. However, the nature of society and what happens in it are also highly important: the historical events and conditions that affect the whole group, the group’s culture, and its motivations. How children are raised – for example, with severity or with benevolence – and family organization are among important aspects of the culture.

  Hitler’s personality and psychopathology. Hitler’s illegitimate birth, his hatred of his father, his belief (probably false) that his paternal grandmother was Jewish, his belief that a Jewish doctor caused the death of his beloved mother, his difficulties with women, his unusual sexual practices, and the suicides of women he had relationships with have been examined in great detail.24

  The psychohistory of individuals is a worthwhile contribution to the understanding of human personality and the disposition to cruelty. However, as an explanation of genocide it has limited value, for two reasons. First, as I noted earlier, there will always be people with extreme views who offer themselves as leaders. It is more important to understand followership – what leads a group to accept such a person as their leader. Second, fanatical devotion to an ideology has more direct influence on the actions of perpetrators than childhood experience or psychopathology. Hitler created a radical ideology out of building blocks in his experience and personality and developed a fanatical devotion to it (for a discussion of fanaticism, see Chapter 4). Knowledge of the childhoods and personalities of leaders and followers can inform us about their susceptibility to fanaticism but cannot explain mass killing and genocide.