The roots of evil: The origins of genocide and other group violence

by Ervin Staub

  Lack of warmth and punitive authoritarian discipline promote this tendency. Alice Miller has shown that historically in Germany (but not only there) children were seen as naturally willful and potentially evil; all means were acceptable, including severe physical punishment, to break the child’s will and instill obedience.

  When obedience is the highest value, self-guidance becomes impossible. People reared this way look for external guidance. “For how could someone whose inner development has been limited to learning to obey the commands of others be expected to live on his own without experiencing a sudden sense of inner emptiness. Military service provided the best opportunity for him to continue the established pattern of taking orders.”24

  A likely consequence of such treatment, also described in books such as Lloyd DeMause’s The History of Childhood and Stone’s writing on England, is deep hostility toward parents.25 However, the child is taught that these feelings are unacceptable; expressing them provokes the strongest punishment. The feelings therefore become unconscious; paradoxically, the young child’s dependence on the parent becomes especially great, and the need for care and affection especially strong.

  But displacement and projection are not the only reason why others are seen as hostile. Parents are prototypes for children, who learn about human beings from their family experience. If parents are punitive, if they make the child suffer, the child will expect and see people in general as hostile, threatening, and dangerous. Children growing up in such families learn the importance of having power and allying themselves with the powerful. As a consequence, they identify with the powerful and are relatively easily turned against the powerless. There is evidence from postwar interviews, from books of child-raising advice, and from other research that these practices were widespread in Germany (see Chapter 8).26

  Warmth and affection can also be used to limit children’s independence, initiative, and deviation from rules. Even obedience generated in an affectionate context can restrict the permissible range of feelings and generate hostility. This is consistent with the research finding that parents who extensively use love withdrawal to indicate disapproval raise conventional children who inhibit their feelings.27 Affection can be used, and it can be part of different patterns of child-rearing practices that modify its meaning and impact.

  Most of us have a tendency to respect people with authority or power and follow their lead. As small children, we are all at the mercy of our parents and other adults. We all grow up under the influence of parents, schools, and the state. Most such authorities are in part and at times arbitrary or punitive or threatening.c Most of us continue to carry within us a feeling that avoiding confrontation with and attaining closeness to people in authority will give us security and confer value on us. Because we are often unaware of this feeling, its influence is difficult to control. The extent of this tendency varies with the experience of the child in and out of the home.

  The original research identified repression, projection, and hostility as components of the authoritarian personality. These are likely to be, but are not inevitably, part of an “authority orientation,” which refers, as I use the term, to a person’s tendency to order the world and relate to people according to their position and power in hierarchies. It depends on the total pattern of socialization practices what else becomes part of this orientation.

  The origins of destructiveness in personality and in the situation

  Our knowledge of personality dispositions and their childhood origins is not specific enough to identify the sources of different types of aggressive behavior: in personal interactions, in criminal violence, in political violence, or in the service of genocide. Circumstances may join with common rudimentary dispositions to shape specific types of hostility and aggression.

  There has been much concern about the relative influence of personality as opposed to situation. I believe that the situation – life problems in society and the conditions created by the culture – is highly important. Immediate circumstances – for example, who the perpetrators associate with, what groups they are part of- are also influential. However, these are normally the result of choices people make. When life problems are intense and long-lasting, the relative importance of individual predispositions may decrease: shared cultural dispositions and shared personal characteristics may lead increasing numbers of people to join extreme movements.

  The people who participated in Stanley Milgram’s studies on obedience to authority did not know what awaited them. Unexpectedly, a person standing next to them exerted strong pressure on them to give another person increasingly powerful electric shocks. However, most people who become perpetrators voluntarily join groups that have inclinations they share. Even when a military engages in mass killing, it is unlikely that an average conscript will be called upon to act as a perpetrator; instead, officers select soldiers they judge best suited. In Argentina, conscripts were assigned to guard prisoners but were not called upon to act as torturers or killers.

  The fanatic as perpetrator

  The personalities of many would-be perpetrators and decision makers predispose them not necessarily to violence but to fanaticism, which in turn can eventually lead to mass killing or genocide. Fanatics are under the influence of a system of beliefs to which they subordinate everything else. They interpret and evaluate reality from the perspective of this system. Any means to fulfill the ideology’s overriding goals come to seem acceptable. Other goals, including the interests of the self, are subordinated to or served by working for the movement’s goals.

  From others’ perspective their behavior may seem irrational and self-destructive. For example, Nazis would not use the blood of prisoners of war for transfusions, because some of them might be Jews who would “contaminate” German soliders.28 Other examples are the Khmer Rouge’s massacre of professional and educated people, destruction of industry, and attacks on militarily stronger Vietnam (see Part III), and suicide missions in the Middle East, particularly by Shiites.

  The many psychohistorical books about Hitler focus on his pathological personality and its childhood origins. To understand Hitler, however, we must realize that his thoughts and feelings were codified in his ideology and turned into “ideals” and principles. Strong needs, fear or anxiety, and the inability to tolerate uncertainty are likely proclivities for fanaticism. Once personality and circumstances give rise to fanaticism, the commitment to a cause becomes a more immediate influence on behavior than personality.

  The ideology usually has roots in the fanatics’ culture. This is evident in the case of the three most destructive ideologies that I examine: the Nazi ideology, that of the Pol Pot group, and Turkish ideology. Contemporary Shiite fanaticism also has cultural roots. The Shiites have been a minority for a long time, and assassination of majority leaders and extreme self-sacrifice for their group have characterized their history.29

  There are two avenues to fanaticism. One is an emotional conversion experience. Substantial relief of physical symptoms can be achieved by intense group religious feelings, as in the miracle cures at Lourdes.30 The vast theatrical Nazi rallies often had a similar conversion effect. A predisposition – personality, illness, or intense needs produced by life problems – and strong emotion generated in a group context are conducive to conversion. Another path to fanaticism is gradual involvement. As they engage in limited actions in support of a movement, people change. They become ready for greater efforts. Their commitment to the group and its ideals increases, strengthened by the group’s rewards (and potential punishments) and by their new identity as members. A progression along a continuum of destruction is an important form of such gradual involvement.

  There are also “good fanatics,” committed to human welfare rather than to grand, abstract ideals or ideologies. Examples are Oscar Schindler, a German who became obsessed with saving Jewish lives, and Mother Teresa, who is devoting her life to help the poor and sick in India. Some good fanatics cheat and lie and endanger themselves
to fulfill their goals. But guided by their concrete goals of protecting the lives and welfare of people, rather than by abstract ideals, they are unlikely to inflict great harm on innocent people as they serve their aims.

  Fanatics usually need the support of a group to develop their profound commitment. Even those who create extreme ideologies usually require followers, and the followers need support before they abandon themselves to the cause.

  Behavior in groups

  Belonging to a group makes it easier for people to act in ways that are out of the ordinary. Joining a group enables people to give up a burdensome self and adopt a shared and valued social identity. At the same time they can shed the inhibitions and limitations of individual identity, the formed structure of the self that is limiting even at the best of times, much more so when the self is devalued. Thus, as group members they can open up emotionally. They more easily experience love, connectedness, and caring within the group. Anger and hate toward outsiders can come to the fore, especially when the group’s beliefs promote these feelings. And they no longer need to take individual responsiblity for their actions; no one is responsible, or the group is responsible, or the group’s leader. Anonymity can lead to the loss of a well-defined separate identity that embodies inhibitions limiting antisocial behavior. Psychological research has shown that wearing a hood increases aggression (as it facilitated aggression by Ku Klux Klan members).31

  Powerful emotions spread through contagion. It becomes difficult to deviate from group perceptions or values. To deviate in action and risk a break with the group may come to seem impossible. Deviation in thought and feeling alone leads to painful inner conflict and gives rise to defenses that keep the individual faithful. When group norms shift, it is difficult for the individual not to follow.

  People predisposed to harm-doing may find membership in certain groups highly satisfying. Hostility toward outgroups becomes desirable; the authoritarian structure is familiar and comfortable; the camaraderie provides a haven in a hostile world.

  The subcultures of perpetrators

  Groups that perpetrate genocide are usually military or created in a military mold. In Argentina, the mass killings were initiated by military leaders and executed by military personnel. The SS had a military type of organization, with even greater than usual emphasis on loyalty, obedience, and indoctrination in the hatred of enemies. In Cambodia, the rebel troops that won the civil war were the direct perpetrators. Only in Turkey were the direct perpetrators a more mixed group, including the military, the police, common criminals, and some of the population. Groups of perpetrators usually have a well-established authoritarian structure and provide training to strengthen obedience, ingroup ties, and the devaluation of enemies. Members must often pass extreme tests of obedience, fulfilling cruel and senseless orders; they must participate in rituals of group identification, sing songs of hatred, and shoot at targets representing figures identified as the enemy. These features are evident in the training of the SS, the torturers under the Greek military dictatorship, and even the U. S. Marines.32

  Psychological functioning and individual responsibility

  The satisfaction of personal or ideological motivations often conflicts with moral values and principles. How are such conflicts resolved? Do perpetrators consciously make moral choices? How do we judge their responsiblity, especially when they move along the continuum of destruction without reflection or conscious choice? I will explore these questions while examining the conduct of the SS and Nazi doctors in Chapter 10.

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  a It is impossible to identify here all the unusual and even aberrant motivations and personal characteristics that may lead to aggression. However, our discussion might apply even to highly unusual instances of violence. Consider, for example, Dennis Nilsen, an English serial killer. For ten years before his first murder he had had intense fantasies about death. This apparently related to the death, when he was six, of his grandfather, the only person in his life with whom he had a close relationship. In these fantasies death and love joined. The killer, while he functioned quite well, was a solitary man. His fantasies, and the murders, gave him a feeling of connection. After killing someone, he would keep the body with him for a long time, washing and dressing it, “caring” for it.13

  b The original research on the authoritarian personality by Adorno and associates has been criticized. Although controversy persists, later work together with other data (e.g., research on the SS and on Greek torturers) suggests that at least an authority orientation is one predisposition of people who become perpetrators. Some criticisms were that the primary measure of authoritarian personality, the F (fascist) scale, excludes authoritarians of the Left; that the scale simply measures a tendency to say yes to questions; that the initial conception overemphasized maladjustment in authoritarian personalities.

  Later research is more sophisticated; it indicates differences in both perception of events and response to them. Authoritarian persons or juries tend to favor greater punishment. Authoritarians are more punitive toward a citizen who killed a policeman at a rock concert if he is negatively described than if he is positively described; “equalitarians” are not affected by information about the character of the defendant. In contrast, authoritarians are unaffected by information about character when the defendant is a policeman, and equalitarians are more punitive toward a policeman who is negatively described. In an experiment where they act as teachers who shock a supposed learner, authoritarians are more punitive toward low-status victims, and equalitarians are more punitive toward high-status victims. More authoritarian persons also have more racist attitudes.

  While the research findings have disconfirmed several aspects of the original theory, they do show that people differ in authority orientation and this difference affects the way they relate to ideas as well as people – especially people with differing authority or status. See endnote 22.

  c All states, all organizations, all families have to deal with issues of authority. In the United States child-rearing practices have become less authoritarian. For example, in the 1920s and 1930s Public Health information to parents included the advice that infants be fed on a fixed schedule, rather than on demand (i.e., when the infant is hungry, which is the current recommendation).

  6 Steps along a continuum of destruction: perpetrators and bystanders

  Once perpetrators begin to harm people, the resulting psychological changes make greater harm-doing probable. However, early public reactions can counteract these changes and inhibit further violence.

  Just- world thinking

  One psychological consequence of harm-doing is further devaluation of victims. According to the just-world hypothesis, which has received substantial experimental support, people tend to assume that victims have earned their suffering by their actions or character.1 Perhaps we need to maintain faith that we ourselves will not become innocent victims of circumstance. However, blaming the victim is not universal; some people turn against the perpetrators. For example, a minority of individuals blame the experimenter instead of devaluing a student receiving electric shocks in an experiment.2 Prior devaluation should make it more likely that victims are blamed.

  People believe in a just world with different degrees of conviction.3 Those whose belief is strong derogate poor people, underprivileged groups, or minorities. Strong belief in a just world is associated with rigid application of social rules and belief in the importance of convention, as opposed to empathy and concern with human welfare.4 It is ironic and seemingly paradoxical (although not truly paradoxical, because the belief that the world is just is not identical to regarding justice as an ideal or to the desire to promote justice) that the belief that the world is a just place leads people to accept the suffering of others more easily, even of people they themselves harmed.

  People do not devalue victims whose innocence is clearly and definitely established.5 But how often can that be done? How can Jews or blacks, communists or anticommunists
be cleared of misdeeds, evil intentions, or faults inherent in their nature, particularly in a climate of prejudice? Devaluation is especially likely if the victims’ continued suffering is expected.6 To feel empathy results in empathic distress. To avoid that, people distance themselves from victims. This can be accomplished by devaluation. Under difficult life conditions, concern about the self also diminishes concern about others’ suffering.

  Learning by doing and the evolution of extreme destructiveness

  The importance of learning by doing became evident to me through studies in which my associates and I induced children to engage in helpful acts and found that afterward they helped and shared more.7 Children who taught a younger child, wrote letters to hospitalized children, or made toys for poor hospitalized children became more helpful on later occasions than children who spent the same time in activities that were similar in nature but not helpful to others.8 Examining past research (much of it conducted to test unrelated hypotheses such as the effects of modeling) I found evidence for the same conclusion.9 The research offers support for the view of some philosophers that morality is learned through moral action. Learning by doing is a basis for developing values, motives, the self concept, and behavioral tendencies.

  Even if initially there is some external pressure, it often becomes difficult to experience regular participation in an activity as alien. People begin to see their engagement in the activity as part of themselves. The less force is used, the more this happens. People come to see themselves as agents and begin to consider and elaborate on the reasons for their actions. If there are benefits to others, even imagined ones, they begin to find the activity worthwhile and its beneficiaries more deserving. If there is harm to others, progressively the victims’ well-being and even lives will lose value in their eyes. In other words, people observe their own actions and draw inferences, both about those affected by them and about themselves.10 They attribute to themselves such characteristics as helpfulness or toughness or willingness to harm. Further actions consistent with their changing views of themselves become likely.