The roots of evil: The origins of genocide and other group violence

by Ervin Staub

  Cultural characteristics that contribute to group violence can be surmised from historical and anthropological data, from art and literature, and so on. All cultures possess some of these characteristics. The likelihood of group violence is greatest if a group possesses a constellation of the most essential ones.

  Aggressiveness as a persistent behavioral mode

  While aggression is an outcome of cultural characteristics and life conditions, aggressiveness can become a habitual way of behaving and even a value. Some people see challenge and provocation everywhere and try to fulfill their goals by aggression.6 Others will not behave aggressively even under extreme provocation.

  It is the same at the group level. For example, among the Mundurucú headhunters of Brazil aggression against other tribes was part of the culture, constantly promoted and reinforced. Potential victims were seen as nonhuman: the very word for a non-Mundurucú means enemy, and warriors spoke of the non-Mundurucú as dangerous animals. Human trophies (heads) conferred high status on a warrior. Males were trained in special skills for hunting enemy tribes. Raids on enemy villages were carefully planned and executed according to well-established patterns.7 The world was seen as hostile and fighting as necessary for survival.

  Sociobiologists argue that there is a genetic disposition to respond with aggression to conditions that threaten survival. Wilson believes that Mundurucú culture itself developed in response to physical conditions that made aggression enhance group survival. “Although solid demographic proof is absent, indirect evidence suggests that numbers of the Mundurucú were (and still are, in a pacified state) limited by the shortage of high quality protein.... When these competitors (e.g., other tribes hunting for game) were decimated by murderous attacks, the Mundurucú share of the forest yield was correspondingly increased.”8 Thus, aggression gave the Mundurucú a “Darwinian edge.” Of course, they were not aware of this, the reasons for aggression being richly overlaid by culture, customs, and religion, including the view of non-Mundurucú tribes as “victims by definition.”a

  Other thinkers have also proposed that human beings are aggressive by nature, often because they were deeply affected by the carnage of war. In the case of Freud, the First World War prompted such reflections. Similar thinking has been based on observations of animals, for example, by the ethologist Lorenz, based on aggression in fish.

  Human beings certainly have the potential for both altruism and aggression. Possibly we even have a genetic tendency toward aggression when we are threatened, and a tendency to act altruistically toward those who are genetically close to us. But such tendencies are strongly affected by experience and learning, even in animals. For example, when monkeys can obtain food by pressing a lever that also results in shock to another monkey, some will stop pushing the lever and sacrifice the food; they are more likely to do this if they have previously shared a cage with the other animal.11

  In my view, there are genetic predispositions toward altruism and aggression, and specific genetic building blocks such as the infants’ attachment to caretakers and fear of strangers. These are shaped by socialization and culture into actual dispositions toward kindness and cruelty through exposure to different experiences, such as warmth and intimacy versus rejection or hostility.12

  In Wilson’s analysis Mundurucú culture expresses and serves genetic dispositions evoked by threat to survival. In my view, varied adaptations to life circumstances are possible, but once a culture evolves aggressive characteristics, aggression can become a way of life. Cultures can also evolve nonaggressive modes of adaptation, both internally and in relation to other societies (for example, the Semai of Malaysia).13 This requires a feeling of security, peaceful modes of conflict resolution, or well-regulated social behavior that minimizes conflict, or a combination of these.

  We should not expect nonaggressive cultures or individuals to remain so under all conditions. Substantial change in the environment requires new adaptations. At times external conditions put people into the midst of violence. Sometimes persistent nonaggression becomes suicidal.

  The peaceful Semai of Malaysia, supposedly ignorant of war and the tasks of soldiers, were lured by promises of rewards into British army units that were fighting communists in the early fifties. When some of their kinsmen were killed, the Semais became fierce. They had strong social controls, but not the personal capacity to modulate and regulate aggressive feelings and behavior. In the midst of violence, they responded with unrestrained violence. On their return home they reverted to their peaceful ways.14

  Aggression as a cultural ideal. Some cultures (and individuals) idealize aggression. American television programs and films attest to some idealization. So does the power of organizations such as the National Rifle Association. The Nazis idealized violence. The Bolsheviks considered aggression valuable and necessary. Dzerzhinski, the first head of the Soviet secret police, the Cheka, proclaimed: “We stand for organized terror... terror being absolutely indispensable in current revolutionary conditions.”15

  Past history of use of aggression to deal with conflict. Like individuals, cultures carry blueprints for dealing with problems. Repeated use of aggression to deal with conflict makes it acceptable. Aggressive plans and strategies are developed, the aggressor becomes competent in the use of aggression, and renewed aggression is more likely. Thus, a history of aggression makes it more “available.”16

  Cultural self-concept, self-esteem, and world view

  As I have pointed out, low self-esteem and a violent and chaotic family background are associated with violent crime.17 Some violent criminals see threat everywhere and proceed to “defend” themselves or their self-image. Others establish masculinity and strength by seeking physical confrontation and victory.18

  Self-concept and self-esteem are also important at the societal level in determining the response to frustration and threat. Societal and individual self-concepts need not be the same. Low self-esteem may even intensify the need to compensate by seeing one’s group in a positive light. Individuals who vary in self-esteem may share a belief in the superiority of their culture, nation, society, or way of life. Most societies are inclined to such ethnocentrism.19 National self-concept is a complex matter, however.

  In times of danger, confidence in existing institutions gives hope and promotes constructive action. Moreover, a positive group identification can help people deal with personal difficulties, especially threats to individual self-esteem.

  On the other hand, idealization of one’s group may heighten frustration in difficult times. In groups as in individuals, very high self-evaluation often masks self-doubt. Persistent life difficulties may contradict the high self-evaluation and bring self-doubt to the surface. Even if there is no underlying self-doubt, a very high self-evaluation may be associated with limited concern for others. Among individuals, a moderately positive self-concept is most strongly associated with sensitivity and responsiveness to other people.20

  It is not customary to classify nations in terms of self-concept and self-esteem. Nonetheless, parallels to the influence of individual self-concept certainly exist. The components and sources of individual self-esteem are highly complex; those of group or national self-esteem are perhaps even more so.

  A familiar aspect of national self-concept is a feeling of deprivation, combined with the belief that one’s country deserves more. Often this includes a belief, realistic or paranoid, that other countries or internal enemies are preventing the group from getting its due in material possessions, prestige, or honor. Germany went to war in 1914 to gain the power and advantages that it deserved but others would not yield to it.21 Later Hitler claimed Germany had the right to more living space (Lebensraum). Argentinians too saw their nation as deprived, its potential for wealth, power, and influence unfulfilled.

  Both an inflated and a weak self-esteem can enhance threat. When positive self-esteem is strongly tied to power, success, or prestige, difficult life conditions will be especially threatening.


  Individual and group world views are beliefs about the way the world works – about the nature of human beings, institutions, and societies. Are others caring or selfish, safe or aggressive? Is aggression normal, or permitted only in extreme cases? Aggression is more likely to occur if it is an acceptable means to fulfill goals, if the world is seen as a dangerous place, and if other groups are regarded as untrustworthy.

  Cultural goals and values

  Cultures can be characterized by their goals, explicit and implicit.22 In the United States, for example, according to one analysis, a basic goal is to maintain belief in equality of opportunity.23 The substantial inequalities of wealth, status, and power are often explained by either hereditary differences in ability or differences in effort. These are genuine influences, but exclusive emphasis on them obscures the extent to which inequality is due to a social organization that enables some people to maintain unearned privileges and limits opportunity for others. One consequence is that people regard themselves as failures when they do not live up to aspirations based on a faith in unlimited opportunity. Another consequence is devaluation of the poor, who are seen as incompetent or lazy, and who may also see themselves this way, which may keep them passive. A contrasting goal, adopted by the Hutterites, for example, is equality of outcome as the basis of social organization.24

  Some goals are agreed upon by a whole society; others are promoted by conflicting subgroups, who want to influence the whole society. Some goals are internal: health care, freedom from hunger, protection of civil rights, equality under law, and maintenance of certain moral or religious values. Other goals are international; they involve the role of the nation in the world, its relationship to other nations, and its relative power, prestige, and wealth. Nationalism, or the desire to enhance the status, power, or influence of one’s country, is a goal more important in some cultures than others. A society’s goals include the propagation of a way of life and the creation of a culture and institutions that will socialize the young to maintain it. Long-standing differences among subgroups of a society in values, goals, and ways of life, especially when there are no well-established ways to reconcile differences and resolve conflict, are likely to be seized upon and their significance intensified when life conditions are difficult.

  Moral value orientations

  Individuals and cultures differ in their concern for others’ welfare. A number of writers have distinguished rule-centered and person-centered moral orientations.25 The focus of a rule-centered morality is norms, conventions, and the maintenance of society. The focus of a person-centered orientation is the well-being of individuals or the group.

  On the individual level, there is evidence that certain characteristics, such as the belief in the acceptability of aggression in contrast to anxiety about its use, promote aggressive responses to instigation.26 But there is little research on the influence of broader value orientations. My students and I exposed individuals to another person who seemed to be in either physical distress from a stomach condition or in psychological distress because a boyfriend had suddenly ended a long-term relationship. Individuals with a strong prosocial value orientation – a positive evaluation of human beings, concern about their welfare, and a feeling of personal responsibility for their welfare – helped more.27 Presumably this person-centered orientation also diminishes the likelihood of aggression.

  Lawrence Kohlberg reported that in experiments on obedience to authority, a small number of persons with a stage six (principled) moral orientation were less likely to obey the experimenter and administer the strongest shocks to the learner.28 When asked to resolve hypothetical moral conflicts, such persons’ moral thinking centers on a belief in justice and the sanctity of human life. Using another system to categorize moral thinking, Kohlberg and his associates found that the few people with principled moral reasoning, as well as persons whose reasoning is less advanced but who see themselves as responsible for fulfilling important values, tended to act morally in both the obedience study and another morally relevant situation.29 This type of morality seems similar to prosocial orientation.

  Carol Gilligan has drawn a distinction between typical male orientation to morality (based on rules and logic) and female orientation (characterized by caring and responsibility).30 A prosocial value orientation and a morality of care and responsibility, although not identical, have evident similarities. In our research there were both males and females with strong prosocial orientations. Gilligan later reported that the two moral orientations characterize both sexes, although rule-centered orientation is dominant in males and person-centered in females.31 In a recent in-depth interview study males and females reported similar values.32

  Whole societies and their subgroups also differ in moral orientation. The moral orientation of a society sets limits on acceptable conduct and influences the choice of avenues to cope with difficult life conditions. Sparta subordinated individual dignity and freedom to the interests of the state; Athens elevated individual freedom, dignity, human reason, and creativity. The institution of slavery in Athens demonstrates that dominant value orientations need not apply to those outside the boundaries of the ingroup. Indians and blacks in America, Jews in many places, Armenians in Turkey, and those defined as enemies by ideology or other criteria have been traditionally excluded from the domain of dominant moral orientations; otherwise unacceptable acts become acceptable when directed at them.

  While moral rules arise to serve human welfare, rules can be reified or held as absolutes, and at times the group rather than the individual is made the focus of their concern. This makes it easier to exclude specific individuals or subgroups from the universe of moral concern. In addition, given the widespread belief in a just world (see Chapter 6), victims will often be seen as deserving their fate.33

  Moral value orientations are expressed in standards and rules adopted by social groups. Adherence to and deviation from rules have powerful social consequences, but people also obey rules because they have adopted them as their own and believe in them. But group morality can shift and permit harm-doing that was previously inconceivable. It then becomes difficult to maintain a personal morality that deviates from the new group morality. Progressively, personal values will change. Certain groups may be excluded from the realm of humanity, and essential values cease to apply to them. How this happens is discussed in Chapter 6.

  Ingroup- outgroup differentiation and devaluation of outgroups

  Recent research in psychology has shown that human beings have a tendency to divide the world into “us” and “them.” They use seemingly trivial information to create ingroups and outgroups and then discriminate against members of the outgroup. Being told that an aesthetic preference test shows that they prefer the modern painter Klee is sufficient for people to favor others who supposedly also like Klee and discriminate against those who like another modern painter, Kandinsky. Even totally arbitrary and trivial differentiations have such effects.34

  Once.. .a group of thirty-two young boys from the suburbs of Bristol, England, had an out-of-the-ordinary experience. It began simply: They sat together in groups of eight and watched dots flash on a screen. Working individually, they were to guess the number of dots that flashed before their eyes. When all of the guessing was done, four of the boys from each octave were taken aside and told that they belonged to a group of people who tend to overestimate in this kind of guessing. The remaining four boys were told that they belonged to a group of people who tend to underestimate. These bogus group categorizations, so seemingly banal and trivial, had important effects on the Bristol boys’ subsequent behavior.

  After learning that he was either an overestimator or an underestimator, each boy was given the opportunity to decide how a quantity of money should be divided between two other boys. He was told that no one would know who made the decision and that his own earnings would be unaffected by the allocation. About the two others the Bristol boys knew only one thing: that one was an overestimator and
the other was an underestimator. It was not much to know, but it was enough: The money was not divided equally. The Bristol boys discriminated in favor of the boy who shared their social category and against the one who did not.35

  Seemingly, people use available information to divide themselves into an ingroup and an outgroup.36 Obviously, people group themselves in many ways and can define those who belong to their nation, political party, religion, profession, neighborhood, or local Parent-Teacher Association as “us,” and they may consider others who do not belong to their group as different and less worthy. But the ties that bind people to significant ingroups are much stronger than this: deep affective associations, shared understandings, common goals, and the perception of a shared fate. The tendency to form ingroups and ethnocentrism are deeply rooted; they evolve out of genetic predispositions, or “building blocks.”

  The capacity of infants to form attachment to caretakers is rooted in genetic makeup. Although the quality of attachment varies, only under extreme conditions will infants form none.37 At the same time they develop attachment, infants also develop stranger anxiety, a fear and/or avoidance of unfamiliar people. This may be a rudimentary source of ingroup-outgroup differentiation. Socialization and experience at this time of life have substantial effects. Infants show less stranger anxiety if they are exposed to a wide variety of people or develop a secure (rather than avoidant or anxious/ambivalent) attachment to caretakers.38

  Psychologists have long believed that the earliest relationship to the primary caretaker is a prototype for later relationships. Research findings in the last decade show that infants who develop a secure attachment – as indicated by a loving connection with neither undue distress about the caretaker’s absence nor anger or avoidance on the caretaker’s return – have a closer, more positive, more effective relationship with their peers during the preschool and early school years.39 This connection to others inherent in secure attachment is an important basis for empathy and caring. Its range may be limited by ingroup-outgroup differentiation; caring may be restricted to those who are “similar,” accepted, and valued.