The roots of evil: The origins of genocide and other group violence

by Ervin Staub

  The communists paid special attention to youth, creating youth groups as early as 1962. Young people have a less fully formed identity, and their minds are more open to new ideals. Armies like young soldiers because they are easier to mold and have a sense of invulnerability that makes them worry less about dying. They have a need to separate from parents and old traditions (although this depends on the culture), but they also need emotional security. An authoritarian system that proclaims higher ideals and provides membership in a group can fulfill deep needs for youth, especially in the midst of societal turmoil, and gain their commitment. Plato’s dictum in the Republic for those seeking to build the perfect city was a psychologically sound recipe for exerting influence: “Taking over their children, they will rear them – far away from those dispositions they have now from their parents – in their own manners and laws.”

  Many Khmer Rouge fighters were very young; some were children. There are reports of children who killed their parents. How did they come to this? The breakdown of social structures, including the family itself, affected children and adolescents especially strongly. Starting in 1970, parents lost the power to support and protect their children or give them a sense of belonging, especially in communist-occupied areas. Young people could gain this feeling of protection and belonging from the Khmer Rouge, as well as a sense of power from wielding a gun. Some were so successful at extinguishing all former ties while adopting a new group identity that they were able to kill their parents.

  The role of specific individuals

  A small number of individuals had an essential role in bringing about the genocide: Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, Son Sen, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith, Koy Thuon, Pol Pot, and Hou Youn (who was himself murdered soon after the 1975 victory). Do specific characteristics of these individuals help to explain the genocide? Certainly they were different from Cambodians who were not sent to study in Paris and who did not become members of the Communist party and devote their lives to politics and revolutionary activities. A few of them went into the government; for example, Khieu Samphan was at one point Sihanouk’s secretary of state for commerce. Others started to organize the revolutionary force in the jungles and the countryside, where they were later joined by Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, and a third member of the group, Hu Nim. Although I discussed their ideological and experiential evolution, we do not know enough about them as people to identify what childhood experiences and personal characteristics prepared or predisposed them for their genocidal ideology and cold-blooded determination.

  We have anecdotal information, which is of limited value. Barron and Paul write that in the context of their values and beliefs, apparently all were principled, honest, brave, and almost puritannical.58 Both Pol Pot and Ieng Sary have been described by some as friendly and even gentle.59 We get a different view of Pol Pot through an outburst during a study group meeting of communist students in Paris. He attacked Hou Youn’s more democratic views: “It is I who will direct the revolutionary organization. I will become the secretary general. I will hold the dossiers, I will control the ministries, and I will see to it that there is no deviation from the line fixed by the central committee in the interests of the people.”60

  Khieu Samphan was described by a contemporary who attended school with him in both Cambodia and France as sickly, quiet, and passive. He was ridiculed and teased by classmates and did not defend himself. He was sexually impotent.61 At one point while he was in public office, security agents stripped him naked in the street, photographed him, and showed the photograph in government circles.

  Of somewhat more value is the information that Pol Pot and Ieng Sary managed to get scholarships to study in Paris without an elite background and, in the case of Pol Pot, in spite of a mediocre academic record. University education was the privilege of the aristocracy, and they must have received their scholarships through connections, by clever maneuvering. Gaining this privilege, studying in Paris, associating there with Cambodians of aristocratic background, and participating in public activities in the Cambodian and the larger community appeared to give them “a sense of being chosen, of being part of a vanguard of the capable-informed – an attitude they never abandoned.”62

  The evolution of Pol Pot and his associates as persons and as a group and the evolution of their ideas led to the ideology that was the blueprint for genocide. They shared a framework and provided each other with support. Much study is required before we shall come to understand the childhood and later experiences that create a propensity to join or lead extreme movements. In the last part of the book we shall consider individual characteristics that prevent the acceptance or creation of destructive ideologies and the origins of these characteristics in socialization and experience.

  One other person had great influence: Prince Sihanouk. His policies while ruling Cambodia have been viewed both as pragmatic and as opportunistic. He probably wanted a democratic capitalism in a neutral Cambodia. To protect neutrality, he attempted to balance the influence of the Western and Communist blocs. After his overthrow he did everything he could to regain power. Having fought the communists, he now joined them and continued to support them even after he saw that they were using him.63 His actions were not principled; his aim seems to have been to regain an important political role. This, presumably, led him to enter again into an alliance with the Khmer Rouge to recapture Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge were driven from the country by Vietnam.

  Steps along the continuum of destruction

  Starting in the mid-1960s, antigovernment violence and government violence followed each other with increasing intensity. During the civil war, there was the U.S. bombing, the invasion, and the communist violence against populations in the territories they occupied. The civil war was fought with great fury, and atrocities were committed on both sides. Government soldiers were known to disfigure captured Khmer Rouge soldiers or behead them, cut them open, and eat their livers.64

  Instead of increasing violence inflicted by one group on another, Cambodia saw an increasing cycle of reciprocal violence between warring factions. As a result of the turmoil during their formative years, communist guidance, and their own experience in fighting, violence against “enemies” became integral to the identities of the young Khmer Rouge fighters.

  The role of bystanders

  There were few bystanders, internal or external, who could have exerted influence in Cambodia. As their power grew, the members of the Pol Pot group killed anyone who did not cooperate. China had continuing friendly relations with Cambodia and was the only country in a position to exert influence, but it did not. In the end, the North Vietnamese invasion stopped the killings.

  The United States had no power to change Cambodian policies once the Pol Pot group took power. U.S. actions did a great deal to “destabilize” Cambodia. The 1970 invasion might be justified by the North Vietnamese use of Cambodia as a sanctuary, but it is difficult to see any justification for the extensive bombardment of heavily populated areas just because they were in the hands of the communists.

  Within the United States we have institutions that protect human and civil rights. In contrast, neither the United States nor other nations have institutions concerned with actions by their governments against the citizens of other countries. Leaders have no direct accountability in this realm. International institutions have little power and therefore little influence. Lacking accountability, leaders are often guided by ideology, prejudice, and broad (and often unexamined) notions of national interest.

  Cambodia also offers another lesson in the careless use of American power. The United States entered, destroyed lives, changed the circumstances, and, when the ship sank, left. Congress ordered President Nixon to stop the bombing on August 15, 1973. Under congressional pressures President Ford terminated the airlift that was bringing supplies to Phnom Penh as the city was near collapse, on April 14, 1975.

  To be an effective bystanders, the United States must maintain friendly relations with other countries. To
maintain our ability to exert influence, we must respect others’ independence and right to choose their ways of life. And we must intervene only when human considerations make this imperative (see Minimalism in the Relations of Nations in Chapter 16).

  Another issue is the behavior of the United States and the world toward Pol Pot and his fellow leaders of “Democratic Cambodia” after their fall from power. The United States and China insisted that the Pol Pot government was the legitimate representative of Cambodia in the United Nations. It was regarded as preferable to the current government of Cambodia created by the Vietnamese. Ever since, the United States and China have supported groups fighting against the Vietnam-backed government. China has been supplying the Khmer Rouge with arms. In 1982 rebel groups led by Son Sann, a former prime minister of Cambodia, and Sihanouk officially joined in a common cause with the Khmer Rouge.

  As Vietnam plans to withdraw from Cambodia, it is a real danger that the Khmer Rouge will regain power. It is the militarily strongest rebel group. Its actions, including its brutal treatment of Cambodians in refugee camps located in Thailand just outside Cambodia, demonstrate its essential continuity.

  The United States has been exerting pressure on Vietnam to withdraw as a condition for normalizing relations between the two countries, without making prior efforts to stop the Khmer Rouge from regaining power. What values guided this U.S. policy? Was it the abstract ideal of freedom or national self-determination, which prevailed over valuing the lives the Khmer Rouge would be likely to destroy? Was it hostility toward Vietnam due to our military defeat by them? Was it antagonism toward the Soviet Union, the supporter of Vietnam?

  As the Vietnamese withdrawal promised for September 1989 nears, fast-moving events offer hope that the Soviets and Chinese will agree on a policy, that the current government of Cambodia will join forces with the ever-present Prince Sihanouk, and that the Khmer Rouge will be stopped from regaining power.

  * * *

  a Sihanouk vacillated in his relationship to the United States; for example, at times he accepted, at other times rejected, aid. This is understandable because he had great need of U.S. economic help but also justifiably mistrusted the U.S. government. Sihanouk was convinced, correctly, that the United States had backed a plot to overthrow him in 1959. He immediately blamed the United States for the November 1963 assassination of Diem, the leader of South Vietnam; he condemned the act as criminal and rejected all U.S. aid to Cambodia.

  14 The disappearances: mass killing in Argentina

  Historical (life) conditions

  I 1930, the Argentine military overthrew the elected president. A long period of political and social instability followed. From then until 1976 only two presidents completed six-year terms; one was Juan Per6n, from 1946 to 1952. All other elected governments were deposed in military coups. There were

  institutional crises, the establishment of irregular or de facto governments, an internal state of war, state of siege and Martial law, attempts at totalitarian or joint rule, changes in the organization of State powers, an abrupt increase in terrorist violence by the extreme left and the extreme right, as a means of armed conflict.1

  Economic difficulties

  The same years saw recurrent economic crises, large disparities in wealth, a decline in workers’ living standards after 1955, and substantial inflation in the years preceding the military takeover of 1976. Per6n was one of the leaders of a military coup in 1943 and became president in 1946. His rule ended with a military coup in 1955. Perón enacted legislation that aimed at social justice and the redistribution of income and he attempted to strengthen the national economy and “national bourgeoisie” (that is the middle class in contrast to the small ruling elite) through government subsides to national industries. At first, combined with increased demand for Argentine argicultural products, this improved economic conditions for large segments of the country.2 However, from the mid-1950s on, the Argentine economy was in a “continuing state of crises and stagnation.”3 Some believe that these economic problems resulted from Per6n’s actions. According to Ronald Dworkin he “created a cult of personality, particularly among workers, by lavish spending that exhausted the huge financial surplus Argentina amassed during the Second World War. He also created a police state, using informers and torturers... .Perón’s (1946-1955) administration prepared the way for the terror described in Nunca Mas.”a4

  Early in the century, Argentines saw their country as cultured and powerful and having great promise, with substantial economic resources. At the end of the Second World War it seemed economically strong, but a precipitous decline followed. In 1945 it was fourth in the world in gold reserves; by 1964 it was twenty-eighth. Its per capita exports were sixth in the world in 1913, thirtieth in 1964; its per capita exports actually declined during that time.5 Rampaging inflation had reached 700 percent by 1976 under Isabel Perón. Economic output was not growing but diminishing.

  Political conflict and violence

  The division between Left and Right became deeper and deeper. Conflicts had long existed between the wealthy oligarchy and the military on the one hand (with the military itself divided) and the working classes and elements of the middle class on the other hand. The military was antagonistic to Per6n because he reduced its influence and offered too much to the working class and its unions. The military also blamed Per6n for economic decline and corruption.

  Perhaps the most direct cause of Perón’s ouster was his conflict with the Catholic church, which had a high status in Argentina guaranteed by the constitution. Both president and vice-president had to be Catholic. Perón strongly attacked the church in response to its opposition to a youth movement created by him. The military and others with strong Catholic and nationalist ties or deep respect for tradition turned against Perón.6

  After Per6n’s exile, the military excluded the powerful Peronist movement from the political process. This made it difficult for the remaining parties to rule effectively. Some of Per6n’s followers moved to the Left, proclaimed “armed struggle,” and began committing terrorist acts. Perón encouraged them from his exile in Spain.

  For most of the postwar era, either the military ruled directly or military men were elected as presidents and ruled with military support. Repression and the exclusion of the people from the political process also contributed to instability. Heavy-handed intervention in the universities and repression under General Ongania (who took power in 1966) helped to radicalize youth.7

  In the relatively brief intervals of genuine civilian rule, military plotting and the instability it generated continued. Crises ensued when the military disagreed with government policies. The inclinations and desires of the military had to be carefully considered by any government if it was to survive. Moreover, civilian political factions sought influence not through elections but by gaining the military’s favor. Civilian governments came to rely on the military to govern. For example, Arturo Frondizi, elected in 1958, the first nonmilitary president since 1943, used the military to put down strikes and had military courts pass sentences on workers who refused to return to their jobs.8

  Supported by the extremes of both Left and Right, Perón came back to power in 1973. From exile he had encouraged leftist violence, but now, facing continued leftist terrorist activity, he sided with the Right and joined in the persecution of the Left. Argentina was in a state of virtual civil war. Leftists kidnapped and publicly executed high-ranking political and military leaders and attacked and bombed broadcasting stations and military posts.9 Extremists of the Right, including police and military personnel, formed death squads and killed leftists.

  The difficult life conditions evoked the motivations that I have described as sources of destructiveness. People felt threatened physically and psychologically. The reaction of military men was especially strong, because their personal and group self-concept, role in society, world view, and ideology were intensely threatened by economic decline, political violence, and social disorganization
.

  Cultural preconditions

  The role of the military in public life

  Argentina gained independence in 1816. After that there were incessant wars among various caudillos (strongmen) in the interior, and until about 1870, fierce battles were fought between centralists, who advocated a centralized state, and federalists, who preferred a flexible federation.10 In the nineteenth century the country was ruled by an oligarchy of landowners. In the twentieth century political reforms resulted in a highly pluralistic many-party system. But none of the parties had enough power to rule. Groups outside the party system, especially unions and the army, increasingly exerted direct influence. The military regarded political instability as both an obligation to correct and an opportunity. It increasingly assumed the role of the dominant party.11

  A guide to political parties of South America states:

  1930 (the overthrow of President Yrigoyen) marked the end of a period of Army indifference to political life which lasted three quarters of a century, and the collapse of the system for electing civilian governments. It is a curious fact that the Army’s progressive elimination of the political parties has taken place almost without a struggle; political leaders have of course openly condemned the military coups but the lack of anything more than a verbal reaction gives rise to the suspicion that most of them have accepted these interventions with equanimity, if not relief.12